Thermal-hydraulic calculations using MARS code applied to low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessment in a PWR

The methods developed for full-power probabilistic safety assessment, including thermal-hydraulic methods, have been widely applied to low power and shutdown conditions. Experience from current low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessments, however, indicates that the thermal-hydraulic methods developed for full-power probabilistic safety assessments are not always reliable when applied to low power and shutdown conditions and consequently may yield misleading and inaccurate risk insights. To increase the usefulness of the low power and shutdown risk insights, the current methods and tools used for thermal-hydraulic calculations should be examined to ascertain whether they function effectively for low power and shutdown conditions. In this study, a platform for relatively detailed thermal-hydraulic calculations applied to low power and shutdown conditions in a pressurized water reactor was developed based on the best estimate thermal-hydraulic analysis code, MARS2.1. To confirm the applicability of the MARS platform to low power and shutdown conditions, many thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed for the selected topic, i.e. the loss of shutdown cooling events for various plant operating states at the Korean standard nuclear power plant. The platform developed in this study can deal effectively with low power and shutdown conditions, as well as assist the accident sequence analysis in low power and shutdown probabilistic safety assessments by providing fundamental data. Consequently, the resulting analyses may yield more realistic and accurate low power and shutdown risk insights.     

Thermal hydraulic behaviors during loss of RHR system at mid-loop operation of Chinese 300 MWe PWR NPP

Thermal hydraulic behavior of nuclear power plant (NPP) is analyzed by using mechanistic computer code for loss of residual heat removal (RHR) system during mid-loop operation of Chinese 300 MWe two-loop pressurized water reactor is presented. In the absence of recovery of RHR or other accident management measures, the reactor core will be uncovered for a long term resulting in core heat-up, degradation and relocation to the lower plenum. The effectiveness of available mitigate measures, such as safety injection system, gravity feed from refueling water storage tank (RWST) and steam generator (SG) reflux-condensation, are investigated. Coolant injection is highly effective in halting the accident progression and make the core recovered. The cooling capability of SG reflux-condensation has a relationship with different availabilities of steam generators and decay heat power. 6 days after shutdown, 2SG operation can keep the water level at mid-line of hot leg. 12 days after shutdown, both 2SG operation and 1SG operation can keep the water level at mid-line of hot leg. The analyses also indicate that the cooling mechanism of safety injection system is more effective than gravity feed from RWST and SG reflux-condensation. Through confirming the success criteria of SG reflux-condensation, time windows can be devided. Then, event trees for loss of RHR system under mid-loop operation are built with considering the analysis results and abnormal procedure.     

An estimation of an operator's action time by using the MARS code in a small break LOCA without a HPSI for a PWR

To estimate the success criteria of an operator's action time for a probabilistic safety/risk assessment (PSA/PRA) of a nuclear power plant, the information from a safety analysis report (SAR) and/or that by using a simplified simulation code such as the MAAP code has been used in a conventional PSA. However, the information from these is often too conservative to perform a realistic PSA for a risk-informed application. To reduce the undue conservatism, the use of a best-estimate thermal hydraulic code has become an essential issue in the latest PSA and it is now recognized as a suitable tool. In the same context, the ‘ASME PRA standard’ also recommends the use of a best-estimate code to improve the quality of a PSA. In Korea, a platform to use a best-estimate thermal hydraulic code called the MARS code has been developed for the PSA of the Korea standard nuclear power plant (KSNP). This study has proposed an estimation method for an operator's action time by using the MARS platform. The typical example case is a small break loss of coolant accident without the high pressure safety injection system, which is one of the most important accident sequences in the PSA of the KSNP. Under the given accident sequence, the operator has to perform a recovery action known as a fast cooldown operation. This study focuses on two aspects regarding an operator's action; one is how they can operate it under some restrictions; the other is how much time is available to mitigate this accident sequence. To assess these aspects, this study considered: (1) the operator's action model and (2) the starting time of the operation. To show an effect due to an operator's action, three kinds of control models (the best-fitting, the conservative, and the proportional-integral) have been assessed. This study shows that the developed method and the platform are useful tools for this type of problem and they can provide a valuable insight related to an operator's actions.     

Accident management following loss-of-coolant accidents during cooldown in a Westinghouse two-loop PWR

Operation of pressurised water reactors involves shutdown periods for refuelling and maintenance. In preparation for this, the reactor system is cooled down, depressurised and partially drained. Although reactor coolant pressure is lower than during full-power operation, there remains the possibility of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), with a certain but low probability. While the decay heat to be removed is lower than that from a LOCA at full power, the reduced availability of safety systems implies a risk of failing to maintain core cooling, and hence of core damage. This is recognised though probabilistic safety analyses (PSA), which identify low but non-negligible contributions to core damage frequency from accidents during cooldown and shutdown. Analyses are made for a typical two-loop Westinghouse PWR of the consequences of a range of LOCAs during hot and intermediate shutdown, 4 and 5 h after reactor shutdown respectively. The accumulators are isolated, while power to some of the pumped safety injection systems (SIs) is racked out. The study assesses the effectiveness of the nominally assumed SIs in restoring coolant inventory and preventing core damage, and the margin against core damage where their actuation is delayed. The calculations use the engineering-level MELCOR1.8.5 code, supplemented by the SCDAPSIM and SCDAP/RELAP5 codes, which provide a more detailed treatment of coolant system thermal hydraulics and core behaviour. Both treatments show that the core is readily quenched, without damage, by the nominal SI which assumes operation of only one pump. Margins against additional scenario and model uncertainties are assessed by assuming a delay of 900 s (the time needed to actuate the remaining pumps) and a variety of assumptions regarding models and the number of pumps available in conjunction with both MELCOR and versions of SCDAP. Overall, the study provides confidence in the inherent robustness of the plant design with respect to LOCA during cooldown to cold shutdown, and in the validity of a two-tier calculational method. The results have been directly used in updating the plant shutdown PSA, by changing the success criteria for core cooling during cooldown of the plant and showing a reduction in overall risk.     

Design evaluation of emergency core cooling systems using Axiomatic Design

In designing nuclear power plants (NPPs), the evaluation of safety is one of the important issues. As a measure for evaluating safety, this paper proposes a methodology to examine the design process of emergency core cooling systems (ECCSs) in NPPs using Axiomatic Design (AD). This is particularly important for identifying vulnerabilities and creating solutions. Korean Advanced Power Reactor 1400 MWe (APR1400) adopted the ECCS, which was improved to meet the stronger safety regulations than that of the current Optimized Power Reactor 1000 MWe (OPR1000). To improve the performance and safety of the ECCS, the various design strategies such as independency or redundancy were implemented, and their effectiveness was confirmed by calculating core damage frequency. We suggest an alternative viewpoint of evaluating the deployment of design strategies in terms of AD methodology. AD suggests two design principles and the visualization tools for organizing design process. The important benefit of AD is that it is capable of providing suitable priorities for deploying design strategies. The reverse engineering driven by AD has been able to show that the design process of the ECCS of APR1400 was improved in comparison to that of OPR1000 from the viewpoint of the coordination of design strategies.     

An evolution of molten core cooling strategies

Fundamental mechanisms behind the molten core cooling strategies are revisited to provide an insight for a proper implementation of severe accident management guideline (SAMG) and a development of an engineered safety feature. From the results of a qualitative evaluation and a quantitative plant analysis, weak points of the current severe accident management guideline for an operating plant are identified and a revision of the molten core cooling strategies is proposed. In addition, technical issues for various kinds of core catcher concepts are discussed.     

Analysis of the Feed & Bleed procedure for the Ascó NPP: First approach study for operation support

The Asociación Nuclear Ascó-Vandellòs (ANAV) is the consortium responsible for the Ascó and Vandellòs-II reactors. The reactors are Westinghouse-design 3-loop PWRs with an approximate electrical power of 1000 MW. In order to operate the reactors ANAV prepared an Integral Plant Model for each plant. The model is used for supporting plant operation and control from the point of view of safety and competitiveness. The Technical University of Catalonia (UPC) has been working with ANAV in order to establish, qualify and use these Best Estimate (BE) models. This paper develops a specific use of the Ascó plant model for operation support and tries to clarify a group of scenarios related to the total loss of feed water (FW) and the corresponding Feed & Bleed (F&B) recovery procedure. The study characterizes the procedure with different calculations and provides results that have become helpful in establishing the impact of partial availability of Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and HPIS trains, the maximum time for starting the procedure and some considerations on heat sink recovery. The use of the BE model provides a consistent overview of the final problem. The results of the analysis are a first approach for operation support.     

Variations of a passive safety containment for a BWR with active and passive safety systems

The paper presents variations of a certain passive safety containment for a near future BWR. It is tentatively named Mark S containment in the paper. It uses the operating dome as the upper secondary containment vessel (USCV) to where the pressure of the primary containment vessel (PCV) can be released through the upper vent pipes. One of the merits of the Mark S containment is very low peak pressure at severe accidents without venting the containment atmosphere to the environment. Another merit is the capability to submerge the PCV and the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) above the core level by flooding water from the gravity-driven cooling system (GDCS) pool and the upper pool. The third merit is robustness against external events such as a large commercial airplane crash owing to the reinforced concrete USCV. The Mark S containment is applicable to a large reactor that generates 1830 MW electric power. The paper presents several examples of BWRs that use the Mark S containment. In those examples active safety systems and passive safety systems function independently and constitute in-depth hybrid safety (IDHS). The concept of the IDHS is also presented in the paper.     

Comparison of hydrogen generation for TVSM and TVSA fuel assemblies for water water energy reactor (VVER)-1000

This paper presents the results received during investigation of hydrogen generation for both types fuel assemblies—the old modernistic type of fuel assemblies (TVSM) and recently installed new one alternative type of fuel assemblies (TVSA) in case of severe accident. There are some differences between both types FAs. They have different geometry as well as different burnable poisons. To investigate behavior of new fuel assemblies during the severe conditions it have been performed comparison of fuel behavior of old type TVSM fuel assembly to new one TVSA.To perform this investigation it has been used MELCOR “input model” for Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) VVER 1000. The model was developed by Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy-Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (INRNE-BAS) for investigation of severe accident scenarios and Probabilistic Safety Analyses (PSA) level 2. The model provides a significant analytical capability for the Bulgarian technical specialists, working in the field of the NPP safety, for analysis of core and containment damaged states and the estimation of radionuclides release outside fuel cladding.It was accepted criteria for vessel integrity about hydrogen concentration to be 8%. This criterion was based on the decision of RSK (Germany commission for reactor safety).Generally based on the received results it was made conclusion that using both types of fuel assemblies it was not disturbance safety conditions of NPP.     

Probabilistic safety analyses developments resurgence in Bulgaria—Kozloduy nuclear power plant example

This paper presents some of the main technical features and insights of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant (NPP) units 5 and 6 probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) level 1. Probabilistic analyses and their applications in Bulgaria were given further impetus in recent years. More than 17 years after the first PSA study in Bulgaria in 1992 today probabilistic analyses receive increasing attention and application than ever before. The Bulgarian regulatory body (BNRA) is also interested in expanding their capability of reviewing and using PSA in plant safety assessments. In November 2008 within the framework of the program financed by European Union (PHARE), a project for assisting the BNRA in establishing the regulatory requirements on the base of PSA was completed. One of the objectives of this project was performance of the independent review of Kozloduy NPP units 5 and 6 PSA. This review was a new impulse for the authors to present in more details of Kozloduy NPP probabilistic assessment studies in the present paper.     

Two types of a passive safety containment for a near future BWR with active and passive safety systems

The paper presents two types of a passive safety containment for a near future BWR. They are named Mark S and Mark X containment. One of their common merits is very low peak pressure at severe accidents without venting the containment atmosphere to the environment. The PCV pressure can be moderated within the design pressure. Another merit is the capability to submerge the PCV and the RPV above the core level. The third merit is robustness against external events such as a large commercial airplane crash. Both the containments have a passive cooling core catcher that has radial cooling channels. The Mark S containment is made of reinforced concrete and applicable to a large power BWR up to 1830 MWe. The Mark X containment has the steel secondary containment and can be cooled by natural circulation of outside air. It can accommodate a medium power BWR up to 1380 MWe. In both cases the plants have active and passive safety systems constituting in-depth hybrid safety (IDHS). The IDHS provides not only hardware diversity between active and passive safety systems but also more importantly diversity of the ultimate heat sinks between the atmosphere and the sea water. Although the plant concept discussed in the paper uses well-established technology, plant performance including economy is innovatively and evolutionally improved. Nothing is new in the hardware but everything is new in the performance.     

RELAP5/MOD3.2 sensitivity calculations of loss-of-feed water (LOFW) transient at Unit 6 of Kozloduy NPP

This paper provides a comparison between the real plant data obtained by Unit 6 of Kozloduy nuclear power plant (NPP) during the loss-of-feed water (LOFW) transient and the calculation results received by RELAP5/MOD3.2 computer model of the same NPP unit.RELAP5/MOD3.2 computer model of the VVER-1000 has been developed at the Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy-Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (INRNE-BAS) based on Unit 6 of Kozloduy NPP. This model has been used for simulation the behavior of the real VVER-1000 NPP during the LOFW transient. Several calculations have been provided to describe how the different boundary conditions reflect on the prediction of real plant parameters.This paper discusses the results of the thermal–hydraulic sensitivity calculations of loss-of-feed water transient for VVER-1000 reactor design. The report also contains a brief summary of the main NPP systems included in the RELAP5 VVER model and the LOFW transient sequences.This report was possible through the participation of leading specialists from Kozloduy NPP and with the assistance of Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) for the United States Department of Energy (US DOE), International Nuclear Safety Program (INSP).     

An overview of instrumentation and control systems of a Korea standard nuclear power plant: A signal interface standpoint

This paper presents an overview of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) type nuclear power plant (NPP) in Korea. Yonggwang unit 3, which was constructed as a basis model for a Korea standard nuclear power plant (KSNP), is selected as an example for the presentation. This overview is derived from analyzing the I&C systems based on a top-down approach. The I&C systems consist of 30 systems. The 183 I&C cabinets are also analyzed and mapped to the systems. The overview is focused on an interface between the systems and the cabinets. This information will be used to understand the implementation of the I&C systems and to group the systems for an upgrade.     

Safety analysis of beyond design basis accidents in RBMK-1500 reactors

At present the design basis accidents for RBMK-1500 are rather thoroughly investigated. The performed analyses helped to develop and implement a number of safety modifications. Further plant safety enhancement requires developing emergency procedures that would enable beyond design basis accidents management by preventing core damage or mitigating consequences of severe accidents.     

Developing architecture for upgrading I&C systems of an operating nuclear power plant using a quality attribute-driven design method

This paper presents the architecture for upgrading the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of a Korean standard nuclear power plant (KSNP) as an operating nuclear power plant. This paper uses the analysis results of KSNP's I&C systems performed in a previous study. This paper proposes a Preparation–Decision–Design–Assessment (PDDA) process that focuses on quality oriented development, as a cyclical process to develop the architecture. The PDDA was motivated from the practice of architecture-based development used in software engineering fields. In the preparation step of the PDDA, the architecture of digital-based I&C systems was setup for an architectural goal. Single failure criterion and determinism were setup for architectural drivers. In the decision step, defense-in-depth, diversity, redundancy, and independence were determined as architectural tactics to satisfy the single failure criterion, and sequential execution was determined as a tactic to satisfy the determinism. After determining the tactics, the primitive digital-based I&C architecture was determined. In the design step, 17 systems were selected from the KSNP's I&C systems for the upgrade and functionally grouped based on the primitive architecture. The overall architecture was developed to show the deployment of the systems. The detailed architecture of the safety systems was developed by applying a 2-out-of-3 voting logic, and the detailed architecture of the non-safety systems was developed by hot-standby redundancy. While developing the detailed architecture, three ways of signal transmission were determined with proper rationales: hardwire, datalink, and network. In the assessment step, the required network performance, considering the worst-case of data transmission was calculated: the datalink was required by 120 kbps, the safety network by 5 Mbps, and the non-safety network by 60 Mbps. The architecture covered 17 systems out of 22 KSNP's I&C systems. The architecture is implementable with the equipment developed in South Korea. The architecture can be used as a model to upgrade the existing I&C systems in a planned, large-scale, and one-shot manner. A more detailed architecture down to software level will be developed in the future.     

Safety analysis of LBLOCA in BDBA scenarios for the Bushehr's VVER-1000 nuclear power plant

This paper presents the results of thermal-hydraulic calculations of a large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA) analysis for a VVER-1000/V446 unit at Bushehr nuclear power plant (BNPP). LBLOCA is analysis in two different beyond design basis accident (BDBA) scenarios using the RELAP5/MOD3.2 best estimate code. The scenarios are LBLOCA with station blackout (SBO) and LBLOCA with pump re-circulation blockage which have been evaluated in the final safety analysis report (FSAR) of BNPP. A model of VVER-1000 reactor based on Unit 1 of BNPP has been developed for the RELAP5/MOD3.2 thermal-hydraulics code consists of 4-loop primary and secondary systems with all their relevant sub-systems important to safety analysis. The analysis is performed without regard for operator's actions on accident management. The safety analysis is carried out and the results are checked against the acceptance criteria which are the possibility of using water inventory in the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) accumulators and the KWU tanks for core cooling and the available time to operators before the maximum design limit of fuel rod cladding damage is reached. These kinds of analyses are performed to provide the response of monitored plant parameters to identify symptoms available to the operators, timing of the loss of critical safety functions and timing of operator actions to avoid the loss of critical safety functions of core damage. The results of performed analyses show that the operators have 2.9 and 3.1 h for LBLOCA with SBO and LBLOCA with pump re-circulation blockage scenarios, respectively, before the fuel rod cladding rupture. The results are also compared with the BNPP FSAR data.