Dissonance and alcohol: Drinking your troubles away.

Hypothesized that dissonance arousal would increase the amount of drinking and that drinking, in turn, would reduce dissonance and subsequent attitude change in 3 studies with 133 college students over age 21. In Studies 1 and 2, Ss rated brands of an alcoholic beverage to measure the amount of drinking immediately after dissonance was aroused by having them write a counterattitudinal essay. Ss' attitudes were measured immediately after the drinking. Both studies found that although dissonance arousal had little effect on the amount of drinking, whatever drinking occurred was sufficient to eliminate dissonance-reducing attitude change. Study 2 established that these results occurred for light as well as heavy social drinkers. Studies 2 and 3 showed that neither water nor coffee drinking was sufficient to eliminate attitude change in this paradigm. The implications are that some forms of alcohol abuse may evolve through the reinforcement of drinking as a means of reducing dissonance, and that dissonance may be frequently reduced through behaviors that ameliorate the feelings of dissonance without involving cognitive change. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attitude change and justification for compliance.

"This experiment has tentatively illustrated some of the processes involved in creating and reducing psychological dissonance and the implications of such dissonance for attitude change in compliance situations. It was hypothesized that increased justification for taking an opinion position discrepant from one's private opinion would lead to decreased dissonance and therefore decreased attitude change toward the discrepant position. Ss were asked to write an essay taking a stand opposite to their initial opinion on a given issue. One group of Ss was then given a number of reasons for compliance with the request (high justification condition). For another group (low justification condition) Ss were given no detailed justification for writing the essay. Attitude change was determined from a postexperimental questionnaire… . Attitude change tended to be greater where manipulated (and perceived) justification was least." From Psyc Abstracts 36:01:1GD76C. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissonance processes as self-affirmation.

Tested the hypothesis that an experience that simply affirms a valued aspect of the self can eliminate dissonance and its accompanying cognitive changes. Three experiments were conducted using the conventional forced-compliance procedure. In Study 1, some of the 76 college student Ss were allowed to affirm an important, self-relevant value (by completing a self-relevant value scale) immediately after having written unrelated dissonant essays and prior to recording their attitudes on the postmeasure. Other Ss underwent an identical procedure but were selected so that the value affirmed by the scale was not part of their self-concept. The value scale eliminated dissonance-reducing attitude change among Ss for whom it was self-relevant but not among Ss for whom it was not self-relevant. This occurred even though the value scale could not resolve or reduce the objective importance of the dissonance-provoking inconsistency. Study 2, conducted with 24 Ss with a strong economic and political value orientation, showed that the self-affirmation effect was strong enough to prevent the reinstatement of dissonance. Study 3, testing generalizability with 24 Ss, replicated the effect by using a different attitude issue, a different value for affirmation, and a different measure of dissonance reduction. Results imply that a need for psychological consistency is not part of dissonance motivation and that salient, self-affirming cognitions may help objectify reactions to self-threatening information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Generalization of dissonance reduction: Decreasing prejudice through induced compliance.

Three studies involving a total of 318 White college students demonstrated that induced compliance can change socially significant attitudes and that the change generalizes to broader beliefs. Ss wrote an essay endorsing a pro-Black policy that was costly to Whites. In Exps 1 and 2, attitudes and general beliefs about Blacks became more favorable in both high- and low-choice conditions, provided publicity of the essay was high. Overall, choice and publicity had additive effects on attitude change. Some high-choice Ss wrote only semipositive (semicompliant) essays and did not change their essay attitudes. Yet their beliefs about Blacks still became more favorable. In Exp 3, racial ambivalence, but not prior attitude, predicted essay compliance. Ambivalent Ss were more likely to comply than were less ambivalent Ss. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of previous performance on evaluations of present performance.

In Study 1, 82 undergraduates viewed 3 videotaped lectures presented by the same lecturer. Ss in the good-performance condition viewed 2 good lectures, followed by a lecture of average quality. Ss in the poor-performance condition viewed 2 poor lectures, followed by the same average lecture. Results show significant contrast effects both for ratings of the frequency of several critical behaviors and for performance evaluations. Ss in the poor-performance condition assigned more favorable behavior ratings and higher performance evaluation ratings to the 3rd (average) lecture than did Ss in the good-performance condition. In Study 2, 71 Ss were used to test the hypothesis that memory biases were responsible for the contrast effects observed in Study 1. Ss viewed the same videotapes but rated the 3rd tape from memory the day after viewing the tape. Results show weak, nonsignificant contrast effects, suggesting that memory biases were not sufficient to explain the results of Study 1. (45 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Physiological arousal, dissonance, and attitude change: Evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a "Don't remind me" effect.

Two experiments, with 80 undergraduates, replicated and extended research by R. T. Croyle and J. Cooper (see record 1984-11595-001) indicating that cognitive dissonance involves physiological arousal. In Exp I, Ss wrote counterattitudinal essays under conditions of high or low choice and, to assess arousal effects owing to effort, with or without a list of arguments provided by the experimenter. In high-choice conditions only and regardless of effort, Ss showed both arousal (heightened galvanic skin response) and attitude change. Arousal, however, did not decline following attitude change. The more effortful task (no arguments provided) produced increased arousal but not greater attitude change. In Exp II, the opportunity to change one's attitude following a freely chosen counterattitudinal essay was manipulated. As in Exp I, arousal increased following the essay but did not decline following a postessay attitude change opportunity. When Ss were not given an attitude change opportunity, however, arousal did decline. It is suggested that if dissonance is a drive state, drive reduction typically may be accomplished through gradual cognitive change or forgetting. (47 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prospective and retrospective reports of mood states before relapse to substance use.

In a prospective design, it was predicted that the role of negative mood in precipitating relapses and crises among alcohol-dependent Ss would be greater when assessed with retrospective mood ratings than when assessed by prospective mood ratings because of Ss' attributional biases. This hypothesis was not supported. Support was found, however, for a relationship between negative bias and the amount of negative mood assessed at the time the retrospective report was given. As has been previously found, the most frequent precipitant of relapses and crises in this study was negative emotional states. Female Ss were more likely to report interpersonal and less likely to report intrapersonal determinants than male Ss. Minor relapses were more likely to be precipitated by social pressure and less likely to be related to negative emotions than major relapses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive dissonance in an intergroup context.

42 student members of a campus group supporting Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election participated in a study of the effects of group membership on dissonance reduction. In a 2?×?2 factorial design, half of the Ss were asked to write arguments contrary to their attitudes, whereas the other half were required to write such arguments. Half of the Ss were then asked to advocate a position that was counter to the attitude that defined their membership in the group. The other half produced arguments that were counter to attitudes relevant to but not definitional of group membership. It was predicted that attitude change would be used as a way to reduce dissonance only by those Ss who freely wrote arguments counter to nondefinitional attitudes. Attitude change was not possible, however, for Ss who freely produced arguments counter to a definitional attitude; these Ss were expected to misattribute their arousal to the existence of a competing out-group and to reduce their dissonance by derogating that group. Results supported these predictions. The importance of group membership in affecting attitude change is discussed. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The attitude polarization phenomenon: Role of response measure, attitude extremity, and behavioral consequences of reported attitude change.

Four studies examined the generality of attitude polarization (C. G. Lord et al, 1979). Biased assimilation of essays on 2 controversial issues was substantial and correlated with reported attitude change. Polarization was observed for reported attitude change on capital punishment and generally stronger in Ss with extreme than moderate attitudes. Polarization was not indicated in a pre–post measurement design. For affirmative action, reported polarization was not observed. The hypothesis that Ss reporting polarization would subsequently write particularly strong essays was not supported, although those reporting depolarization wrote relatively weak essays. The results suggest the relevance of individual differences in reported attitude change but do not confirm the powerful inferences frequently drawn regarding the pervasive, undesirable consequences of self-reported attitude polarization. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vested interest as a moderator of attitude–behavior consistency.

Two studies examined the hypothesis that the degree to which an individual perceives an attitude as hedonically relevant affects the relationship between attitudes and behavior. In Exp I, 99 undergraduates' willingness to work actively against the passage of a referendum that would raise the legal drinking age was associated with their age and, consequently, the degree to which this change would affect them. In Exp II with 100 college students, Ss who felt strongly that they would be affected either positively or negatively by the imposition of a university-wide senior comprehensive examination were consistent with their expressed attitudes toward the examination. The behavior of Ss who felt that the test would not affect them, however, was not strongly related to their attitude toward it. Ego involvement did not moderate attitude–behavior consistency. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affective-cognitive consistency and thought-induced attitude polarization.

70 undergraduates whose preexperimental attitudes toward either capital punishment or censorship were identified as either high or low in affective-cognitive consistency wrote 2 essays, one on the topic for which consistency had been assessed (relevant essay) and the other on the unassessed topic (distractor essay). Findings indicate that in accord with the hypothesis that thought-induced attitude polarization requires the presence of a well-developed knowledge structure, high-consistency Ss evidenced greater polarization than low-consistency Ss only on the relevant topic after writing the relevant essay. Content analyses of Ss' relevant essays supported A. Tesser's (1978) ideas regarding mediation: High (vs low) consistency Ss expressed a greater proportion of cognitions that were evaluatively consistent with their prior affect toward the attitude object and a smaller proportion of evaluatively inconsistent and neutral cognitions. High-consistency Ss evidenced a greater tendency to assimilate discrepant information by generating refutational thoughts that discredited or minimized the importance of inconsistent information than did low-consistency Ss. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of affective and cognitive focus on the attitude–behavior relation.

Previous research has produced contradictory findings regarding the effects of thought on the attitude–behavior relation. In an attempt to integrate these findings, the present authors proposed that thought may make either the affective or cognitive component of the attitude more salient and, thus, more important in the formation of the general evaluation and that behaviors may either be cognitively or affectively driven. It was hypothesized that a match between the attitude component emphasized by thought and the attitude component that drives behavior would increase the attitude–behavior relation, and alternatively, that a mismatch between the attitude components would decrease the relation. To test this hypothesis, 68 undergraduates focused either on the affective or cognitive component of their attitude before evaluating puzzles. The context of puzzle-playing behavior was varied to make the behavior either instrumental (cognitively driven) or consummatory (affectively driven), and Ss were given the opportunity to play with the puzzles. Correlations between the evaluations of the puzzles and the amount of time spent playing with the puzzles supported the hypothesis: Thought emphasizing the affective component produced evaluations that predicted consummatory behavior (affectively driven behaviors) but not instrumental behavior (cognitively driven). Alternatively, thought emphasizing the cognitive component produced evaluations that predicted instrumental behavior (cognitively driven) but not consummatory behavior. (20 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory accuracy in the recall of emotions.

Study tested whether Ss could accurately estimate the intensity and the relative frequency of their positive vs. negative emotions and the degree to which 1 dimension biases the recall of another. Ss completed mood reports at random moments each day or at the end of the day against which were compared their mood estimates. Estimates made prior to the mood-reporting periods were used to control for the effects of prolonged mood reporting. Various types of accuracy were examined: absolute, in which Ss overestimated their emotional intensity and underestimated the frequency of their positive affect vs. their negative affect; relative, in which Ss' relative frequency estimates were moderately accurate; and discriminant, in which intensity estimates were biased by actual frequency, whereas frequency estimates were unbiased by intensity. Ss' accuracy did not improve substantially following the daily recording of their moods, suggesting a problem at the retrieval stage. The theoretical and measurement implications of the results are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of public and private self-consciousness on the public expression of personal beliefs.

Examined the joint effects of private and public self-consciousness (SC) on attitudinal consistency. 113 male undergraduates (categorized as high and low private and high and low public SC) reported their own attitudes toward punishment. Later, each S was asked to write an essay in which he restated his attitude. Immediately prior to writing the essay, S learned that he would also be discussing his opinion with either a partner who held an attitude opposite to his own or a partner whose attitude was unknown. As predicted, the attitudes expressed in the essays of high public SC Ss were more moderate than those expressed by low public SC Ss. One effect of this moderation strategy was to lower the correlation between privately held and publicly expressed beliefs among Ss high in public SC. In contrast, attitudinal consistency was substantial among Ss who were low in public and high in private SC. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Trivialization: the forgotten mode of dissonance reduction.

Trivialization as a mode of dissonance reduction and the conditions under which it is likely to occur were explored in 4 studies. Study 1 tested and supported the hypothesis that when the preexisting attitude is made salient, participants will trivialize the dissonant cognitions rather than change their attitudes. Study 2 tested and supported the hypothesis that following a counterattitudinal behavior, participants will choose the first mode of dissonance reduction provided for them, whether it is trivialization or attitude change. Study 3 tested and supported the hypothesis that following a counterattitudinal behavior, the typical self-affirmation treatment leads to trivialization. Study 4 demonstrated that providing a trivializing frame by making an important issue salient also encourages trivialization rather than attitude change even when there was no opportunity for self-affirmation. The implications for cognitive dissonance theory and research are briefly discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of attitudinal, cognitive, and situational variables on recall of biased communications.

Investigated the attitudinal congeniality hypothesis (the assumption that people learn material congenial to their attitudes more easily than uncongenial material) in a 2 by 2 design: instruction set (learn vs judge) by essay bias (pro vs con), with attitude toward student activism as the focal ex post facto variable. 120 college students served as Ss. Verbal skills, quantitative skills, and overlap of prior knowledge structure with essay content were treated as covariates. A number of variables related to quality of essay content and demand characteristics were controlled and/or measured to achieve the maximum possible control over recall variance. Results indicate that greater recall was associated with greater intellectual skills, greater overlap of prior knowledge, more positive attitudes toward the experimental setting, instructions to learn the essay, and the attitudinal congeniality effect (indexed by the Attitude by Essay Bias interaction). Interpretation is based on the effect of each variable on the perceived utility of the essay's content. (32 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty and deceit.

Examined the validity of the distraction hypothesis (Maier & Thurber, 1968). Ss were undergraduate students who watched a videotaped interview and rated the veracity of an actress who played the role of a college student. Study 1 disconfirmed the distraction hypothesis. Ss relied on nonverbal cues to make judgments of veracity, but the presence of nonverbal cues did not distract Ss from processing verbal content. Study 2 tested an alternate explanation, the situational familiarity hypothesis. Study 2 found that judgments in familiar situations were influenced primarily by verbal content cues, whereas those in unfamiliar situations were influenced by both verbal and nonverbal cues. Findings indicate that situational factors influence information processing and affect the relative importance of verbal and nonverbal cues in judgments of veracity. Generalizability of prior deception research is questioned. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amount of information about the attitude object and attitude–behavior consistency.

The synthesis of 2 separate lines of inquiry—research on information integration and longitudinal studies of attitudes—prompted the hypothesis that the degree of consistency between attitudes and behavior will increase as a function of the amount of information available about the attitude object. This hypothesis was tested in 3 longitudinal studies, ranging in length from 4 days to 4 mo, that investigated the following behaviors: voting for candidates for political office, voting for 2 social-policy election initiatives, and having an influenza vaccination. Ss were 62 undergraduates (Study 1), 270 undergraduates (Study 2), and 299 27–92 yr old veterans (Study 3). In support of the hypothesis, amount of information moderated the consistency between attitudes and behavior in each study, and the significance of this relation remained even after controlling for the effects of other potential moderators, including prior direct behavioral experience with the attitude object and attitude certainty. Consistent with previous research, direct behavioral experience was also a determinant of attitude–behavior consistency, and this relation was independent of the effect of amount of information for the behavior of having an influenza vaccination. Discussion focuses on the interrelation among moderators of attitude–behavior consistency and on the theoretical implications of the findings. (52 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)