Feelings or Words? Understanding the Content in Self-Report Ratings of Experienced Emotion.

People differ in the extent to which their verbal reports of experienced emotion are valence focused or arousal focused. Three multimethod studies are reported to explore whether differential focus reflects individual differences in the cognitive structure of emotion language versus differences in phenomenological experience. Although there was some evidence that valence focus and arousal focus were linked to variations differences in cognitive structure, the findings are also consistent with the view that self-report ratings are being driven by the properties of the feelings that are being reported. Implications for the study of experienced emotion are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotion recognition across cultures: The influence of ethnicity on empathic accuracy and physiological linkage.

The present study tested whether empathic accuracy and physiological linkage during an emotion recognition task are facilitated by a cultural match between rater and target (cultural advantage model) or unaffected (cultural equivalence model). Participants were 161 college students of African American, Chinese American, European American, or Mexican American ethnicity. To assess empathic accuracy—knowing what another person is feeling—participant’s (raters) used a rating dial to provide continuous, real-time ratings of the valence and intensity of emotions being experienced by 4 strangers (targets). Targets were African American, Chinese American, European American, or Mexican American women who had been videotaped having a conversation with their dating partner in a previous study and had rated their own feelings during the interaction. Empathic accuracy was defined as the similarity between ratings of the videotaped interactions obtained from raters and targets. To assess emotional empathy—feeling what another person is feeling—we examined physiological linkage (similarity between raters’ and targets’ physiology). Our findings for empathic accuracy supported the cultural equivalence model, while those for physiological linkage provided some support for the cultural advantage model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The experience of power: Examining the effects of power on approach and inhibition tendencies.

Two studies of task-focused dyads tested the approach/inhibition theory of power (P. Keltner, D. H. Gruenfeld, & C. Anderson, in press), which posits that having power increases the tendency to approach and decreases the tendency to inhibit. Results provided preliminary support for the theory: Participants higher in personality dominance or assigned control over resources expressed their true attitudes, experienced more positive and less negative emotion, were more likely to perceive rewards (i.e., that their partner liked them), and were less likely to perceive threats (e.g., that their partner felt anger toward them). Most of these effects were mediated by the sense of power, suggesting that subjective feelings of power are an important component in the effects of power. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Valence Focus and the Perception of Facial Affect.

Individuals differ in the extent to which they emphasize feelings of pleasure or displeasure in their verbal reports of emotional experience, an individual difference termed valence focus (VF). This multimethod study indicates that VF is linked to heightened efficiency in perceptual processing of affective stimuli. Individuals higher in VF (i.e., who emphasized feelings of pleasure/displeasure in reports of emotional experiences) were more sensitive to changes in negative facial expressions than individuals lower in VF. The effect was not accounted for by current affective state or other personality characteristics. Implications for the validity of self-reported experienced emotion are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity of emotions.

Describes 4 views of emotion intensity and quality within the pleasure-arousal theory of emotions. It is argued that only 1 of these views is conceptually and empirically tenable. This view assumes that the quality of emotions, or at least the quality of their "affective core," is determined by the proportion of, and their intensity by the absolute degrees of, experienced pleasure or displeasure (P) and activation or deactivation (A). Results from 2 unidimensional scaling studies, in which a total of 69 affects were rated for the degree of P and A experienced at low, typical, and high intensities, were in accord with this position. 91 college students participated in these studies. To overcome a remaining problem of the theory, namely, that it does not allow one to distinguish among more than a few basic groups of emotions, a "hybrid" cognitive-P-A theory of emotion is proposed, according to which emotions are appraisal-caused patterns of P and A. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotion concepts and emotional states in social judgment and categorization.

An objection to conclusions of research investigating effects of emotions on cognitive processes is that the effects are due to the activation of semantic concepts rather than to emotional feelings. A sentence unscrambling task was developed to prime concepts of happiness, sadness, or neutral ideas. Pilot studies demonstrated that unscrambling emotional sentences did not affect emotional state but did prime semantically related words. Experiment 1 showed that the induction of emotional state but not the sentence unscrambling task produced emotion-congruent judgments. Results of Experiment 2 showed that individuals in emotional states categorized according to emotional equivalence more often than participants in a neutral state. Sentence unscrambling had no effect on emotional response categorization. The influences of emotions and emotion knowledge in cognition and emotion are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Escaping affect: How motivated emotion regulation creates insensitivity to mass suffering.

As the number of people in need of help increases, the degree of compassion people feel for them ironically tends to decrease. This phenomenon is termed the collapse of compassion. Some researchers have suggested that this effect happens because emotions are not triggered by aggregates. We provide evidence for an alternative account. People expect the needs of large groups to be potentially overwhelming, and, as a result, they engage in emotion regulation to prevent themselves from experiencing overwhelming levels of emotion. Because groups are more likely than individuals to elicit emotion regulation, people feel less for groups than for individuals. In Experiment 1, participants displayed the collapse of compassion only when they expected to be asked to donate money to the victims. This suggests that the effect is motivated by self-interest. Experiment 2 showed that the collapse of compassion emerged only for people who were skilled at emotion regulation. In Experiment 3, we manipulated emotion regulation. Participants who were told to down-regulate their emotions showed the collapse of compassion, but participants who were told to experience their emotions did not. We examined the time course of these effects using a dynamic rating to measure affective responses in real time. The time course data suggested that participants regulate emotion toward groups proactively, by preventing themselves from ever experiencing as much emotion toward groups as toward individuals. These findings provide initial evidence that motivated emotion regulation drives insensitivity to mass suffering. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Don't look down: Emotional arousal elevates height perception.

In a series of experiments, it was found that emotional arousal can influence height perception. In Experiment 1, participants viewed either arousing or nonarousing images before estimating the height of a 2-story balcony and the size of a target on the ground below the balcony. People who viewed arousing images overestimated height and target size more than did those who viewed nonarousing images. However, in Experiment 2, estimates of horizontal distances were not influenced by emotional arousal. In Experiment 3, both valence and arousal cues were manipulated, and it was found that arousal, but not valence, moderated height perception. In Experiment 4, participants either up-regulated or down-regulated their emotional experience while viewing emotionally arousing images, and a control group simply viewed the arousing images. Those participants who up-regulated their emotional experience overestimated height more than did the control or down-regulated participants. In sum, emotional arousal influences estimates of height, and this influence can be moderated by emotion regulation strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Just stop thinking about it": Effects of emotional disengagement on children's memory for educational material.

Children regulate negative emotions in a variety of ways. Emotion education programs typically discourage emotional disengagement and encourage emotional engagement or "working through" negative emotions. The authors examined the effects of emotional disengagement and engagement on children's memory for educational material. Children averaging 7 or 10 years of age (N=200) watched either a sad or an emotionally neutral film and were then instructed to emotionally disengage, instructed to engage in problem solving concerning their emotion, or received no emotion regulation instructions. All children then watched and were asked to recall the details of an emotionally neutral educational film. Children instructed to disengage remembered the educational film better than children instructed to work through their feelings or children who received no emotion regulation instructions. Although past research has indicated that specific forms of emotional disengagement can impair memory for emotionally relevant events, the current findings suggest that disengagement is a useful short-term strategy for regulating mild negative emotion in educational settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ironic effects of emotion suppression when recounting distressing memories.

Theories of ironic mental control posit that under conditions in which effortful control is compromised, for example, in laboratory manipulations of mental load or in those suffering from clinical levels of negative affect, attempts to suppress negative emotions can lead to a paradoxical increase in such feelings, relative to conditions in which no suppression is attempted. In line with this, we showed that high negative affect participants, when asked to suppress (downregulate) their negative feelings while writing about a distressing personal memory, exhibited an ironically greater increase in negative emotions compared with a no-instruction condition, in contrast to low negative affect controls who were able to suppress their emotions. Comparable ironic effects were not associated with instructions to experience emotions. This first demonstration of ironic effects of emotion suppression in response to personal material in those with emotional problems sheds light into how certain emotion regulation strategies may maintain and exacerbate such conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotion experience, expression, and regulation in Alzheimer's disease.

Alzheimer's disease (AD) is associated with intact experience but abnormal expression of emotion. Because emotion regulation is important in determining levels of experienced and expressed emotion, individuals with AD and control participants were asked to watch film clips under conditions of spontaneous expression, suppression, or amplification of emotion. Both groups had difficulties with behavioral amplification that were related to performance on a measure of theory of mind. However, intentional use of suppression was intact even for those with AD, consistent with models of aging that regard some emotion control processes as being relatively more automatic in older adulthood. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit theories of emotion: Affective and social outcomes across a major life transition.

The authors demonstrate that people differ systematically in their implicit theories of emotion: Some view emotions as fixed (entity theorists), whereas others view emotions as more malleable (incremental theorists). Using a longitudinal and multimethod design, the authors show that implicit theories of emotion, as distinct from intelligence, are linked to both emotional and social adjustment during the transition to college. Before entering college, individuals who held entity (vs. incremental) theories of emotion had lower emotion regulation self-efficacy and made less use of cognitive reappraisal (Part 1). Throughout their first academic term, entity theorists of emotion had less favorable emotion experiences and received decreasing social support from their new friends, as evidenced by weekly diaries (Part 2). By the end of freshman year, entity theorists of emotion had lower well-being, greater depressive symptoms, and lower social adjustment as indicated in both self- and peer-reports (Part 3). The emotional, but not the social, outcomes were partially mediated by individual differences in emotion regulation self-efficacy (Part 4). Together, these studies demonstrate that implicit theories of emotion can have important long-term implications for socioemotional functioning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 11(4) of Emotion (see record 2011-18271-002). There was an error in the title. The title of the article should read, “Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness.” All versions of this article have been corrected.] Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Feelings don't come easy: Studies on the effortful nature of feelings.

We propose that experience of emotion is a mental phenomenon, which requires resources. This hypothesis implies that a concurrent cognitive load diminishes the intensity of feeling since the 2 activities are competing for the same resources. Two sets of experiments tested this hypothesis. The first line of experiments (Experiments 1–4) examined the intensity of participants' feelings as they performed a secondary (backward counting) task. The results showed that the intensity of both negative and positive feelings diminished under a cognitive load and that this attenuation of feeling was not mediated by either distraction from external stimuli or demand characteristics. In the second set of experiments (Experiments 5–6), load was created by asking the participants to focus on the feelings. Even in these circumstances, the participants who were under load reported a lower intensity of feeling than those who were not under load. We explain these findings in terms of a resource-dependent model of emotional experience. Possible implications of our findings for a broader class of phenomenological experiences are succinctly discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of child gender role and maternal feedback to child stress on the emergence of the gender difference in depressive rumination in adolescence.

Extensive research has linked a greater female tendency to ruminate about depressed feelings or mood to the gender difference in depression. However, the developmental origins of the gender difference in depressive rumination are not well understood. We hypothesized that girls and women may be more likely to ruminate because rumination represents a gender-stereotyped coping style that is associated with a more feminine gender role identity, maternal encouragement of emotion expression, and passive coping responses to stress. This study examined whether child self-reported gender role identity and observed maternal responses to child stress mediated the emergent gender difference in depressive rumination in adolescence. Maternal gender role attitudes were further hypothesized to moderate the relationship between child sex and mediating variables. Rumination and gender role identity were assessed in 316 youths and their mothers in a longitudinal study from age 11 to age 15; in addition, 153 mother–child dyads participated in an observational task at age 11 from which maternal responses to a child stressor were coded. Results indicated that greater feminine gender role identity among children and encouragement of emotion expression by mothers at age 11 significantly mediated the association between child sex and the development of depressive rumination at age 15, even after controlling for rumination at age 11. Maternal gender role attitudes significantly moderated the relationship between child sex and maternal encouragement of emotion expression, such that mothers who endorsed more traditional gender role attitudes themselves were particularly likely to encourage emotion expression in their daughters. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Only because I love you: Why people make and why they break promises in romantic relationships.

People make and break promises frequently in interpersonal relationships. In this article, we investigate the processes leading up to making promises and the processes involved in keeping them. Across 4 studies, we demonstrate that people who had the most positive relationship feelings and who were most motivated to be responsive to the partner's needs made bigger promises than did other people but were not any better at keeping them. Instead, promisers' self-regulation skills, such as trait conscientiousness, predicted the extent to which promises were kept or broken. In a causal test of our hypotheses, participants who were focused on their feelings for their partner promised more, whereas participants who generated a plan of self-regulation followed through more on their promises. Thus, people were making promises for very different reasons (positive relationship feelings, responsiveness motivation) than what made them keep these promises (self-regulation skills). Ironically, then, those who are most motivated to be responsive may be most likely to break their romantic promises, as they are making ambitious commitments they will later be unable to keep. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Feelings change: Accounting for individual differences in the temporal dynamics of affect.

People display a remarkable variability in the patterns and trajectories with which their feelings change over time. In this article, we present a theoretical account for the dynamics of affect (DynAffect) that identifies the major processes underlying individual differences in the temporal dynamics of affective experiences. It is hypothesized that individuals are characterized by an affective home base, a baseline attractor state around which affect fluctuates. These fluctuations vary as the result of internal or external processes to which an individual is more or less sensitive and are regulated and tied back to the home base by the attractor strength. Individual differences in these 3 processes—affective home base, variability, and attractor strength—are proposed to underlie individual differences in affect dynamics. The DynAffect account is empirically evaluated by means of a diffusion modeling approach in 2 extensive experience-sampling studies on people's core affective experiences. The findings show that the model is capable of adequately capturing the observed dynamics in core affect across both large (Study 1) and shorter time scales (Study 2) and illuminate how the key processes are related to personality and emotion dispositions. Implications for the understanding of affect dynamics and affective dysfunctioning in psychopathology are also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metacognition of emotional face recognition.

While humans are adept at recognizing emotional states conveyed by facial expressions, the current literature suggests that they lack accurate metacognitions about their performance in this domain. This finding comes from global trait-based questionnaires that assess the extent to which an individual perceives him or herself as empathic, as compared to other people. Those who rate themselves as empathically accurate are no better than others at recognizing emotions. Metacognition of emotion recognition can also be assessed using relative measures that evaluate how well a person thinks s/he has understood the emotion in a particular facial display as compared to other displays. While this is the most common method of metacognitive assessment of people's judgments of learning or their feelings of knowing, this kind of metacognition—“relative meta-accuracy”—has not been studied within the domain of emotion. As well as asking for global metacognitive judgments, we asked people to provide relative, trial-by-trial prospective and retrospective judgments concerning whether they would be right or wrong in recognizing the expressions conveyed in particular facial displays. Our question was: Do people know when they will be correct in knowing what expression is conveyed, and do they know when they do not know? Although we, like others, found that global meta-accuracy was unpredictive of performance, relative meta-accuracy, given by the correlation between participants' trial-by-trial metacognitive judgments and performance on each item, were highly accurate both on the Mind in the Eyes task (Experiment 1) and on the Ekman Emotional Expression Multimorph task (in Experiment 2). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of self-distancing on adaptive versus maladaptive self-reflection in children.

Although children and adolescents vary in their chronic tendencies to adaptively versus maladaptively reflect over negative feelings, the psychological mechanisms underlying these different types of self-reflection among youngsters are unknown. We addressed this issue in the present research by examining the role that self-distancing plays in distinguishing adaptive versus maladaptive self-reflection among an ethnically and socioeconomically diverse sample of fifth-grade public schoolchildren. Children were randomly assigned to analyze their feelings surrounding a recent anger-related interpersonal experience from either a self-immersed or self-distanced perspective. They then rated their negative affect and described in writing the stream of thoughts they experienced when they analyzed their feelings. Children's stream-of-thought essays were content analyzed for the presence of recounting statements, reconstruing statements, and blame attributions. Path analyses indicated that children who analyzed their feelings from a self-distanced perspective focused significantly less on recounting the “hot,” emotionally arousing features of their memory (i.e., what happened to me?) and relatively more on reconstruing their experience. This shift in thought content—less recounting and more reconstruing—led children in the self-distanced group to blame the other person involved in their recalled experience significantly less, which in turn led them to display significantly lower levels of emotional reactivity. These findings help delineate the psychological mechanisms that distinguish adaptive versus maladaptive forms of self-reflection over anger experiences in children. Their basic findings and clinical implications are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)