From strange bedfellows to natural allies: the shifting allegiance of fire service organisations in the push for federal fire-safe cigarette legislation

Background: Cigarettes are the leading cause of fatal fires in the USA and are associated with one in four fire deaths. Although the technology needed to make fire-safe cigarettes has been available for many years, progress has been slow on legislative and regulatory fronts to require the tobacco industry to manufacture fire-safe cigarettes. Method and results: We conducted a case study, drawing on data from tobacco industry documents, archives, and key informant interviews to investigate tobacco industry strategies for thwarting fire-safe cigarette legislation in the US Congress. We apply a theoretical framework that posits that policymaking is the product of three sets of forces: interests, institutions, and ideas, to examine tobacco industry behaviour, with a special focus on their and others'' attempts to court fire service organisations, including firefighters'' unions as allies. We discuss the implications of our findings for future policy efforts related to fire-safe cigarettes and other tobacco control issues. Conclusions: Tobacco control advocates ought to: continue efforts to align key interest groups, including the firefighters unions; contest tobacco industry "diversionary" science tactics; and pursue a state based legislative strategy for fire-safe cigarettes, building towards national legislation.     

Tobacco control implications of the first European product liability suit

Objective: To examine tobacco control implication of the first European product liability suit in Finland.

Methods: Systematic search of internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet and at the British American Tobacco Guildford Depository.

Results: Despite legal loss, the litigation contributed to subsequent tobacco control legislation in Finland. The proceedings revealed that the industry had concealed the health hazards of its products and, despite indisputable evidence, continued to deny them. The positions taken by the industry rocked its reliability as a social actor and thus weakened its chances of influencing tobacco policy. Despite fierce opposition from the tobacco industry, tobacco products were included in the product liability legislation, tobacco was entered on the Finnish list of carcinogens, and an extensive Tobacco Act was passed in Parliament.

Conclusions: Tobacco litigation might not stand alone as a tool for public health policymaking but it may well stimulate national debate over the role of smoking in society and influence the policy agenda.

     

The passage and initial implementation of Oregon's Measure 44

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the passage and early implementation of Ballot Measure 44, "An Act to Support the Oregon Health Plan", and tobacco control policymaking in Oregon. Measure 44 raised cigarette taxes in Oregon by US$0.30 per pack, and dedicated 10% of the revenues to tobacco control. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with members of the Committee to Support the Oregon Health Plan, Measure 44's campaign committee, as well as with state and local officials, and tobacco control advocates. Additional information was obtained from public documents, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: Although the tobacco industry outspent Measure 44's supporters 7 to 1, the initiative passed with 56% of the vote. Even before the election, tobacco control advocates were working to develop an implementation plan for the tobacco control programme. They mounted a successful lobbying campaign to see that the legislature did not divert tobacco control funds to other uses. They also stopped industry efforts to limit the scope of the programme. The one shortcoming of the tobacco control forces was not getting involved in planning the initiative early enough to influence the amount of money that was devoted to tobacco control. Although public health groups provided 37% of the money it cost to pass Measure 44, only 10% of revenues were devoted to tobacco control. CONCLUSIONS: Proactive planning and aggressive implementation can secure passage of tobacco control initiatives and see that the associated implementing legislation follows good public health practice.     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Smoking,social class,and gender: what can public health learn from the tobacco industry about disparities in smoking?

Objective: To discover how the tobacco industry considers social class and gender in its efforts to market cigarettes in the USA, particularly to socially disadvantaged young women. Methods: A systematic on-line search of tobacco industry documents using selected keywords was conducted, and epidemiological data on smoking rates reviewed. Results: The two largest cigarette manufacturers in the USA consider "working class" young adults to be a critical market segment to promote growth of key brands. Through their own market research, these companies discovered that socially disadvantaged young women do not necessarily desire a "feminine" cigarette brand. Conclusions: Considering the tobacco industry''s efforts, alongside the persistent and growing disparities in cigarette smoking by social class, and the narrowing of differences in smoking by gender, it is concluded that additional tobacco control resources ought to be directed toward working class women.     

Courtesy and the challenges of implementing smoke-free policies in Japan.

For decades, the tobacco companies have developed a worldwide campaign to oppose the creation of smoke-free environments. Public health efforts to promote clean indoor air have been uneven throughout the world, and in few places have such efforts faced as many challenges as in Japan. The Japanese market is dominated by Japan Tobacco, which is partly owned by the government, and Philip Morris International is also present in Japan. Japan Tobacco and Philip Morris International have developed campaigns promoting courtesy and tolerance that, until recently, seem to have resonated well with the public. The companies also have supported research promoting ventilation and have funded consultants to act as experts in the area of second-hand smoke exposure. Japan is a critical country to study, partly because of the strength of Japan Tobacco in the country and the growth of Japan Tobacco International in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, and partly because of Japan's ratification of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to provide an overview of the tobacco industry's scientific and political efforts to stifle the development of clean indoor measures in Japan. Learning past industry strategies may assist policymakers and advocates in the development of future public health activities.     

What should be the elements of any settlement with the tobacco industry?

Litigation and regulatory assaults on the tobacco companies may create a willingness among tobacco manufacturers to bargain resources and acceptance of public policy changes for limitations of liability, as has been seen by the recent settlement with the Liggett Group. Two elements absolutely critical to any plan are the elimination of tobacco advertising and promotion and the removal of addiction as a reason for tobacco use. Minimal components of any settlement should include: (a) acceptance by the tobacco manufacturers of the causal relationship between tobacco use and disease, and the addictive nature of nicotine; (b) a total ban on tobacco advertising and promotion; (c) FDA jurisdiction over tobacco products and their nicotine content, with the intent of removing nicotine as soon as acceptable nicotine substitution products are available; (d) reimbursement to the states for Medicaid and other state expenditures attributable to smoking, to the maximum extent feasible; (e) funding for local, state, and federal programmes and research in tobacco control; (f) acceptance of legislation and regulations protecting the right of non-smokers to breathe air free of tobacco smoke; (g) funding for a large, national, media-led, anti- tobacco campaign; and (h) cessation assistance for addicted smokers. If negotiations toward a settlement proceed, it is essential that the public health community participate in defining the elements of any agreement to ensure that whatever agreement develops is focused on reducing tobacco-related disease rather than continuing the profitability of American tobacco companies. That participation requires articulation of the core elements essential to an acceptable agreement. If resolution of the public health issues surrounding continued sale of tobacco products can be reached in the United States, it may provide a model for similar resolution in other countries.


     

"Accommodating" smoke-free policies: tobacco industry's Courtesy of Choice programme in Latin America

Objective

To understand the implementation and effects of the Courtesy of Choice programme designed to “accommodate” smokers as an alternative to smoke‐free polices developed by Philip Morris International (PMI) and supported by RJ Reynolds (RJR) and British American Tobacco (BAT) since the mid‐1990s in Latin America.

Methods

Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, BAT “social reports”, news reports and tobacco control legislation.

Results

Since the mid‐1990s, PMI, BAT and RJR promoted Accommodation Programs to maintain the social acceptability of smoking. As in other parts of the world, multinational tobacco companies partnered with third party allies from the hospitality industry in Latin America. The campaign was extended from the hospitality industry (bars, restaurants and hotels) to other venues such as workplaces and airport lounges. A local public relations agency, as well as a network of engineers and other experts in ventilation systems, was hired to promote the tobacco industry''s programme. The most important outcome of these campaigns in several countries was the prevention of meaningful smoke‐free policies, both in public places and in workplaces.

Conclusions

Courtesy of Choice remains an effective public relations campaign to undermine smoke‐free policies in Latin America. The tobacco companies'' accommodation campaign undermines the implementation of measures to protect people from second‐hand smoke called for by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, perpetuating the exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor enclosed environments.Latin Americans are highly exposed to second‐hand tobacco smoke (SHS) both in public places and in workplaces.^1,2 In 2001, the Pan American Health Organization launched its “Smoke Free Americas” initiative³ to “raise awareness of the harm caused by secondhand tobacco smoke, and support efforts to achieve more smoke‐free environments in the Americas.” There is longstanding strong public concern over the effects of SHS in Latin America. In 1997, research conducted for Philip Morris International (PMI) showed that about 80% of respondents in four Latin American countries agreed that “Other people''s tobacco smoke poses a long term health risk to nonsmokers.”⁴ These results reflect a stronger consensus that SHS is hazardous than Philip Morris (PM) found in the US in 1989—62% of non‐smokers and 32% of smokers—as the movement for smoke‐free workplaces and public places was beginning to accelerate them.⁵ A 2001 survey conducted for the World Health Organization (WHO) in the main urban areas of Argentina showed strong public support (94%; 96% non‐smokers and 89% smokers) for the creation of smoke‐free places to avoid SHS.⁶ Public opinion polls conducted in 2006 in Argentina⁷ and Uruguay⁸ reported that 92% of respondents agreed that “SHS is dangerous for nonsmokers'' health”, showing an increase in public concern about SHS by 12% since 1997.The main barrier to progress in implementing smoke‐free policies in Latin America has been the efforts by two transnational tobacco companies, PMI and British American Tobacco (BAT), which control almost the entire cigarette market in the region through their subsidiaries (PMI 40%, BAT 60%). Similar to the voluntary self‐regulating advertising codes, which the tobacco companies use to fight restrictions on tobacco advertising,^9,10 the tobacco industry has orchestrated public relations campaigns in Latin America since the mid‐1990s to avoid legislated smoke‐free policies.^11,12 As in the US, beginning in the late 1980s,¹¹ this effort mobilised the hospitality industry to block meaningful tobacco control legislation to preserve the social acceptability of smoking and to protect industry profits. These programmes, known as Accommodation in the US and Courtesy of Choice in most parts of the rest of the world,^11,13,14,15 encourage the voluntary creation of smoking and non‐smoking sections in the hospitality industry as an alternative to legislation requiring 100% smoke‐free environments. Also, as in the US, the tobacco industry sought to present ventilation as the “solution” to SHS.¹⁶As of April 2007, 12 Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) had ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC, the first international public health treaty, calls for the implementation of “effective legislative, executive, administrative or other measures … at the appropriate governmental level to protect all persons from exposure to tobacco smoke” (Article 4.1) “in indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public places.” (Article 8).¹⁷ Given the fact that the only truly effective protection from SHS is the creation of 100% smoke‐free environments,¹⁸ in 2003, Venezuela approved a state law (in Monagas¹⁹) and between 2005 and 2006, Argentina passed and regulated two provincial laws (in Santa Fe and Tucumán) to establish 100% smoke‐free public places and workplaces. In March 2006, Uruguay became the first 100% smoke‐free country in the Americas. In response to this movement, one can expect the tobacco industry to accelerate its Accommodation efforts as a way of undermining such effective smoke‐free policies to implement FCTC.     

Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health

Objective: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992.

Data sources: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties.

Study selection: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

Data extraction: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents.

Data synthesis: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference.

Results and conclusion: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.

     

International trade agreements: a threat to tobacco control policy

International covenants establish a role for governments in ensuring the conditions for human health and wellbeing, which has been recognised as a central human right. International trade agreements, conversely, prioritize the rights of corporations over health and human rights. International trade agreements are threatening existing tobacco control policies and restrict the possibility of implementing new controls. This situation is unrecognised by many tobacco control advocates in signatory nations, especially those in developing countries. Recent agreements on eliminating various trade restrictions, including those on tobacco, have expanded far beyond simply international movement of goods to include internal tobacco distribution regulations and intellectual property rules regulating advertising and labelling. Our analysis shows that to the extent trade agreements protect the tobacco industry, in itself a deadly enterprise, they erode human rights principles and contribute to ill health. The tobacco industry has used trade policy to undermine effective barriers to tobacco importation. Trade negotiations provide an unwarranted opportunity for the tobacco industry to assert its interests without public scrutiny. Trade agreements provide the industry with additional tools to obstruct control policies in both developed and developing countries and at every level. The health community should become involved in reversing these trends, and help promote additional measures to protect public health.     

Tobacco industry strategy to undermine tobacco control in Finland

Objective: To identify and explain tobacco industry strategy in undermining tobacco control measures in Finland and results of these interferences in tobacco policy development during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Methods: Tobacco industry documents, which have been publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA, were analysed. Documents were sought by Finland and by names of organisations and tobacco control activists. Documents were accessed and assessed between September 2000 and November 2002. Tactics of the tobacco industry activities were categorised as presented by Saloojee and Dagli.

Results: The international tobacco companies utilised similar strategies in Finland as in other industrial markets to fight tobacco control and legislation, the health advocacy movement, and litigation. These activities slowed down the development and implementation of the Tobacco Act in Finland. However, despite the extensive pressure, the industry was not able to prevent the most progressive tobacco legislation in Europe from being passed and coming into force in Finland in 1977 and in 1995.

Conclusion: Denying the health hazards caused by tobacco—despite indisputable scientific evidence—decreased the credibility of the tobacco industry. Strategy of denial was falsely chosen, as health advocacy groups were active both in society and the parliamentary system. The strong influence of the tobacco industry may have in fact increased the visibility of tobacco control in Finland as the litigation process was also drawing attention to negative health effects of tobacco. Therefore the tobacco industry did not manage to convince public opinion. However, the tobacco industry did obtain experience in Finland in how to object to tobacco control measures.

     

African American leadership groups: smoking with the enemy

BACKGROUND: Among all racial and ethnic groups in the USA, African Americans bear the greatest burden from tobacco related disease. The tobacco industry has been highly influential in the African American community for decades, providing funding and other resources to community leaders and emphasising publicly its support for civil rights causes and groups, while ignoring the negative health effects of its products on those it claims to support. However, the industry's private business reasons for providing such support were unknown. OBJECTIVE: To understand how and for what purposes the tobacco industry sought to establish and maintain relationships with African American leaders. METHODS: Review and analysis of over 700 previously secret internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet. RESULTS: The tobacco industry established relationships with virtually every African American leadership organisation and built longstanding social connections with the community, for three specific business reasons: to increase African American tobacco use, to use African Americans as a frontline force to defend industry policy positions, and to defuse tobacco control efforts. CONCLUSION: As the tobacco industry expands its global reach, public health advocates should anticipate similar industry efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups. The apparent generosity, inclusion, and friendship proffered by the industry extract a price from groups in the health of their members. Helping groups anticipate such efforts, confront industry co-optation, and understand the hidden costs of accepting tobacco industry largesse should be part of worldwide tobacco control efforts.     

Eyes on the prize: transnational tobacco companies in China 1976-1997

Internal tobacco industry documents relevant to China as published on www.tobaccoarchives.com located between 31 May and 1 August 1999 were searched. Documents describing the ambitions and conduct of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in China between 1976 and 1997 were located and reviewed in three sections: part A-early identification of market potential and attempts to enter the market, and improve trade and technology; part B-marketing and promotion efforts; part C-efforts to pre-empt legislation, control the smoking and health debate, and undermine the anti-tobacco lobby.     

Entering our 16th year

Background and objective

British American Tobacco (BAT) has historically enjoyed a monopoly position in Kenya. Analysis of recent tobacco control debates and a case study of BAT''s response to the emergence of competition in Kenya are used to explore the company''s ability to shape public policy and its treatment of tobacco farmers.

Design

Analysis of internal industry documents from BAT''s Guildford depository, other relevant data and interviews with key informants.

Results

BAT enjoys extensive high‐level political connections in Kenya, including close relationships with successive Kenyan presidents. Such links seems to have been used to influence public policy. Health legislation has been diluted and delayed, and when a competitor emerged in the market, BAT used its contacts to have the government pass legislation drafted by BAT that compelled farmers to sell tobacco to BAT rather than to its competitor. BAT was already paying farmers less than any other African leaf‐growing company, and the legislation entrenched poor pay and a quasi‐feudal relationship. BAT''s public relation''s response to the threat of competition and the ministers'' public statements extolling the economic importance of tobacco growing suggest that BAT has manipulated tobacco farming as a political issue.

Conclusions

The extent of BAT''s influence over public policy is consistent with the observations that, despite ratifying the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, progress in implementing tobacco control measures in Kenya has been limited. The benefits of tobacco farming seem to be deliberately exaggerated, and an analysis of its true cost benefits is urgently needed. Tobacco farmers must be protected against BAT''s predatory practices and fully informed about its activities to help them have an informed role in policy debates. As image, particularly around the importance of tobacco farming, seems key to BAT''s ability to influence policy, the truth about its treatment of farmers must be publicised.Driven by the recent expansion of transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) across many low‐ and middle‐income countries, the burden of tobacco''s health effect is shifting. It is predicted that, by 2030, 70% of the estimated 10 million global deaths from tobacco will occur in developing countries.¹ In this context, sub‐Saharan Africa (SSA) offers an opportunity for global health, being the only region in the world where primary prevention of the tobacco epidemic remains possible.² However, with TTCs investing heavily in the region during the last decade and with evidence of rapidly rising consumption, particularly among youth,³ this window of opportunity is closing rapidly.Implementation of comprehensive regulatory measures is required to prevent further escalation of the epidemic in SSA, and the World Health Organisation''s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) provides excellent opportunities in this regard. The African nations recognised this in pressing unanimously for a comprehensive treaty while simultaneously acknowledging the need to find an alternative income for countries dependent on tobacco farming, notably Zimbabwe and Malawi.^2,3 Tobacco farming represents a unique dimension to the tobacco control debate in SSA, and previous analyses of tobacco industry documents suggest that the tobacco industry has attempted to hijack such debates by presenting tobacco control as a “first world” concern that would lead to economic destabilisation and exacerbate poverty and malnutrition among tobacco‐growing countries.⁴ By contrast, a growing body of evidence suggests that tobacco farmers face considerable financial and health risks from growing tobacco.^{5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}As African nations seek to implement the provisions of the FCTC, tobacco control legislation will have to be developed and enacted, providing opportunities for the tobacco industry to influence policy. The fact that Kenya has signed and ratified the FCTC¹³ while (as detailed below) efforts to implement legislation consistent with the treaty have been unsuccessful amid persistent reports of BAT influence¹⁴ highlights the possible barriers. Hence, there is an urgent need to understand the tobacco control policy environment in Africa, including the relationships between tobacco farmers and TTCs, which are clearly integral to this. However, there remains a dearth of research in this area. This paper seeks to address this gap by examining British American Tobacco''s (BAT) policy influence in Kenya.BAT merits particular attention as it is the dominant player in SSA, with a market share of over 90% in 11 countries.³ The selection of Kenya reflects its significance to BAT''s operations in Africa, the role it seems to have in BAT''s efforts to influence policy regionally¹⁵ and the nature of Kenyan tobacco politics.After an introduction to the origins and character of BAT''s political influence in Kenya and an overview of recent tobacco control debates in the country, this paper uses a case study of the company''s response to an emergent competitor, Mastermind Tobacco Kenya (referred to in the documents as MTK or MTCo), to examine BAT''s influence on policymaking. The paper therefore aims to shed important light on issues critical to the development of tobacco control across SSA.     

Tobacco interests or the public interest: 20 years of industry strategies to undermine airline smoking restrictions

Objectives

To understand the evolution of 20 years of tobacco industry strategies to undermine federal restrictions of smoking on aircraft in the United States.

Design

We searched and analysed internal tobacco industry records, public documents, and other related research.

Results

The industry viewed these restrictions as a serious threat to the social acceptability of smoking. Its initial efforts included covert letter‐writing campaigns and lobbying of the airline industry, but with the emergence of proposals to ban smoking, the tobacco companies engaged in ever increasing efforts to forestall further restrictions. Tactics to dominate the public record became especially rigorous. The industry launched an aggressive public relations campaign that began with the promotion of industry sponsored petition drives and public opinion surveys. Results from polling research that produced findings contrary to the industry''s position were suppressed. In order to demonstrate smoker outrage against a ban, later efforts included the sponsorship of smokers'' rights and other front groups. Congressional allies and industry consultants sought to discredit the science underlying proposals to ban smoking and individual tobacco companies conducted their own cabin air quality research. Faced with the potential of a ban on all domestic flights, the industry sought to intimidate an air carrier and a prominent policymaker. Despite the intensification of tactics over time, including mobilisation of an army of lobbyists and Congressional allies, the tobacco industry was ultimately defeated.

Conclusions

Our longitudinal analysis provides insights into how and when the industry changed its plans and provides public health advocates with potential counterstrategies.     

Tobacco industry influence on the definition of tobacco related disorders by the American Psychiatric Association

Objective: The Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, third edition (DSM-III), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1980, included the first official definitions by the APA of tobacco dependence and tobacco withdrawal. Tobacco industry efforts to influence the DSM-III were investigated. Method: Searches of previously secret tobacco industry documents, primarily the University of California San Francisco Legacy Tobacco Documents Library and British American Tobacco collections. Additional information was collected through discussions with editors of DSM-III, and library and general internet searches. Results: The tobacco companies regarded the inclusion of tobacco dependence as a diagnosis in DSM-III as an adverse event. It worked to influence the content of the DSM-III and its impact following publication. These efforts included public statements and private lobbying of DSM-III editors and high ranking APA officers by prominent US psychiatrists with undisclosed ties to the tobacco industry. Following publication of DSM-III, tobacco companies contracted with two US professors of psychiatry to organise a conference and publish a monograph detailing controversies surrounding DSM-III. Conclusions: The tobacco industry and its allies lobbied to narrow the definition of tobacco dependence in serial revisions of DSM-III. Following publication of DSM-III, the industry took steps to try to mitigate its impact. These actions mirror industry tactics to influence medical research and policy in various contexts worldwide. Such tactics slow the spread of a professional and public understanding of smoking and health that otherwise would reduce smoking, smoking induced disease, and tobacco company profits.     

Fiscal versus social responsibility: how Philip Morris shaped the public funds divestment debate

Calls for institutional investors to divest (sell off) tobacco stocks threaten the industry's share values, publicise its bad behaviour, and label it as a politically unacceptable ally. US tobacco control advocates began urging government investment and pension funds to divest as a matter of responsible social policy in 1990. Following the initiation of Medicaid recovery lawsuits in 1994, advocates highlighted the contradictions between state justice departments suing the industry, and state health departments expanding tobacco control programmes, while state treasurers invested in tobacco companies. Philip Morris (PM), the most exposed US company, led the divestment opposition, consistently framing the issue as one of responsible fiscal policy. It insisted that funds had to be managed for the exclusive interest of beneficiaries, not the public at large, and for high share returns above all. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to show how PM sought to frame both the rhetorical contents and the legal contexts of the divestment debate. While tobacco stock divestment was eventually limited to only seven (but highly visible) states, US advocates focused public attention on the issue in at least 18 others plus various local jurisdictions. This added to ongoing, effective campaigns to denormalise and delegitimise the tobacco industry, dividing it from key allies. Divestment as a delegitimisation tool could have both advantages and disadvantages as a tobacco control strategy in other countries.     

Marketing to the marginalised: tobacco industry targeting of the homeless and mentally ill

Objectives: To describe the tobacco industry''s relationships with and influence on homeless and mentally ill smokers and organisations providing services to them. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents and journal articles. Results: The tobacco industry has marketed cigarettes to the homeless and seriously mentally ill, part of its "downscale" market, and has developed relationships with homeless shelters and advocacy groups, gaining positive media coverage and political support. Discussion: Tobacco control advocates and public health organisations should consider how to target programmes to homeless and seriously mentally ill individuals. Education of service providers about tobacco industry efforts to cultivate this market may help in reducing smoking in these populations.     

Political realities of statewide smoking legislation: the passage of California's Assembly Bill 13

OBJECTIVE: To prepare a history of the enactment of California Assembly Bill 13 (AB 13), a state law prohibiting smoking in most workplaces passed in 1994, and to discuss its initial impacts. METHODS: Data were gathered from open ended interviews with representatives of voluntary health organisations, local government organisations, and principal legislators involved in the process, as well as observers around the state who could provide insight into the legislative process. Information was also obtained from legislative hearings and debates, public documents, letters and personal communications, internal memoranda, and news reports. RESULTS: The success of local tobacco control legislation in California led to a situation in which some health groups were willing to accept state preemption in order to attract the support of the state restaurant association for a bill. The decision to accept this preemption compromise was made by the state level offices of the voluntary health agencies without consulting the broader tobacco control community within California. In contrast, local tobacco control advocates did not accept this compromise, in part because of their belief that local legislation was a better device to educate the public, generate media coverage, and build community support for enforcement and implementation of clean indoor air and other tobacco control laws. Enactment of AB 13 was associated with a slowing of all local tobacco control legislation, including youth oriented laws. CONCLUSIONS: Because its supporters initially doubted that AB 13 would pass, there was never an effort to reconcile the policy differences between state oriented and locally oriented tobacco control policies. This lack of consensus, combined with the political realities inherent in passing any state legislation, led to a bill with ambiguous preemption language which replaced the "patchwork of local laws" with a "patchwork of local enforcement."