基于RTI的统计分析方法检测与防御虫洞攻击

移动Ad hoc网是一种新型的无线移动网络,具有无中心、自组织、拓扑结构动态变化以及开放式通信等特性,使得Ad hoc网络易遭受攻击.虫洞攻击是针对Ad hoc路由协议的攻击,对Ad hoc网络造成的威胁最大.提出一种基于RTT(往返时间)的统计分析检测方法,在路由发现过程中,目的节点在返回路由应答(RREP)之前统计...     

Ad Hoc网络下虫洞攻击的检测方法

随着Ad hoc网络的广泛应用,其固有的特性和安全漏洞带来了极大的安全隐患,其中虫洞攻击是Ad Hoc网络难以解决的攻击之一,本文首先阐述了虫洞攻击的原理,然后将虫洞攻击的2种模式进行了分析。后面介绍了现在已提出的检测虫洞攻击的多种方法,本文第3部分对这些方法的一些功能和局限(同时检测2种模式的虫洞攻击、定位恶意节点、需要额外的硬件设备等)进行了比较,对在什么环境使用什么检测方法提出观点,最后作者提出了如何解决虫洞攻击的思路。     

利用虫洞原理抵御黑洞攻击的方法

移动Ad hoc网络(MANETs)在民用设施和国防事业方面得到广泛应用.动态变化的拓扑结构是Ad hoc网络的一大特征,也正是这种动态性使得Ad hoc网络特别容易受到安全方面的攻击.重点讨论在AODV协议下的黑洞攻击和灰洞攻击,并根据攻击的特点,提出了一种利用虫洞原理防御的策略.     

基于MCPK的移动网络安全路由方案

针对移动Ad Hoc网络易受虫洞攻击的问题,提出一种基于最佳链路路由协议的MSRP安全路由协议,其中包括邻居检测、身份认证与通信密钥协商过程,探讨在平衡安全和性能的情况下解决OLSR协议中存在的安全问题。采用基于MCPK的安全路由协议,通过在OLSR邻居探测阶段引入安全验证机制来预防虫洞攻击。实验结果表明,随着加密通道长度的增加,虫洞攻击检测率明显上升,该协议能较好地预防和检测虫洞攻击。     

基于邻居路由的Ad Hoc网络虫洞检测

针对Ad Hoc网络中虫洞检测方法带来的高时延和能耗问题,提出一种低时延和能耗的轻量级虫洞检测方法。即在节点查询路由后,利用路由节点的邻居数目,找出可能受虫洞影响节点的集合,同时依据路由节点的某个邻居节点的路由信息,进一步确定路由节点是否受虫洞影响。仿真结果表明,该方法可有效减少虫洞检测中的路由查询次数,并且与DeWorm和E2SIW方法相比,可有效减少时间延迟和能量消耗。     

基于邻居路由的Ad Hoc网络虫洞检测

针对Ad Hoc网络中虫洞检测方法带来的高时延和能耗问题,提出一种低时延和能耗的轻量级虫洞检测方法。即在节点查询路由后,利用路由节点的邻居数目,找出可能受虫洞影响节点的集合,同时依据路由节点的某个邻居节点的路由信息,进一步确定路由节点是否受虫洞影响。仿真结果表明,该方法可有效减少虫洞检测中的路由查询次数,并且与DeWorm和E2SIW方法相比,可有效减少时间延迟和能量消耗。     

Ad Hoc网络中的虫洞攻击与检测方法研究

虫洞攻击是一种针对移动自组织网络路由协议的攻击,一般是至少由两个节点进行合谋的协同攻击。攻击节点之间通过虫洞攻击能够大量吸引数据包,从而达到控制网络的目的。基于按需距离矢量路由协议,根据移动自组织网络中的虫洞攻击原理,采用NS2仿真平台,通过对按需距离矢量路由协议的修改,对虫洞攻击进行了仿真,并且分析了虫洞攻击对网络性能参数的影响。根据虫洞攻击特性,设计了三种攻击检测方法:地理位置定位、邻居信任检测以及邻居监听。将这三种方法在NS2中仿真,验证了其可行性。     

基于OLSR路由协议的HIDA算法

针对Ad Hoc网络中的虫洞攻击,根据最优链路状态路由(OLSR)协议的运行特点,提出检测伪邻居的HELLO间隔分布式算法(HIDA)。仿真结果表明,在网络平均节点数大于4、节点随机最大移动速率大于2 m/s时,HIDA算法能达到80%以上的虫洞攻击检测率。     

双重认证Ad hoc网络安全路由协议设计

由于Ad hoc网络拓扑的动态性和数据传输的多跳性,传统路由协议不能保证Ad hoc网络路由安全。提出一种双重认证Ad hoc网络安全多径路由协议——TASRP（Two-tier Authentication Secure Multi-path Ad hoc Routing Protocol）,在按需路由建立的过程中,引入了双重认证（邻节点之间的身份认证、中间节点处理路由请求包时的相互认证）机制,同时实现了一次性会话密钥的交换,既保证了节点分离路径的安全建立,又实现了端到端的数据安全传输,保证了整个网络运行的安全。最后运用BAN逻辑进行推理分析,分析表明,该路由协议具有高的安全性。     

Ad Hoc无线网络虫洞攻击安全策略研究

随着信息技术的发展,无线网络已经成为现代通信系统的一个重要组成部分.Ad Hoc无线网络就是其中的一种.虫洞攻击是一种针对移动Ad Hoc网络路由协议的高级攻击形式,极难防御.本文提出了一种较为简便的网络拓扑分析算法检测虫洞攻击,并基于该算法提出了OLSR路由协议安全改进机制.     

Securing DSR against wormhole attacks in multirate ad hoc networks

A wormhole attack is one of the hardest problems to detect whereas it can be easily implanted in any type of wireless ad hoc network. A wormhole attack can easily be launched by the attacker without having knowledge of the network or compromising any legitimate nodes. Most existing solutions either require special hardware devices or make strong assumptions in order to detect wormhole attacks which limit the usability of these solutions. In this paper, we present a security enhancement to dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol against wormhole attacks for ad hoc networks which relies on calculation of round trip time (RTT). Our protocol secures DSR against a wormhole attack in ad hoc networks for multirate transmissions. We also consider the processing and queuing delays of each participating node in the calculation of RTTs between neighbors which to date has not been addressed in the existing literature. This work provides two test cases that show that not taking multirate transmission into consideration results in miss identifying a wormhole attack.     

Defending against Wormhole Attack in MANET Using an Artificial Immune System

MANETs are mobile networks that are spontaneously deployed over a geographically limited area without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure. Typically, nodes are both autonomous and self-organized without requiring a central administration or a fixed network infrastructure. Due to their distributed nature, MANET is vulnerable to a specific routing misbehavior, called wormhole attack. In a wormhole attack, one malicious node tunnels packets from its location to the other malicious node. Such wormhole attacks result in a false route with fewer hop count. If the source node follows this fake route, malicious nodes have the option of delivering the packets or dropping them. This article aims at removing these attacks. For this purpose, it investigates the use of an Artificial Immune System (AIS) to defend against wormhole attack. The proposed approach learns rapidly how to detect and bypass the wormhole nodes without affecting the overall performance of the network. The proposed approach is evaluated in comparison with other existing solutions in terms of dropped packet count, packet loss ratio, throughput, packet delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay. A simulation result shows that the proposed approach offers better performance than other schemes defending against the wormhole attack.     

抵御虫洞攻击的无线传感器网安全定位算法

节点定位技术是无线传感器网络的支撑技术之一,节点位置信息是很多基于无线传感器网络的应用的基础.无线传感器网络是一个动态的网络,每隔一段时间需要进行重新定位,并且在重定位过程中易受到攻击节点攻击.针对无线传感器网络中无需测距的定位技术,分析虫洞攻击对DV-Hop定位的影响,提出了一种基于信誉模型的抵御虫洞攻击的分布式轻量级DV-Hop安全定位算法TMDV-Hop(Trust-Model-based DV-Hop Localization Against Wormhole Attack).仿真表明,在无需额外硬件辅助下,TMDV-Hop算法能有效降低虫洞攻击对定位过程的影响,验证了该算法的有效性.     

一种有效防御虫洞攻击的方法

由于无线传感器网络节点位置信息对网络的应用起着重要的作用,且传感器网络的资源有限,因此,针对DV-Hop定位算法的安全性能较差,定位过程中极易受到破坏性极大的虫洞攻击等缺点,提出了一种有效防御DV-Hop中的虫洞攻击的方法,在DV-Hop算法中引入了检测虫洞攻击及有效防御虫洞攻击的EPWDV-Hop算法,通过Matlab仿真软件进行模拟仿真。仿真结果表明,修改后的算法不仅提高了定位精度,而且很好地预防了算法中的虫洞攻击。     

LiteWorp: Detection and isolation of the wormhole attack in static multihop wireless networks

In multihop wireless systems, such as ad hoc and sensor networks, the need for cooperation among nodes to relay each other’s packets exposes them to a wide range of security attacks. A particularly devastating attack is known as the wormhole attack, where a malicious node records control and data traffic at one location and tunnels it to a colluding node far away, which replays it locally. This can either disrupt route establishment or make routes pass through the malicious nodes. In this paper, we present a lightweight countermeasure for the wormhole attack, called LiteWorp, which relies on overhearing neighbor communication. LiteWorp is particularly suitable for resource-constrained multihop wireless networks, such as sensor networks. Our solution allows detection of the wormhole, followed by isolation of the malicious nodes. Simulation results show that every wormhole is detected and isolated within a very short period of time over a large range of scenarios. The results also show that the fraction of packets lost due to the wormhole when LiteWorp is applied is negligible compared to the loss in an unprotected network. Simulation results bring out the configuration where no framing is possible, while still having high detection rate. Analysis is done to show the low resource consumption of LiteWorp, the low detection latency, and the likelihood of framing by malicious nodes.     

DDRP中的虫洞攻击分析与预防

定向扩散路由协议极易遭受虫洞攻击。为此,以仅存在2个毒害节点的情况为例,推导毒害节点放置位置与虫洞攻击严重程度间的定量关系。通过OMNeT++上的仿真实验,求解毒害节点最佳放置位置,并说明对应的最大虫洞攻击严重程度。为预防虫洞攻击,提出一种将最佳梯度节点加强转换为梯度节点概率选择加强的策略。仿真实验结果表明,该预防策略是有效的。