Adult age differences in the realism of confidence judgments: Overconfidence, format dependence, and cognitive predictors.

Realistic confidence judgments are essential to everyday functioning, but few studies have addressed the issue of age differences in overconfidence. Therefore, the authors examined this issue with probability judgment and intuitive confidence intervals in a sample of 122 healthy adults (ages: 35-40, 55-60, 70-75 years). In line with predictions based on the na?ve sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), substantial format dependence was observed, with extreme overconfidence when confidence was expressed as an intuitive confidence interval but not when confidence was expressed as a probability judgment. Moreover, an age-related increase in overconfidence was selectively observed when confidence was expressed as intuitive confidence intervals. Structural equation modeling indicated that the age-related increases in overconfidence were mediated by a general cognitive ability factor that may reflect executive processes. Finally, the results indicated that part of the negative influence of increased age on general ability may be compensated for by an age-related increase in domain-relevant knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Local and Global Judgments of Confidence.

Studies of calibration have shown that people's mean confidence in their answers (local confidence) tends to be greater than their overall estimate of the percentage of correct answers (global confidence). Moreover, whereas the former exhibits overconfidence, the latter often exhibits underconfidence. Three studies present evidence that global underconfidence reflects a failure to make an allowance for correct answers that are likely to result from mere guessing and can be eliminated by informing participants of the dubious normative status of estimates below 50% (i.e., chance). Previously reported discrepancies between global and local confidence, it is concluded, arise less from possible methodological artifacts in assessment of local confidence than from normatively inappropriate assessments of global confidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty.

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Subjective Probability Intervals: How to Reduce Overconfidence by Interval Evaluation.

Format dependence implies that assessment of the same subjective probability distribution produces different conclusions about over- or underconfidence depending on the assessment format. In 2 experiments, the authors demonstrate that the overconfidence bias that occurs when participants produce intervals for an uncertain quantity is almost abolished when they evaluate the probability that the same intervals include the quantity. The authors successfully apply a method for adaptive adjustment of probability intervals as a debiasing tool and discuss a tentative explanation in terms of a naive sampling model. According to this view, people report their experiences accurately, but they are naive in that they treat both sample proportion and sample dispersion as unbiased estimators, yielding small bias in probability evaluation but strong bias in interval production. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preference measurement by the methods of successive intervals and monetary estimates.

The method of successive intervals is compared with respondents' estimates of how much they would pay for a series of objects, as measures of object preference. It is argued that "the principle that consumers make purchases at those points on their buying continuum where marginal preferences are equal assumes that preferences measured for articles of different costs are based upon the same sized measuring unit." The method of successive intervals or other method based on a judgmental error unit calls for a correction when the range in preference variation is large, and the monetary estimates can be used to provide such a correction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sex bias in the diagnosis of primary orgasmic dysfunction.

M. Kaplan proposed that some diagnostic categories are constructed with a built-in sex bias, making diagnosis of females more likely by the very way the disorder is defined. However, critics such as Williams and Spitzer have remained unpersuaded that such categories exist. After briefly analyzing the concept of sex bias, I argue that Masters and Johnson's widely used diagnostic criteria for primary orgasmic disorders are sex biased in several ways. Problematic consequences of such biases include inflated incidence estimates for women, the appearance of enormous gender differences in pathology, ill-founded ideas about female psychosexual vulnerability, and overconfidence in the efficacy of sex therapy. Finally, contrary to Kaplan's critical comments about DSM-III, I argue that DSM-III's diagnostic criteria for orgasmic dysfunction correct the sex biases in Masters and Johnson's approach and represent substantial progress in diagnostic logic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Role of Coding Time in Estimating and Interpreting Growth Curve Models.

The coding of time in growth curve models has important implications for the interpretation of the resulting model that are sometimes not transparent. The authors develop a general framework that includes predictors of growth curve components to illustrate how parameter estimates and their standard errors are exactly determined as a function of receding time in growth curve models. Linear and quadratic growth model examples are provided, and the interpretation of estimates given a particular coding of time is illustrated. How and why the precision and statistical power of predictors of lower order growth curve components changes over time is illustrated and discussed. Recommendations include coding time to produce readily interpretable estimates and graphing lower order effects across time with appropriate confidence intervals to help illustrate and understand the growth process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias among physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses.

Examines findings showing that (1) those who know an event has occurred tend to claim that, if they had been asked to predict the event in advance, they would have been likely to do so; and (2) such Ss demonstrate hindsight bias to the extent that their "prediction" accuracy exceeds the accuracy of others who actually make the prediction without knowledge of the outcome. 75 practicing physicians were divided into 5 equal groups and given the same medical case history. The foresight group was asked to assign a probability estimate to each of 4 possible diagnoses. The 4 hindsight groups were asked to do the same, but each was told that a different 1 of the 4 possible diagnoses was correct. The hindsight groups, who were told that the least likely diagnoses were correct, assigned far greater probability estimates to these "correct" diagnoses than did the foresight group. Implications for physicians are discussed with respect to overconfident 2nd opinions, overconfidence in diagnostic accuracy, and inadequate appreciation of the original difficulty of diagnoses. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of strategies for reducing interval overconfidence in group judgments.

The present experiments examined several strategies designed to reduce interval overconfidence in group judgments. Results consistently indicated that 3–4 person nominal groups (whose members made independent judgments and later combined the highest and lowest of these estimates into a single confidence interval) were better calibrated than individual judges and interactive groups. This pattern held even when participants were directly instructed to expand their interval estimates, or when interactive groups appointed a devil's advocate or explicitly considered reasons why their interval estimates might be too narrow. Interactive groups did not perform substantially better than individuals, although participants frequently had the impression that group judgments were far superior to individual judgments. This misperception resembles the "illusion of group effectivity" found in brainstorming research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Illusions of competence for phonetically, orthographically, and semantically similar word pairs.

Illusions of competence are thought to arise when judgements of learning (JOLs) made in the presence of intact cue-target pairs during study create a “foresight bias,” such that JOLs are inflated by the apparent association between a cue and a target, despite the lack of benefit this association has for recall performance. For example, Castel, McCabe, and Roediger (2007) recently demonstrated an illusion of competence for identical word pairs (mouse—mouse). In two experiments, the authors examined possible sources for this overconfidence, including phonetic, semantic, and orthographic similarity. An illusion of competence was found for homophones, synonyms, orthographically similar, and unrelated items, whereas no illusion of competence was found for word pairs with a relatively high forward-semantic association. Self-paced study times indicated that encoding fluency was not closely associated with the magnitude of overconfidence. Error data revealed participants may have been engaging in strategic responding in order to maximise correct recall. Our results underscore the importance of considering factors that influence both JOLs and recall performance when considering sources of (mis)calibration in absolute accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting One's Own Forgetting: The Role of Experience-Based and Theory-Based Processes.

The authors examined the hypothesis that judgments of learning (JOL), if governed by processing fluency during encoding, should be insensitive to the anticipated retention interval. Indeed, neither item-by-item nor aggregate JOLs exhibited "forgetting" unless participants were asked to estimate recall rates for several different retention intervals, in which case their estimates mimicked closely actual recall rates. These results and others reported suggest that participants can access their knowledge about forgetting but only when theory-based predictions are made, and then only when the notion of forgetting is accentuated either by manipulating retention interval within individuals or by framing recall predictions in terms of forgetting rather than remembering. The authors interpret their findings in terms of the distinction between experience-based and theory-based JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Global-scale location and distance estimates: Common representations and strategies in absolute and relative judgments.

The authors examined whether absolute and relative judgments about global-scale locations and distances were generated from common representations. At the end of a 10-week class on the regional geography of the United States, participants estimated the latitudes of 16 North American cities and all possible pairwise distances between them. Although participants were relative experts, their latitude estimates revealed the presence of psychologically based regions with large gaps between them and a tendency to stretch North America southward toward the equator. The distance estimates revealed the same properties in the representation recovered via multidimensional scaling. Though the aggregated within- and between-regions distance estimates were fitted by Stevens's law (S. S. Stevens, 1957), this was an averaging artifact: The appropriateness of a power function to describe distance estimates depended on the regional membership of the cities. The authors conclude that plausible reasoning strategies, combined with regionalized representations and beliefs about the location of these relative to global landmarks, underlie global-scale latitude and distance judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Highly confident but wrong: Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments.

Although gender differences are fairly consistent when people report their general confidence, much less is known about such differences when individuals assess the degree of confidence they have in their ability to answer any particular test question. The objective of this research was to investigate gender differences in item-specific confidence judgments. Data were collected from 3 psychology courses containing 70 men and 181 women. After answering each item on course exams, students indicated their confidence that their answer to that item was correct. Results showed that gender differences in confidence are dependent on the context (whether items were correct or wrong) and on the domain being tested. Moreover, although both men and women were overconfident, undergraduate men were especially overconfident when incorrect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

To calculate or not to calculate: A source activation confusion model of problem familiarity's role in strategy selection.

How do people decide whether to try to retrieve an answer to a problem or to compute the answer by some other means? The authors report 2 experiments showing that this decision is based on problem familiarity rather than on retrievability of some answer (correct or incorrect), even when problem familiarization occurred 24 hr earlier. These effects at the level of the individual problem solver and the results reported by L. M. Reder and F. E. Ritter (see record 1992-30097-001) are well fit with the same parameter values in a spreading-activation computational model of feeling of knowing in which decisions to retrieve or compute an answer are based on the familiarity or activation levels of the problem representation. The authors therefore argue that strategy selection is governed by a familiarity-based feeling-of-knowing process rather than by a process that uses the availability of the answer or some form of race between retrieving and computing the answer. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?

People frequently mispredict the long-term emotional impact of circumstances. The authors examine 2 causes of such mispredictions-a focusing illusion and underappreciation of adaptation. In Experiment 1, the authors found, in 852 adults, that quality of life estimates (for living with disability) were not increased by reducing focusing illusions. In Experiment 2, the authors found, in 698 adults, that people's disability estimates were increased by asking them to reflect on adaptation. In Experiment 3, the authors found, across 312 Midwestern college students, that both approaches reduced the participants' predictions of the life satisfaction of their peers living in southern California. In the case of living in a better climate, the results suggest that attention to either cause influences people's predictions, whereas in the case of chronic disability, the results suggest that it is easier to get people to appreciate adaptation than it is to reduce focusing illusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) people use others’ opinions.

A basic issue in social influence is how best to change one’s judgment in response to learning the opinions of others. This article examines the strategies that people use to revise their quantitative estimates on the basis of the estimates of another person. The authors note that people tend to use 2 basic strategies when revising estimates: choosing between the 2 estimates and averaging them. The authors developed the probability, accuracy, redundancy (PAR) model to examine the relative effectiveness of these two strategies across judgment environments. A surprising result was that averaging was the more effective strategy across a wide range of commonly encountered environments. The authors observed that despite this finding, people tend to favor the choosing strategy. Most participants in these studies would have achieved greater accuracy had they always averaged. The identification of intuitive strategies, along with a formal analysis of when they are accurate, provides a basis for examining how effectively people use the judgments of others. Although a portfolio of strategies that includes averaging and choosing can be highly effective, the authors argue that people are not generally well adapted to the environment in terms of strategy selection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Unpriming: The Deactivation of Thoughts Through Expression.

Unpriming is a decrease in the influence of primed knowledge following a behavior expressing that knowledge. The authors investigated strategies for unpriming the knowledge of an answer that is activated when people are asked to consider a simple question. Experiment 1 found that prior correct answering eliminated the bias people normally show toward correct responding when asked to answer yes-no questions randomly. Experiment 2 revealed that prior answering intended to be random did not unprime knowledge on subsequent attempts to answer randomly. Experiment 3 found that exposure to the correct answer did not influence the knowledge bias but that exposure to the incorrect answer increased bias. Experiment 4 revealed that merely expressing the answer for oneself was sufficient to unprime knowledge. Experiment 5 found that each item of activated knowledge needs to be unprimed specifically, in that correctly answering 1 question does not reduce the knowledge bias in randomly answering another. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Regulation of memory accuracy with multiple answers: The plurality option.

We report two experiments that investigated the regulation of memory accuracy with a new regulatory mechanism: the plurality option. This mechanism is closely related to the grain-size option but involves control over the number of alternatives contained in an answer rather than the quantitative boundaries of a single answer. Participants were presented with a slideshow depicting a robbery (Experiment 1) or a murder (Experiment 2), and their memory was tested with five-alternative multiple-choice questions. For each question, participants were asked to generate two answers: a single answer consisting of one alternative and a plural answer consisting of the single answer and two other alternatives. Each answer was rated for confidence (Experiment 1) or for the likelihood of being correct (Experiment 2), and one of the answers was selected for reporting. Results showed that participants used the plurality option to regulate accuracy, selecting single answers when their accuracy and confidence were high, but opting for plural answers when they were low. Although accuracy was higher for selected plural than for selected single answers, the opposite pattern was evident for confidence or likelihood ratings. This dissociation between confidence and accuracy for selected answers was the result of marked overconfidence in single answers coupled with underconfidence in plural answers. We hypothesize that these results can be attributed to overly dichotomous metacognitive beliefs about personal knowledge states that cause subjective confidence to be extreme. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparative psychological studies of Negroes and whites in the United States: A clarification.

Dreger and Miller (see 35: 4875) criticize a paper by Pasamanick (see 21: 948) in terms of sampling and skin color estimates. This paper is an answer to these criticisms and a general discussion of the issues involved. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)