Utility-cogenerator game for pricing power sales and wheeling fees

The authors have studied an extensive game model of an electricity market where a cogenerator sells excess electricity to an electric utility or to an end user. They found that a buy-back system (the utility purchases cogenerated power) is as efficient as a cogenerator-customer wheeling system and that these two systems are more desirable than a monopoly system for the regulator. The buy-back rate should be equal to (LP bargaining solution) or less than (Nash bargaining solution) the marginal cost of the electric utility. They also conducted an analysis of a two-period electricity market in which they found that the cogenerator that can supply excess power during peak period obtains the market advantage     

基于主从博弈的新型城镇配电系统产消者竞价策略

随着能源互联技术的发展以及售电侧市场的逐步放开,新型城镇配电系统在优化运行和交易模式上呈现多能协同、交易开放的特征。新型城镇配电系统的电力零售交易机制被重新定义,产消者通过非合作竞争上报最优竞标曲线获取最大售电收益,电网公共服务企业收取过网费并提供保底供电服务,用户可基于实时电价与激励政策参与需求响应降低用电成本。在此背景下,充分考虑配电网内多角色的主动参与以及运营商的经济调度要求,建立一种基于主从动态博弈理论的产消者非合作竞价双层模型。以改进的IEEE 33节点配电网为算例,采用改进粒子群优化算法与CPLEX求解器相结合的方法,求得该主从博弈模型的均衡解。仿真结果表明,该策略可以在保证电网公共服务企业和用户利益基础上实现产消者利润最大化,为新型城镇电力零售市场的交易模式提供参考。     

Operation and economy of a refuse‐fired generating system with electricity wheeling service

Electric power markets have been partially liberalized and liberalization will be proceeding steadily. On the other hand, refuse‐fired generating systems (RGS) are constructed in many municipal corporations as on‐site power sources. This paper discusses the operation of an RGS which can transfer its excess energy to consumers through the electricity wheeling service of the electric utility. The RGS is operated by the dynamic programming method under the constraints of RGS operation and electricity wheeling service. In the DP method, the estimation function is the annual total electricity charge of both the RGS and the consumers, and the control variable is the residual amount in the refuse pit. A university, hospitals, welfare apartment houses, and their combinations are selected as consumers. The main results obtained are as follows: (1) electricity wheeling service is more economical than the absence of electricity wheeling service when the annual demand of the consumer is higher than 70% of the excess energy of RGS; (2) it is more economical as the load factor increases if the annual demand is the same; (3) the most economical consumer is the combination of four hospitals and five welfare apartment houses, for which the total electricity charge can be reduced to 84% of that in the absence of wheeling service. It is concluded that the total electricity charge of the RGS with electricity wheeling service could be decreased considerably by selecting the consumers appropriately. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Electr Eng Jpn, 146(1): 59–69, 2004; Published online in Wiley InterScience ( www.interscience.wiley.com ). DOI 10.1002/eej.10211     

电力市场下的可中断负荷管理及其方法

为实现电力资源在电力市场下的有效配置和社会福利的最大化，主要从电价、机制和合约3个角度为电力市场下可中断负荷管理提供解决方法。根据可避免成本设计可中断电价，运用机制设计理论设计博奕规则，利用金融衍生工具设计合约形式，为电力公司在电力市场下进行可中断负荷管理提供了有利力的依据和指导价值，为电力市场下电网的安全经济运行服务。     

Pricing and operation in deregulated electricity market by noncooperative game

Pricing structure is becoming considerably important for both electric utility industries and their customers. This paper derives an operation rule for a market model with an electric utility and independent power producers (IPPs) as players of the noncooperative game. The derived operation rules reflecting the competition can be viewed as an extension of the conventional equalizing incremental cost method for the deregulated power systems. As indicated in this paper, the prices of electricity for purchases and sales are equal to the incremental costs of the generators of IPPs but are generally cheaper than the incremental cost of the generators belonging to the utility. To examine the proposed approach, several systems are used as the demonstrated examples in this paper.     

简易当量电价法的解析表达及发电厂商古诺博弈行为初探

将基本的简易当量电价法作解析表达，其中考虑了二次供应函数的参数报价，实际的电力市场往往更接近于寡头市场，发电厂商可以通过策略性的报价获得超额利润。在简易当量电价法体制下，研究了发电厂商报价的寡头古诺博弈模型及其算法，即发电厂商通过持留发电容量，抬高电价，获取超额利润。采用两层优化模型，上层是电力市场定价模型，下层是发电厂商利润最大化，在求双寡头古诺博弈均衡点时，采用了网格搜索算法和反应曲线法，进一步讨论了该博弈行为对系统的影响，给出了说明性算例，算例表明电力市场中发电厂商的博弈行为会造成电价上升，其中寡头勾结的情况造成的危害最大。     

区域配电网内分布式电源和负载联盟交易模式设计和分析

分布式电源和负载可在配电侧形成电能供给和消费的联盟,并参与区域电力市场交易。相比于单独进行交易,这样的联盟通过帮助市场能力较弱的分布式电源和负载参与到配电网市场中,推动配电网中的中小型负载和分布式电源之间的直购电业务的发展,促进配电网侧的电力市场形成;同时利用市场信号引导分布式电源和负载的电能生产和消费过程,使得它们获得更多的经济利益,促进分布式可再生能源的发展。文中给出了区域配电网中联盟交易模式的存在条件,并且基于公用电网的作用和合作博弈理论,建立了相应的交易价格模型。进一步,以集成售电商的收益为优化目标,构建了联盟选择和定价的优化决策模型。仿真算例说明了联盟交易模式的理论可行性,证明了在不同运行场景中所提优化决策模型的有效性。     

Wheeling charge under a deregulated environment

Today's electric power industry is undergoing many fundamental changes due to the process of deregulation. Traditionally, electric power systems in many countries were structured in a single vertically integrated company for providing electric power to their customers based on cost of service. However, a number of countries have implemented or are implementing a free market deregulated industry in recent years. It is strongly believed that deregulation will have profound and important implications on technology within the electric power industry and the operation of industrial systems. Therefore, industrial sectors need to reevaluate potential impacts and strategies of operation under a deregulated environment. One of the most exciting opportunities for the customer is the implementation of wholesale and retail wheeling. With this change, customers will have the option to purchase services and energy from different sources. However, before exercising this right, one has to understand the possible costs and risks associated with this right. From the economic point of view, lower energy cost does not necessarily mean lower utility cost. The cost of wheeling charges and other factors have to be figured into the calculation. Since it is impossible to color the electron, there is no standard formula to calculate wheeling charges within the utility industry. This paper discusses several commonly used wheeling calculation methods used by utility companies. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the vector absolute mega-watt mile method that is used by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas     

基于古诺模型的发电商竞价策略分析

着重探讨了在电力市场环境下 ,按照“网厂分开、竞价上网”的原则 ,发电商如何制定竞价策略的问题。采用经济学上的古诺模型 ,在考虑发电商向电力公司支付过网电量过网费的情况下 ,用博弈的方法分析了发电商的最优发电量和最大利润等等 ,并讨论了过网费对发电商制定最优策略的影响。     

区域电力市场考核结算新方法

随着电力市场规模的不断扩大,市场主体和合同种类增加、转运增多,导致区域电力市场的考核结算问题变得异常复杂。为解决这一问题,文中基于"解耦"的基本思路,提出了"电网结算和电厂结算分离的分层结算思路"、"电量考核与运行考核分离"、"合同电量与偏差电量分别结算"等考核结算新思路,有效解决了区域电力市场考核结算机制日趋复杂化的问题。该新结算思路已经在南方电力市场中得到应用。实践表明,该方法可以保障市场结算的透明和公平性,并有效解决南方电力市场中竞争电量与非竞争电量并存、西电东送等问题。     

基于多主体主从博弈的负荷聚合商经济优化模型

在未来电力市场环境下,针对具有不同利益诉求的主体实现经济优化调度问题,基于电价型需求响应与主从博弈,提出了以负荷聚合商经济效益最大、电动汽车与空调各自用电成本最低、分布式电源运营商经济效益最大为目标的经济优化模型。通过优化负荷聚合商发布的电价信息、调整电动汽车与空调各自用电策略以及改变分布式电源运营商售电策略实现纳什均衡。利用仿真验证了所提模型在优化各主体经济性的同时能有效降低负荷峰谷差,提高新能源利用率。     

含分布式电源接入的市场多主体博弈分析

研究能源互联网发展背景下含有分布式电源(distributed generation, DG)接入的电力市场中的多主体博弈问题。首先,利用多代理(multi-agents)技术,在由发电商、供电商与多类型用户组成的市场中,搭建了多主体博弈框架。其次,针对该框架下的市场各主体特点,分别采用统一市场出清价格(market clearing price, MCP)和按报价支付(pay as bid, PAB)的市场机制,构建了最优供应函数决策模型、最优投标电价决策模型以及考虑投标风险的最优投标电量决策模型。并且,基于效用函数,考虑弹性负荷(具有分布式发电或可中断能力)用户的购售能力,建立了最优购电和最优DG发电量决策模型。最终,实现了市场各博弈主体的利益均衡化目的。仿真结果表明,基于多代理技术的博弈能实现市场各主体的合理收益,不同主体组合的市场博弈结果存在较明显差异。充分挖掘弹性负荷调节能力可有效提高分布式清洁能源发电渗透率。以上结果符合工程实际与设计需求,验证了所提模型的合理性与有效性。     

电力竞价上网智能决策支持系统

根据电厂竞价上网的特点,基于大系统控制论思想,采用人工智能技术和博弈论方法建立了电力市场发电侧的电力竞价上网智能决策支持系统。采用数学模型方法建立发电成本计算模型;采用数学模型与知识模型相结合的方法建立发电成本构成分析与优化模型;采用3层前馈人工神经网络建立网上电价预测模型,用遗传算法确定网络连接权,以优化神经网络模型的学习过程;采用博弈论方法建立上网电力报价模型。在建立这些模型的同时,需要构建相应的数据库和知识库系统,如企业生产与管理数据库系统、生产优化知识库系统和电网数据库系统等。     

电力零售市场研究:（三）电力零售市场的合同

在电力零售市场上，合同是用户和电力供应商之间权利义务的具体体现。文中首先分析了电力零售转运的一般过程，阐明了电费的构成，对垄断市场下和电力零售市场下用户电费单的变化进行了说明；然后研究了电力零售合同的3种类型及其主要内容，为电力零售市场上的合同签订和电费谈判奠定了基础。     

多区域互联电力系统输送服务边际电价的实现和分析

在电力工业中,按参与转运的电力公司和其他电力公司（电力交易方）在地域上的关系可以划分为不同的转运类型：区域内部,母线到母线;区域间,区域到区域;区域间,区域到母线;区域间,母线到区域;区域间,母线到母线。在一个多区域互联电力系统中,一个区域的有功/无功的边际转运成本是系统中电力交易买卖双方的功率变换变化一个单位时引起的该区域内运行成本的变化。每一个转运区域的边际转运成本是用多区域最优潮流模型基于最优发电调度计算得到的。应用每个区域的发电成本对母线功率需求变化和功率交换水平变化的信息,可以计算不同类型的电力交易的边际转运成本。文中通过一个有16条母线和４个互联区域的系统来分析和运用所提方法,并讨论了负荷水平和交换功率水平变化对边际转运价格的影响。     

小议电力市场的建立及发展

分析我国电力市场体系的基本形势。阐述了特许权投标模式、发电侧竞争性投标、趸售或零售转供、强制或者自愿型电力库的利弊,提出建立区域性竞争型的电力市场,有效地推进了电力市场的发展和进步。     

基于非合作博弈的独立售电公司最优规划方法

随着电力体制改革持续推进,电力市场进一步开放,新增售电主体接入配电网,在丰富配电侧可调配资源的同时增大了规划难度。为了指导独立售电公司合理参与配电网建设,形成良好的市场环境,提出一种基于非合作博弈的最优规划方法,以确定售电公司发电设备的投资方案。首先,提出独立售电公司综合运营策略及模型;然后,基于完全信息非合作静态博弈,以独立售电公司的综合收益作为各主体的优化目标,建立非合作博弈模型;最后,研究非合作静态博弈流程,为了求解复杂的混合整数非线性模型,采用二阶锥松弛方法将模型转化为混合整数二阶锥规划问题,提出基于数学优化的迭代搜索算法用以求解所提模型的Nash均衡解。以IEEE 33节点系统为例,仿真结果表明了所提模型的合理性与算法的有效性。     

电力市场中效用风险指标及其决策模型的研究

电力市场条件下的可靠性问题已经引起人们的广泛关注,尤其是如何提供有效的手段保障市场条件下系统运行可靠性和经济性的协调发展。文中针对上述问题,提出了电力系统元件的效用风险指标的基本概念和计算方法。该指标考察了电力系统元件故障前后全社会福利的变化值,并将其与电力系统元件的物理可靠性结合起来．形成了一个可以同时评估系统元件可靠性和经济性的新方法,从而为电力市场条件下的电力系统可靠性研究提供了一条崭新的思路。为了验证所提出的理念,文中基于经过简化的电力市场模式．构造了新型的考虑效用风险指标的购电决策模型,并给出了求解过程。算例分析验证了文中提出的理念的可行性和合理性。     

考虑电动汽车群和新增实体的电力市场多方交易策略研究

目前,电力市场在新增实体和大规模电动汽车并网的影响下,交易主体呈现多元化的趋势。以博弈理论为基础,通过实验计算模拟的方式分析了电力市场的交易方式及策略选择的新形态。首先考虑了地理位置、收益及系统网损等因素,建立了电动汽车群、新增实体和电网公司多方动态非合作博弈模型。以6个新增实体和2个电动汽车群为例,采用协同进化遗传算法求解其纳什均衡解。通过算例模拟分析,验证了所提方法的合理有效性。该研究为分析电动汽车群和新增实体对电力市场多方交易决策的影响提供理论参考。