In defense of deception.

Comments that A. Ortmann and R. Hertwig's (see record 1997-04731-011) call to outlaw the use of all forms of deception in psychological research is both methodologically unsound and ethically misguided. Deception procedures differ so much in the nature and degree of deception used that even the harshest critic would be hard-pressed to state unequivocally that all deception is unacceptable. When the methodological requirements of an investigation lead the researcher to conclude that the only way a study can be carried out is by using deceptive tactics, the decision to deceive necessarily results in additional ethical responsibilities for the researcher, and the degree of deception should be held at a level that does not exceed what is required by the research. An absolute rule prohibiting the use of deception in all psychological research would have the egregious consequence of preventing researchers from carrying out a wide range of important studies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of simplicity.

Suggests that criticisms of the basis of auto-instructional programming misperceive the role ot the stimulus–response (S–R) model of learning when they fail to acknowledge that the principles of programmed instruction were derived from the S–R model. (0 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of measurement.

Argues that criticism of psychological tests is misplaced and ignores the major advantages of objective measurement. Professionally prepared multiple-choice tests are efficient yet searching. Tests achieve their power through aggregation and consequently indicate general tendencies, which are valid for aggregate behavioral tendencies. The apparent precision of numerical scores fosters an overdependence on test scores that must be resisted. Quantitative measurement can provide an indication of social problems. For example, large ethnic differences in average test scores are probably not the result of test bias but probably indicate the extent of educational disadvantage experienced by minorities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of freedom.

Comments on B. Schwartz's (see record 2000-13324-008) discussion of excessive personal freedom, autonomy, self-determination, and life satisfaction and meaning. A positive psychology, according to Schwartz, must constrain "tyranny of choice" (p. 81), and psychologists should "deemphasize freedom" because "American society has created an excess of freedom" (p. 79). R. Solomon suggests that a positive psychology for the 21st century must enhance and facilitate the creation of freedom, not undo it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of controversy.

Discovering truth is not the sole agenda for every scientist. The rewards of achieving paradigm hegemony are huge and serve to justify all manner of strategies and tactics. In this issue and some that have preceded it, scientific paradigm clashes have been brought into the bright light of public scrutiny. I believe a science that is critical progresses faster than one driven solely by induction. Debate is undeniably a part of science, one from which spectators (practitioners and researchers) benefit. A greater understanding of each position is made easier by a direct and clear statement of that position and of what its proponents view as problems with the opposing paradigm. It is not expected that those who read an extreme position will adopt it; however, they may come to understand it better and draw their own conclusions accordingly. Controversy, properly understood and used, can serve the scientific community by sharpening the focus on the true issues where research is most vital to further our understanding of human behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of rigorous evaluation.

Comments on Sikes and Cleveland's (see record 1969-07237-001) article on a program to improve the social relationships between police and community. If verbal labels are ignored, the modal response for both police and community is on the negative side of the scale. Not using more rigorous procedures leaves the results of their evaluation ambiguous. (0 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of Walter Lippmann.

Discusses possible misconceptions that may arise from an article by L. J. Cronbach (see record 1976-03506-001) regarding the interpretation of the army intelligence test results of World War I and the ramifications of these misconceptions. W. Lippmann challenged basic assumptions of tests along with the antidemocratic conclusions conferred upon their results by army psychologists. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of the test.

Argues that the commonly encountered advice that a single test score cannot be used in making important decisions about students is incorrect for 2 reasons: the advice is imprecise regarding the nature of testing, and the advice deviates from what is said in the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (1985). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of military psychology.

Contradicts M. J. Saks's (1970) assertions that the role of military psychology is in conflict with the ethical standards of psychologists. Emotional pacificism and the equating of military defense with murder may prove to be more destructive than the pacificism that led to World War II. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of external invalidity.

Maintains that many psychological investigations are accused of failure to generalize to the real world because of sample bias or artificiality of setting. It is argued in this article that such generalizations often are not intended. Rather than making predictions about the real world from the laboratory, it is possible to test predictions that specify what ought to happen in the lab. Even "artificial" findings may be regarded as interesting because they show what can occur, even if it rarely does; or, where generalizations are made, they may have added force because of artificiality of sample or setting. A misplaced preoccupation with external validity can lead to dismissing good research for which generalization to real life is not intended or meaningful. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of narcissistic personality traits.

Comments on the article by Miller and Campbell (see record 2010-17135-004), in which they provide an informative discussion of the importance of considering narcissistic personality trait research when attempting to understand narcissistic personality disorder. Their arguments might seem so straightforward and compelling that they are hardly worth presenting. However, it does seem that this considerable body of literature is at times neglected, if not ignored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of nuclear depth psychology.

Presents a brief historical review and statements of policymakers to demonstrate that the central principles of psychologists concerning nuclear war have affected the behavior of some policymakers. It is suggested that J. G. Blight's (see record 1987-16803-001) pessimism about the incompatibility between the views of psychologists and policymakers is unwarranted; considerations of why psychologists have had low impact on national security policy are offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of Arnold's theory of emotion.

Criticizes M. L. Goldstein's (see 42:4) review of Arnold's theory of emotion because he disregards her major work (1960) and misinterprets her 1950 version. His assumption that a theory must be couched in objectivist terms to be testable is untenable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In "defense" of defense mechanisms: A reply to Locke's comments.

A previous article by E. A. Locke (see PA, Vol. 49: Issue 1) raised 4 questions regarding the defense mechanism study of H. R. Bobbitt and O. Behling. In the present article these authors reply to Locke's questions and reiterate the idiosyncratic nature of F. Herzberg's definition of defense mechanisms and the need for further research in terms of the protection of one's self-concept as a defense mechanism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Daseinsanalysis: In defense of the ontological difference.

Reviews the special issue of The Humanistic Psychologist, Psychotherapy for freedom: The daseinsanalytic way in psychology and psychotherapy edited by Erik Craig (Volume 16, Number 1, Spring 1988, 278 pp.). The editor brings together a uniquely developed collection of essays, seminars, and interviews delving into foundational as well as clinically-oriented issues regarding the application of Martin Heidegger's philosophy to the fields of psychiatry and psychotherapy. Craig's edition exhibits a cohesiveness not often found in edited volumes, and it manages to be inspiring to the more advanced reader while remaining accessible to the introductory student. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of the Velten mood induction procedure.

Examined whether the Velton Mood Induction procedure (VMIC) (E. Velton, 1968) produced mood effects only through demand characteristics, in 2 studies. In study 1, 50 undergraduates were assigned to 1 of the 5 mood conditions: Positive, negative, neutral, and positive and negative demand. They were presented the VMIC, and were then asked to complete the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL). In study 2, 49 Ss were assigned to 1 of 4 imagine conditions with target moods: Elated, depressed, in a positive or negative mood; and were then asked to complete the MAACL. Mood effects of the VMIC were genuine and not simply the product of demand characteristics. Ss reported mood change after reading the VMIC. The VMIC did not provide Ss with information about a mood state that they did not already know, and Ss did not respond more extremely to the moods of depression and elation as compared to negative and positive moods. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

In defense of "bootstrapping": Erratum.

Reports an error in the original article by R. M. Dawes (American Psychologist, 1972[Aug], Vol 27[8], 773-774). On page 774, the following statement appeared: "Rather than ignore this finding, I used it to illustrate the very first principle I discussed: that linear composites based on paramorphic representations are superior to those based on actuarial analysis". The statement should read: "Rather than ignore this finding, I used it to illustrate the very first principle I discussed: that linear composites based on actuarial predictions are superior to clinical judgments when both are based on the same codable input. Nowhere in the article did I state or imply that linear composites based on paramorphic representations are superior to those based on actuarial analysis". (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1990-56997-001.) Responds to A. G. Weinstein's (1972) comments on R. M. Dawes's (see record 1971-25701-001) findings supporting "bootstrapping" in Dawes's study of graduate admissions. Bootstrapping can be used when actuarial analysis is impossible (e.g., criterion information is lacking or unavailable until after decisions are made). It is not implied that linear composites based on paramorphic representations are superior to those based on actuarial analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)