考虑资金约束零售商公平关切的融资模式研究

以资金充足供应商和资金约束零售商组成的二级供应链为背景,考虑零售商公平关切心理,基于Nash讨价还价公平关切框架,分析了银行融资和交易信用融资2种方式,进而分析公平关切对供应链融资及运营决策的影响。研究表明：当批发价达到某个阈值时,零售商拒绝融资及交易,当批发价低于这个阈值时,零售商在一定条件下会选择交易信用融资,否则会选择银行融资。还比较了零售商公平中性与公平关切的选择行为：给定批发价,受公平关切影响,零售商决策趋于保守,2种融资方式下订货量都会减小。因此,供应商在2种融资模式下均会降低最优批发价以激励零售商增加订货量。可见零售商公平关切会影响供应链融资及运营决策,促使供应链利润分配更加公平。     

违约情形下的信用保单质押融资

为了解决制造商以及零售商均存在资金约束的供应链的融资问题,构建了零售商存在违约的情形时的信用保单质押融资模型。基于报童模型的随机规划问题和博弈论的分析方法,分析了不同利率条件下零售商的订货决策、银行的利率决策以及制造商的投保决策。分析表明,零售商控制本身的违约率,通过合理的订货量获取利润。制造商通过合理的投保水平以及批发价决策来实现本身的效益。银行确定合理的利率以及根据制造商的投保水平来确定融资额度,以求实现自身的利润。制造商以及银行都希望零售商有低的违约率。其中,信用保险对融资中的各方都是有利的。     

Supplier credit guarantee loan in supply chain with financial constraint and bargaining

This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power.     

Supply chain coordination under trade credit and retailer effort

In this paper, we study the role of trade credit in coordinating a Capital Constrained Supply Chain in the presence of retailer Effort (CCSCE), essentially because of the impact of its related default risks on the relationship between the chain’s members. We consider a CCSCE consisting of a supplier and a retailer where the retailer may exert costly promotional efforts to increase the market demand but has limited capital and no access to bank financing due to low credit rating. Conversely, the supplier has adequate funds to offer trade credit to the retailer without borrowing from external channels. We then examine whether the existing coordination contracts can still coordinate the CCSCE under trade credit. Our result shows that these contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain when the interest rate of trade credit is competitively priced. Nevertheless, this position cannot always be reached. That’s why we propose a generalised contract based on risk compensation to coordinate the CCSCE. Using our proposed coordinating contract, the supplier perfectly coordinates the retailer’s decisions for the largest joint profit, and arbitrarily allocates the maximised joint profit among supply chain members. Finally, the numerical study allows to verify this finding. From managerial insights, our results provide the supply chain managers with novel insights on how to combine trade credit with the existing coordination contracts in order to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain as well as the individual member.     

Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy

This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.     

Coordination of a dual-channel supply chain after demand or production cost disruptions

Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain could not only achieve the integrated profit of the supply chain but also alleviate the channel conflict. Although some researches addressed this area, there is scant literature to discuss the coordination issue in the situations of disruption. To fill this void, we utilise a contract with a wholesale price, a direct channel’s price and a lump sum fee to coordinate a dual-channel supply chain under the cases of demand disruptions and production cost disruptions. After deriving the optimal contract for each case, we find that the manufacturer can achieve coordination of the disrupted supply chain by adjusting the parameters of the coordination contract used in a normal environment. We also show that after disruptions, there exists a contract adjustment benefit zone, in which both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from the adjustment of coordination contract when demand increases or production cost decreases. A further analysis of the production and distribution strategies in the coordinated dual-channel supply chain after disruptions suggests that the adjustment of the total production and sales of each channel depends heavily on the level of disruptions and the degree of consumers’ loyalty to both channels.     

需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约

研究需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约,建立了由单个零售商和单个制造商组成的供应链模型。该模型中零售商决定商品的订货量和销售价格,制造商决定商品的批发价格。以集中决策系统下供应链的利润、销售价格和销售量作为基准,研究分散情况下供应链的效率、销售价格以及销售量的变化,同时考虑在此情况下制造商提供的批发价格构成,在此基础上进一步探讨价格弹性对供应链效率和供应链利润分配比例的影响。     

考虑制造商设备维修的制造—零售供应链决策与协调

设备可靠性是影响供应不确定的重要因素。为了研究企业内部的维修策略对整条供应链的运营策略产生的具体影响,在考虑设备维修的情况下,针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈的方法研究制造商的最优维修策略和定价策略以及零售商的最优订货量。研究结果表明,制造商的预防性维修次数存在上限且最大维修次数与设备可靠性无关;预防性维修策略有助于提高制造商的产量,降低产品的批发价格,但制造商的最优产出量不会达到企业的最大产能;收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调;制造商在任何情形下都具有提高设备可靠性的动机,但零售商只会在市场规模较大时才存在为制造商提供设备改造资金的动机。     

考虑激励模式的动态回收闭环供应链最优决策与协调研究

考虑由单一的制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链,制造商不仅通过正向供应链销售新产品,还通过激励措施从消费者那里回收旧产品,且将动态回收过程、HJB阶段控制纳入到供应链中。除探讨不同情形下均衡决策外,还设计激励成本分担契约来促进废旧产品的回收。研究表明:集中决策较分散决策供应链系统利润更高,产品回收率更高,回收激励强度更高;产品的销售价格、批发价格、零售商收益、制造商收益与回收率呈正相关,回收激励强度与回收率呈负相关;激励成本分担契约下,制造商的回收强度、回收率达到集中决策的水平,有趣的是激励成本分担契约下,产品的批发价格、销售价格均略高于分散决策的水平,制造商的收益实现帕累托改进,零售商的收益只有在一定情形下才会实现帕累托改进,供应链系统的整体收益实现帕累托改进。此外,还探讨了激励成本分担情形下零售商不出现破产的条件。最后给出算例分析验证了相关结论。     

资金与碳排放双重约束下低碳供应链决策研究

在低碳供应链背景下,建立制造商存在资金和碳排放双重约束下的Stackelberg博弈定价模型。探究了无资金约束、提前支付和银行贷款3种情形下企业定价和制造商融资决策问题,并分析了相关因素对最优决策和利润的影响。研究表明,当银行利率小于提前支付折扣因子时,制造商始终选择提前支付融资模式;反之,制造商的融资模式选择会受到碳排放影响因子和碳价的影响。而消费者偏好绿色产品时,可以减少制造商的融资规模,但会造成制造商和零售商利润的减少。     

随机需求下基于心理偏差的批发价格契约与协调

基于行为经济学中的社会比较理论,提出了正负心理偏差概念,建立了正负心理偏差情形下的供应链效应模型。分析了两类情形下的零售商最优订购策略以及正向心理偏差指数、零售商外生势力参数、负向心理偏差指数对两类情形下最优订购策略的影响。讨论了批发价契约使得供应链协调的条件。理论与算例分析表明,当零售商存在正向心理偏差时,零售商效应随正向心理偏差指数的增大呈现出U型变化特征,在特定条件下,批发价契约可以使得供应链得到协调;当零售商存在负向心理偏差时,订购量随负向心理偏差指数的增大而减少,随外生势力参数的增大而减少,无论负向心理偏差指数、制造商外生势力参数取何值,供应链均不能得到协调。探讨了决策过程中非理性因素对订购策略的影响,所得结论可为订购实践提供指导,丰富了行为运作研究。     

公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。     

风险规避与信用担保比例对供应链融资选择的影响

研究资金充足制造商和资金约束零售商构成的供应链的融资选择问题。运用CVaR方法,构建风险规避的制造商和零售商在贸易信用融资和核心企业部分信用担保融资下的风险收益模型,分析制造商和零售商的风险规避程度和制造商提供的信用担保比例对双方收益以及供应链融资选择的影响。结果表明,制造商与零售商的风险规避程度对收益起反向影响,且双方的收益对制造商的风险规避程度更敏感;制造商提供的担保比例或者银行利率越高,零售商收益越高,但是制造商收益越低;制造商风险规避度和提供的担保比例满足一定条件情况下,零售商和制造商都会选择内部融资方式。     

公平偏好下基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约研究

引入公平偏好,构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型,采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好,回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外,供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低,但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。     

Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, but manufacturers’ insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies. To alleviate capital constraints, manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments. This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts. Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain, manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas. (2) When financing independently, a decentralized decision-making mode (MD) is the best choice for manufacturers. (3) In cooperative financing, when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode (SD) in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit, the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved. (4) When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model (SC) in cooperative financing, they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction. If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range, the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement, indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.     

资金约束供应链预付款融资模式的比较优势分析

供应链下游企业以预付款方式为资金约束的上游企业提供生产性融资与传统的从外部金融机构（如银行）获得融资的方式相比具有其自身的优势,具有提升供应链的运作效率作用。在上游企业存在资金约束的供应链中,建立了供应链成员企业作为参与人的动态博弈模型。分别得到了银行融资模式和预付款模式下供应链成员企业的均衡策略,分析了预付款较银行融资模式的优势。结果表明,存在价格区间使得批发价格在在该区间内时,下游企业能够激励上游企业选择预付款模式并实现双方的帕累托改进,同时提高供应链整体的运作效率。     

The value of trade credit with rebate contract in a capital-constrained supply chain

We investigate the value of an innovative trade credit with rebate contract (TCRC) model in a stylised supply chain. In this supply chain, the capital-abundant manufacturer offers an integrated contract involving trade credit, minimum ordering and sales rebate contract to a capital-constrained retailer. To highlight the value of the TCRC model, we compare it with a traditional trade credit financing (TTCF) model in a ‘selling to the newsvendor model’. First, we show that equilibrium strategies exist between the manufacturer and the retailer under the TCRC or TTCF model. Second, this study investigates equilibrium selection between the TCRC and TTCF models for the individual and the supply chain. Finally, we show the manufacturer’s pricing policy, wherein the TCRC model outperforms the TTCF model for the players. Furthermore, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to show evidence for theoretical analysis and measure the operation efficiency of the TCRC model for players in the supply chain.     

Inventory misplacement and demand forecast error in the supply chain: profitable RFID strategies under wholesale and buy-back contracts

We investigate RFID adoption strategies under wholesale price and buy-back contracts in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who faces inventory misplacement and demand forecast error. RFID can alleviate the misplacement problem, and can reduce demand forecast error by shortening order lead time. By a newsvendor model, we characterise the optimal contract terms in the supply chain without and with RFID adoption, respectively. We further analyse how the contract terms depend on RFID-related parameters (e.g. salable rate and demand forecast error). We find that both without and with RFID, the wholesale price contract will lead to the double marginalisation problem, while the buy-back contract can coordinate the supply chain. We show that the supply chain adopts RFID if and only if the tagging cost is below a threshold; the threshold is in negative correlation to the demand forecast error. The supply chain is more willing to adopt RFID under the buy-back contract than under the wholesale price contract. RFID adoption can sometimes lessen the double marginalisation problem under the wholesale price contract, improving the supply chain efficiency. A smaller RFID tagging cost or a reduced forecast error do not necessarily lead to higher supply chain efficiency.     

考虑需求相互转移的卖方消费信贷协调契约

为了研究在信贷消费需求与现款消费需求之间存在相互转移的条件下,卖方消费信贷中单个零售商和单个银行的利费率制定策略和协调机制,运用了主从博弈理论和供应链协调中收益共享契约的研究方法,建立了由银行主导的分散决策模型、集中决策模型及收益共享契约模型。得出结论：随着需求流失系数的增大,银行制定的利费率和零售商提供的利费补贴同时随之增大,而信贷消费者实际支付的利费率随之减小;当零售商将其全部的信贷消费收益分享给银行时,收益共享契约可实现信贷消费系统的协调,但为了实现系统的完美共赢协调,需要银行进一步将协调后的部分利润分享给零售商。仿真结果表明：与分散决策相比,收益共享协调契约下,零售商的利润减少254.475 4,而银行的利润增加508.950 9,系统的整体利润增加254.475 4,系统效益提高了25.56%。     

Supply chain coordination with trade credit under the CVaR criterion

Trade credit is a popular payment method in the supply chain. However, it may transfer the market risk facing by the retailer to the manufacturer in the form of default risk. To reduce the default loss, we set up a modified newsvendor model incorporating random default probability. Under the goal of loss minimisation, the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is derived with the criterion of conditional value at risk, and compared with the retailer’s optimal order quantity. It is found that, compared with traditional newsvendor setting, the setting of default possibility in trade credit can increase the order quantity but decrease the production quantity. If the risk aversion level and gross profit of product are low, the manufacturer may deliver below the quantity ordered. Although the default loss can be reduced by cutting order, the profits of both agents decrease, thereby leading to a deviation from the supply chain coordination. Trade credit coordinating the supply chain requires an extremely long credit period, which is not feasible. Moreover, quantity discount contract is able to improve the retailer’s order quantity, but insufficient to achieve coordination, which also depends on the manufacturer’s risk aversion level.