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1.
Turing's (1936) analysis of effective symbolic procedures is a model of conceptual clarity that plays an essential role in the philosophy of mathematics. Yet appeal is often made to the effectiveness of human procedures in other areas of philosophy. This paper addresses the question of whether Turing's analysis can be applied to a broader class of effective human procedures. We use Sieg's (1994) presentation of Turing's Thesis to argue against Cleland's (1995) objections to Turing machines and we evaluate her proposal to understand the effectiveness of procedures in terms of their reliability and precision. A number of conditions for effectiveness are identified and these are used to provide a general argument against the possibility of a Leibnizian decision procedure. 相似文献
2.
Is the Church-Turing thesis true? 总被引:10,自引:10,他引:0
Carol E. Cleland 《Minds and Machines》1993,3(3):283-312
The Church-Turing thesis makes a bold claim about the theoretical limits to computation. It is based upon independent analyses of the general notion of an effective procedure proposed by Alan Turing and Alonzo Church in the 1930's. As originally construed, the thesis applied only to the number theoretic functions; it amounted to the claim that there were no number theoretic functions which couldn't be computed by a Turing machine but could be computed by means of some other kind of effective procedure. Since that time, however, other interpretations of the thesis have appeared in the literature. In this paper I identify three domains of application which have been claimed for the thesis: (1) the number theoretic functions; (2) all functions; (3) mental and/or physical phenomena. Subsequently, I provide an analysis of our intuitive concept of a procedure which, unlike Turing's, is based upon ordinary, everyday procedures such as recipes, directions and methods; I call them mundane procedures. I argue that mundane procedures can be said to be effective in the same sense in which Turing machine procedures can be said to be effective. I also argue that mundane procedures differ from Turing machine procedures in a fundamental way, viz., the former, but not the latter, generate causal processes. I apply my analysis to all three of the above mentioned interpretations of the Church-Turing thesis, arguing that the thesis is (i) clearly false under interpretation (3), (ii) false in at least some possible worlds (perhaps even in the actual world) under interpretation (2), and (iii) very much open to question under interpretation (1). 相似文献
3.
Effective procedures and computable functions 总被引:8,自引:8,他引:0
Carole E. Cleland 《Minds and Machines》1995,5(1):9-23
Horsten and Roelants have raised a number of important questions about my analysis of effective procedures and my evaluation of the Church-Turing thesis. They suggest that, on my account, effective procedures cannot enter the mathematical world because they have a built-in component of causality, and, hence, that my arguments against the Church-Turing thesis miss the mark. Unfortunately, however, their reasoning is based upon a number of misunderstandings. Effective mundane procedures do not, on my view, provide an analysis of ourgeneral concept of an effective procedure; mundane procedures and Turing machine procedures are different kinds of procedure. Moreover, the same sequence ofparticular physical action can realize both a mundane procedure and a Turing machine procedure; it is sequences of particular physical actions, not mundane procedures, which enter the world of mathematics. I conclude by discussing whether genuinely continuous physical processes can enter the world of real numbers and compute real-valued functions. I argue that the same kind of correspondence assumptions that are made between non-numerical structures and the natural numbers, in the case of Turing machines and personal computers, can be made in the case of genuinely continuous, physical processes and the real numbers. 相似文献
4.
This paper explores Church's Thesis and related claims madeby Turing. Church's Thesis concerns computable numerical functions, whileTuring's claims concern both procedures for manipulating uninterpreted marksand machines that generate the results that these procedures would yield. Itis argued that Turing's claims are true, and that they support (the truth of)Church's Thesis. It is further argued that the truth of Turing's and Church'sTheses has no interesting consequences for human cognition or cognitiveabilities. The Theses don't even mean that computers can do as much as peoplecan when it comes to carrying out effective procedures. For carrying out aprocedure is a purposive, intentional activity. No actual machine does, orcan do, as much. 相似文献
5.
Recipes,Algorithms, and Programs 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
In the technical literature of computer science, the concept of an effective procedure is closely associated with the notion of an instruction that precisely specifies an action. Turing machine instructions are held up as providing paragons of instructions that "precisely describe" or "well define" the actions they prescribe. Numerical algorithms and computer programs are judged effective just insofar as they are thought to be translatable into Turing machine programs. Nontechnical procedures (e.g., recipes, methods) are summarily dismissed as ineffective on the grounds that their instructions lack the requisite precision. But despite the pivotal role played by the notion of a precisely specified instruction in classifying procedures as effective and ineffective, little attention has been paid to the manner in which instructions "precisely specify" the actions they prescribe. It is the purpose of this paper to remedy this defect. The results are startling. The reputed exemplary precision of Turing machine instructions turns out to be a myth. Indeed, the most precise specifications of action are provided not by the procedures of theoretical computer science and mathematics (algorithms) but rather by the nontechnical procedures of everyday life. I close with a discussion of some of the rumifications of these conclusions for understanding and designing concrete computers and their programming languages. 相似文献
6.
In Part V of his Discourse on the Method, Descartes introduces a test for distinguishing people from machines that is similar to the one proposed much later by Alan Turing. The Cartesian test combines two distinct elements that Keith Gunderson has labeled the language test and the action test. Though traditional interpretation holds that the action test attempts to determine whether an agent is acting upon principles, I argue that the action test is best understood as a test of common sense. I also maintain that this interpretation yields a stronger test than Turing's, and that contemporary artificial intelligence should consider using it as a guide for future research. 相似文献
7.
The Church-Turing thesis and effective mundane procedures 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We critically discuss Cleland's analysis of effective procedures as mundane effective procedures. She argues that Turing machines cannot carry out mundane procedures, since Turing machines are abstract entities and therefore cannot generate the causal processes that are generated by mundane procedures. We argue that if Turing machines cannot enter the physical world, then it is hard to see how Cleland's mundane procedures can enter the world of numbers. Hence her arguments against versions of the Church-Turing thesis for number theoretic functions miss the mark.The first author is a postdoctoral researcher of the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research. The financial support of this organization is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
8.
In 1936, when the world was computerless, Alan Turing invented the first virtual machine, now called the Universal Turing Machine (A. Turing, 1936). This concept provided a common ground for a theoretical exploration of the computable. Today, in a world with millions of computers linked to form a global computing network, we are again contemplating the virtues of virtual machines. Will a virtual machine, executing on millions of physical computing devices, be as useful in computing practice as Turing's machine is in computer theory? The author argues that it will and that its coming is inevitable. These considerations pertain to the delivery systems part of the Internet architecture which is presented 相似文献
9.
This paper concerns Alan Turing's ideas about machines, mathematical methods of proof, and intelligence. By the late 1930s, Kurt Gödel and other logicians, including Turing himself, had shown that no finite set of rules could be used to generate all true mathematical statements. Yet according to Turing, there was no upper bound to the number of mathematical truths provable by intelligent human beings, for they could invent new rules and methods of proof. So, the output of a human mathematician, for Turing, was not a computable sequence (i.e., one that could be generated by a Turing machine). Since computers only contained a finite number of instructions (or programs), one might argue, they could not reproduce human intelligence. Turing called this the ``mathematical objection' to his view that machines can think. Logico-mathematical reasons, stemming from his own work, helped to convince Turing that it should be possible to reproduce human intelligence, and eventually compete with it, by developing the appropriate kind of digital computer. He felt it should be possible to program a computer so that it could learn or discover new rules, overcoming the limitations imposed by the incompleteness and undecidability results in the same way that human mathematicians presumably do. 相似文献
10.
We sketch the historical and conceptual context of Turing's analysis of algorithmic or mechanical computation. We then discuss two responses to that analysis, by Gödel and by Gandy, both of which raise, though in very different ways. The possibility of computation procedures that cannot be reduced to the basic procedures into which Turing decomposed computation. Along the way, we touch on some of Cleland's views. 相似文献
11.
The Status and Future of the Turing Test 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
The standard interpretation of the imitation game is defended over the rival gender interpretation though it is noted that Turing himself proposed several variations of his imitation game. The Turing test is then justified as an inductive test not as an operational definition as commonly suggested. Turing's famous prediction about his test being passed at the 70% level is disconfirmed by the results of the Loebner 2000 contest and the absence of any serious Turing test competitors from AI on the horizon. But, reports of the death of the Turing test and AI are premature. AI continues to flourish and the test continues to play an important philosophical role in AI. Intelligence attribution, methodological, and visionary arguments are given in defense of a continuing role for the Turing test. With regard to Turing's predictions one is disconfirmed, one is confirmed, but another is still outstanding. 相似文献
12.
Turing Test: 50 Years Later 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3
The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper is a review of the past 50 years of the Turing Test. Philosophical debates, practical developments and repercussions in related disciplines are all covered. We discuss Turing's ideas in detail and present the important comments that have been made on them. Within this context, behaviorism, consciousness, the `other minds' problem, and similar topics in philosophy of mind are discussed. We also cover the sociological and psychological aspects of the Turing Test. Finally, we look at the current situation and analyze programs that have been developed with the aim of passing the Turing Test. We conclude that the Turing Test has been, and will continue to be, an influential and controversial topic. 相似文献
13.
There is an intensive discussion nowadays about the meaning of effective computability, with implications to the status and provability of the Church–Turing Thesis (CTT). I begin by reviewing what has become the dominant account of the way Turing and Church viewed, in 1936, effective computability. According to this account, to which I refer as the Gandy–Sieg account, Turing and Church aimed to characterize the functions that can be computed by a human computer. In addition, Turing provided a highly convincing argument for CTT by analyzing the processes carried out by a human computer. I then contend that if the Gandy–Sieg account is correct, then the notion of effective computability has changed after 1936. Today computer scientists view effective computability in terms of finite machine computation. My contention is supported by the current formulations of CTT, which always refer to machine computation, and by the current argumentation for CTT, which is different from the main arguments advanced by Turing and Church. I finally turn to discuss Robin Gandy's characterization of machine computation. I suggest that there is an ambiguity regarding the types of machines Gandy was postulating. I offer three interpretations, which differ in their scope and limitations, and conclude that none provides the basis for claiming that Gandy characterized finite machine computation. 相似文献
14.
The Turing Test* 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Turing's test has been much misunderstood. Recently unpublished material by Turing casts fresh light on his thinking and dispels a number of philosophical myths concerning the Turing test. Properly understood, the Turing test withstands objections that are popularly believed to be fatal. 相似文献
15.
Adam Drozdek 《AI & Society》1995,9(4):389-395
The question whether or not computers can think was first asked in print by Alan Turing in his seminal 1950 article. In order to avoid defining what a computer is or what thinking is, Turing resorts to the imitation game which is a test that allows us to determine whether or not a machine can think. That is, if an interrogator is unable to tell whether responses to his questions come from a human being or from a machine, the machine is imitating a human being so well that it has to be acknowledged that these responses result from its thinking. However, then as now, it is not an indisputable claim that machines could think, and an unceasing stream of papers discussing the validity of the test proves this point. There are many arguments in favour of, as well as against, the claims borne by the test, and Turing himself discusses some of them. In his view, there are mice possible objections to the concept of a thinking machine, which he eventually dismisses as weak, irrelevant, or plain false. However, as he admits, he can present no very convincing arguments of a positive nature to support my views. If I had I should not have taken such pains to point out the fallacies in contrary views. 相似文献
16.
Manin, Feynman, and Deutsch have viewed quantum computing as a kind of universal physical simulation procedure. Much of the writing about quantum logic circuits and quantum Turing machines has shown how these machines can simulate an arbitrary unitary transformation on a finite number of qubits. The problem of universality has been addressed most famously in a paper by Deutsch, and later by Bernstein and Vazirani as well as Kitaev and Solovay. The quantum logic circuit model, developed by Feynman and Deutsch, has been more prominent in the research literature than Deutsch’s quantum Turing machines. Quantum Turing machines form a class closely related to deterministic and probabilistic Turing machines and one might hope to find a universal machine in this class. A universal machine is the basis of a notion of programmability. The extent to which universality has in fact been established by the pioneers in the field is examined and this key notion in theoretical computer science is scrutinised in quantum computing by distinguishing various connotations and concomitant results and problems. 相似文献
17.
According to the conventional wisdom, Turing (1950) said that computing machines can be intelligent. I don't believe it. I think that what Turing really said was that computing machines –- computers limited to computing –- can only fake intelligence. If we want computers to become genuinelyintelligent, we will have to give them enough initiative (Turing, 1948, p. 21) to do more than compute. In this paper, I want to try to develop this idea. I want to explain how giving computers more ``initiative' can allow them to do more than compute. And I want to say why I believe (and believe that Turing believed) that they will have to go beyond computation before they can become genuinely intelligent. 相似文献
18.
In their recent paper “Do Accelerating Turing Machines Compute the Uncomputable?” Copeland and Shagrir (Minds Mach 21:221–239, 2011) draw a distinction between a purist conception of Turing machines, according to which these machines are purely abstract, and Turing machine realism according to which Turing machines are spatio-temporal and causal “notional" machines. In the present response to that paper we concede the realistic aspects of Turing’s own presentation of his machines, pointed out by Copeland and Shagrir, but argue that Turing's treatment of symbols in the course of that presentation opens the door for later purist conceptions. Also, we argue that a purist conception of Turing machines (as well as other computational models) plays an important role not only in the analysis of the computational properties of Turing machines, but also in the philosophical debates over the nature of their realization. 相似文献
19.
基于量子逻辑的自动机理论是量子计算模型的一个重要研究方向.该文研究了基于量子逻辑的图灵机(简称量子图灵机)及其一些变形,给出了包括非确定型量子图灵机l-VTM,确定型量子图灵机l-VDTM以及相应类型的多带量子图灵机,并引入量子图灵机基于深度优先与宽度优先识别语言的两种不同定义方式,证明了这两种定义方式在量子逻辑意义下是不等价的.进一步证明了l-VTM、l-VDTM与相应类型的多带量子图灵机之间的等价性.其次,给出了量子递归可枚举语言及量子递归语言的定义,并给出了二者的层次刻画,证明了l-VTM与l-VDTM不等价,但两者作为量子递归语言的识别器是等价的.最后,文中讨论了基于量子逻辑的通用图灵机的存在性问题,给出了一套合理编码系统,证明了基于量子逻辑的通用图灵机在其所取值的正交模格无限时不存在,而在其所取值的正交模格有限时是存在的. 相似文献
20.
Wilfried Sieg 《Natural computing》2007,6(2):187-205
Turing’s notion of human computability is exactly right not only for obtaining a negative solution of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem that is conclusive, but also for achieving a precise characterization of formal systems that is needed for the general formulation of the incompleteness theorems. The broad intellectual context reaches back to Leibniz and requires a focus on mechanical procedures; these procedures are to be carried out by human computers without invoking higher cognitive capacities. The question whether there are strictly broader notions of effectiveness has of course been asked for both cognitive and physical processes. I address this question not in any general way, but rather by focusing on aspects of mathematical reasoning that transcend mechanical procedures.Section 1 discusses Gödel’s perspective on mechanical computability as articulated in his [193?], where he drew a dramatic conclusion from the undecidability of certain Diophantine propositions, namely, that mathematicians cannot be replaced by machines. That theme is taken up in the Gibbs Lecture of 1951; Gödel argues there in greater detail that the human mind infinitely surpasses the powers of any finite machine. An analysis of the argument is presented in Section 2 under the heading Beyond calculation. Section 3 is entitled Beyond discipline and gives Turing’s view of intelligent machinery; it is devoted to the seemingly sharp conflict between Gödel’s and Turing’s views on mind. Their deeper disagreement really concerns the nature of machines, and I’ll end with some brief remarks on (supra-) mechanical devices in Section 4. 相似文献