Mood effects on attitude judgments: Independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration.

Investigated the independent effects of induced mood on the encoding of persuasive messages and on the assessment of attitude judgments. In Exp 1, positive or negative mood was induced either before the encoding of a counterattitudinal message or before the assessment of attitude judgments. When mood was induced before message presentation, Ss in a bad mood were more persuaded by strong than by weak arguments, whereas Ss in a good mood were equally persuaded by strong and by weak arguments. When Ss encoded the message in a neutral mood, however, the advantage of strong over weak arguments was more pronounced when Ss were in a good rather than in a bad mood at the time of attitude assessment. In Exp 2, Ss exposed to a counterattitudinal message composed of either strong or weak arguments formed either a global evaluation or a detailed representation of the message. Positive, negative, or neutral mood was then induced. Ss in a good mood were most likely and Ss in a negative mood least likely to base their reported attitudes on global evaluations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-persuasion and self-presentation as mediators of anticipatory attitude change.

Three experiments with 197 undergraduates determined when anticipatory attitude change occurs via self-persuasion or self-presentation and identified the implications for attitude persistence of a shift by either process. In Exp I, Ss' thoughts and attitudes were assessed while they expected either a counterattitudinal or a proattitudinal message. Ss generated thoughts and reported attitudes consistent with the direction of the anticipated message, even though their responses were anonymous. In the final 2 experiments, the publicness of Ss' attitudes was varied to examine the impact of self-presentational concerns on thoughts and attitudes. In Exp II, Ss in the private condition spontaneously generated more thoughts relevant to the anticipated counterattitudinal message than did Ss in the public condition. In Exp III, some Ss were told that the anticipated counterattitudinal message was not forthcoming. When the message was canceled in the public condition, Ss failed to show an anticipatory shift in attitude; in the private condition, however, anticipatory attitude change was obtained. It is concluded that when self-presentation concerns are manifest, temporary changes in attitude occur in response to these concerns. In contrast, when pressures to self-present are low, anticipatory changes reflect genuine shifts in attitude resulting from an active consideration of the merits of the counterattitudinal position. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ironic processes in the mental control of mood and mood-related thought.

Investigated the mental control of mood and mood-related thought. In Exp 1, Ss reminiscing about a happy or sad event were asked to make their mood positive, were given no instructions, or were asked to make their mood negative. Ss attempting mood control without an imposed cognitive load were successful, whereas those who attempted control while rehearsing a 9-digit number not only failed to control their moods, but also showed self-reported mood change opposite the mood they intended to create. In Exp 2, Ss attempting to control mood-related thoughts under cognitive load showed increased accessibility of those thoughts contrary to the direction of intended control in a Stroop-type color-naming task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attitudes and cognitive response: An electrophysiological approach.

Two experiments employed electrophysiological procedures to assess the covert information-processing activity of message recipients. In Exp I, 24 undergraduates expected to hear discrepant communications and were requested to "collect their thoughts" following each forewarning. As discrepancy increased, anticipatory counterargumentation increased, whereas production of favorable thoughts and agreement decreased. Following forewarnings, oral muscle, cardiac, and respiratory activity increased, whereas nonoral muscle activity remained constant and quiescent. In Exp II, 60 undergraduates anticipated and heard a proattitudinal (P), a counterattitudinal (C), or a neutral (N) communication. Ss evaluated more positively and generated more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments to the P than the C advocacy but rated similarly the N and P advocacies. As in Exp I, incipient oral muscle activity increased following the forewarning of an involving C advocacy; it also increased for all conditions during the message. Patterns of subtle facial muscle changes reflected the affective nature of the cognitive responding before and during the message. (3 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Happiness versus sadness as a determinant of thought confidence in persuasion: A self-validation analysis.

The present research introduces a new mechanism by which emotion can affect evaluation. On the basis of the self-validation hypothesis (R. E. Petty, P. Bri?ol, & Z. L. Tormala, see record 2002-12575-003), the authors predicted and found that emotion can influence evaluative judgments by affecting the confidence people have in their thoughts to a persuasive message. In each study, participants first read a strong or weak persuasive communication. After listing their thoughts about the message, participants were induced to feel happy or sad. Relative to sad participants, those put in a happy state reported more thought confidence. As a consequence, the effect of argument quality on attitudes was greater for happy than for sad participants. These self-validation effects generalized across different emotion inductions, different persuasion topics, and different measures of thought confidence. In one study, happy and sad conditions each differed from a neutral affect control. Most important, these metacognitive effects of emotion only occurred under high elaboration conditions. In contrast, individuals with relatively low motivation to think showed a main effect of emotion on attitudes, regardless of argument quality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of source magnification of cognitive effort on attitudes: An information-processing view.

In Exp I 120 undergraduates viewed a videotape of 1 or 3 speakers presenting 1 or 3 arguments in favor of a counterattitudinal position. The 3-source/3-argument message produced significantly more persuasion than any of the other conditions, which did not differ from each other. It is suggested that each time a speaker appears, the recipient "gears up" to process the message and that if either speaker or argument is repeated, further thinking about the arguments is minimal. Exp II (30 Ss) excluded an alternative to this processing interpretation by showing that Ss exposed to the multiple-source/multiple-argument message did not infer that the pool of proproposal arguments was larger than that inferred by other Ss. In Exp III (100 Ss), Ss exposed to 3 compelling arguments purportedly produced by 3 different persons generated more positive thoughts and were more persuaded than Ss who read the same high quality arguments presumably generated by 1 person. However, Ss exposed to 3 weak arguments purportedly produced by 3 different persons generated more negative thoughts and were less persuaded than Ss who read the same low quality arguments attributed to 1 source. Overall, results indicate that increasing the number of sources of a message increases thinking about the message content. This increased thinking can result in either increased or decreased persuasion, depending on the cogency of the message arguments. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of message repetition and position on cognitive response, recall, and persuasion.

Although the mere exposure effect has been researched widely, surprisingly little is known about the attitudinal and cognitive effects of message repetition. It was hypothesized that the sequence of topic-relevant thoughts generated in response to a (repeated) persuasive message would parallel attitude change. To test this prediction, 2 experiments were conducted. In Exp I, 133 undergraduates heard a communication either 0 (control), 1, 3, or 5 times in succession, rated their agreement with the advocated position, and listed the message arguments they could recall. In Exp II, 193 undergraduates heard a communication either 1, 3, or 5 times, rated their agreement, listed their thoughts, and listed the message arguments they could recall. In both experiments, agreement first increased, then decreased as exposure frequency increased (regardless of the position advocated), but agreement was unrelated to the recall of the message arguments. In Exp II, analyses of the listed thoughts revealed that counterargumentation decreased, then increased, whereas topic-irrelevant thinking increased as exposure frequency increased; as expected, only topic-relevant thoughts were related to agreement. Results are interpreted in terms of an attitude-modification model in which repetition and content of a persuasive advocacy affect the type and number of thoughts generated; these thoughts, in turn, affect the attitudinal reaction to the advocacy. (63 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On-line and memory-based modification of attitudes: Determinants of message recall-attitude change correspondence.

Experiments investigated the impact of message elaboration on attitude change–message recall correspondence when attitude change occurs in an on-line (as attitude-relevant information is received), or memory-based (on the basis of retrieved attitude-relevant information) fashion. In 2 experiments, Ss' processing goals were manipulated to increase or inhibit on-line change and message elaboration. As predicted, Ss reported postexposure attitudes more rapidly in on-line vs memory-based conditions. Decreased message elaboration increased attitude–recall correspondence, regardless of when attitude change occurred. Increased elaboration produced elaboration–attitude judgment correspondence. Results suggest that recall of message content will best predict persuasion when message content is encoded free of elaborations, regardless of when attitude change occurs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When motives clash: Issue involvement and response involvement as determinants of persuasion.

College students heard a strong or weak message after learning whether the message issue would have relevance to their personal lives outside the laboratory (high or low issue involvement) and whether they would later discuss the message issue (high or low response involvement). Judging from subjects' recall of message information, either high issue involvement or high response involvement was sufficient to instigate high levels of attention to the message. Issue-involved-only subjects, however, were most strongly influenced by message quality. They agreed more with and had more favorable thoughts about strong relative to weak messages, and they were most likely to engage in attitude-consistent behavior. Response-involved-only subjects were not affected by message quality, either on public attitude and thought measures or on a private behavioral measure. Response-and-issue-involved subjects were in between these extremes. Message quality had modest effects on their thoughts and attitudes, but not on their behavior. These results suggest that issue involvement encourages systematic processing that is sensitive to how well message arguments concur with personal standards. In contrast, response involvement encourages expression of attitudes that satisfy self-presentational needs. This expression may be mediated by message processing that is either biased toward moderation or nonintegrative, or by outward impression management, or both. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On mood and peculiar people: Affect and person typicality in impression formation.

Are memories and impressions about unusual, atypical people more likely to be influenced by mood? Atypical targets were expected to elicit more extensive processing, and mood-primed associations were expected to play a greater role in such judgments. In Exp 1 (N?=?72), mood effects were stronger on judgments of atypical than of prototypical persons. In Exp 2 (N?=?42), mood effects on memory were greater for atypical targets, and recall was also better for typical people in positive mood and for atypical targets in negative mood. Exp 3 (N?=?60) replicated these findings and also found greater mood effects on processing and judgmental latencies for atypical than for typical targets. The results suggest that mood effects depend on the kind of processing strategies triggered by prototypical and atypical targets, consistent with recent multiprocess theories of affect and cognition (J. P. Forgas, 1992). The implications of the results for current affect-cognition models, as well as everyday instances of affective biases in social judgments and stereotyping, are considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Happiness and stereotypic thinking in social judgment.

Four experiments examined the effects of happiness on the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgment. In each experiment, individuals who had been induced to feel happy rendered more stereotypic judgments than did those in a neutral mood. Exp 1 demonstrated this phenomenon with a mood induction procedure that involved recalling life experiences. Exps 2 and 3 suggested that the greater reliance on stereotypes evident in the judgments of happy individuals was not attributable to cognitive capacity deficits created by intrusive happy thoughts or by cognitively disruptive excitement or energetic arousal that may accompany the experience of happiness. In Exp 4, happy individuals again were found to render more stereotypic judgments, except under conditions in which they had been told that they would be held accountable for their judgments. These results suggest that although happy people's tendency to engage in stereotypic thinking may be pervasive, they are quite capable of avoiding the influence of stereotypes in their judgments when situational factors provide a motivational impetus for such effort. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Majority and minority influence: Source-position imbalance as a determinant of message scrutiny.

Two experiments addressed the issue of whether endorsement of a position by a numerical majority or a minority leads to greater scrutiny of the information presented in a persuasive message. In Exp 1, a counterattitudinal position was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. Argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes with majority than with minority endorsement. In Exp 2, a proattitudinal or a counterattitudinal message was endorsed by a majority or a minority and was supported by strong or weak arguments. When the source and message position were unexpected (i.e., majority-counter and minority-pro messages), argument quality had a larger impact on attitudes than when the source and message position were expected (i.e., majority-pro and minority-counter messages). Thus, either majority or minority endorsement can enhance message scrutiny if the source-position pairing is surprising. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing deficits and the mediation of positive affect in persuasion.

Motivational and cognitive mediators of the reduced processing of persuasive messages shown by recipients in a positive mood were tested. Ss in positive or neutral moods read strong or weak counterattitudinal advocacies for either a limited time or for as long as they wanted. Under limited exposure conditions, neutral mood Ss showed attitude change indicative of systematic processing, whereas positive mood Ss showed no differentiation of strong and weak versions of the message. When message exposure was unlimited, positive mood Ss viewed the message longer than did neutral mood Ss and sytematically processed it rather than relying on persuasion heuristics. These findings replicated with 2 manipulations of mood and 2 different attitude issues. We interpret the results as providing evidence that reduced cognitive capacity to process the message contributes to the decrements shown by positive mood Ss. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical tests of the absolute sleeper effect predicted from the discounting cue hypothesis.

Two experiments tested the sleeper effect with respect to persuasion research (i.e., the finding that a persuasive message has a greater delayed than initial impact on Ss' attitudes). These experiments included strong tests of the discounting cue hypothesis because they (a) demonstrably created the conditions that the theory indicated were necessary for the effect to occur, (b) demonstrably minimized the impact of a force known to countervail against the effect, and (c) employed statistical tests that had adequate power to detect the effect should it occur. In Exp I, 161 undergraduates read 1 of 2 persuasive messages accompanied by a discounting cue. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met with 1 message, and an absolute sleeper effect was obtained when attitudes were measured again after 5 wks. In Exp II, 493 undergraduates read a persuasive message and 1 of 5 discounting cues. All the requirements for a strong test were demonstrably met in 3 cue conditions, and absolute sleeper effects were found in each of them after 6 wks. Absolute sleeper effects were not observed in the 2 cue conditions in which the necessary conditions for the effect were not met. It is concluded that absolute sleeper effects can be reliably obtained when all the necessary theoretical conditions are met, a known countervailing force is absent, and the statistical tests have adequate power. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Issue involvement can increase or decrease persuasion by enhancing message-relevant cognitive responses.

Two experiments with 96 undergraduates tested the hypothesis that high issue involvement enhances thinking about the content of a persuasive communication. Exp I varied involvement and the direction of a message (pro- or counterattitudinal). Increasing involvement enhanced persuasion for the proattitudinal but reduced persuasion for the counterattitudinal advocacy. Exp II again varied involvement, but both messages took a counterattitudinal position. One message employed compelling arguments and elicited primarily favorable thoughts, whereas the other employed weak arguments and elicited primarily counterarguments. Increasing involvement enhanced persuasion for the strong message but reduced persuasion for the weak one. Together the experiments provide support for the view that high involvement with an issue enhances message processing and therefore can result in either increased or decreased acceptance. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The student as Pygmalion: Effect of student expectation on the teacher.

Two experiments examined the possibility that student expectations regarding a teacher's competence can be communicated to the teacher and bring about the expected behavior. In Exp I, 39 female undergraduates acting as students were administered a lesson by a teacher (confederate) who the students expected to be either effective or ineffective. Results show significant differences in student attitudes, performance, and nonverbal behavior according to expectation. In Exp II, confederates acting as students emitted either positive or negative nonverbal behavior toward 40 female undergraduates acting as their teachers. There were significant effects on teachers' attitudes and behavior. Moreover, ratings of the teacher by judges showed teachers were rated as being more adequate under conditions of positive student nonverbal behavior than negative nonverbal behavior. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Repetition of highly similar messages and attitude change.

Predicted that message repetition would increase positive attitudes in a situation where highly similar communications are used. 5 similar advertisements (i.e., those using the same basic arguments but differing in the phrasing and order of points raised) served as stimulus messages and were sequentially presented with attitude being measured by a cognitive response analysis of thoughts recorded by 50 undergraduates. Results support the prediction of a positive relationship between the number of presentations and attitude. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of need for cognition on message evaluation, recall, and persuasion.

Studied the relation among need for cognition (NFC), message processing, and persuasion. 57 pairs of undergraduates holding approximately the same attitude toward instituting senior comprehensive exams but differing widely in their scores on a NFC scale participated in Exp I. Ss read a set of either strong or weak arguments supporting the recommendation that senior comprehensive exams be instituted. Results reveal that argument quality had a greater impact on the message evaluations and source impressions provided by Ss high than by those low in NFC and that Ss high in NFC reported expending more cognitive effort and recalled more message arguments regardless of argument quality. The findings from Exp I were replicated in Exp II (110 female undergraduates) with a different topic (i.e., raising student tuition) and cover story. The inclusion of a postcommunication attitude measure revealed that the attitudes of Ss high in NFC were more affected by argument quality than those of Ss low in NFC. These studies document a reliable difference among individuals in their tendency to derive information from and elaborate on externally provided message arguments. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empathy and attitudes: Can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group improve feelings toward the group?

Results of 3 experiments with 202 undergraduates suggest that feeling empathy for a member of a stigmatized group can improve attitudes toward the group as a whole. In Exps 1 and 2, inducing empathy for a young woman with AIDS (Exp 1) or a homeless man (Exp 2) led to more positive attitudes toward people with AIDS or toward the homeless, respectively. Exp 3 tested possible limits of the empathy–attitude effect by inducing empathy toward a member of a highly stigmatized group, convicted murderers, and measuring attitudes toward this group immediately and then 1–2 wks later. Results provided only weak evidence of improved attitudes toward murderers immediately but strong evidence of improved attitudes 1–2 wks later. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Susceptibility to persuasive appeals as a function of source credibility and prior experience with the attitude object.

Two experiments were conducted to assess the susceptibility of attitudes formed by either direct experience (DE) or indirect experience (IE) to proattitudinal or counterattitudinal messages delivered by a highly credible or a less credible source. The results were generally consistent with Fazio and Zanna's (1981) theory of DE and IE attitudes and with predictions derived from Petty and Cacioppo's (1981, 1986) elaboration likelihood model. In Experiment 1, DE attitudes proved to be more resistant to a counterattitudinal appeal than were IE attitudes. Moreover, the final attitudes of DE participants reflected these subjects' cognitive elaborations of the message arguments (i.e., the central route to persuasion), whereas the attitudinal responses of IE participants were affected more by source characteristics (i.e., peripheral cues). In Experiment 2, DE attitudes became more extreme in response to a proattitudinal appeal, but IE attitudes did not. In addition, the polarization shifts shown by DE participants were in keeping with these subjects' predominantly favorable elaborations of the message, whereas the attitudes of IE participants were more closely related to subjects' impressions of the communicator. Thus, DE attitudes were more resistant to attack and, yet, more susceptible to proattitudinal influence than were attitudes originating from IE. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)