Commentary: Divergent-thinking research and the Zeitgeist.

Commentary on an article by P. J. Silvia et al. (see record 2008-05954-001) which discusses the topic of divergent thinking. More than 40 years have passed since the publication of the Wallach and Kogan (1965) volume, and yet it continues to draw both praise and criticism from researchers in the creativity field. The Silvia et al. (2008) article tilts more strongly to criticism than to praise, and accordingly, one of the editors of this journal (JCK) kindly offered me an opportunity to respond. I do so with some hesitancy, as I am no longer an active divergent-thinking (DT) researcher. This gap in active involvement as a DT researcher was not a severe handicap for me in appraising the Silvia et al. (2008) article. Issues of reliability and validity of DT measures--the central concern of that article--have preoccupied investigators ever since Guilford's (1950) original formulation, a preoccupation that I shared. At the outset, I should state that I consider the Silvia et al. (2008) treatment of those fundamental issues to be methodologically sound. My intent in the present commentary, rather, is to demonstrate that the Zeitgeist at the time of the Wallach and Kogan (1965) study was quite different from that prevailing today. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: Reply to Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010).

Comments on an article by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (see record 2010-14834-005). The authors argued (a) that the so-called receiver operating characteristic is nonlinear for data on belief bias in syllogistic reasoning; (b) that their data are inconsistent with Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (see record 2000-02818-008) model of belief bias; (c) that their data are inconsistent with any of the existing accounts of belief bias and only consistent with a theory provided by signal detection theory; and (d) that in fact, belief bias is a response bias effect. In this reply, we present reanalyses of Dube et al.'s data and of old data suggesting (a) that the receiver operating characteristic is linear for binary “valid” versus “invalid” responses, as employed by the bulk of research in this field; (b) that Klauer et al.'s model describes the old data significantly better than does Dube et al.'s model and that it describes Dube et al.'s data somewhat better than does Dube et al.'s model; (c) that Dube et al.'s data are consistent with the account of belief bias by misinterpreted necessity, whereas Dube et al.'s signal detection model does not fit their data; and (d) that belief bias is more than a response bias effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Associative versus contingency accounts of category learning: Reply to Melz, Cheng, Holyoak, and Waldmann (1993).

E. R. Melz et al (see record 1994-24205-001) argue that the partial blocking of cue A that was previously reported (D. R. Shanks; see record 1991-26433-001) when Ss were presented with intermixed AB?→?1, B?→?1 category learning trials is not consistent with the associative Rescorla-Wagner (R-W; 1972) theory analysis that was offered, given that the theory predicts complete blocking at asymptote. However, this claim assumes that Ss were trained to asymptote in these experiments, and there is no reason to believe this was the case. Melz et al further argue that there has been no reported evidence of complete blocking in associative learning tasks, which is incorrect. It is shown that, on the contrary, there is abundant evidence of it. The R-W theory analysis of the results is therefore sound. The results reported were inconsistent with contingency theories as they are normally formulated. Melz et al propose a revised contingency theory which, they argue, can account for data from a range of learning tasks. In particular, they claim that their theory can accommodate the results. It is shown that the theory can be refuted… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The limitations of behavior-genetic analyses: Comment on McGue, Elkins, Walden, and Iacono (2005).

This article takes issue with the behavior-genetic analysis of parenting style presented by M. McGue, I. Elkins, B. Walden, and W. G. Iacono (see record 2005-14938-011). The author argues that the attribution of their findings to inherited genetic effects was without basis because McGue et al. never indicated how those genetic effects manifested themselves. Instead, McGue et al. neglected important, and inevitable, developmental effects that most developmental psychologists understand to influence parent and adolescent behavior. The author also suggests that there is great merit in adopting the approach of developmental systems theory in understanding McGue et al.'s findings in particular and all developmental phenomena in general. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On Broadening the Cognitive, Motivational, and Sociostructural Scope of Theorizing About Gender Development and Functioning: Comment on Martin, Ruble, and Szkrybalo (2002).

In their article on gender development, C. L. Martin, D. N. Ruble, and J. Szkrybalo (see record 2002-18663-003) contrasted their conception of gender development with that of social cognitive theory. The authors of this commentary correct misrepresentations of social cognitive theory and analyze the conceptual and empirical status of Martin et al.'s (2002) theory that gender stereotype matching is the main motivating force of gender development. Martin et al. (2002) based their claim for the causal primacy of gender self-categorization on construal of gender discrimination as rudimentary self-identity, equivocal empirical evidence, and dismissal of discordant evidence because of methodological deficiencies. The repeated finding that gendered preferences and behavior precede emergence of a sense of self is discordant with their theory. Different lines of evidence confirm that gender development and functioning are socially situated, richly contextualized, and conditionally manifested rather than governed mainly by an intrinsic drive to match stereotypic gender self-conception. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When selective adaptation and contrast effects are distinct: A reply to Diehl, Kluender, and Parker.

Two alternative conceptualizations of selective adaptation with speech have recently received attention: the adaptation level theory (AL) outlined by R. L. Diehl (see record 1981-05067-001) and a 2-stage model outlined by the 1st author and P. Jusczyk (see record 1982-00351-001). Diehl et al (see record 1986-05428-001) reported evidence of streaming in selective adaptation and claimed that their results provide a counterdemonstration to recent studies that have argued against the AL approach. It is shown how the Diehl et al results can be accounted for by both the 2-stage model and AL theory. Results are presented from a study with 74 undergraduates that compared adaptation and paired-comparison procedures. These results are precisely as predicted by the 2-stage model, but they cannot be accounted for by AL theory. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attachment, culture, and amae.

Comments on the article by F. Rothbaum et al (see record 2000-02781-001), which highlighted evidence of cultural variations in, and noted ways in which attachment theory is laden with Western values and meaning in comparisons of the US and Japan. According to the present author, the evidence and conclusions of Rothbaum et al are flawed. The main critique of the universality of attachment theory offered by Rothbaum et al pertained to cultural differences in how Western and Japanese children use the secure base. In the West, secure attachment is commonly believed to promote exploration. However, the present author points out that Rothbaum et al argued that for Japanese children "the major link is with dependence, and adaptation primarily refers to accommodation, avoidance of loss, fitting in with others, and ultimately loyalty and interdependence". According to the present author, this argument is unsupported by empirical studies, and while being advanced as a challenge to the universalistic core of attachment theory, Rothbaum et al subsequently argued that in Japan, secure attachment leads not to exploration but to amae (dependence). Much empirical work needs to be conducted before Rothbaum et al's proposed link between secure attachment and dependency can be evaluated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What would be if what is wasn't? Rejoinder to Judiesch, Schmidt, and Hunter (1993).

In their critique of the N. S. Raju et al (1990) utility model, M. K. Judiesch et al (see record 1994-19598-001) claimed that Raju et al simply shifted the problem from one of estimating the standard deviation of the dollar-valued performance (Y) to that of estimating the coefficient of variation (?–iY–n/μ–iY–n). In showing the inaccuracy of this claim, the authors demonstrate that the Judiesch et al misunderstandings of the underlying assumptions of the Raju et al model have led to their misinterpretations. Furthermore, the authors refute the contentions of Judiesch et al that (1) the A parameter in the Raju et al model is equal to average employee value and (2) it is appropriate to correct the validity coefficient for criterion unreliability when conducting a utility analysis. A more detailed discussion of the issues relating to transforming the original performance scale is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Insufficient evidence.

Comments on the article by F. Rothbaum et al (see record 2000-02781-001), which highlighted evidence of cultural variations in, and noted ways in which attachment theory is laden with Western values and meaning in comparisons of the US and Japan. According to the present author, the Rothbaum et al study is particularly important to Japanese investigators, as the validity of attachment theory has sometimes been taken for granted too easily in Japan. Unfortunately, however, Rothbaum et al overlooked important empirical results that clarify the validity of attachment theory in Japanese samples. The present author contends that Rothbaum et al misunderstood or distorted the meanings of measures that are usually applied in attachment studies, and thus the arguments offered by Rothbaum et al resulted in a superficial critique of the cross-cultural validity of attachment theory. As a result of their failure to present empirical evidence to refute cross-cultural validity in attachment theory, Rothbaum et al did not provide any important challenge to researchers in Japan. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commentary: Reliability and validity of uniqueness scoring in creativity assessment.

Commentary on an article by P. J. Silvia et al. (see record 2008-05954-001) which discusses the topic of divergent thinking. In Study 1, Silvia et al. (2008) criticized the uniqueness scoring of Wallach and Kogan (1965). The uniqueness scoring has a virtue that single rater may be enough to rate, and it is characterized by the assignment of points to uncommon responses in a pool of sample's responses. The first criticism for uniqueness scoring is that uniqueness scores increase as a subject produces more responses, resulting in confounding of uniqueness and fluency. The second criticism relates to the ambiguity of statistical rarity pursued by uniqueness scoring in that uniqueness does not guarantee creativity. When a mundane unique response is misperceived as creative, reliability is threatened. Some bizarre, grotesque, or inappropriate responses in the pool of responses may be assigned a point, causing the validity to be threatened. The third criticism raised by the authors is that the uniqueness scoring system penalizes large samples in that it is less probable for a response in a larger sample of people to appear unique. However, the subjective scoring system has other deficits and is never free from the first two criticisms. The third criticism is, however unfounded; rather, the uniqueness scoring system is in a better position to capture the construct of creativity through better accessibility to large samples. The authors' (Silvia et al., 2008) three criticisms will be discussed one by one. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The contextual change paradox is still unresolved: Comment on Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (1999).

According to the contextual change theory of memory loss, spontaneous forgetting reflects a retrieval impairment due to subtle and unprogrammed shifts in environmental cues over a retention interval. However, Riccio, Richardson, and Ebner (1984) noted an apparent paradox in this model; specifically, laboratory studies inducing explicit shifts in contextual cues found less disruption of performance as retention intervals increased. Bouton, Nelson, and Rosas (see record 1999-10106-001) critiqued several of the claims made by Riccio et al. and concluded that the contextual cue theory is still a valid account of spontaneous forgetting. In this comment, the authors address the 3 major criticisms offered by Bouton et al., point out an inconsistency in their argument, and conclude that the original paradox still poses problems for the contextual change theory of forgetting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More on the repressed memory debate: A reply to Alpert, Brown, and Courtois (1998).

Replies to comments by J. L. Alpert et al (see record 2000-13581-006), which were made in response to the original article by P. A. Ornstein et al (see record 2000-13581-005) on adult recollections of childhood abuse. Ornstein et al suggest that the Alpert et al rebuttal of their article betrayed the same set of problems that riddled the original position paper by Alpert et al (see record 2000-13581-002), which presented the report by the American Psychological Association Working Group on Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse. They address 3 of the major arguments by Alpert et al—inappropriate selectivity in reviewing the literature, the idea that suggestibility is confined to peripheral events, and the idea that laboratory research has limited relevance for the issues under discussion—and then turn to several miscellaneous points that were raised. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang.

D. P. O'Brien et al (see record 1995-08272-001) argue that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning is easy to refute, and they report 3 experiments that they believe falsify the theory. In contrast, L. Bonatti (see record 1995-08253-001) argues that the model theory is too flexible to be falsified. It is shown that the experiments by O'Brien et al do not refute the model theory and that Bonatti's claims are ill founded. Formal rule theories of propositional reasoning have 3 major weaknesses in comparison with the model theory: (1) They have no decision procedure; (2) they lack predictive power, providing no account of several robust phenomena (e.g., erroneous conclusions tend to be consistent with the premises); and (3) as a class of theories, they are difficult to refute experimentally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Two types of psychologists: Remarks on the Mendelsohn, Weiss, and Feimer contribution.

Argues that G. A. Mendelsohn et al (see record 1983-00168-001) (1) demolished a straw man of their own construction—that J. Block et al (1973) did not seek to create a typology nor did they offer one, (2) were unable to recover via their preferred analytic approach crucial and dependable findings manifested via the Block et al approach, and (3) did not confront the issue they claimed to have addressed: whether, in the realm of personality psychology, a typological approach can offer conceptual and empirical advantages over the undifferentiated approach to analysis that has been dominant in American psychology. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Beyond the hedonic treadmill: Revising the adaptation theory of well-being": Comment on Diener, Lucas, and Scollon (2006).

Comments on the article by E. Diener, R. E. Lucas, and C. N. Scollon (see record 2006-05893-003) which cited a study by Tellegen et al. in which the Well-Being scale of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ), administered to 44 pairs of monozygotic reared-apart (MZA) twins, yielded a within-pair correlation of .48. I contend that, in their subsequent proposed changes to subjective well-being (SWB) theory, Diener et al. failed to incorporate the implications of this heritability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Plausible models of alphabetic search: Reply to Scharroo, Leeuwenberg, Stalmeier, and Vos (1994).

D. Klahr et al (see record 1984-05777-001) proposed a model of the cognitive processes involved in alphabetic retrieval in terms of a 2-level hierarchy of forward-linked associations. J. Scharroo et al (see record 1994-24216-001) attempt to demonstrate that a simple associative model is more plausible, more parsimonious, and a better fit to the data than is the Klahr et al model. In this commentary the author argues that Scharroo et al misrepresent the way in which Klahr et al evaluated their model and that they fail to demonstrate the superiority of a simple associative model. In addition, it is suggested that a composite model that integrates the distinctive features of both models would advance understanding of the process of alphabetic retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus-feedback feeding sequence: Reply to Ellins, von Kluge, and Cramer (1990).

Taste-potentiated noise aversions have been demonstrated in rats (S. R. Ellins et al, Ellins and S. von Kluge, and M. D. Holder et al; see PA, Vols 73:3082, 74:24095, and 75:28622, respectively). However, these aversions are apparently less readily established than taste-potentiated odor aversions suggesting that all exteroceptive stimuli are not equally well potentiated by taste (Holder et al). Despite the claims of Ellins, von Kluge, and R. E. Cramer (see record 1990-19032-001), we replicated their findings and see no inconsistency between our findings and theirs. Both sets of results are explained by a common theory of conditioning (J. Garcia, 1989; Garcia & Holder, 1985). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

List-strength and list-length effects: Reply to Shiffrin, Ratcliff, Murnane, and Nobel (1993).

R. M. Shiffrin et al (see record 1994-24299-001) claimed that the theory of distributed associative memory (TODAM) is unable simultaneously to predict an absent (or negative) list-strength effect (LSE) and a positive list-length effect (LLE). However, Shiffrin et al failed to distinguish between situations in which lag (i.e., number of items intervening between study and test) is controlled and situations in which it is not. The authors stand by their previous conclusion: TODAM can explain why there is little or no LSE when at the same time there is an LLE when the LLE is studied under the standard conditions. It is argued that there are no published studies where lag has been controlled. However, this simplified version of TODAM cannot explain an LLE when a scoring window is used. Whether such a result would be inconsistent with a more complete version of TODAM remains to be seen. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the pursuit of sound science for the betterment of the American Indian community: Reply to Beals et al. (2009).

The authors of this reply argue that ongoing criticism of existing theories, the development of alternative theories, and empirical theory tests offer the best chance for advancing American Indian research. The authors therefore note their appreciation for the comments of J. Beals et al. (see record 2009-02580-012). The authors nevertheless disagree with many of the specific claims of Beals et al., noting that in their original article (see record 2007-06095-002), (a) the characterization of the existing literature on reservation-dwelling American Indian drinking was accurate; (b) no argument made by Beals et al. undermines their theoretical contention that there is a relative lack of contingency between access to basic life reinforcers and sobriety on many reservations; (c) the theory was developed in a responsible manner, specifically by a reservation-tied American Indian, and was reviewed by a reservation leadership team, a cultural consultant, and reviewers for this journal, at least one of whom consulted leaders of other reservations; and (d) the theory was based on previous interdisciplinary theory development. The authors encourage the development and testing of new, alternative theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)