Personal theories, intellectual ability, and epistemological beliefs: Adult age differences in everyday reasoning biases.

Age-related differences in everyday reasoning biases were explored. In each of 2 social domains, examination of theoretical beliefs and biases along 2 dimensions of scientific reasoning, involving the law of large numbers and the evaluation of experimental evidence, revealed that, across age groups, scientific reasoning was used to reject evidence that contradicted prior beliefs; relatively cursory reasoning was used to accept belief-consistent evidence. Biased reasoning was more common among middle-aged and older adults than among young adults. Dispositions to engage in analytic processing were negatively related to biases, but intellectual abilities and bias were not related. The findings support a 2-process view of adult cognitive development and suggest that the tendency to rely on heuristic information processing increases with age. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of scientific reasoning biases: Cognitive versus ego-protective explanations.

Two conflicting perspectives have dominated the literature on self-serving reasoning biases. One maintains that individuals have difficulty objectively processing information relevant to their personal theories because they are reluctant to relinquish their cause-effect beliefs relevant to that domain. The ego-protective view claims that such biases arise because they enhance or protect individuals' self-views. These opposing positions were studied with 5th, 8th, and 11th graders. Scientific reasoning improved with age. Analyses of biases, indicated by ratings of evidence quality and written justifications, yielded mixed results regarding developmental trends in reasoning biases. Both theoretical beliefs and ego-protective motivations predicted reasoning biases. An accuracy motivation led to more complex justifications but failed to reduce reasoning biases. Adolescents appear to selectively apply their scientific reasoning skills. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Goal-oriented critical reasoning and individual differences in critical reasoning biases.

In 4 experiments, the relationship among critical reasoning, personal goals, general intellectual ability, and information-processing style were explored. Three critical reasoning competencies were investigated: the law of large numbers, the intuitive analysis of covariance, and the ability to detect flaws in experimental designs. Participants were presented problems that involved goal-enhancing, goal-neutral, and goal-threatening evidence. There were 2 main findings: (a) Although general ability predicted 2 components of critical reasoning, biases in reasoning were better predicted by information processing style (i.e., rational vs. intuitive). (b) Reasoning on the goal-enhancing and neutral problems was less sophisticated than reasoning on threatening problems. Depth of processing seems to be a primary mechanism underlying motivated reasoning. In addition, information processing style is an individual difference variable that moderates the extent of reasoning biases. Similar results were obtained across different forms of critical thinking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working Memory and Intelligence--Their Correlation and Their Relation: Comment on Ackerman, Beier, and Boyle (2005).

On the basis of a meta-analysis of pairwise correlations between working memory tasks and cognitive ability measures, P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002) claimed that working memory capacity (WMC) shares less than 25% of its variance with general intelligence (g) and with reasoning ability. In this comment, the authors argue that this is an underestimation because of several methodological shortcomings and biases. A reanalysis of the data reported in Ackerman et al. using the correct statistical procedures demonstrates that g and WMC are very highly correlated. On a conceptual level, the authors point out that WMC should be regarded as an explanatory construct for intellectual abilities. Theories of working memory do not claim that WMC is isomorphic with intelligence factors but that it is a very strong predictor of reasoning ability and also predicts general fluid intelligence and g. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of quantitative reasoning and gender biases.

One hundred twenty-seven 7-, 9-, and 11-year-old children were presented large or small samples of own-gender enhancing or other-gender enhancing observations. Children read arguments based on the observations, rated argument intelligence, judged the number of other children to whom the observations could be generalized, and provided verbal justifications for their judgments. Own-gender reasoning biases declined with age; these declines were, however, partially accounted for by declines in the strength of self-reported gender affiliations. Reasoning biases-demonstrated by problem-to-problem shifts in reasoning quality-were constrained by sample size, indicating a modest degree of rationality even among 7-year-olds. Specifically, biases co-existed with reasonably extensive generalization from large samples of other-gender evidence. Children were thus able to satisfy motivations for own-gender favoritism and reason in accord with the law of large numbers. Several explanations of the findings-based on changes in the salience of gender, multiple classification skills, and the ability to reason independently from beliefs-are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning, Integration, Inference Alteration, and Text Comprehension.

This paper reports how the study of formal logical reasoning provides insight into more everyday types of reasoning, such as that involved in language comprehension. Both of these types of cognition are thought to involve the use of mental models, and so it is reasonable to think that the cognitive operations needed for formal logical reasoning would be involved in everyday reasoning as well. We focused on three aspects of formal reasoning: (a) the integration of information into a common mental model, (b) the drawing of inferences, and (c) the coordination of alternative possibilities. We were able to show that the integration and inference components were related to narrative comprehension processes, but the coordination of alternative models was not. Thus, there is evidence for some overlap in the mental processes used in formal and everyday reasoning. This further justifies the study of formal logical reasoning as a window into certain types of everyday reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Everyday problem solving in adulthood and old age.

We examined everyday problem solving in adulthood and compared it with traditional measures of cognitive abilities. In the first phase of the research, we describe the construction of an inventory to assess problem solving in situations that adults might encounter in everyday life and examine raters' judgments of effective responses to the problems. In the second phase, adults (N?=?126) between the ages of 20 and 78 were administered the inventory and tests of verbal and abstract problem-solving abilities. Results indicated modest but significant positive correlations between performance on the inventory and traditional ability tests. The examination of age differences revealed that performance on the Everyday Problem-Solving Inventory and verbal ability test increased with age, whereas performance on a traditional problem-solving test declined after middle age. In addition, education was unrelated to everyday problem solving, highly related to verbal ability, and moderately related to traditional problem solving. Results are discussed in relation to pluralistic conceptions of intelligence and theories of adult intellectual development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning about certainty and uncertainty in concrete, causal, and propositional contexts.

Examined children's comprehension of certainty and uncertainty within the context of concrete and propositional reasoning tasks. 69 1st, 3rd, and 5th graders were given G. Pieraut-LeBonniec's (1980) box task and a multisufficient causality task to assess reasoning about certainty and uncertainty in concrete contexts. Ss were also given conditional syllogisms to assess this ability in a propositional context. Half of the Ss at each grade were given contramanded syllogism task statements intended to block erroneous conversational inferences made about these conditional statements. Results indicate that there were no developmental differences in reasoning about concrete certainty, but significant improvement occurred with age in reasoning about concrete uncertainty. On syllogisms, only the 5th graders benefited from contramanding and thus demonstrated an understanding of propositional uncertainty. Correlational and error analyses showed that the discrimination between certainty and uncertainty was mastered in concrete contexts prior to the time when this discrimination occurred in propositional contexts. It is concluded that reasoning about concrete certainty and uncertainty requires a different competence than that required for reasoning about propositional certainty and uncertainty. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom.

In a prestudy, a questionnaire was sent to 97 professors in the fields of art, business, philosophy, and physics; it was also given to 17 laypersons. Ss were asked to list behaviors characteristic of an ideally intelligent, creative, or wise person in one's field of endeavor, or in general (for laypersons). In Exp I, 285 professors in the same fields and 30 laypersons rated the extent to which each of the behaviors listed at least twice in the prestudy was characteristic of an ideally intelligent, creative, or wise individual. In Exp II, a subset of the behaviors from the prestudy was sorted by 40 undergraduates to yield a multidimensional space characterizing the Ss' implicit theories for intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. In Exp III, 30 adults rated themselves on a subset of the behaviors from the prestudy, and these ratings were correlated with "ideal prototype" ratings to yield a measure of resemblance to the prototype. Resemblance scores were then correlated with scores on standardized ability tests. In Exp IV, 30 adults rated hypothetical individuals described in simulated letters of recommendation in terms of their intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. Results reveal that people have systematic implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, which are used accurately both in evaluating themselves and in evaluating hypothetical others. Moreover, the implicit theories for each of the constructs show at least some convergent–discriminant validity with respect to each other. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning, Emotions, and Delusional Conviction in Psychosis.

The aim of the study was to elucidate the factors contributing to the severity and persistence of delusional conviction. One hundred participants with current delusions, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (PRP trial), were assessed at baseline on measures of reasoning, emotions, and dimensions of delusional experience. Reasoning biases (belief inflexibility, jumping to conclusions, and extreme responding) were found to be present in one half of the sample. The hypothesis was confirmed that reasoning biases would be related to delusional conviction. There was evidence that belief inflexibility mediated the relationship between jumping to conclusions and delusional conviction. Emotional states were not associated with the reasoning processes investigated. Anxiety, but not depression, made an independent contribution to delusional conviction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning and conversation.

Informal arguments take place when individuals exchange views on whether it is worthwhile to believe some assertion or take some action. Debates between friends or family members, classroom sparring about an idea, scientific exchanges about empirical results or theories, and critical discussions and responses in many fields can all be instances of arguments. This article describes the structure of these arguments in terms of the conversational moves that participants can make within them—for example, asking for a justification, giving a reason, offering an objection, or conceding a point. The central part of the article proposes a model for the way people determine to which of the argument's claims each participant is committed. According to the model, commitment is the result of rules defined over the sequence of conversational moves. A participant's commitment to claims that occur later in the argument has well-defined implications for commitment to claims that occurred earlier. Predictions from the model compare well with people's judgments of commitment over a range of argument types. The analysis of argument commitment also illuminates concepts such as burden of proof that are difficult to define within current reasoning theories that treat just a single side of an issue. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Postprimary education has little impact on informal reasoning.

Investigated whether postprimary education enhances informal reasoning skills, operationalized as skill in the construction of arguments about everyday issues. Eight groups of 40 Ss were balanced for sex, and contained 1st- and 4th-yr high school students, 1st- and 4th-yr undergraduates, 1st- and 4th-yr graduate students, or nonstudents with and without a bachelor's degree. Each S gave oral arguments on 2 issues; responses were scored for overall quality, number of lines of argument, and other factors. Analysis disclosed a borderline statistically significant impact of high school, college, and graduate school. However, both level of performance and rates of gain with education were much lower than expected. It is argued that present educational practices do little to foster the development of informal reasoning skills; education redesigned for this purpose could have a much greater impact. (31 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social combination models, persuasive arguments theory, social comparison theory, and choice shift.

Individuals and 5-person groups responded 3 successive times to 4 standard choice-dilemma items in the order of either individual–group–individual or individual–individual–individual; 288 male undergraduates served as Ss. Decisions were made for oneself, for a friend, and for a stranger (the hypothetical protagonist of the standard choice-dilemma instructions). Decisions for the stranger were more risky than decisions for a friend, and decisions for a friend were more risky than decisions for oneself. As predicted from persuasive arguments theory, the best fitting social combination model on the most risky item was risk-supported wins; the best fitting model on the most conservative item was conservative-supported wins; and the best fitting model on 2 less extreme items was majority wins. It is emphasized that social combination models and theories of group-interaction processes, such as persuasive arguments theory or social comparison theory, are complementary rather than rival explanations of collective decision making. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Male–female differences in predicting displaced volume: Strategy usage, aptitude relationships, and experience influences.

Investigated the role of aptitudes and experiences in gender differences in scientific reasoning by using the Predicting Displaced Volume (PDV), a scientific reasoning task known to be solved by males more frequently than females. 778 7th–11th graders were administered the PDV in groups. Of the Ss, 90% consistently used 1 of 4 expectation-based strategies to solve the problems. Males used the correct strategy more frequently than females; males and females both used the same incorrect strategies. It was found that gender differences in PDV did not reflect gender differences in spatial ability, field dependence–independence (FDI), or Piagetian formal reasoning. In addition, gender differences in PDV were not accounted for by science and math course-taking experience. Factors such as spatial ability and FDI may correlate highly with scientific reasoning task performance but may not account for gender-related differences in that performance. (51 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Familiarity with content and conditional reasoning.

Examined the relationship between familiarity of content and conditional reasoning. It was hypothesized that there would be an interaction between Ss' familiarity with content in the premises and their conditional reasoning performance. 43 graduate students in education and 53 1st-yr dentistry students took a 30-item test of conditional reasoning that was based on 5 logical arguments each repeated twice with symbolic, lay dental, and professional dental content. Data were analyzed using a 2-way multivariate analysis of variance with repeated measures with the 5 arguments as dependent variables. The interaction between student type and content was not supported. Significant main effects for content were attributed to the lay and professional vs symbolic contrast. It is concluded that conditional reasoning performance was not influenced by Ss' familiarity content in the premises. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Identification of informal reasoning fallacies as a function of epistemological level, grade level, and cognitive ability.

Informal reasoning fallacies are violations of critical discussion norms. As epistemological understanding of knowledge justification appears to underlie the informal reasoning skills of argument construction and evaluation, it was hypothesized that adolescents with greater epistemological sophistication would be more able to identify informal reasoning fallacies. It was hypothesized that 11th graders would be more epistemologically sophisticated than 7th or 9th graders and, thus, would more likely identify fallacies. Students responded to questions regarding argument scenarios that did or did not contain fallacies. More 11th graders identified fallacies. Epistemological level predicted only identification of one type of fallacy that might be described as epistemological in nature. Cognitive ability also seemed to contribute to the increased ability with grade to identify fallacies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emergence of children's causal explanations and theories: Evidence from everyday conversation.

This research examines the content of explanations that 4 English-speaking children gave or asked for in everyday conversations recorded from 2? to 5 years of age. Analyses of nearly 5,000 codable explanations (identified by markers like why or because) focused on the entity targeted for explanation (e.g., person, animal, object), the explanatory mode of causal reasoning (e.g., psychological, physical), and interrelations between these elements. Children's explanations focused on varied entities (animals, objects, and persons) and incorporated diverse modes (psychological, physical, social-conventional, and even biological reasoning). Children's pairings of entities with explanatory modes suggest appropriately constrained yet flexible causal reasoning. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that young children draw on several complementary causal-explanatory theories to make sense of real-life events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relations among children's social goals, implicit personality theories, and responses to social failure.

Two studies examined children's thought patterns in relation to their responses to social challenge. In Study 1, 4th and 5th graders tried out for a pen pal club under either a performance goal (stressing the evaluative nature of the tryout) or a learning goal (emphasizing the potential learning opportunities). In their behavior and attributions following rejection, children who were focused on a performance goal reacted with more helplessness, whereas children given a learning goal displayed a more mastery-oriented response. Study 2 found that in response to hypothetical socially challenging situations, 4th, 5th, and 6th graders who believed personality was nonmalleable (entity theorists) vs. malleable (incremental theorists) were more likely to endorse performance goals. Together, these studies indicate that children's goals in social situations are associated with their responses to social failure and are predicted by their implicit theories about their personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)