Constructivism and rational-emotive therapy: A critique.

Comments on the work of M. J. Mahoney and T. J. Gabriel (see record 1989-12682-001) by (1) addressing the claim that rational-emotive therapy (RET) is rationalistic, (2) examining the technical language of A. Ellis's (published 1962–1989) RET and A. T. Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy as a source of confusion about their epistemology, and (3) proposing a view of the constructivistic vs rationalistic dichotomy as an attempt to discriminate a humanistic orientation in counseling and psychotherapy from one that seems more scientific in its aims and methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Professor Bechtoldt's critique.

Presents a reply regarding Bechtoldt's critique (see record 1960-06754-001) of the article by Haggard et al. (see record 1960-00131-001). True, many of the comments in his section on "Factor Analytic Techniques" are interesting and informative--and generally corrective--but they are also essentially irrelevant to our paper and its purpose. There is clear difference of opinion as to whether, when, or what factor analytic techniques should be used in particular cases. Some of Bechtoldt's remarks in his sections entitled "Direct Correlation Methods'and "Concluding Remarks" call for more specific comment, primarily because I think he misses the point from time to time. Bechtoldt has us on the ropes when he cites the statement "with the procedures discussed thus far, it is not possible to form groups around such a priori profiles." We should have said "not practicable" (instead of using the too strong term "not possible") to indicate that, for the majority of research workers, these procedures are not possible from a practical point of view. In his concluding paragraph, he appears to chide us (following his phrase "other technically questionable discussions") for possibly suggesting "the testing of statistical hypotheses using sets of related observations." We took pains to observe that, although multivariate data can be analyzed properly only by the appropriate multivariate statistical techniques, approximate produres for pattern analytic studies are available which utilize most of the information in the data without violating certain important statistical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Balay and Shevrin: Constructive critique or misguided attack?

Comments on J. Balay and H. Shevrin's (see record 1988-20203-001) article on subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA) and offers observations concerning (1) the perceived threat posed by SPA research to belief in subliminal perception and psychodynamic hypotheses; (2) Balay and Shevrin's view of science; and (3) errors, biased statements, and inadequate analyses of the SPA findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic representation of meaning: A critique.

The representational view of mind is examined by focusing on what is perhaps its key tenet, namely, that semantic representations serve as the basis for the knowledge of meaning and for the production and comprehension of linguistic expressions. The argument marshalled against this view is twofold and involves conceptual and methodological, empirical, procedural, and developmental considerations. First, I invoke contextual considerations to mark the limitations of the standard account of the representation of meaning. Second, I point out the inadequacy of a two-stage model based on the distinction beween standard and nonstandard meaning. I conclude that semantic representations are the products of cognitive activity, not the basis for it. Rather than serving as the general framework for such activity, they are associated with particular, advanced stages of it that are generally characterized by a degree of autonomy from context and from the agent's action in the world. Alternatives to the representational framework are explored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A reply to Ellis's critique of Wessler's critique of rational-emotive therapy.

Points out inconsistencies in A. Ellis's (see record 1994-18385-001) critique of the contention that rational-emotive therapy is constructivistic in theory but not in practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Promoting father involvement: An analysis and critique: Comment on Silverstein (1993).

In analyzing the forces that undermine greater fathering involvement in American society, L. B. Silverstein (see record 1994-17264-001) critiques the views of R. Trivers (1972), J. Belsky, L. Steinberg, and P. Draper (1991), and many sociobiological thinkers regarding the determinants of parenting. Despite the shared view regarding the value of promoting greater father involvement, there are several problems with Silverstein's analysis: (1) casting conservatives as extremists who deny the role of environment in shaping fathering; (2) omitting from the analysis of sociobiology the core notion that organisms adjust their behavior in response to environmental forces in the service of biological, that is, reproductive-fitness, goals; and (3) characterizing the Belsky et al theory of socialization as one that minimizes the role of the environment and implies that intervention efforts to foster father involvement are ineffective for biological and developmental reasons. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The postmodern turn in psychoanalysis: A critique.

In the recent literature, legitimate criticisms of some traditional psychoanalytic views have been transformed into untenable philosophical positions that do not constitute an adequate basis for psychoanalytic theory or practice. For example, skepticism toward the therapeutic value of insight and self-knowledge has been transformed into a philosophical position that rules out the very possibility of discovering truths about the mind. According to this view, rather than uncovering and discovering what is in the patient's mind, the mind is "interpretively constructed." The author argues that all of the difficulties of traditional theory identified by "new view" theorists do not obviate the need to recognize the existence of the patient's psychic reality independent of interpretive constructions and to attempt to understand that reality as fully and as accurately as possible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contemporary theories of depression: critique and comparison

Three theoretical viewpoints have dominated the recent empirically oriented literature on depression: A. Beck's (see PA, Vol 53:7512) cognitive view, M. Seligman's (see PA, Vol 53:7618) helplessness model, and P. M. Lewinsohn's (see PA, Vol 53:7587) theory implicating a low rate of response-contingent reinforcement. In this paper, each theory is evaluated individually in terms of its empirical support and adequacy as a theory, and the theories are contrasted and compared with one another. Special attention is given to recent studies not discussed in the theorists' major summary papers and to empirical findings whose relevance to a particular theory has not previously been noted. Although there is reason to believe that any or all of the elements suggested by the three theorists—perception, control, and rate of reinforcement—are of import in depression, none has been proven to be a necessary antecedent of depressive episodes. (3 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Childhood depression: A critique of the concept.

Examines the concept of early childhood depression as an independent constellation of symptoms. Opposed to this concept is the view that putative symptoms of depression observed clinically are merely transitory developmental phenomena that dissipate as a function of time. Examination of the published clinical literature indicates that childhood depression is diagnosed and treated as a distinct syndrome; some reports suggest that the condition may even be underdiagnosed. Data adduced from longitudinal and epidemiological studies, however, show marked variations of such symptoms with children's age: symptoms are less frequent in older children. Moreover, the prevalence of many of these symptoms in normal children is great enough to suggest that clinical manifestations are neither statistically atypical nor psychopathologic. Pertinent epidemiological reasearch has not, however, been undertaken. It is concluded that no reliable and valid method for assessing this presumed condition in children has been developed, and diagnosis is based largely on surmise. It is suggested that the question of iatrogenic effects of treatment needs to be studied. (56 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Revisiting Skeels' final study: A critique.

Reviews H. M. Skeels's (see record 1966-13077-001) study on the effect of early environment on intelligence. Although such findings are often regarded as irrefutable, a reexamination of the supposed decrement in intelligence in the contrast group and the supposed increment in the intelligence in the treatment group led the author to disagree. It is concluded that the study is riddled and confounded with variables that make a clear interpretation of the results impossible. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Concept of process-reactive schizophrenia: A critique.

A review of current issues, including (1) the dichotomy vs. continuum view of the process-reactive concept, (2) the question of organic involvement in process schizophrenia, (3) the relationship of severity of illness to the concept, (4) the problem of duration of hospitalization, (5) comparability of criteria, (6) adequacy of control groups, (7) sociocultural diversity, and (8) uniformity of process-reactive differences. (2 p. ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to a "critique and reformulation" of behavior therapy.

It is argued that Breger and McGaugh's (see 39:4) criticisms are misguided and fail to mention numerous studies and arguments which support the view that behavior therapy is an encouraging development and has already achieved some therapeutic success. Attention is drawn to various "laws of learning" which have been employed in constructing treatment techniques and for generating and assessing specific hypotheses. Several doubtful assertions made by Breger and McGaugh are discussed and factual errors are corrected. Their suggested reformulation of behavior therapy is rejected as being fragmentary, vague, and unconstructive. (38 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The primacy of primary control is a human universal: A reply to Gould's (1999) critique of the life-span theory of control.

This reply to S. J. Gould's (see record 1999-03499-007) critique of J. Heckhausen and R. Schulz's (see record 1995-24550-001) life-span theory of control addresses four issues: (1) the universal claim that primary control holds functional primacy over secondary control, (2) the status of secondary control as a confederate to primary control, (3) empirical evidence and paradigms for investigating universality and cultural variations, and (4) the capacity of the human control system to manage both gains and losses in control throughout the life span and aging-related decline in particular. Theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence from evolutionary, comparative, developmental, and cultural psychology are presented to support the authors' view that primary control striving holds functional primacy throughout the life span and across cultural and historical settings. Recommendations for empirically investigating the variations in the way primary control striving is expressed in different cultures are outlined. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A critique of "Fears as attitudes."

Contends that in a recent study by R. M. Suinn, et al (see record 1972-09128-001) on the proposition that "fears are attitudes," data analysis was inadequate and incorrect and unjustified conclusions were drawn from the results. It is further shown that the converse of their proposition, that attitudes are like fears, has more heuristic value and several important implications for social psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Professional ideology: A response to a critique.

The present author responds to the article by J. Stubbins (see record 1985-31779-001) on rehabilitation services as ideology by providing an analysis of historical and philosophical bases of disability policies. It is posited that socioeconomic forces have influenced rehabilitation services' focus upon the individual client and that their impact persists despite evidence of the ineffectiveness of this approach. It is suggested that what Stubbins says could be valid for all human-service programs. (7 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attribution and affect: Comments on Sohn's critique.

The author examines D. Sohn's (see record 1978-21902-001) critique of his analysis of the attribution–affect relation. Weiner agrees that one should separate emotional reactions from interpersonal evaluation and that effort does not magnify all the possible affective reactions to success and failure. A conception relating attributions to affect that can incorporate Sohn's data is outlined. Weiner expresses the hope that this theoretical approach will provide a new path to the analysis of emotions. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of facial response in self-reports of emotion: A critique of Laird.

Discusses a study by J. D. Laird (see record 1985-11387-001) that contrasted 16 successful demonstrations of the facial feedback hypothesis with R. Tourangeau and P. C. Ellsworth's (see record 1981-00499-001) failure to demonstrate any effects of facial expressions on mood. It is argued that Laird's conclusion that facial feedback effects have been demonstrated consistently and that the null results of the Tourangeau-Ellsworth study are atypical is more strongly worded than current evidence warrants. It is shown that most of the 16 successful studies are relevant only to the weak (dimensional) version of the hypothesis and not to the strong (categorical) version that Tourangeau and Ellsworth sought to test. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

An empirical examination of Weiner's critique of attribution research.

Evaluates 3 of the allegations of error made by B. Weiner (see record 1983-32685-001) about methodological pitfalls in attributional research. The present authors (see record 1985-15804-001) contend that failure to confirm Weiner's predictions occurred because of theoretical shortcomings inherent in his model rather than because of procedural limitations in testing it. The path analysis of the cognitive model of achievement motivation study of the present authors (see record 1981-01260-001) was replicated using undergraduates dissatisfied by their midterm examinations. The time interval for retest was lengthened from 2 days to 3 wks. Results show that disconfirmation of Weiner's prediction occurred irrespective of which expectancy measure (expectancy or expectancy change) or which behavioral criterion was employed. Expansion of the cognitive model to include additional affective variables (humiliation, guilt, and shame reactions) were useful in understanding the role of effort cognitions in eliciting failure-induced affect. (46 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of From classical to contemporary psychoanalysis: A critique and integration.

Reviews the book, From classical to contemporary psychoanalysis: A critique and integration by Morris N. Eagle (see record 2010-09133-000). The entire contents of the current volume is conceptually organized, a veritable tour de force in its capacity to grab hold of a mass of sprawling, unruly theories, clinical data, and related research, and shape them into an easily digestible, overarching view of the current state of psychoanalysis. The book is divided between Freud’s theories and selected contemporary theories, and each of those two major sections consists of subsections on the nature of mind, object relations, psychopathology, and treatment, as seen from both the Freudian and the contemporary perspective. The third and last section of the book presents divergences and convergences between both camps, and among theories within each camp. It is hard to imagine any course taught in a psychoanalytic institute of any persuasion that would not derive immense benefit from the inclusion of related readings from this book. Most apparent in this volume is the clarity of Eagle’s thought and the deeply respectful attitude he brings to others’ work, even those he disagrees with. Eagle provides a cogent rationale for even the most arcane of Freud’s speculations regarding the functioning of the mental apparatus, including some unique insights such as the “ironic centrality of object relations” in that model. With equal clarity he lays out the contemporary critique of Freud’s work, especially his model of mind, a critique which proposes to substitute notions of experience as unformulated and indeterminate (e.g., Donnell Stern), the unconscious as consisting of veridical representations of early interactions (e.g., attachment theorists, Daniel Stern, Beebee and Lachman), and the mind as socially constructed (e.g., Stolorow, Mitchell). As these contemporary theorists have critiqued Freud’s model, Eagle provides an incisive critique of these newer models. However, I suspect that even the strict constructionists in each theoretical camp will appreciate Eagle’s efforts to present their theory in its best and most reasonable light. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)