The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 29(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2007-16865-001). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a pp then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inflation of conditional predictions.

The authors report 7 experiments indicating that conditional predictions--the assessed probability that a certain outcome will occur given a certain condition--tend to be markedly inflated. The results suggest that this inflation derives in part from backward activation in which the target outcome highlights aspects of the condition that are consistent with that outcome, thus supporting the plausibility of that outcome. One consequence of this process is that alternative outcomes are not conceived to compete as fully as they should. Another consequence is that prediction inflation is resistant to manipulations that induce participants to consider alternative outcomes to the target outcome. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relationship between probability of endorsement and social desirability scale value for a set of 2,824 personality statements.

A group of 47 male and 48 female judges rated 2824 personality statements for social desirability using a 9-point rating scale. Another group of 110 male and 111 female Ss described themselves in terms of the same set of 2824 statements by answering each "true" or "false." The correlation between probability of a "true" response and social desirability scale value for the combined sex groups was .892. The distribution of the social desirability scale values of the 2824 statements was distinctly bimodal. These results are in accord with another large-scale study in which 1647 personality statements were investigated. In view of the large number of personality statements involved in these 2 studies, it is suggested that a correlation of .90 between probability of endorsement and social desirability scale value and a bimodal distribution of the scale values of personality statements may be characteristic of the population. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditions for the Acceptance of Deontic Conditionals.

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities": Correction to Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003).

Reports an error in "The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities" by Klaus Oberauer and Oliver Wilhelm (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003[Jul], Vol 29[4], 680-693). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a p2003-06626-018.) Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Scale judgments of triplets of opinion statements.

115 students at Boston University evaluated the attitude positions of anonymous sources when different sets of 3 opinion statements were attributed to them. The triplets varied in the extent to which their constituent statements reflected strongly favorable to strongly unfavorable sentiments in regard to capital punishment. The results indicate that the scale judgment of a triplet and confidence concerning judgment are affected by the mean of the scale values of the component statements and by the dispersion of the scale values around the mean. The extreme triplets are judged even more pro or con than any of their constituents. The judges' own positions on the issue did not affect their evaluations of the triplets. (24 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consequential Conditionals: Invited and Suppressed Inferences From Valued Outcomes.

Consequential conditionals are defined as "if P then Q" statements, where P is an action, and Q a predicted outcome of this action, which is either desirable or undesirable to the agent. Experiment 1 shows that desirable (viz. undesirable) outcomes invite an inference to the truth (viz. falsity) of their antecedent. Experiment 2 shows that the more extreme the outcome is, the stronger the invited inference is. Experiment 3 shows that modus ponens from premises "If A then C, A" can be suppressed with the introduction of a consequential conditional, "If C then Q," where Q is an undesirable outcome. Experiment 4 shows that the more undesirable Q is, the larger the suppression is. The authors discuss how these results can enrich current approaches of conditional inference on the basis of mental models, complementary necessary conditions, and conditional probabilities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Amphetamine and the adenosine A2A antagonist KW-6002 enhance the effects of conditional temporal probability of a stimulus in rats.

As the length of foreperiod preceding an imperative signal increases, reaction time decreases and anticipatory (prior to the signal) responding increases. The authors designed a task to dissociate the effect of elapsing time in the foreperiod and conditional temporal probability of the imperative stimulus. The effects of 2 drugs--amphetamine and KW-6002--known to enhance the effect of foreperiod were compared. Three groups of rats were trained to respond to an auditory signal presented at 1 of 3 foreperiods, unpredictable from trial to trial. The length of preparation time was different for each group, but conditional temporal probability was the same. Reaction times were faster as a function of increased preparation time, whereas anticipatory responses were strongly modulated by conditional probability. Both amphetamine and KW-6002 speeded reaction times and increased anticipatory responding. The pattern of behavior was consistent with the suggestion that they enhanced the motor preparatory effects of conditional probability rather than speeded a timing process. The authors concluded that preparation time and expectancy (conditional temporal probability of an imperative signal) have differential effects on performance and that amphetamine and KW-6002 enhance the effect of expectancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How people interpret conditionals: Shifts toward the conditional event.

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a 6-sided die and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upward when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the sides of each die. In 2 experiments (N? = 66, N? = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional's antecedent and consequent: Participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: Conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference = 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Choice strategies in multiple-cue probability learning.

Choice strategies for selecting among outcomes in multiple-cue probability learning were investigated using a simulated medical diagnosis task. Expected choice probabilities (the proportion of times each outcome was selected given each cue pattern) under alternative choice strategies were constructed from corresponding observed judged probabilities (of each outcome given each cue pattern) and compared with observed choice probabilities. Most of the participants were inferred to have responded by using a deterministic strategy, in which the outcome with the higher judged probability is consistently chosen, rather than a probabilistic strategy, in which an outcome is chosen with a probability equal to its judged probability. Extended practice in the learning environment did not affect choice strategy selection, contrary to reports from previous studies, results of which may instead be attributable to changes with practice in the variability and extremity of the perceived probabilities on which the choices were based. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emotional and academic consequences of parental conditional regard: Comparing conditional positive regard, conditional negative regard, and autonomy support as parenting practices.

The authors conducted 2 studies of 9th-grade Israeli adolescents (169 in Study 1, 156 in Study 2) to compare the parenting practices of conditional positive regard, conditional negative regard, and autonomy support using data from multiple reporters. Two socialization domains were studied: emotion control and academics. Results were consistent with the self-determination theory model of internalization, which posits that (a) conditional negative regard predicts feelings of resentment toward parents, which then predict dysregulation of negative emotions and academic disengagement; (b) conditional positive regard predicts feelings of internal compulsion, which then predict suppressive regulation of negative emotions and grade-focused academic engagement; and (c) autonomy support predicts sense of choice, which then predicts integrated regulation of negative emotions and interest-focused academic engagement. These findings suggest that even parents’ use of conditional positive regard as a socialization practice has adverse emotional and academic consequences, relative to autonomy support. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and Conditional Probability Judgments: A Global Matching Approach.

Age differences in bias in conditional probability judgments were investigated based on predictions derived from the Minerva-Decision Making model (M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), a global matching model of likelihood judgment. In this study, 248 younger and older adults completed frequency judgment and conditional probability judgment tasks. Age differences in the frequency judgment task are interpreted as an age-related deficit in memory encoding. Older adults' stronger biases in the probability judgment task point to age differences in criterion setting. Age-related biases were eliminated when age groups were equated on memory encoding by means of study time manipulation. The authors conclude that older adults' stronger judgment biases are a function of memory impairment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Deductive rationality in validating and testing conditional inferences.

We asked people to validate conditional inferences (e.g., "A, therefore C" with "if A then C"). People are more likely to look for falsifications ("A and not-C") versus confirmations ("A and C") given a forced choice. Second, falsification rates are lower for logically valid versus invalid inferences. Logically valid inferences are inferences that follow necessarily. Experiment 1 (N = 96) shows that emphasising this logicality constraint increases falsification rates in the validation task and corroborates that validation-by-falsification increases logically correct inference evaluations. Experiment 2 (N = 41) corroborates the other way round that people who are more likely to make logically correct evaluations, show higher falsification performance in the validation task. The results support mental-models theory and suggest alternative theories similarly need to specify how people would go about looking for counterexamples. We proffer such a specification for two alternatives to the model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Expected base rates and trait covariations in person perception.

This paper is primarily concerned with judgments about the characteristics of the general other and the incorporation of these expectancies in the judgment of specific others. Expectancies are defined in terms of (1) the perceived probability of occurrence of attributes in the general other, and (2) the perceived probability of joint occurrence of attributes in the general other. Along with other related variables, the veridicality of these expectancies are discussed. In addition, the idea of the greater informational value of atypical known behaviour about a specific other (behaviour which occurs infrequently in the general other) is considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hypothetical and certain inferences from conditional arguments read in texts.

In 3 experiments, affirmative and hypothetical probes were presented after narrative texts containing conditional arguments. According to the data, readers represented modus ponens deductions as certain, except when it was only a weakly necessary cause of a given effect. They represented any logically invalid inferences resulting from affirming the conditional consequent as hypothetical, except when it was the effect of strongly sufficient cause. Accordingly, readers must be processing conditional syntax as an asymmetric constraint. However, the underlying causal knowledge can be sufficient either to discredit or warrant the inferences. Thus according to the theory of natural logic, readers can draw formal deductions and be convinced of their necessity. This provides further evidence that readers can represent their inferences as hypothetical (N. Campion, 2004). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals.

We consider reasoning about prefactual possibilities in the future, for example, "if I were to win the lottery next year I would buy a yacht" and counterfactual possibilities, for example, "if I had won the lottery last year, I would have bought a yacht." People may reason about indicative conditionals, for example, "if I won the lottery I bought a yacht" by keeping in mind a few true possibilities, for example, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht." They understand counterfactuals by keeping in mind two possibilities, the conjecture, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht" and the presupposed facts, "I did not win the lottery and I did not buy a yacht." We report the results of three experiments on prefactuals that examine what people judge them to imply, the possibilities they judge to be consistent with them, and the inferences they judge to follow from them. The results show that reasoners keep a single possibility in mind to understand a prefactual. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making sense of surprise: An investigation of the factors influencing surprise judgments.

Surprise is often defined in terms of disconfirmed expectations, whereby the surprisingness of an event is thought to be dependent on the degree to which it contrasts with a more likely, or expected, outcome. The authors investigated the alternative hypothesis that surprise is more accurately modeled as a manifestation of an ongoing sense-making process. In a series of experiments, participants were given a number of scenarios and rated surprise and probability for various hypothetical outcomes that either confirmed or disconfirmed an expectation. Experiment 1 demonstrated that representational specificity influences the relationship that holds between surprise and probability ratings. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the inclusion of an enabling event lowers surprise ratings for disconfirming outcomes. Experiment 3 explored the reason for this effect, revealing that enabling events lower surprise by reducing uncertainty, thus enhancing ease of integration. Experiment 4 evaluated the contrast hypothesis directly, showing that differences in contrast are not correlated with differences in surprise. These results provide converging support for the view that the level of surprise experienced for an event is related to the difficulty of integrating that event with an existing representation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Measurement issues associated with conditional reasoning tests: Indirect measurement and test faking.

Conditional reasoning is a new measurement technique used to measure cognitive biases associated with latent personality motives. The current article describes 3 studies examining 2 related measurement issues associated with conditional reasoning tests (CRTs). Study 1 examined the necessity of maintaining indirect assessment when administering CRTs. Results indicated that, compared with a control condition, 2 experimental conditions that disclosed the purpose of assessment yielded significant mean shifts on a CRT. Study 2 explored whether CRTs could be faked when the purpose of assessment was not disclosed. Results indicated that when indirect measurement was maintained, CRTs appeared to be resistant to faking. Study 3 compared scores on the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression across student, applicant, and incumbent samples. Results indicated no significant mean differences among these samples. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)