Computational levels and conditional inference: Reply to Schroyens and Schaeken (2003).

This article is a reply to W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's (2003; see record 2002-08431-014) critique of M. Oaksford, N. Chater, and J. Larkin's (2000; see record 2000-08540-005) conditional probability model (CP) of conditional inference. It is argued that their meta-analysis does not falsify CP because the evidence may bear on more than one computational level of explanation. Moreover, it is argued that CP provides a rational account of more of the data than W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's mental models theory. Other points are also addressed. It is suggested that W. Schroyens and W. Schaeken's model and CP converge on the importance of probabilistic prior knowledge in conditional inference. This is consistent with the normative literature, which (like CP) treats conditionals in terms of subjective conditional probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The negated conditional: A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hypothetical and certain inferences from conditional arguments read in texts.

In 3 experiments, affirmative and hypothetical probes were presented after narrative texts containing conditional arguments. According to the data, readers represented modus ponens deductions as certain, except when it was only a weakly necessary cause of a given effect. They represented any logically invalid inferences resulting from affirming the conditional consequent as hypothetical, except when it was the effect of strongly sufficient cause. Accordingly, readers must be processing conditional syntax as an asymmetric constraint. However, the underlying causal knowledge can be sufficient either to discredit or warrant the inferences. Thus according to the theory of natural logic, readers can draw formal deductions and be convinced of their necessity. This provides further evidence that readers can represent their inferences as hypothetical (N. Campion, 2004). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing of logically valid and logically invalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension.

Two competing theories of processing of conditionals (if-then) were tested. Syntactic theories posit that people only draw inferences conforming to the logically valid modus ponens (MP) schema. Mental models theories predict that people draw MP and invalid affirming-the-consequent (AC) inferences. Three experiments tested these predictions. Participants read short stories that conformed to either the MP or AC form but without conclusions, and they completed either priming or recognition tasks. Results indicate that both MP and AC inferences occur during discourse processing: MP and AC premise forms prime their respective conclusions, participants erroneously judged that they had read the conclusions to MP and AC arguments, and AC inferences did not stem from a biconditional interpretation of conditionals. Findings support mental models theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Updating meta-analytic research findings: Bayesian approaches versus the medical model.

The authors examine 3 methods of combining new studies into existing meta-analyses: (a) adding the new study or studies to the database and recalculating the meta-analysis (the medical model); (b) using the Bayesian procedure advocated by F. L. Schmidt and J. E. Hunter (1977) and F. L. Schmidt, J. E. Hunter, K. Pearlman, and G. S. Shane (1979) to update the meta-analysis; and (c) using the Bayesian methods advocated by these authors and M. T. Brannick (2001) and M. T. Brannick, S. M. Hall, and Y. Liu (2002) to estimate study-specific parameters. Method b was found to severely overweight new studies relative to the previous studies contained in the meta-analysis, and Method c was found to do the same while also requiring an assumption with a low prior probability of being correct, causing the method to violate Bayesian principles. The authors present an alternative Bayesian procedure that does not suffer from these drawbacks and yields meta-analytic results very similar to those obtained with the medical model. They recommend use of the medical model or this alternative Bayesian procedure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does depression interfere with effort mobilization? Effects of dysphoria and task difficulty on cardiovascular response.

On the basis of predictions of the mood-behavior model (G. H. E. Gendolla, 2000) and motivational intensity theory (J. W. Brehm & E. A. Self, 1989), the authors conducted 2 studies that critically tested the common assumption that dysphoria is associated with a motivational deficit. Dysphoric and nondysphoric undergraduates performed a cognitive task that was either easy or difficult. Effort intensity (i.e., resource mobilization) was assessed as performance-related cardiovascular reactivity. In support of the authors' predictions and in contrast to the popular view of a general motivational deficit, both studies found a crossover interaction between dysphoria and task difficulty: In the difficult condition, nondysphoric participants indeed showed stronger systolic blood pressure reactivity than dysphoric participants. But in the easy condition, dysphoric participants showed stronger systolic reactivity than nondysphoric participants. The findings are discussed with respect to motivational deficits in depression and possible underlying mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Six-month-old infants rely on explanatory inference when relating communication to people and manipulatory actions to inanimate objects: Reply to Gergely (2001).

Responds to G. Gergely's (see record 2001-11105-001) criticism of the interpretation of the results in the author's earlier study (see record 2000-15399-008). Six-month-old infants expect people to talk to persons, but they expect people to manipulate objects (M. Legerstee, J. Barna, & C. DiAdamo, 2000). This interpretation of the behavior of 6-month-olds is consistent with both (a) the task requirements in M. Legerstee et al.'s (2000) study and (b) previous empirical and theoretical work that supports the conclusion that infants use explanatory inferences to make sense of the world during the first 6 months of life. The ability to understand that people communicate with persons but act on objects is a precursor to the infant's subsequent understanding that people communicate about objects (intentional communication) at 9–12 months of age. Studies by G. Gergely and his colleagues (Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 1999; G. Gergely, Z. Nadasdy, G. Csibra, & S. Biró, 1995) showing that infants attend differently to types of movements of inanimate objects do not shed light on the infant's conceptual understanding of people. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional and academic consequences of parental conditional regard: Comparing conditional positive regard, conditional negative regard, and autonomy support as parenting practices.

The authors conducted 2 studies of 9th-grade Israeli adolescents (169 in Study 1, 156 in Study 2) to compare the parenting practices of conditional positive regard, conditional negative regard, and autonomy support using data from multiple reporters. Two socialization domains were studied: emotion control and academics. Results were consistent with the self-determination theory model of internalization, which posits that (a) conditional negative regard predicts feelings of resentment toward parents, which then predict dysregulation of negative emotions and academic disengagement; (b) conditional positive regard predicts feelings of internal compulsion, which then predict suppressive regulation of negative emotions and grade-focused academic engagement; and (c) autonomy support predicts sense of choice, which then predicts integrated regulation of negative emotions and interest-focused academic engagement. These findings suggest that even parents’ use of conditional positive regard as a socialization practice has adverse emotional and academic consequences, relative to autonomy support. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.

A probabilistic computational level model of conditional inference is proposed that can explain polarity biases in conditional inference (e.g., J. St.B. T. Evans, 1993). These biases are observed when J. St.B. T. Evans's (1972) negations paradigm is used in the conditional inference task. The model assumes that negations define higher probability categories than their affirmative counterparts (M. Oaksford & K. Stenning, 1992); for example, P(not-dog) > P(dog). This identification suggests that polarity biases are really a rational effect of high-probability categories. Three experiments revealed that, consistent with this probabilistic account, when high-probability categories are used instead of negations, a high-probability conclusion effect is observed. The relationships between the probabilistic model and other phenomena and other theories in conditional reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Deductive rationality in validating and testing conditional inferences.

We asked people to validate conditional inferences (e.g., "A, therefore C" with "if A then C"). People are more likely to look for falsifications ("A and not-C") versus confirmations ("A and C") given a forced choice. Second, falsification rates are lower for logically valid versus invalid inferences. Logically valid inferences are inferences that follow necessarily. Experiment 1 (N = 96) shows that emphasising this logicality constraint increases falsification rates in the validation task and corroborates that validation-by-falsification increases logically correct inference evaluations. Experiment 2 (N = 41) corroborates the other way round that people who are more likely to make logically correct evaluations, show higher falsification performance in the validation task. The results support mental-models theory and suggest alternative theories similarly need to specify how people would go about looking for counterexamples. We proffer such a specification for two alternatives to the model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The impact of vulnerability to and severity of a health risk on processing and acceptance of fear-arousing communications: A meta-analysis.

This meta-analysis of studies of the persuasive impact of fear appeals evaluated the contribution of our stage model of the processing of fear-arousing communications relative to other fear appeal theories. In contrast to other theories, our stage model (a) specifies the cognitive processes underlying persuasion through fear-arousing communications, (b) proposes that threat-induced defensive processing does not interfere with the effectiveness of fear-arousing communications but actually contributes to it, and (c) predicts that vulnerability and severity manipulations have differential effects on measures of attitude as compared with intention and behavior. To evaluate these predictions, the authors expanded on previous meta-analyses by assessing the independent as well as joint effects of vulnerability to and severity of a risk, both on information processing and on measures of persuasion (attitude, intention, behavior). Overall, findings were consistent with the stage model. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Event perception: A mind-brain perspective.

People perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events. Here the authors propose a theory according to which the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing and regulates attention and memory. Perceptual systems continuously make predictions about what will happen next. When transient errors in predictions arise, an event boundary is perceived. According to the theory, the perception of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures that represent previously learned information about event parts and inferences about actors' goals and plans. Neurological and neurophysiological data suggest that representations of events may be implemented by structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex and that perceptual prediction error is calculated and evaluated by a processing pathway, including the anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical neuromodulatory systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biomechanical analysis of masticatory system configuration in Neandertals and Inuits

Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) present a theory of conditional inference based upon the manipulation of mental models. In the present paper, the theory is critically examined with regard to its ability to account for psychological data, principally with respect to the rate at which people draw the four basic inferences of modus ponens (MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent (AC) and modus tollens (MT). It is argued first that the theory is unclear in its definition and in particular with regard to predictions of problem difficulty. Clarification and specification of principles are consequently provided here. Next, it is argued that there are a number of phenomena in the conditional reasoning literature for which the theory cannot account in its present form. Specifically, (a) the relatively frequency of DA and AC inferences on affirmative conditional is not as predicted by the theory, (b) differences occur between inferences on if then and only if rules beyond the capacity of the theory to explain and (c) there is no account of the "negative conclusion bias" observed when negated components are introduced into the rules. A number of revisions to the mental model theory of conditional reasoning are proposed in order to account for these findings.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (see record 2001-05308-002) (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (see record 1998-04232-002) (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (see record 2001-05308-001) (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reflections on International Perspectives in Psychology.

Comments on the articles by K. J. Gergen et al (see record 83-32710) and K. Pawlik and G. d'Ydewalle (see record 83-32705). The author agrees with Gergen et al that presently there is fragmentation in the body of knowledge and signs of alienation among disciplines in the US. In developing countries however, there is not such pronounced compartmentalization, with fewer restrictions and more freedom in practicing any profession. The author agrees with Pawlik and d'Ydewalle that, as in other developing countries, there is a need in the Middle East to discover the national heritage and incorporate it into the local disciplines of psychology and social sciences. The author suggests some additional elements that were missing from Pawlik and d'Ydewalle's analysis, but agrees wholeheartedly with their perspective that although the US is self-sufficient and sophisticated in many ways, it could benefit greatly from the wisdom and richness abundantly stored in other cultures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Exemplar and prototype models revisited: Response strategies, selective attention, and stimulus generalization.

J. D. Smith and colleagues (J. P. Minda & J. D. Smith, 2001; J. D. Smith & J. P. Minda, 1998, 2000; J. D. Smith, M. J. Murray, & J. P. Minda, 1997) presented evidence that they claimed challenged the predictions of exemplar models and that supported prototype models. In the authors' view, this evidence confounded the issue of the nature of the category representation with the type of response rule (probabilistic vs deterministic) that was used. Also, their designs did not test whether the prototype models correctly predicted generalization performance. The present work demonstrates that an exemplar model that includes a response-scaling mechanism provides a natural account of all of Smith et al's experimental results. Furthermore, the exemplar model predicts classification performance better than the prototype models when novel transfer stimuli are included in the experimental designs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Independent retrieval of source dimensions: An extension of results by Starns and Hicks (2005) and a comment on the ACSIM measure.

Recently, J. J. Starns and J. L. Hicks (2005) have argued that source dimensions are retrieved independently from memory (see record 2005-15992-004). In their innovative experiment, manipulating the retrievability of 1 source feature did not affect memory for a 2nd feature. Following C. S. Dodson and A. P. Shimamura (2000; see record 2000-08540-012), the authors argue that the source memory measure that Starns and Hicks used (known as the average conditional source identification measure) is vulnerable to a response bias in this particular paradigm, and this may undermine Starns and Hicks's conclusion. Starns and Hicks, however, acknowledged this possibility. The authors substantiate this claim by a simulation and by replicating Starns and Hicks's experiment. In 2 further experiments, the authors use an extended multinomial model to analyze data showing that Starns and Hicks's conclusion holds even if results cannot be attributed to response biases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment on "Competition for consciousness among visual events: The psychophysics of reentrant visual processes" (Di Lollo, Enns & Rensink, 2000).

V. Di Lollo, J. T. Enns, and R. A. Rensink (2000) reported properties of masking that they claimed were inconsistent with all current models. The current authors show, through computer simulation, that many current models can account for V. Di Lollo et al.'s (2000) data. Although V. Di Lollo et al. (2000) argued that their data could be accounted for only with models that incorporate reentrant processing, the current authors show that reentrant processing is not necessary. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)