Egocentrism versus protocentrism: The status of self in social prediction.

In this article, the author discusses the limitations of the egocentric view of self in which self serves as an automatic filter, inhibiting access to alternative representations of others' thoughts and feelings. The author then outlines a protocentric model, the self-as-distinct (SAD) model, in which generic representations of prototypic others serve as the default; representations of self, specific others, or categories encode only distinctiveness from generic knowledge about prototypic others. Thus, self-knowledge is distributed both in generic representations in which self and prototypic others are undifferentiated and in a self-representation that encodes distinctiveness. The self-representation does not serve to make predictions about others because it encodes how self differs from the generic representation of others. Predictions that are the same about self and others are protocentric, based on generic knowledge that serves as the default. The SAD model parsimoniously accounts for many inconsistent findings across various domains in social cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the status of self in social prediction: Comment on Karniol (2003).

A challenge to mainstream notions on the status of the self in social prediction is welcome. The self-as-distinct model (R. Karniol, 2003) is thoughtful, provocative, and parsimonious, but it is also underspecified, undertested, and selective in its treatment of the evidence. More important, the model does not provide compelling answers to issues pertaining to the origins of prototypic social knowledge, the status of self-knowledge, the content of the self-representation, whether the use of self in social prediction is a logical contradiction, and whether the self's role in social prediction is amotivated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Method Matters: Effects of Explicit Versus Implicit Social Comparisons on Activation, Behavior, and Self-Views.

The authors investigated the impact of explicit versus implicit social comparisons. Simply being primed with a superior or inferior standard (implicit comparison) produced contrast as evidenced by accessibility of self-knowledge (Study 2), intellectual performance (Study 3), and self-ratings (Study 4), inconsistent with the standard. However, when participants were explicitly asked to compare, increased accessibility of a similarity focus (Study 1) and self-knowledge, behavioral performance, and self-ratings congruent with the standard were obtained more easily, indicative of assimilation. Explicit comparisons produced assimilation when the self was seen as mutable (rather than immutable; Study 4), when behavioral consequences were measured immediately after the comparison (rather than later; Study 3), and when the participants described (rather than ranked) their intelligence (Study 5). These findings support the interpretation comparison model. Implications for resolution of empirical inconsistencies in the social comparison literature are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Return of the ego--Self-referent information as a filter for social prediction: Comment on Karniol (2003).

The protocentrism paradigm of social prediction (R. Karniol, 2003) challenges the egocentrism paradigm tacitly accepted by many researchers. The author reviews the 2 paradigms comparatively by focusing on 3 conceptual and 3 empirical issues. On conceptual grounds, the author suggests that the egocentrism paradigm has been proven useful because of (a) its greater breadth and parsimony, (b) the difficulties in documenting the origin of protocenters, and (c) the indeterminate nature of self-as-distinct tags (which are crucial to protocentrism). On empirical grounds, the author argues that in research on perceptions of self-other similarities, the egocentric process of social projection is well-established. Self-referent knowledge (a) is most readily accessible, (b) receives greater weight in prediction tasks than does other-referent knowledge, and (c) tends to be suppressed only temporarily, with effort, and incompletely. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comparison processes in social judgment: Mechanisms and consequences.

This article proposes an informational perspective on comparison consequences in social judgment. It is argued that to understand the variable consequences of comparison, one has to examine what target knowledge is activated during the comparison process. These informational underpinnings are conceptualized in a selective accessibility model that distinguishes 2 fundamental comparison processes. Similarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard similarity, whereas dissimilarity testing selectively makes accessible knowledge indicating target-standard dissimilarity. These respective subsets of target knowledge build the basis for subsequent target evaluations, so that similarity testing typically leads to assimilation whereas dissimilarity testing typically leads to contrast. The model is proposed as a unifying conceptual framework that integrates diverse findings on comparison consequences in social judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Egocentric pattern projection: How implicit personality theories recapitulate the geography of the self.

Five studies demonstrated egocentric pattern projection, in that the implicit personality theories (IPTs) that participants held about other people tended to recapitulate the terrain of their own personality. To the extent that participants believed they possessed 2 traits to a similar degree within themselves, they tended, through their judgments of others and estimates of population parameters, to claim that the 2 traits were positively correlated in other people; and if they believed they possessed 2 traits to a dissimilar degree within themselves, they tended to claim that the 2 traits were negatively correlated in other people. Further evidence showed that information about the self plays a causal role in the construction of implicit theories, making a unique contribution to the shape of IPTs over and above that of information about another person. The relevance of these data for recent controversies over egocentric social judgment is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When you and I are "we," you are not threatening: The role of self-expansion in social comparison.

Many theories of self-evaluation emphasize the power of social comparison. Simply put, an individual is thought to gain esteem whenever she or he outperforms others and to lose esteem when he or she is outperformed. The current research explored interdependent self-construal as a moderator of these effects. Two studies used a priming task to manipulate the level of self-construal and investigate effects of social comparison in dyadic (Study 1) and group situations (Study 2). Both studies demonstrated that when the target for comparison is construed as part of the self, his or her successes become cause for celebration rather than costs to esteem. Additionally, gender differences in chronic relational and collective self-construals moderated the patterns of social comparison in a form similar to that of priming relational and collective self-construals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of The relational self: Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology.

Reviews the book, The relational self: Theoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology edited by Rebecca C. Curtis (see record 1991-97680-000). The relational self, a collection of papers from a conference held at Adelphi University in 1990, represents the latest attempt at rapprochement between psychoanalysis and social/personality psychology. The core unifying theme in this new effort at integration is the relational self. The dialectical relation between the self and environment is well illustrated by four essays devoted to current perspectives from social psychology. Several other essays provide the reader with a glimpse of the richness and vitality in current research on the self. I see no easy way of reconciling the two underlying research traditions, which differ not only in their methods and aims but also in the basic language used to describe human experiences. Perhaps in these postmodern times, there is no urgent need to stretch paradigms in the quest for unity of science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Psychological models of the justice motive: Antecedents of distributive and procedural justice.

Two psychological theories consider why people care about justice. The social-exchange-based resource model argues that people want to maximize the resources they obtain from social interactions, a goal that they believe is facilitated by following rules of distributive and procedural justice; the identity-based relational model suggests that people attempt to maintain high status within groups and use the justice of their experiences to evaluate their group status. Two studies on reactions to experiences with authorities (legal and managerial) examine the influence of these motives on (1) people's evaluations of the distributive and procedural justice of their experiences and (2) affective and behavioral reactions to those experiences. Results support a model in which relational issues dominate definitions of justice. Whereas distributive justice judgments are shaped by both resource and relational judgments, procedural justice judgments are shaped by relational concerns. The findings suggest two distinct justice motives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The jury and abjury of my peers: The self in face and dignity cultures.

The self is defined and judged differently by people from face and dignity cultures (in this case, Hong Kong and the United States, respectively). Across 3 experiments, people from a face culture absorbed the judgments of other people into their private self-definitions. Particularly important for people from a face culture are public representations—knowledge that is shared and known to be shared about someone. In contrast, people from a dignity culture try to preserve the sovereign self by not letting others define them. In the 3 experiments, dignity culture participants showed a studied indifference to the judgments of their peers, ignoring peers' assessments—whether those assessments were public or private, were positive or negative, or were made by qualified peers or unqualified peers. Ways that the self is “knotted” up with social judgments and cultural imperatives are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From Seeing to Being: Subliminal Social Comparisons Affect Implicit and Explicit Self-Evaluations.

The authors hypothesize that social comparisons can have automatic influences on self-perceptions. This was tested by determining whether subliminal exposure to comparison information influences implicit and explicit self-evaluation. Study 1 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information increased the accessibility of the self. Study 2 revealed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information resulted in a contrast effect on explicit self-evaluation. Study 3 showed that subliminal exposure to social comparison information affects self-evaluations more easily than it affects mood or evaluations of other people. Studies 4 and 5 replicated these self-evaluation effects and extended them to implicit measures. Study 6 showed that automatic comparisons are responsive to a person's perceptual needs, such that they only occur when people are uncertain about themselves. Implications for theories of social cognition, judgment, and comparison are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

My head says yes but my heart says no: Cognitive and affective attraction as a function of similarity to the ideal self.

The authors hypothesized that similarity to the ideal self (IS) simultaneously generates attraction and repulsion. Attraction research has suggested that a person likes individuals who are similar to his or her IS. Social comparison research has suggested that upward social comparison threatens self-evaluation. In Experiment 1, attraction to a partner increased and then decreased as the partner became more similar to and then surpassed the participant's IS. In Experiment 2, the cognitive and affective components of attraction increased and decreased, respectively, as the partner approached and surpassed the participant's IS to the extent that the dimension of comparison was meaningful and participants anticipated meeting their partner. Similarity to the IS generates opposing cognitive and affective reactions when the self-evaluative threat of upward comparison intensifies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How people make support judgments: Individual differences in the traits used to infer supportiveness in others.

Social support and other social judgments are composed of several distinct components, of which relationship effects are an important part. With regard to support judgments, relationship effects refer to the fact that when judging the same targets, people differ systematicatly in whom they see as supportive. One explanation for this effect is that people differ in how they combine information about targets to judge supportiveness. Participants rated the supportiveness of hypothetical targets and targets from their own social networks. Multilevel modeling identified the traits participants used to make support judgments. There were significant differences in the extent to which participants used different target personality traits to judge supportiveness. In addition, participant neuroticism predicted the extent to which participants used target neuroticism and agreeableness to judge supportiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Human cognition in its social context.

Presents a model of how the human cognitive system operates in its natural social context. The model focuses on both input and output variables that have been ignored in the development of most other cognitive theories. On the input end, the model emphasizes the role of prior knowledge and the goal-directed nature of social information processing. On the output end, the model emphasizes various types of social judgments and affective reactions, as well as memory and behavioral decision making. The model is designed to provide a general conceptual framework for integrating much of contemporary social cognition research. As such, it is consistent with, and occasionally subsumes, more molecular theories of specific social phenomena. An indication of the model's applicability to cognitive heuristics, representation of self, and the role of affect in information processing is included. Predictions of the model (e.g., the effects of information on both recall and judgments when the information is processed for different purposes) and the empirical evidence bearing on them are discussed. (4 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The "relative self": Informational and judgmental consequences of comparative self-evaluation.

Results of 5 studies demonstrated that self-evaluative comparisons have 2 distinct informational consequences with opposing judgmental effects: They selectively increase the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge and provide an evaluative reference point. The first informational consequence produces assimilation in self-evaluative judgments, whereas the latter yields contrast. Using a lexical decision task, Study 1 demonstrated that a social comparison selectively increases the accessibility of standard-consistent self-knowledge. Study 2 showed that this effect also holds for comparisons with objective standards. Studies 3 and 4 revealed that the same comparison may lead to assimilation on objective and contrast on subjective self-judgments. Finally, Study 5 demonstrated that assimilation results for comparisons with relevant and irrelevant standards, whereas contrast occurs only for relevant standards. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social influence and threat in confrontations between competent peers.

Five studies investigated social influence processes in confrontations between competent peers and showed a default absence of influence of a competent source on an equally competent target. This default lack of influence is attributed to the representation that competent targets give to the influence encounter, in which different answers from competent peers are incompatible, the error of the source thus being the sine qua non condition of targets’ correctness. However, an influence appeared when the representation of the task was modified via a decentering procedure (Study 1), even when controlling for alternative explanations (Study 2). Study 3 demonstrated that this liberating effect of decentering did not appear when the source was incompetent. Study 4 also examined social comparison processes and showed that independence of judgments produced the same liberating effect as decentering. Finally, Study 5 showed that the default lack of influence in confrontations between competent peers is due to the presence of a threat to the self. Indeed, the reduction of threat through a procedure of self-affirmation modified the representation of the task and allowed influence to appear. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The perception of situational consistency in behaviour: Assessing the actor-observer bias.

Differences in judgments of self and judgments of others in the perceived consistency of behaviour across situations are assessed. Using S-R Inventories, judges made ratings on a number of modes of response to a variety of situations regarding two behaviours, anxiety and hostility. After Jones and Nisbett (1971), it was predicted that self-judgments would show less consistency over situations than judgments of others. Two comparisons were made both involving two different analyses. In Study I the same person was rated by three judges (self, friend, and acquaintance); in Study II one judge rated two different target persons (self and friend). In the major analysis, consistency of behaviour was defined in terms of intrasubject correlations across situations. In a second, supplementary analysis, consistency was described in terms of differences (rather than relationships) between situations. A variance components analysis was applied to each set of data. For the most part, the results were as predicted. A further distinction was noted between judgments of a target by friend and by acquaintance, with acquaintances perceiving greater consistency of behaviour across situations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A model for inferential accuracy.

Inferential accuracy is distinguished from other forms of accuracy in social perception, including differential and stereotype accuracy, and defined in terms of a person's ability, given limited information about a target person, correctly to judge other pertinent characteristics about that person. A model and accompanying paradigm are proposed for studying this process. Given the observation that judgments about the joint probability of traits tend to be highly stable across groups of judges, it is possible to obtain scale values for a set of personality characteristics for each target. Each judge's ratings of this target may be plotted with respect to these ranked scale values in such a way that the degree to which his own judgments parallel the consensual patterning of trait inferences may be determined. Two parameters, slope and intercept, determine a straight line summarizing this relationship. These parameters are hypothesized to correspond to the judge's sensitivity to trait inferential information, and his threshold for employing more or less remote inferential data. It is hypothesized that these two parameters will account for a major portion of the individual difference variance in tasks involving inferential accuracy. The evidence to date, although limited, suggests that while sensitivity is general across dimensions, threshold is more specific. Whereas sensitivity is potentially linked to accurate knowledge of lay personality theory, threshold may be related to a process similar to assimilative projection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distancing from experienced self: How global-versus-local perception affects estimation of psychological distance.

In 4 studies, the authors examined the prediction derived from construal level theory (CLT) that higher level of perceptual construal would enhance estimated egocentric psychological distance. The authors primed participants with global perception, local perception, or both (the control condition). Relative to the control condition, global processing made participants estimate larger psychological distances in time (Study 1), space (Study 2), social distance (Study 3), and hypotheticality (Study 4). Local processing had the opposite effect. Consistent with CLT, all studies show that the effect of global-versus-local processing did emerge when participants estimated egocentric distances, which are distances from the experienced self in the here and now, but did not emerge with temporal distances not from now (Study 1), spatial distances not from here (Study 2), social distances not from the self (Study 3), or hypothetical events that did not involve altering an experienced reality (Study 4). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)