When not to comment.

Suggests that errors, such as the one S. D. McLaughlin (1980) made in his critique of M. H. Birnbaum's (1979) article on sex bias in salaries of psychologists, could be avoided if authors would read material cited as containing theory before rushing into print with claims that procedures are atheoretical. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theoretical partialing requires a defensible theory.

Argues that S. D. McLaughlin's (1980) comment on M. H. Birnbaum's (1979) article on sex bias in salaries of psychologists is not a definitive evaluation of either atheoretical or theoretical partialing. McLaughlin fails to support use of the partial correlation between sex and salary, with a measure of merit held constant, as the criterion of sex discrimination. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A one-factor mind about mind and emotion.

R. B. Zajonc comments that M. H. Birnbaum's (1980) one-factor proof that Zajonc's theoretical position can be rejected on scientific grounds is tenable only if 2 sets of important findings reported in the article are disregarded. Birnbaum's predilection for parsimony is misdirected in the analysis of the affect-cognition problem, for it pre-empts much of the research that needs to be carried out. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relationships among models of salary bias.

Clarifies the relationships among models of salary equity, including H. F. Gollob's (see record 1985-08151-001) difference index, from the point of view of M. H. Birnbaum's (1979, 1981) mediated models of salaries. The difference index has properties that make it unattractive as a measure of group bias. Situations in which the models reach the same conclusion or disagree are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Feeling more than thinking.

Suggests that R. B. Zajonc's (1981) reply to M. H. Birnbaum's (1981) comment on Zajonc's (see record 1980-09733-001) earlier article seriously misrepresents both Birnbaum's position and the theories under consideration. The misrepresentations are addressed. (8 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Is there sex bias in salaries of psychologists?": Reply.

M. H. Birnbaum's (1979, 1981) procedure may have some utility in providing additional support to a discrimination interpretation of the theoretically derived partial. Its use as a criterion for not rejecting a "no-bias" null hypothesis is likely to be misleading. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Let's give the devil his due: A response to Birnbaum.

Argues that although M. H. Birnbaum's (see record 1973-20037-001) criticism regarding the potential inadequacies of the correlation coefficient in model assessment is correct, the examples he provides actually reveal inadequacies in the models rather than in the correlation coefficient. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What, can the devill speake true?"

Replies to M. H. Birmbaum (see record 1973-20037-001), who argued that the correlation coefficient has the power to mislead and is, therefore, an instrument of the devil, who can be exorcised only by an application of functional measurement. It is noted that Birnbaum's conclusions may satisfy the tests of J. Sprenger and H. Kraemer in Malleus Maleficarum (1489), but they do not follow from logical analysis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parsimonious testing of transitive or intransitive preferences: Reply to Birnbaum (2011).

Birnbaum (see record 2011-23298-003) raised important challenges to testing transitivity. We summarize why an approach based on counting response patterns does not solve these challenges. Foremost, we show why parsimonious tests of transitivity require at least 5 choice alternatives. While the approach of Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (see record 2011-00732-003) achieves high power with modest sample sizes for 5 alternatives, pattern-counting approaches face the difficulty of combinatoric explosion in permissible response patterns. Even for fewer than 5 alternatives, if the choice of how to “block” individual responses into response patterns is slightly mistaken, intransitive preferences can mimic transitive ones. At the same time, statistical tests on proportions of response patterns rely on similar “independent and identically distributed” sampling assumptions as tests based on response proportions. For example, the hypothetical data of Birnbaum (2011, Tables 2 and 3) hinge on the assumption that response patterns are properly blocked, as well as sampled independently and with a stationary distribution. We test an intransitive lexicographic semiorder model on Tversky's (1969) and Regenwetter et al.'s data and, consistent with Birnbaum's (2011) concern, we find evidence for model mimicry in some cases. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rater bias in psychological research: When is it a problem and what can we do about it?

Rater bias is a substantial source of error in psychological research. Bias distorts observed effect sizes beyond the expected level of attenuation due to intrarater error, and the impact of bias is not accurately estimated using conventional methods of correction for attenuation. Using a model based on multivariate generalizability theory, this article illustrates how bias affects research results. The model identifies 4 types of bias that may affect findings in research using observer ratings, including the biases traditionally termed leniency and halo errors. The impact of bias depends on which of 4 classes of rating design is used, and formulas are derived for correcting observed effect sizes for attenuation (due to bias variance) and inflation (due to bias covariance) in each of these classes. The rater bias model suggests procedures for researchers seeking to minimize adverse impact of bias on study findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A method for investigating sources of rater bias.

Few studies in counseling and psychotherapy have investigated rater bias. The purpose of this study was to outline a method for studying rater bias. We studied three potential sources of rater bias: (a) characteristics of the rater, client, and therapist; (b) the similarity of characteristics between rater and therapist or client; and (c) perceived similarity between rater and therapist or client. We used a new rater-bias measure. The data for the study were ratings on the Collaborative Study Psychotherapy Rating Scale for 826 sessions of psychotherapy in the Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program. High interrater reliability was found for all scales of the measure. We found evidence of rater bias only on the facilitative conditions scale. Rater bias was not found for the other scales, perhaps because of the extensive development of the measure, careful selection of the raters, lengthy rater training, and continued contact with raters throughout the rating period. The rater-bias measure may be useful to other researchers as a means of testing the reactivity of their measures to rater bias. Finally, the method for investigating rater bias can be used by other researchers to evaluate rater bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Study of the measurement bias of two standardized psychological tests.

Psychological tests are subject to two distinct forms of bias. The first form, measurement bias, occurs when individuals with equal standing on the trait measured by the test, but sampled from different subpopulations, have different expected test scores. Relational bias, the second type of bias, exists with respect to a second variable if a measure of bivariate association differs across groups. Empirical studies have found little evidence of relational bias. Two recent court cases, however, seem to have been more influenced by considerations of measurement bias than the literature concerning relational bias. Unfortunately, a consequence of both court cases is that the respective test makers must select items for future tests on the basis of a statistic (proportion correct) that is inappropriate for evaluating measurement bias. More sophisticated approaches may also suffer from methodological difficulties unless special precautions are taken. In this article, tests of English and Mathematics Usage are analyzed by measurement bias methods in which several steps are taken to reduce methodological artifacts. Many items are found to be biased. Nonetheless, the sizes of these effects are very small and no cumulative bias across items is found. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evidence for response bias as a source of error variance in applied assessment.

After 100 years of discussion, response bias remains a controversial topic in psychological measurement. The use of bias indicators in applied assessment is predicated on the assumptions that (a) response bias suppresses or moderates the criterion-related validity of substantive psychological indicators and (b) bias indicators are capable of detecting the presence of response bias. To test these assumptions, we reviewed literature comprising investigations in which bias indicators were evaluated as suppressors or moderators of the validity of other indicators. This review yielded only 41 studies across the contexts of personality assessment, workplace variables, emotional disorders, eligibility for disability, and forensic populations. In the first two contexts, there were enough studies to conclude that support for the use of bias indicators was weak. Evidence suggesting that random or careless responding may represent a biasing influence was noted, but this conclusion was based on a small set of studies. Several possible causes for failure to support the overall hypothesis were suggested, including poor validity of bias indicators, the extreme base rate of bias, and the adequacy of the criteria. In the other settings, the yield was too small to afford viable conclusions. Although the absence of a consensus could be used to justify continued use of bias indicators in such settings, false positives have their costs, including wasted effort and adverse impact. Despite many years of research, a sufficient justification for the use of bias indicators in applied settings remains elusive. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal Attribution and Hindsight Bias for Economic Developments.

Hindsight bias for economic developments was studied, with particular focus on the moderating effects of attitudes and causal attributions. Participants (N = 263) rated the likelihood of several economic developments 6 months before and 6 months after the euro introduction in 2002. Hindsight bias occurred selectively for attitude-consistent economic developments: Euro supporters showed stronger hindsight bias for positive developments than for negative ones; euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. Causal attribution further moderated the hindsight bias: Participants who perceived a strong connection between the euro introduction and specific economic developments showed higher attitude-consistent hindsight bias than participants who perceived those developments as unrelated to the euro. It is argued that hindsight bias serves to stabilize subjective representations of the economy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Diversity in in-group bias: Structural factors, situational features, and social functions.

Four experiments addressed the different forms and functions of in-group bias in different contexts. The authors proposed 2 functions: an identity-expressive function and an instrumental function (or promotion of positive social change). The authors manipulated status differentials, the stability of these differences, and the communication context (intra- vs. intergroup) and measured in-group bias and both functions. As predicted, identity expression via in-group bias on symbolic measures was most important for stable, high-status groups. By contrast, material in-group bias for instrumental motives was most prevalent in unstable, low-status groups but only when communicating with in-group members. This latter effect illustrates the strategic adaptation of group behavior to audience (i.e., displaying in-group bias may provoke the out-group and be counterproductive in instrumental terms). Stable, low-status groups displayed more extreme forms of in-group bias for instrumental reasons regardless of communication context (i.e., they had nothing to lose). Results are discussed in terms of a contextual-functional approach to in-group bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Explicit and implicit memory bias in panic disorder with agoraphobia

Thirty patients with a diagnosis of panic disorder with agoraphobia and 30 normal controls were compared on explicit memory (cued recall) and implicit memory (word stem completion) for positive, neutral, social threat, and physical threat words. The panic patients showed an explicit memory bias, but no implicit memory bias, for physical threat words. The index of explicit memory bias for physical threat words was found to correlate with anxiety sensitivity and degree of agoraphobic fear and avoidance. The index of baseline bias for threat words on the word completion task, on the other hand, correlated with trait anxiety. Although there were no correlations between explicit and implicit memory bias for physical threat words, explicit memory bias for physical threat words correlated with explicit memory bias indexes for positive words and social threat words. The results are discussed in terms of the functional role of an explicit memory bias for physically threatening events in panic disorder. The negative results on implicit memory bias are discussed in relation to earlier studies, the use of different implicit memory tasks, and the role of baseline bias on implicit memory tasks. Finally, the hypothesis is suggested that explicit and implicit memory bias for emotional information may represent two different styles of information processing, which serve as vulnerability factors for different emotional disorders.     

Accuracy and bias in the perception of the partner in a close relationship.

Partners in close relationships can be both accurate and biased in their perceptions of each other. Moreover, sometimes a bias can lead to accuracy. The authors describe a paradigm for the simultaneous measurement of accuracy and bias in 2-person relationships. One prevalent bias in close relationships is assumed similarity: Does the person think that his or her partner sees the world as he or she does? In a study of 238 dating and married heterosexual couples, the authors found evidence for both bias and accuracy; the bias effects were considerably stronger, especially when the measure was linked to the relationship. They found little or no evidence for gender differences in accuracy and bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lateral bias in infant chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

This study documents the presence, strength, and direction of lateralization in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) over the first 3 months of life. Nursery-reared chimpanzees (7 males and 5 females) were repeatedly assessed on a behavioral scale. Lateral bias was measured for 4 behaviors: hand-to-mouth, hand-to-hand, defensive grasp, and first step. Hand-to-mouth was significantly lateralized for the sample. Eight of the 10 chimpanzees that showed hand-to-mouth used the right hand. Lateral bias for defensive grasp was positively related to lateral bias both of first step and of hand-to-mouth. Lateral bias in hand-to-mouth was inversely related to lateral bias in hand-to-hand. Strength of lateralization increased as chimpanzees matured. These laterality effects in infant chimpanzees were expressed under conditions of emotional arousal. Moreover, degree of laterality may be a predictor of responsivity to stress. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attentional retraining procedures: Manipulating early or late components of attentional bias?

According to cognitive models of anxiety disorders, attentional bias for threatening information is a vulnerability factor to the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. A recently developed methodology to reduce attentional bias has been found to reduce emotional reactivity and anxiety. The present study aimed at identifying the effects of this attentional bias reduction on early and later stages of threat processing. Undergraduates were allocated to an attentional bias reduction (n = 23) versus control condition (n = 25). It was found that attentional bias reduction influenced late but not early stages of threat processing. This finding is of theoretical importance in relation to studies on the causal role of attentional bias and emotional reactivity. Moreover, the present findings also bear relevance to the clinical application of attentional retraining procedures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lateral bias for rotational behavior in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

This research examined lateral bias for rotational behavior in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). A symmetrical distribution of rotational bias was noted, with approximately equal numbers of Ss preferring to turn to the right and to the left. As a group, adults did not exhibit a lateral rotational bias. Immatures preferentially rotated to the left. Across Ss, the strength of rotational bias was positively related to the incidence of right-eyed looking. Rotational bias was not related to hand preference. The finding of analogous age-dependent patterns of rotational bias in capuchins and in humans suggests that the rotational behavior of Cebus apella can be used to model an asymmetric response pattern that has been linked to development in Homo sapiens. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)