Constructivism and rational-emotive therapy: A critique.

Comments on the work of M. J. Mahoney and T. J. Gabriel (see record 1989-12682-001) by (1) addressing the claim that rational-emotive therapy (RET) is rationalistic, (2) examining the technical language of A. Ellis's (published 1962–1989) RET and A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy as a source of confusion about their epistemology, and (3) proposing a view of the constructivistic vs rationalistic dichotomy as an attempt to discriminate a humanistic orientation in counseling and psychotherapy from one that seems more scientific in its aims and methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Ellis's critique of Wessler's critique of rational-emotive therapy.

Points out inconsistencies in A. Ellis's (see record 1994-18385-001) critique of the contention that rational-emotive therapy is constructivistic in theory but not in practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Another reply to Wessler's critique of rational-emotive therapy.

Comments on R. Wessler's (see record 1994-18429-001) reply to a critique of A. Ellis's (see record 1994-18385-001) critique of rational emotive therapy's views on constructivism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Efficacy of rational-emotive therapy: A quantitative analysis.

Meta-analysis of 28 controlled studies on the efficacy of rational-emotive therapy (RET) showed RET to be superior to placebo and no treatment but equally effective in comparison with other types of treatment such as combination therapies and systematic desensitization. No support was found for the view that RET with a main or balanced emphasis on behavioral techniques is more efficacious than RET with a primarily or exclusively cognitive approach. However, given the heterogeneity of the set of studies and its relatively small sample size, interpretations of results have to be made with caution, particularly because evidence was found for a relationship between study characteristics and magnitude of effect size. For the sake of meta-analysis, outcome studies should be required to report at least the means and standard deviations for all experimental groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reflections on rational-emotive therapy.

Reflects on rational-emotive therapy in 1955, and discusses some of its recent constructivist and humanist theories and practices. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An appraisal of rational-emotive therapy.

Albert Ellis's rational-emotive therapy (RET) is scrutinized on several conceptual and empirical grounds, including its reliance on constructive assessment and its ethical stance. Its professional impact thus far exceeds its scientific status. Opinion varies on how even to define irrational beliefs; 1 consequence is problems in assessing them. Meta-analytic reviews provide support for the general utility of RET, but more qualitative reviews question both the internal and external validity of much of the published research. Lacking are process studies that can shed light on the mechanisms of therapeutic change, a situation likely due to the complexity of RET and to a lack of consensus as well about its very definition. Perhaps more progress can be achieved by forsaking studies of RET as a package and shifting instead to an examination of specific therapeutic tactics in particular circumstances. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive mediation in person-centered and rational-emotive therapy.

Relations among counselor and client cognitive and behavioral variables were examined in relation to counselor and client ratings of counseling effectiveness. Unlike previous cognitive-mediational process research on counseling, the conceptual and coding systems used were tailored specifically to two different counseling approaches. Data were obtained from videotapes of 20 counseling sessions and from 40 stimulated recall interviews with both counselors and clients following the counseling sessions. Ten of the sessions followed a rational-emotive format; 10 followed a person-centered format. Both therapeutic conditions consisted of two dyads, each studied experimentally during 5 sessions selected from brief counseling interventions. Results indicated that variables composed from both cognitive and behavioral data predicted participant ratings of counseling effectiveness more than did behavioral variables alone. As in previous research, such relations seemed to depend on a strong negative correlation between counselor transparency (accurate client perceptions of counselor intentions) and participant ratings of counseling effectiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Inaccurate implications of philosophy of science and rational-emotive therapy: A reply to DiGiuseppe.

Argues that contrary to R. DiGiuseppe's (see record 1987-22610-001) claims, irrational beliefs are evaluative cognitions with central importance theories of emotion and are the focus of disputing in rational-emotive therapy. The concept of personal paradigm and the potential contributions of cognitive psychology to cognitive psychotherapy are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cost effectiveness of an employee assistance program with rational-emotive therapy.

We propose that the emergence of employee assistance programs provides an opportunity for psychologists to demonstrate the financial utility of psychological services. A case example of cost-benefit study demonstrates that rational-emotive therapy applied as an in-house employee assistance program saved a corporation at least $2.74 for each dollar spent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The implication of the philosophy of science for rational-emotive theory and therapy.

Suggests that rational-emotive therapy (RET) reflects specific philosophical positions, the most important of which is A. Ellis's (1962, 1979) position on epistemology. The notion of defining beliefs as rational or irrational and the primary clinical strategy in RET of disputing irrational beliefs demonstrates this epistemological emphasis. In disputing irrational beliefs, the therapist asks the client to question a specific irrational belief and the criteria for holding that belief. R. Wessler and R. Wessler's (1980) expanded RET model is reviewed, and a revised model involving constructual abilities and personal paradigms is proposed. A case example of a 53-yr-old White female with intense social anxiety illustrates the relationship between inferences, evaluations, and the personal paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Initial study using fixed-role and rational-emotive therapy in treating public-speaking anxiety.

22 undergraduates who reported high levels of public-speaking anxiety received fixed-role, or rational-emotive group therapy, or no therapy. Pre- and posttherapy measures included 5 self-report and 2 behavioral measures. Support for the hypothesis that treatment would reduce anxiety more than no treatment was secured on most self-report measures. To the extent that reliability permitted data analysis, the behavioral data showed no significant differences. Results lend some support to the common assumption that psychotherapy as compared to no treatment is effective in reducing emotional disorders, and that cognitive therapies, as well as behavioral therapies, are amenable to controlled study if clear definition of variables is obtained. (19 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Inaccurate implications of philosophy of science and rational-emotive therapy: A reply to DiGiuseppe": A reply to Wessler.

Disputes points made by R. L. Wessler (see record 1988-30350-001) about the present author's proposal that rational-emotive theory adopted T. S. Kuhn's (1962) construct of paradigms to better understand the nature and origin of irrational beliefs and to guide the disputing process in psychotherapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychiatric diagnosis: A critique.

An analysis of the problems involved in psychiatric diagnosis, its validity, reliability, purpose, and achievement in light of the authors' own opinions and empirical evidence. They conclude that a classificatory system in psychiatry serves the same essential purpose as taxonomy in science in general, and that a simple, coherent, and meaningful system of classification based on behavioral correlates of psychiatric syndromes is possible. (77 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Critique of rational-emotive philosophy.

Comments on rational-emotive therapy (RET) and its relationship to rational-emotive psychology (REP) as discussed by P. W. Sharkey (see record 1982-26956-001) and A. Ellis (see record 1982-26947-001). The present author concurs with Sharkey's view that REP is not logically or epistemologically necessary to the conduct of RET. Critical analysis reveals logical and philosophical confusion in Ellis's response and confirms Sharkey's findings of conceptual difficulties in REP. One source of the confusion is thought to be the dependency on the world view of logical positivism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive psychology: A phenomenological critique.

Reviews the general orientation of cognitive psychology, some contemporary difficulties and problems noted by cognitive psychologists, and apparent commonalities between phenomenological and cognitive psychologies. It is argued that the problems of cognitive psychology are inevitable consequences of its natural scientific orientation, which is far more traditional than it is revolutionary. A phenomenologically based, human science approach to psychology is offered as a solution of fundamental disciplinary problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Concept of process-reactive schizophrenia: A critique.

A review of current issues, including (1) the dichotomy vs. continuum view of the process-reactive concept, (2) the question of organic involvement in process schizophrenia, (3) the relationship of severity of illness to the concept, (4) the problem of duration of hospitalization, (5) comparability of criteria, (6) adequacy of control groups, (7) sociocultural diversity, and (8) uniformity of process-reactive differences. (2 p. ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic representation of meaning: A critique.

The representational view of mind is examined by focusing on what is perhaps its key tenet, namely, that semantic representations serve as the basis for the knowledge of meaning and for the production and comprehension of linguistic expressions. The argument marshalled against this view is twofold and involves conceptual and methodological, empirical, procedural, and developmental considerations. First, I invoke contextual considerations to mark the limitations of the standard account of the representation of meaning. Second, I point out the inadequacy of a two-stage model based on the distinction beween standard and nonstandard meaning. I conclude that semantic representations are the products of cognitive activity, not the basis for it. Rather than serving as the general framework for such activity, they are associated with particular, advanced stages of it that are generally characterized by a degree of autonomy from context and from the agent's action in the world. Alternatives to the representational framework are explored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Acute stress disorder: A synthesis and critique.

The diagnosis of acute stress disorder (ASD) was introduced to describe initial trauma reactions that predict chronic posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This review outlines and critiques the rationales underpinning the ASD diagnosis and highlights conceptual and empirical problems inherent in this diagnosis. The authors conclude that there is little justification for the ASD diagnosis in its present form. The evidence for and against the current emphasis on peritraumatic dissociation is discussed, and the range of biological and cognitive mechanisms that potentially mediate acute trauma response is reviewed. The available evidence indicates that alternative means of conceptualizing acute trauma reactions and identifying acutely traumatized people who are at risk of developing PTSD need to be considered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Measurement of moral values: A review and critique.

A historical review of the literature on efforts to assess strength of moral values led to the conclusion that existing instruments have weaknesses which limit their utility for psychological research. The most important of these weaknesses are: (1) questionable assumptions about the relationship of moral values and moral behavior, (2) a focus on moral abstractions rather than moral behavior in realistic contexts, (3) reliance on subjective and inferential scoring procedures which stress "correct" moral values, and (4) inadequate standardization. It is concluded that moral values are best conceptualized as subjective and individual attitudes whose measurement is most meaningfully achieved independent of a concern with moral behavior and conventional standards of moral evaluation. (2 p. ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cost effectiveness of an employee assistance program with rational€motive therapy: A critique.

Raises 2 issues with an article by S. H. Klarreich et al (see record 1987-29949-001) concerning methodological considerations (a no-control group posttest design) and data analysis. It is suggested that cost-benefit research needs to be carried out carefully. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)