Disgust sensitivity predicts intuitive disapproval of gays.

Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly—even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. Two studies demonstrate that a dispositional proneness to disgust (“disgust sensitivity”) is associated with intuitive disapproval of gay people. Study 1 was based on previous research showing that people are more likely to describe a behavior as intentional when they see it as morally wrong (see Knobe, 2006, for a review). As predicted, the more disgust sensitive participants were, the more likely they were to describe an agent whose behavior had the side effect of causing gay men to kiss in public as having intentionally encouraged gay men to kiss publicly—even though most participants did not explicitly think it wrong to encourage gay men to kiss in public. No such effect occurred when subjects were asked about heterosexual kissing. Study 2 used the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2006) as a dependent measure. The more disgust sensitive participants were, the more they showed unfavorable automatic associations with gay people as opposed to heterosexuals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memories of yesterday’s emotions: Does the valence of experience affect the memory-experience gap?

Intense pain is often exaggerated in retrospective evaluations, indicating a possible divergence between experience and memory. However, little is known regarding how people retrospectively evaluate experiences with both pleasant and unpleasant aspects. The Day Reconstruction Method (DRM; Kahneman. Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004b) provides a unique opportunity to examine memory-experience gaps in recollections of individual days, which elicit a wide gamut of emotions. We asked female participants (N = 810, Study 1, and N = 615, Study 2) to reconstruct episodes of the previous day using the DRM and demonstrated that memory and experience diverge for both pleasant and unpleasant emotions. When they rated their day overall in a retrospectively evaluative frame of mind, the participants recalled more unpleasant and pleasant emotions than they reported feeling during the individual episodes, with a larger gap for unpleasant emotions than for pleasant emotions. The findings suggest that separate processes are used for committing positive and negative events to memory and that, especially when unpleasant emotions are involved, prudence is favored over accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Savoring Versus Dampening: Self-Esteem Differences in Regulating Positive Affect.

Five studies examined the hypotheses that when people experience positive affect, those low in self-esteem are especially likely to dampen that affect, whereas those high in self-esteem are especially likely to savor it. Undergraduate participants' memories for a positive event (Study 1) and their reported reactions to a success (Study 2) supported the dampening prediction. Results also suggest that dampening was associated with worse mood the day after a success (Study 2), that positive and negative affect regulation are distinct, that self-esteem is associated with affect regulation even when Neuroticism and Extraversion are controlled (Studies 3 and 4), and that self-esteem may be especially important for certain types of positive events and positive affect regulation (Study 5). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Everyday magical powers: The role of apparent mental causation in the overestimation of personal influence.

These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event--even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer's basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators' visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators' influence. Finally, additional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Don't worry, be happy? Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and performance.

People regulate their affect either to feel good or to achieve instrumental success. The present experiments show that when driven by performance goals, people can be motivated to experience unpleasant affect when it is trait-consistent, because of its instrumental benefits (e.g., M. Tamir & M. D. Robinson, 2004). In 4 studies, individuals high in neuroticism were more likely than those low in neuroticism to choose to increase their level of worry, as indicated by self-reported preferences (Study 1) and by behavioral choices in experimental settings (Studies 2-4). As predicted, such preferences were evident when expecting to perform demanding tasks but not when expecting an undemanding task (Study 2). Study 4 suggests that such preferences for short-term unpleasant affect may be beneficial to performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Turning shame inside-out: “humiliated fury” in young adolescents.

The term “humiliated fury” refers to the anger people can experience when they are shamed. In Study 1, participants were randomly exposed to a prototypical shameful event or control event, and their self-reported feelings of anger were measured. In Study 2, participants reported each school day, for 2 weeks, the shameful events they experienced. They also nominated classmates who got angry each day. Narcissism was treated as a potential moderator in both studies. As predicted, shameful events made children angry, especially more narcissistic children. Boys with high narcissism scores were especially likely to express their anger after being shamed. These results corroborate clinical theory holding that shameful events can initiate instances of humiliated fury. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of social identity and threat on self-esteem and group attributions.

Two studies were conducted to examine reactions and coping responses to a threatened group identity. In both studies, participants were asked to read a (fictitious) report that varied whether their group received a good or bad evaluation. In Study 2, the report also gave an internal or external reason for the rating. Study 1 showed that participants made more positive affirmations about an important group membership when their group had been threatened. They also made an equal number of internal and external attributions when they identified strongly with their group. Study 2 showed that participants who were given a group-serving attribution when their group had been threatened had higher self-esteem than those not given a group-serving attribution, especially if they identified strongly with their group. These results are discussed in the context of social identity theory and biased information processing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of aggressive-rejected and nonaggressive-rejected children's interpretations of self-directed and other-directed rejection

The hypothesis that aggressive-rejected children are unaware of their social status because they are self-protective when processing negative peer feedback was tested in 3 studies. In Study 1, fourth-grade girls and boys were asked to name peers they liked or disliked, as well as peers they thought liked or disliked them. Comparisons of aggressive-rejected, nonaggressive-rejected, and average status groups revealed that aggressive-rejected children were more unrealistic in their assessments of their social status than were nonaggressive-rejected children. In Study 2, rejected and average boys identified in Study 1 were asked to name who they thought liked or disliked other children from their classroom. Comparisons of perceived and actual nominations for peers revealed that aggressive-rejected children were able to assess the social status of others as well as did nonaggressive-rejected and average status children. Because the difficulties aggressive-rejected children demonstrated in Study 1 did not generalize to judging the status of others in Study 2, the self-protective hypothesis was supported. Study 3 provided a parallel test of this hypothesis under more controlled conditions. Subjects from Study 2 viewed other children receiving rejection feedback from peers in videotaped interactions and received similar feedback themselves from experimental confederates. While all subjects rated self-directed feedback somewhat more positively than other-directed feedback, aggressive-rejected subjects had the largest self-favoring discrepancy between their judgments of self- and other-directed feedback. These findings also suggest that aggressive-rejected children may make self-protective "errors" when judging other children's negative feelings about them. Ethnicity differences in evaluating peer feedback emerged in Studies 1 and 3, raising questions about the impact of minority status on children's evaluations of rejection feedback.     

Impact of Perceived Consensus on Stereotypes About Obese People: A New Approach for Reducing Bias.

In 3 experiments, the authors tested the effect of perceived social consensus on attitudes toward obese people. Participants completed self-report measures of attitudes toward obese people prior to and after manipulated consensus feedback depicting attitudes of others. In Study 1 (N=60), participants decreased negative and increased positive stereotypes after learning that others held more favorable attitudes toward obese people. In Study 2 (N=55), participants improved attitudes when they learned about favorable attitudes of obese people from an in-group versus an out-group source. In Study 3 (N=200), a consensus approach was compared with other stigma reduction methods. Social consensus feedback influenced participants' attitudes and beliefs about causes of obesity. Providing information about the uncontrollable causes of obesity and supposed scientific prevalence of traits also improved attitudes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Naturalistic action impairment in closed head injury.

The authors sought to determine whether errors of action committed by patients with closed head injury (CHI) would conform to predictions derived from frontal lobe theories. In Study 1, 30 CHI patients and 18 normal controls performed routine activities, such as wrapping a present, under conditions of graded complexity. CHI patients committed more errors even on the simplest condition; but, except for a higher proportion of omitted actions, their error profile was very similar to that of controls. Study 2 involved a subset of patients whose performance in Study 1 was within normal limits. When these high functioning patients were asked to perform the routine tasks under still more taxing conditions, they, too, committed errors in excess of the control group. Accounts based on frontal mechanisms have a difficult time explaining the overall pattern of findings. An alternative based on limited-capacity resources is suggested. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Once is enough: Causal reasoning from a single instance.

Points out that research on how people make predictions has focused on abstract rules and schemata. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that people often make predictions and explain events by comparing their situation to a single, previously experienced event. In 2 studies that examined this possibility, 161 undergraduates learned about members of a foreign culture, some of whom performed a rule-governed behavior. Ss then predicted the behavior of other members of the culture. One member was similar to an individual who performed the behavior, but the rule predicted that this new member would not perform the behavior. Both studies showed that in making their predictions, Ss relied on the similarity of this member to the previously encountered individual. Study 1 also demonstrated that people were increasingly likely to use a single, similar instance as the rule governing the behavior became more complex. Results emphasize the role that concrete experience plays in people's predictions. Further, they suggest that when people learn a novel behavior, they may, at least initially, learn a set of examples rather than a rule. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cyberostracism: Effects of being ignored over the Internet.

Ostracism is such a widely used and powerful tactic that the authors tested whether people would be affected by it even under remote and artificial circumstances. In Study 1, 1,486 participants from 62 countries accessed the authors' on-line experiment on the Internet. They were asked to use mental visualization while playing a virtual tossing game with two others (who were actually computer generated and controlled). Despite the minimal nature of their experience, the more participants were ostracized, the more they reported feeling bad, having less control, and losing a sense of belonging. In Study 2, ostracized participants were more likely to conform on a subsequent task. The results are discussed in terms of supporting K. D. Williams's (1997) need threat theory of ostracism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Here's Looking at Me: The Effect of Memory Perspective on Assessments of Personal Change.

Five studies manipulated the memory perspective (1st-person vs. 3rd-person) individuals used to visually recall autobiographical events and examined its effects on assessments of personal change. Psychotherapy clients recalled their first treatment (Study 1), and undergraduates recalled past social awkwardness (Study 2). Participants who were induced to recall from the 3rd-person perspective believed, and acted as though (Study 2), they had changed more since the events occurred. Subsequent studies revealed a crucial moderator: Third-person recall produces judgments of greater self-change when people are inclined to look for evidence of change, but lesser self-change when they are inclined to look for evidence of continuity. This pattern emerged when motivation (Studies 1 and 2), goals (Study 3), instructions (Study 4), and self-esteem (Study 5) determined participants' focus on change versus continuity. Results have implications for constructivism in memory and judgment and for the ability to sustain self-improvement efforts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do people with low self-esteem really want to feel better? Self-esteem differences in motivation to repair negative moods.

This research examined the hypothesis that people with low self-esteem (LSE) are less motivated than people with high self-esteem (HSE) to repair their negative moods. In Study 1, participants completed diaries in response to either a success or a failure in their everyday lives. Participants described what they intended to do next and the reasons behind those plans. After failure, fewer LSE than HSE participants expressed a goal to improve their mood. A follow-up investigation (Study 2) suggested that this difference was not due to a self-esteem difference in knowledge of mood repair strategies. In Study 3, after undergoing a negative mood induction, fewer LSE than HSE participants chose to watch a comedy video, even though both groups believed the comedy video would make them happy. Studies 4 and 5 explored possible reasons why LSE people are less motivated than HSE people to repair their negative moods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Patient-oriented interventions to improve communication in a medical office visit.

Examined an intervention to improve the patient's contribution to communication in a medical office visit. In Study 1, 53 women awaiting a medical appointment were assigned either to a group that was asked to list 3 questions to ask their physician or to a control group. Ss who listed questions asked more questions in the visit and reported being less anxious. In Study 2, with 49 women, a 3rd group received a message from their physician encouraging question asking. Both experimental groups asked more of the questions they had wished to, had greater feelings of control, and were more satisfied with the visit and with the information they received. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How prevalent is wishful thinking? Misattribution of arousal causes optimism and pessimism in subjective probabilities.

People appear to be unrealistically optimistic about their future prospects, as reflected by theory and research in the fields of psychology, organizational behavior, behavioral economics, and behavioral finance. Many real-world examples (e.g., consumer behavior during economic recessions), however, suggest that people are not always overly optimistic. I suggest that people can be both overly optimistic and pessimistic in their beliefs about future events, depending on whether they focus on success or on failure. More specifically, people judge the likelihood of desirable and undesirable events to be higher than similar neutral events because they misattribute the arousal those events evoke to their greater perceived likelihood. I demonstrated this stake-likelihood effect in 4 studies. In Study 1, arousal was shown to increase likelihood judgments. Study 2 demonstrated that such elevated likelihood judgments are due to misattribution of the arousal from having a stake in the outcome. Study 3 demonstrated that such misattribution of arousal occurs for desirable and undesirable events. Study 4 showed the effects of optimism and pessimism on likelihood judgments in a field setting with soccer fans. Together, the findings suggest that wishful thinking might be less prevalent than previously believed. Pessimism might be as likely as optimism in subjective probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an explanation of cultural differences in in-group favoritism: The role of individual versus collective primacy.

Previous research conducted on a Western sample has shown that people are less apt to exhibit in-group favoritism when they perform well individually while their in-group performs poorly. The authors evaluated whether this finding would be moderated by the cultural dimension of individual–collective primacy, which refers to whether people give more weight to their personal interests rather than their in-group's interests when forced to choose between the two. The authors hypothesized that relative to their counterparts from the United States, participants from the People's Republic of China would have more of a collective-primacy orientation and therefore would exhibit more in-group favoritism when they performed well individually while their in-group performed poorly. The results supported the hypothesis. Implications for the literatures on in-group favoritism and cross-cultural differences are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Seeking security or growth: A regulatory focus perspective on motivations in romantic relationships.

Using a multimethod approach, we examined how regulatory focus shapes people's perceptual, behavioral, and emotional responses in different situations in romantic relationships. We first examined how chronic regulatory focus affects romantic partners' support perceptions and problem-solving behaviors while they were engaged in a conflict resolution discussion (Study 1). Next, we experimentally manipulated regulatory focus and tested its effects on partner perceptions when individuals recalled a prior conflict resolution discussion (Study 2). We then examined how chronic regulatory focus influences individuals' emotional responses to hypothetical relationship events (Study 3) and identified specific partner behaviors to which people should respond with regulatory goal-congruent emotions (Study 4). Strongly prevention-focused people perceived their partners as more distancing and less supportive during conflict (Studies 1 and 2), approached conflict resolution by discussing the details related to the conflict (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more agitation (Study 3). Strongly promotion-focused people perceived their partners as more supportive and less distancing (Studies 1 and 2), displayed more creative conflict resolution behavior (Study 1), and experienced a negative relationship outcome with more sadness and a favorable outcome with more positive emotions (Study 3). In Study 4, recalling irresponsible and responsible partner behaviors was associated with experiencing more prevention-focused emotions, whereas recalling affectionate and neglectful partner behaviors was associated with more promotion-focused emotions. The findings show that regulatory focus and approach–avoidance motivations influence certain interpersonal processes in similar ways, but regulatory focus theory also generates novel predictions on which approach–avoidance models are silent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)