Whose standard is it,anyway? How the tobacco industry determines the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards for tobacco and tobacco products

OBJECTIVE: To describe the extent of the tobacco industry involvement in establishing international standards for tobacco and tobacco products and the industry influence on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents made public as part of the settlement of the Minnesota Tobacco Trial and the Master Settlement Agreement. Search words included "ISO", "CORESTA", "Barclay", "compensation and machine smoking", "tar and nicotine deliveries", and the name of key players, in different combinations. RESULTS: It is clear that the tobacco industry, through the Cooperation Centre for Scientific Research Relative to Tobacco (CORESTA), play a major role in determining the scientific evidence and suggesting the standards that are eventually adopted as international standards for tobacco and tobacco products in several areas, including the measurement of cigarette tar and nicotine yield. CONCLUSIONS: ISO's tobacco and tobacco products standards are not adequate to guide tobacco products regulatory policies, and no health claims can be made based on ISO's tobacco products standards. There is an urgent need for tobacco control advocates and groups worldwide to be more involved with the work of the ISO, both directly and through their national standardisation organisations.     

Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry used the "accommodation" message to mount an aggressive and effective worldwide campaign to recruit hospitality associations, such as restaurant associations, to serve as the tobacco industry's surrogate in fighting against smoke-free environments. METHODS: We analysed tobacco industry documents publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA. Documents were accessed between January and November 2001. RESULTS: The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, made financial contributions to existing hospitality associations or, when it did not find an association willing to work for tobacco interests, created its own "association" in order to prevent the growth of smoke-free environments. The industry also used hospitality associations as a vehicle for programmes promoting "accommodation" of smokers and non-smokers, which ignore the health risks of second hand smoke for employees and patrons of hospitality venues. CONCLUSION: Through the myth of lost profits, the tobacco industry has fooled the hospitality industry into embracing expensive ventilation equipment, while in reality 100% smoke-free laws have been shown to have no effect on business revenues, or even to improve them. The tobacco industry has effectively turned the hospitality industry into its de facto lobbying arm on clean indoor air. Public health advocates need to understand that, with rare exceptions, when they talk to organised restaurant associations they are effectively talking to the tobacco industry and must act accordingly.     

Tobacco industry consumer research on socially acceptable cigarettes

Objective: To describe tobacco industry consumer research to inform the development of more "socially acceptable" cigarette products since the 1970s. Methods: Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents. Results: 28 projects to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes were identified from Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, British American Tobacco, and Lorillard tobacco companies. Consumer research and concept testing consistently demonstrated that many smokers feel strong social pressure not to smoke, and this pressure increased with exposure to smoking restrictions. Tobacco companies attempted to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes with less visible sidestream smoke or less odour. When presented in theory, these product concepts were very attractive to important segments of the smoking population. However, almost every product developed was unacceptable in actual product tests or test markets. Smokers reported the complete elimination of secondhand smoke was necessary to satisfy non-smokers. Smokers have also been generally unwilling to sacrifice their own smoking satisfaction for the benefit of others. Many smokers prefer smoke-free environments to cigarettes that produce less secondhand smoke. Conclusions: Concerns about secondhand smoke and clean indoor air policies have a powerful effect on the social acceptability of smoking. Historically, the tobacco industry has been unable to counter these effects by developing more socially acceptable cigarettes. These data suggest that educating smokers about the health dangers of secondhand smoke and promoting clean indoor air policies has been difficult for the tobacco industry to counter with new products, and that every effort should be made to pursue these strategies.     

Tobacco industry success in preventing regulation of secondhand smoke in Latin America: the "Latin Project"

OBJECTIVE: To examine the tobacco industry's strategy to avoid regulations on secondhand smoke exposure in Latin America. METHODS: Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available through the internet. All available materials, including confidential reports regarding research, lobbying, and internal memoranda exchanged between the tobacco industry representatives, tobacco industry lawyers, and key players in Latin America. RESULTS: In Latin America, Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco, working through the law firm Covington & Burling, developed a network of well placed physicians and scientists through their "Latin Project" to generate scientific arguments minimising secondhand smoke as a health hazard, produce low estimates of exposure, and to lobby against smoke-free workplaces and public places. The tobacco industry's role was not disclosed. CONCLUSIONS: The strategies used by the industry have been successful in hindering development of public health programmes on secondhand smoke. Latin American health professionals need to be aware of this industry involvement and must take steps to counter it to halt the tobacco epidemic in Latin America.     

British Columbia capital regional district 100% smokefree bylaw: a successful public health campaign despite industry opposition

Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it. Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research. Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement. Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.     

The Living Tomorrow Project: how Philip Morris has used a Belgian tourist attraction to promote ventilation approaches to the control of second hand smoke

Study objective: To examine the involvement of Philip Morris in Living Tomorrow 2 and determine the rationale behind its involvement.

Design: Research was conducted through a web based search of internal tobacco industry documents made publicly available through litigation.

Main results: For approximately €1 000 000 Philip Morris (now Altria) became a co-initiator of Living Tomorrow 2, a tourist complex in Belgium that aims to demonstrate how we will be living in the future. In addition to promoting the company and its grocery products, Philip Morris is using the complex and its website to promote ventilation as a means of accommodating smokers and non-smokers in the indoor environment. Particular emphasis was placed on the bar and restaurant areas. Despite the rationale for its involvement, Philip Morris fails to acknowledge its role as a cigarette manufacturer. As a form of corporate sponsorship Philip Morris thought its involvement could evade any European tobacco advertising ban.

Conclusions: Philip Morris is using a tourist attraction to promote its views on control of second hand smoke (SHS) and accommodation of smokers and non-smokers in the indoor environment. However, ventilation does not deal with the health effects of SHS. Policymakers must be cognisant of the devious tactics the industry employs to promote its own agenda, especially in relation to indoor air quality and smoking in public places. Tobacco control legislation should be continually modified and strengthened in response to the changing activities of the tobacco industry as it strives to evade existing legislation and deter the advent of new legislation.

     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Courtesy and the challenges of implementing smoke-free policies in Japan.

For decades, the tobacco companies have developed a worldwide campaign to oppose the creation of smoke-free environments. Public health efforts to promote clean indoor air have been uneven throughout the world, and in few places have such efforts faced as many challenges as in Japan. The Japanese market is dominated by Japan Tobacco, which is partly owned by the government, and Philip Morris International is also present in Japan. Japan Tobacco and Philip Morris International have developed campaigns promoting courtesy and tolerance that, until recently, seem to have resonated well with the public. The companies also have supported research promoting ventilation and have funded consultants to act as experts in the area of second-hand smoke exposure. Japan is a critical country to study, partly because of the strength of Japan Tobacco in the country and the growth of Japan Tobacco International in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, and partly because of Japan's ratification of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to provide an overview of the tobacco industry's scientific and political efforts to stifle the development of clean indoor measures in Japan. Learning past industry strategies may assist policymakers and advocates in the development of future public health activities.     

Print media coverage of California's smokefree bar law

OBJECTIVE: To assess the print media coverage of California's smokefree bar law in the state of California. DESIGN: Content analysis of newspaper, trade journal, and magazine items. SUBJECTS: Items regarding the smokefree bar law published seven months before and one year following the implementation of the smokefree bar law (June 1997 to December 1998). Items consisted of news articles (n = 446), opinion editorials (n = 31), editorials (n = 104), letters to the editor (n = 240), and cartoons (n = 10). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Number and timing of publication of items, presence of tobacco industry arguments or public health arguments regarding law, positive, negative, and neutral views of opinion items published. RESULTS: 53% of items published concerning the smokefree bar law were news articles, 47% were opinion items. 45% of items regarding the smokefree bar law were published during the first month of implementation. The tobacco industry dominated coverage in most categories (economics, choice, enforcement, ventilation, legislation, individual quotes), except for categories public health used the most frequently (government role, tactics, organisational quotes). Anti-law editorials and letters to the editor were published more than pro-law editorials and letters. Region of the state, paper size, presence of local clean indoor air legislation, and voting on tobacco related ballot initiatives did not have an impact on the presence of opinion items. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco industry succeeded in obtaining more coverage of the smokefree bar law, both in news items and opinion items. The tobacco industry used historical arguments of restricting freedom of choice and economic ramifications in fighting the smokefree bar law, while public health groups focused on the worker protection issue, and exposed tobacco industry tactics. Despite the skewed coverage, public health groups obtained adequate attention to their arguments to keep the law in effect.     

From adversary to target market: the ACT-UP boycott of Philip Morris

Background: In 1990, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) sparked a year long boycott of Philip Morris's Marlboro cigarettes and Miller beer. The boycott protested the company's support of Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), a leading opponent of AIDS funding and civil rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people. ACT-UP demanded that Philip Morris sever its ties with Helms and acknowledge its responsibility to the LGBT community and to people with AIDS.

Objective: To assess the impact of the boycott on the LGBT community, the tobacco industry, and the tobacco control movement; and to determine what lessons tobacco control advocates can extract from this case.

Data sources: Internal tobacco industry documents and newspaper archives.

Methods: Search of tobacco industry documents websites using "boycott", "ACT-UP", "gay", and other terms.

Results: Philip Morris used the boycott to its own advantage. It exploited differences within the community and settled the boycott by pledging large donations to combat AIDS. Through corporate philanthropy, Philip Morris gained entrée to the LGBT market without appearing gay friendly. Many LGBT organisations, thirsty for recognition and funding from mainstream corporations, welcomed Philip Morris's overtures without considering the health hazards of tobacco.

Conclusions: Unless the goal of a boycott is to convince the tobacco industry to abandon tobacco altogether, such actions invite the industry to expand its marketing under the guise of philanthropy. Tobacco control advocates should be clear about goals and acceptable settlement terms before participating in a boycott of a tobacco company.

     

The limits of competing interest disclosures

Objective: To assess the effectiveness of conflict of interest disclosure policies by comparing a competing interests disclosure statement that met the requirements established by the journal in a 2003 article on health effects of secondhand smoke based on the American Cancer Society CPS-I dataset with internal tobacco industry documents describing financial ties between the tobacco industry and authors of the study.     

Endotoxins in tobacco smoke: shifting tobacco industry positions.

In the 1980s, the tobacco industry started a campaign to divert attention away from secondhand tobacco smoke (SHS) as a major source of indoor air pollution in workplaces by highlighting the roles of other indoor air pollutants. The industry, working through "third parties," highlighted endotoxins, naturally occurring substances that cause numerous inflammatory reactions in humans, as an alternative explanation to SHS as causing indoor air problems. In 1995, Hasday and colleagues were the first to present findings that cigarette smoke contains significant quantities of endotoxins. This discovery surprised tobacco industry scientists. The 1999 publication of the full Hasday et al. findings received only limited media attention but got the full attention of Philip Morris scientists concerned about a new public health issue and a new basis for regulation of workplace smoking by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which already regulated workplace endotoxin exposures from other sources. Philip Morris undertook an internal endotoxin research project to test the Hasday et al. findings and to determine if endotoxin-free cigarettes were possible. Although experiments were conducted to remove endotoxin from the tobacco, there is no evidence that they were successful. Following confirmation of SHS as an important source of endotoxins, the scientist promoting endotoxins as an important indoor air pollutant for the tobacco industry softened his position on the role of endotoxins as indoor pollutants. The presence of endotoxins in SHS provides an additional mechanism for the adverse effects of SHS that should be researched further, and the risk of exposure should be assessed.     

German tobacco industry's successful efforts to maintain scientific and political respectability to prevent regulation of secondhand smoke

Objective

To examine the tactics the tobacco industry in Germany used to avoid regulation of secondhand smoke exposure and to maintain the acceptance of public smoking.

Methods

Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available on the internet between June 2003 and August 2004.

Results

In West Germany, policymakers were, as early as the mid 1970s, well aware of the fact that secondhand smoke endangers non‐smokers. One might have assumed that Germany, an international leader in environmental protection, would have led in protecting her citizens against secondhand smoke pollution. The tobacco manufacturers in Germany, however, represented by the national manufacturing organisation “Verband” (Verband der Cigarettenindustrie), contained and neutralised the early debate about the danger of secondhand smoke. This success was achieved by carefully planned collaboration with selected scientists, health professionals and policymakers, along with a sophisticated public relations programme.

Conclusions

The strategies of the tobacco industry have been largely successful in inhibiting the regulation of secondhand smoke in Germany. Policymakers, health professionals, the media and the general public should be aware of this industry involvement and should take appropriate steps to close the gap between what is known and what is done about the health effects of secondhand smoke.     

From strange bedfellows to natural allies: the shifting allegiance of fire service organisations in the push for federal fire-safe cigarette legislation

Background: Cigarettes are the leading cause of fatal fires in the USA and are associated with one in four fire deaths. Although the technology needed to make fire-safe cigarettes has been available for many years, progress has been slow on legislative and regulatory fronts to require the tobacco industry to manufacture fire-safe cigarettes. Method and results: We conducted a case study, drawing on data from tobacco industry documents, archives, and key informant interviews to investigate tobacco industry strategies for thwarting fire-safe cigarette legislation in the US Congress. We apply a theoretical framework that posits that policymaking is the product of three sets of forces: interests, institutions, and ideas, to examine tobacco industry behaviour, with a special focus on their and others'' attempts to court fire service organisations, including firefighters'' unions as allies. We discuss the implications of our findings for future policy efforts related to fire-safe cigarettes and other tobacco control issues. Conclusions: Tobacco control advocates ought to: continue efforts to align key interest groups, including the firefighters unions; contest tobacco industry "diversionary" science tactics; and pursue a state based legislative strategy for fire-safe cigarettes, building towards national legislation.     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

African American leadership groups: smoking with the enemy

BACKGROUND: Among all racial and ethnic groups in the USA, African Americans bear the greatest burden from tobacco related disease. The tobacco industry has been highly influential in the African American community for decades, providing funding and other resources to community leaders and emphasising publicly its support for civil rights causes and groups, while ignoring the negative health effects of its products on those it claims to support. However, the industry's private business reasons for providing such support were unknown. OBJECTIVE: To understand how and for what purposes the tobacco industry sought to establish and maintain relationships with African American leaders. METHODS: Review and analysis of over 700 previously secret internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet. RESULTS: The tobacco industry established relationships with virtually every African American leadership organisation and built longstanding social connections with the community, for three specific business reasons: to increase African American tobacco use, to use African Americans as a frontline force to defend industry policy positions, and to defuse tobacco control efforts. CONCLUSION: As the tobacco industry expands its global reach, public health advocates should anticipate similar industry efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups. The apparent generosity, inclusion, and friendship proffered by the industry extract a price from groups in the health of their members. Helping groups anticipate such efforts, confront industry co-optation, and understand the hidden costs of accepting tobacco industry largesse should be part of worldwide tobacco control efforts.     

Taking it to the streets: responses of African American young adults to internal tobacco industry documents.

Since the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 between 46 states and the major tobacco companies forced the release of over 30 million pages of previously secret internal tobacco industry documents, researchers have been exploring how information in the documents can be useful for advancing public health efforts. Previous research shows that the tobacco industry has made massive efforts to target marginalized communities, not only through typical advertising channels but also through establishing financial and other ties with influential leadership groups. However, no previous studies have explored how members of targeted groups might respond at the grassroots level to actual internal tobacco industry documents about such targeting. This exploratory focus group study, which invited urban African American participants to comment on previously secret internal tobacco industry documents, suggests that such documents may be useful in efforts to socially denormalize tobacco use, promote critical reflection about community targeting, and mobilize individuals toward quitting.     

Litigation in Argentina: challenging the tobacco industry

Objective

To evaluate the processes and outcomes of tobacco litigation in Argentina and to analyse the strategies of the tobacco industry to oppose litigation using tobacco industry documents.

Methods

A systematic search of tobacco industry documents on the internet dating from 1978 to 2002. Law library searches using Argentinean official and unofficial reports systems were combined with computerised online searches.

Results

There have been at least 15 failed litigation cases in Argentina and the tobacco industry presented a concerted defence in every claim regardless of cost. We categorised 11 cases as product liability and nicotine addiction, two as health care reimbursement, and two as criminal law and secondhand smoke. Industry strategies included hiring legal consultants from prestigious international and Argentinean law firms and developing litigation prevention programmes. Industry monitored legal academic meetings, controlled the development of new product liability legislation, obtained favourable opinions from experts, and closely observed the development of litigation in Argentina.

Conclusion

The strategies used by the industry have been successful in preventing recovery for tobacco injuries through litigation. Argentinean health advocates and lawyers need to be aware of the roles and strategies of the tobacco industry in order to develop effective litigation in Argentina.     

British American Tobacco's tactics during China's accession to the World Trade Organization

Background

China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 after years of negotiations. As a WTO member, China had to reduce tariffs on imported cigarettes and remove non‐tariff barriers to allow foreign cigarettes to be more competitive in the Chinese market. Among foreign tobacco companies, British American Tobacco (BAT) was the most active lobbyist during China''s WTO negotiations.

Objective

To review and analyse BAT''s tactics and activities relating to China''s entry into the WTO.

Methods

Internal tobacco industry documents were reviewed and are featured here. Industry documents were searched mainly on the website of BAT''s Guildford Depository and other documents'' websites. 528 documents were evaluated and 142 were determined to be relevant to China''s entry into the WTO.

Results

BAT was extremely active during the progress of China''s entry into the WTO. The company focused its lobbying efforts on two main players in the negotiations: the European Union (EU) and the US. Because of the negative moral and health issues related to tobacco, BAT did not seek public support from officials associated with the WTO negotiations. Instead, BAT lobbyists suggested that officials protect the interests of BAT by presenting the company''s needs as similar to those of all European companies. During the negotiation process, BAT officials repeatedly spoke favourably of China''s accession into the WTO, with the aim of presenting BAT as a facilitator in this process and of gaining preferential treatment from their Chinese competitor.

Conclusions

BAT''s activities clearly suggest that tobacco companies place their own interests above public health interests. Today, China struggles with issues of tobacco control that are aggravated by the aggressive practices of transnational tobacco companies, tobacco‐tariff reductions and the huge number of smokers. For the tobacco‐control movement to progress in China, health advocates must understand how foreign tobacco companies have undermined anti‐tobacco activities by taking advantage of trade liberalisation policies. China should attach importance to public health and comprehensive tobacco‐control policies and guarantee strong protection measures from national and international tobacco interests supported by international trade agreements.China is the largest tobacco producing and consuming country in the world, with over 350 million smokers in a population of 1.2 billion.^1,2 China''s cigarette market is dominated by a state‐owned monopoly, the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which strongly protects the domestic tobacco industry.³ This largest cigarette market in the world is nearly 3½ times the size of the US cigarette market and over 12 times the size of the German cigarette market, which is the largest in Western Europe.⁴ However, as smoking rates have fallen in North America and Western Europe,⁵ transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) from the US and Great Britain have turned to international cigarette markets to seek greater profits.China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 after years of negotiations.⁶ As a condition of WTO membership, China had to reduce tariffs on imported cigarettes and remove non‐tariff barriers to allow greater competitiveness for foreign cigarettes in the Chinese market.⁷ O''Sullivan and Chapman⁸ and Lee et al⁹ studied TTC industry documents and described TTC aims and conduct in China. Those studies mainly focused on the heavy reliance on contraband and the undermining of national advertising bans. However, no previous papers have examined China''s entry into the WTO on the basis of tobacco‐industry documents. British American Tobacco (BAT) was engaged in the most active lobbying during China''s accession to the WTO. This paper reviews and analyses BAT documents related to China''s WTO negotiations to clarify BAT''s tactics and use of international trade policies to support their corporate interests.     

Tobacco industry strategy to undermine tobacco control in Finland

Objective: To identify and explain tobacco industry strategy in undermining tobacco control measures in Finland and results of these interferences in tobacco policy development during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Methods: Tobacco industry documents, which have been publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA, were analysed. Documents were sought by Finland and by names of organisations and tobacco control activists. Documents were accessed and assessed between September 2000 and November 2002. Tactics of the tobacco industry activities were categorised as presented by Saloojee and Dagli.

Results: The international tobacco companies utilised similar strategies in Finland as in other industrial markets to fight tobacco control and legislation, the health advocacy movement, and litigation. These activities slowed down the development and implementation of the Tobacco Act in Finland. However, despite the extensive pressure, the industry was not able to prevent the most progressive tobacco legislation in Europe from being passed and coming into force in Finland in 1977 and in 1995.

Conclusion: Denying the health hazards caused by tobacco—despite indisputable scientific evidence—decreased the credibility of the tobacco industry. Strategy of denial was falsely chosen, as health advocacy groups were active both in society and the parliamentary system. The strong influence of the tobacco industry may have in fact increased the visibility of tobacco control in Finland as the litigation process was also drawing attention to negative health effects of tobacco. Therefore the tobacco industry did not manage to convince public opinion. However, the tobacco industry did obtain experience in Finland in how to object to tobacco control measures.