Concerning instrumental autonomic conditioning: A rejoinder.

A. Crider, G. Schwartz, and S. Shnidman's (see 43:8) reply to E. S. Katkin and E. N. Murray's (see 42:10) review of instrumental autonomic conditioning makes several valid points but also contains many differences in interpretation based on a contrasting theoretical position. It is contended herein that the acceptability of "facts" as "facts" and "evidence" as "evidence" is determined often by predisposing epistemological orientations. Many of Crider et al.'s points are well taken, but the evidence on instrumental autonomic conditioning in humans remains far less convincing than the evidence available from animal studies. The methodological questions raised by Katkin and Murray's earlier paper appear to be clarified substantially by some of Crider et al.'s comments; however, the clarification has not reduced the danger of artifacts being interpreted as substantive evidence. (30 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A taxonomy of instrumental conditioning.

Proposes a classification scheme for instrumental conditioning paradigms based on 4 dichotomies: (a) whether the organism is required to "emit" or "omit" a response, (b) whether a "desirable" or "aversive" stimulus event is made contingent upon the response, (c) whether the operation performed upon this stimulus event is one which "increases" or "decreases" its magnitude or intensity, and (d) whether or not the organism is given any "signal" prior to the response as to the consequent stimulus event. The resulting classification scheme includes 16 distinct paradigms, each of which is illustrated with research examples (when they are known to exist) and with examples from "real-life" situations. The relationship between the present scheme and previous classification attempts is indicated, and a meaningful and consistent nomenclature is proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychopathy and autonomic conditioning.

Utilized a delayed, differential paradigm to investigate electrodermal, cardiac, and vasomotor conditioning in 18 psychopathic, 18 nonpsychopathic, and 18 "mixed" inmates. 3 tones, each 10 sec. long, were presented 16 times each in random order, alone, or followed by a shock or slide of a nude female. The psychopaths gave very little evidence of differential electrodermal conditioning. However, they acquired differential cardiac and digital vasomotor responses just as readily as did the nonpsychopaths to the CS followed by shock or by slides. Neither group gave any evidence of differential cephalic vasomotor conditioning. The psychopaths exhibited a lower level of tonic electrodermal activity and were less electrodermally responsive than were the other Ss. There were no differences between groups in tonic heart rate or in cardiac or digital vasomotor responsivity. However, the psychopaths responded to shock with cephalic vasodilation while the nonpsychopaths responded with vasoconstriction. (34 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On models and assumptions: A reply to Smith.

Responds to E. R. Smith's (see record 1979-25963-001) critique of the present authors' (see record 1978-31808-001) model depicting the effects of dating, thought, reality constraints, and initial love on current feelings of love toward an individual one has dated. The present authors conclude that (a) their analysis was appropriate given their assumptions, (b) their assumptions are tentative, and (c) their conclusions would still be reasonable even admitting Smith's alternative assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On missing the point: A reply to Jaques et al.

Replies to comments by Jaques et al (see record 2005-09346-002) on the author's original article (see record 1980-33168-001). I daresay that virtually every author who must respond to criticism thinks that the critical reader missed the point. In this case, I must join the legion of misunderstood authors. The article is entitled, "Psychological Services in Rehabilitation Medicine: Clinical Aspects of Rehabilitation Psychology." I attempted a very brief overview of the roles and functions of rehabilitation psychologists, not rehabilitation counselors. Somebody missed the point! Further, as I stated both in the abstract and in the summary, I was focusing on traditional clinical and counseling applications. I am a psychologist, and I wrote this particular article for an audience of professional psychologists to try to introduce some of the issues involved in psychological practice in this particular setting. I think that I accomplished that rather straightforward goal, and I hope that some of the readers will now consider rehabilitation psychology as an area of specialization that does utilize the skills learned in traditional clinical and counseling psychology doctoral programs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On cost effectiveness: A reply.

Replies to G. H. Roid's (see record 1982-26437-001) comments on an earlier article by the present author (PA, Vol 66:10977) which suggested a need for cost-benefit (CB) and cost-effectiveness (CE) analyses in mental heath evaluations. The present author agrees that CB and CE are not simplistic techniques and that there are many complexities and drawbacks to them. He does, however, stress one indirect advantage—that it forces a broad view of financial costs and benefits of mental health services. Outcomes such as reduced medical utilization, absenteeism, or being employed need to be traced and incorporated more routinely in research on the effectiveness of mental health services. In addition to Roid's suggestion for further research on the problems of CB/CE analyses, the present author notes the educational needs of psychologists to add these and other techniques of policy analysis to their methodological arsenal. (9 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the functions of the self: A reply to Hull and Levy.

The alternative to self-awareness theory proposed by J. G. Hull and A. S. Levy (see record 1980-27166-001) is based on an encoding of self-relevant information. This alternative conception, unfortunately, does not appear to have the number of psychological variables or the requisite specificity to deal with the range of phenomena studied under the rubric of self-awareness processes. The contentions that self-focused attention is not a bidirectional phenomenon and that self-focused attention is not a self-evaluative state appear to be unfounded. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response bias, criteria settings, and the fast-same phenomenon: A reply to Ratcliff.

R. Ratcliff (see record 1985-19264-001) simulated data from 3 letter-matching experiments with his diffusion model. The fits were accomplished by varying 3 criteria, an encoding (or comparison) criterion and same and different response criteria. It is suggested that the necessity of including a comparison criterion is consistent with the conclusion of the present author and colleagues (see record 1985-11336-001) that bias of response criteria, alone, is insufficient to generate the fast-same phenomenon (faster same than different responses, often accompanied by a predominance of false-different errors). Although the diffusion model generates the commonly obtained pattern of reaction times (RTs) and errors through the settings of criteria, it does so by postulating complex patterns of settings, with no theoretical rationale for why or when they occur. The specific fits of the model violate several widely accepted psychophysical principles. It is concluded that criteria setting cannot be regarded as an adequate account of the fast-same phenomenon unless a psychologically meaningful rationale is developed for predicting the situations in which particular settings of criteria will be adopted. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the paradigmatic objections to experimental psychology: A reply to Gadlin and Ingle.

Responds to the H. Gadlin and G. Ingle (see record 1976-03455-001) proposition that fundamental anomalies are inherent in the experimental paradigm and an alternate paradigm is therefore needed. The "paradigmatic" objections to the psychology experiment are scrutinized, and the following conclusions drawn: (a) Contrary to implication, the paradigm need not include mechanistic suppositions about people. The experiment is a methodological tool and, as such, is free of assumptions about the substance of an inquiry. (b) In the foregoing sense, the experiment is, indeed, independent of the content of psychological phenomena; however, the logical separation between method and content is common to all the empirical sciences. Thus, it may not be considered a unique "anomaly" of the psychology experiment. (c) The injunctions regarding the precedence of phenomena over method and reflexivity are thoroughly consistent with the experimental paradigm; hence, they may not identify an alternative thereto. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Latent inhibition and compound conditioning: A reply to Holmes and Harris (2009).

Schmajuk, Lam, and Gray (SLG, 1996) presented a neural network model of classical conditioning that addresses the multiple properties of latent inhibition (LI). According to the model, LI is the result of the decreased attention to the target stimulus during preexposure and testing. Recently, Holmes and Harris (2009) suggested that, although the model was able to describe their experimental results showing that LI to a preexposed stimulus disappears with extended compound conditioning, it could not describe the fact that LI is not affected by a delay following compound conditioning. However, computer simulations demonstrate that the SLG model describes and explains both results. Because the model also explains both the deleterious and the facilitating effects on LI of a delay following simple conditioning, the SLG model seems unique in explaining the complete range of reported effects of temporal delays on LI as well as most of the properties of LI. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

On fact, hunch, and stereotype: A reply to Mischel.

Charges that W. Mischel (1973), in discussing the dilemmas of psychodynamic approaches, creates the illusory impression that they have clearly failed where behavioral approaches have clearly succeeded. Further documentation is provided of the differing empirical focus of research from these 2 viewpoints. Whether an integration of psychodynamic and behavioral approaches will prove fruitful remains to be seen, but the claim that current findings demonstrate the futility of such an effort is not justified. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On alternative interpretations of experimental findings: A reply to Wolf.

Compared M. G. Wolf's (see PA, Vol. 45:Issue 4) interpretation to the authors' interpretation of the data, which makes fewer assumptions and discards fewer data than Wolf's and is able to integrate the results of several different types of experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On learning and development, Piagetian style: I. A reply to Lefebvre-Pinard.

Examines the equilibration theory of Piaget (learning vs development, stage transitions) to make more explicit the methodological foundations of B. Inhelder et al (1974). In this connection, the "problem-solving" learning method used by these authors is analyzed by means of the new concept of "learning loops." Similarly, the successful equilibration learning method used by M. Lefebvre and A. Pinard (1974) is analyzed and shown to involve executive facilitation and chunking (coordination) of 2 crucial schemes. A process-structural model of conservation acquisition previously developed by the present author, and its empirical tests by R. Case (1975) and by G. M. Parkinson (1975), are used to illustrate and to empirically support the process-structural differences theoretically found between these 2 equilibration methods. (54 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distorting the point: A reply to Wolpe.

Replies to J. Wolpe's (1982) critique of the present author's (1971) review of 100 cases that yielded a 36% relapse rate after behavior therapy. It is maintained that Wolpe misleads the reader to believe that this was a reference to "multimodal therapy" when in fact this was developed later by the present author (1983). The 36% relapse rate was found in those individuals who were treated by traditional behavior therapy. Also questioned is Wolpe's reference to a follow-up rate of 3% or less as characteristic of behavior therapy. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On Schneider's reply to Albee.

Responds to S. F. Schneider's (see record 1972-21036-001) reply to G. W. Albee's (see record 1971-08263-001) article on clinical psychology as a profession. Albee's provocation may be useful, since intergroup conflict in clinical psychology might produce constructive changes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Choice and contingency in the development of behavioral autonomy during instrumental conditioning.

In two experiments hungry rats received extensive training to lever press for food outcomes before one outcome was devalued by aversion conditioning and responding tested in extinction. If the rats were trained on a concurrent schedule in which two responses yielded different outcomes, performance during the extinction test was reduced by devaluation of the associated outcome. By contrast, if a single response was trained concurrently with the noncontingent presentations of the other outcome, test performance was insensitive to devaluation of the contingent outcome. This finding demonstrates that training on a schedule that offers a choice between responses that yield different outcomes prevents the onset of behavioral autonomy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On perspectives, theories, models, and friends: A reply to the relationalists.

The authors respond to the "relational" issue of Psychoanalytic Psychology (PP; Vol. 12, No. 1) and support Karol Marshall's remonstration about the need to clarify what exactly the category relational refers to. It is noteworthy that in this issue of PP the relational thinkers do not engage the specific topics of our essay. The author's article attempted to review the most comprehensive relational thinkers of that time across theoretical variables. Relationalists have begun to spell out the technical consequences of their perspective in recent discussions of neutrality, authority, and self-disclosure, among other issues. This is a useful trend in the relational literature, and we hope it continues. We are concerned, however, that the relational thinkers writing in this issue tend to dismiss the contributions to PP 12(1) because the perspectives presented there did not satisfy the relationalist vision of how scientific exchange should be undertaken. Although we feel that it is important for emerging points of view to be able to elaborate assumptions, constructs, and principles within their own framework and in their own way, constructive dialogue, much less a comparative analysis of the contributions and limitations of different points of view, requires that we have some common ground. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)