Free will in absentia: Dennett on free will and determinism.

Mark Crooks (see record 2004-18788-002) has given a helpful discussion of Daniel Dennett's "philosophical abolition of mind," adding to the list of reasons why many philosophers jokingly say Dennett should have titled his 1991 book "Consciousness Explained Away". As Crooks argues, Dennett really is committed 'to our phenomenal experience, beliefs, desires, etc. as all being illusory in the strongest possible sense. Yet, when it comes to free will, Dennett fights hard to maintain that free will is something more than an illusion, that it is a capacity our neurophysiological machinery has. Dennett's new book-like his writings on mind and consciousness-is short on argument and long on rhetoric and cute stories. And herein lies Dennett's greatest strength, to seemingly make palatable ideas that many people think stand no chance. This, however, is also his greatest weakness in that ultimately the rhetoric fails to carry the day under closer scrutiny. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dennett as illusionist.

Mark Crooks's article (see record 200418788-002) correctly draws attention to the ambiguous use of the notion of 'illusion' by Daniel Dennett in its arguments against theories that postulate the existence of qualia. The present comment extends that criticism by showing how Dennett's strictures reveal a failure to perceive an illusion in Dennett's own arguments. First, the inadequacy of his dismissal of inner registration is shown to be based in a prejudicial interpretation of the case for qualia. Second, his resistance to the idea of the non-epistemicity of the sensory fields shows him failing to acknowledge, not only the evolutionary advantage of such fields, but also that the flexibility and relativity of perception from person to person allows human communication to increase the rate of adaptive response across the species. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Commentary on crooks.

Mark Crooks (see record 2004-18788-002) effectively demolishes Dennett's theory by concentrating on its internal defects. In which case I would like to contribute to this discussion by examining some scientific evidence that may be relevant. Dennett claims that hallucinations do not involve any actual sensory element but only a change in our beliefs. A schizophrenic does not actually hear the voices he complains about--he develops the false belief that he is hearing something. This puts hallucinations on a par with the patient's delusions e.g. his false belief that other people are persecuting him. The majority view, in contrast, is that hallucinations represent defective function in the sensory system. In this impasse, evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies should help. These allow us to identify those areas of the brain that are activated under the conditions we are interested in. If the majority are right, then a subject having hallucinations should show increased activity in some part of his sensory brain. On the other hand, if Dennett is right, the subject should show no such increased activity but, instead, possibly abnormal activity in the part of the brain related to the formation of delusions. To answer this question I performed a Medline search of the literature on imaging studies in hallucinations occurring under various circumstances. The results were interesting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Last Philosophical Behaviorist: Content and Consciousness Explained Away.

Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology (programmatic phenomenology denial) are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical percepts, as interpreted by elementary science of perception, and as this implicates a more general critique of naive realism and its applications to such hypothetical scenarios as our actual existence within cranial vats and the so-called inverted spectrum argument devolved from Locke. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory of Mind and Motion Perception in Schizophrenia.

This study investigated the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) deficits and visual perception in patients with schizophrenia (N=52; 17 remitted and unmedicated) compared with healthy controls (N=30). ToM was assessed with the Eyes Test, which asked participants to choose which of 4 words best described the mental state of a person whose eyes were depicted in a photograph. Visual perception was evaluated with form and motion coherence threshold measurements. Results revealed that patients with schizophrenia (both remitted and nonremitted) showed deficits on the Eyes Test and the motion coherence task. ToM dysfunctions were associated with higher motion coherence thresholds and more severe negative symptoms. This suggests that ToM deficits are related to motion perception dysfunctions, which indicates a possible role of motion-sensitive areas in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Studies of How the Mind Publicly Enfolds into Being.

Review of book Studies of How the Mind Publicly Enfolds into Being edited by William E. Smythe and Angelina Baydala. This volume contains the fruits of a symposium of the Western Canadian Theoretical Psychologists devoted to the topic contained in the title, though the original idea was expressed by considering "psyche and polis" (p. viii), the two Greek terms from which our conceptions of self and public largely derive. Most of the reflection does not return all the way to ancient Greece, but the essays draw deeply on historical sources, retracing the influences of contemporary thought and reminding the audience of some roads not taken. The issue and definition of self are the predominant theme. Judging from the references, the sources of inspiration for many of these essays is predominantly philosophical, with liberal borrowings from sociology, cultural studies, and political theory. Despite the complexity and range of theoretical issues discussed, the contributions are uniformly clear and engaging, a credit to authors and editors alike. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology of adolescent inhalant intoxication.

Although volatile substance inhalation is prevalent in many contexts and presents a serious threat to public health, this pernicious form of substance misuse remains poorly understood. The question of why people seek and misuse inhalants may be addressed by examining phenomenological accounts of inhalant intoxication, yet few investigations of inhalant intoxication experiences are reported in the literature. This investigation employed a structured interview to assess inhalant intoxication experiences of 267 low-, moderate-, and high-frequency inhalant users. Low-frequency inhalant users reported predominately hedonic experiences during inhalant intoxication, whereas high-frequency users reported a mixture of hedonic and aversive experiences. Aversive experiences such as depressed mood, suicidal ideation, and chest pain were commonly reported by high-frequency users but were relatively rare among low-frequency users. High-frequency users also experienced significantly more euphoria, talkativeness, and grandiosity during inhalant intoxication than low-frequency users. Hedonic and aversive experiences during episodes of inhalant intoxication are relatively common among high-frequency adolescent inhalant users. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of member influence in an organization: Phenomenology versus organization structure.

This study explores the relative tenability of 2 hypotheses concerning the effects on members' loyalty and activity of membership influence in an organization. The phenomenological hypothesis explains the effects in terms of the influence which the members perceive to exist; the structural hypothesis in terms of the influence that actually does exist. This is a secondary analysis of questionnaire data from a previous survey of 104 leagues of the League of Women Voters of the U. S. Significant interleague correlations are found between members' average perceptions of membership influence in their respective leagues and the average loyalty and activity of members in these leagues who are matched on perception of influence. These correlations cannot easily be explained phenomenologically since the members who differ in loyalty and activity report identical perceptions of membership influence. (34 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An Integrated Theory of the Mind.

Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology and psychiatry: Duquesne Conference considers the conjunction.

The Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center of Duquesne University sponsored its fourth annual symposium on March 6-7 , 1986. The topic this year was "Phenomenology and Psychiatry." Headlining the group of notable symposiasts was J. H. van den Berg from the University of Leiden. Other participating phenomenological psychiatrists were Gion Condrau of Zurich, Alfred Kraus of Heidelberg, and Dieter Wyss of Wurzburg. After introductory remarks by Father Edward L. Murray, professor of psychology at Duquesne, Dr. van den Berg gave the opening presentation, entitled "The beginning and waning of the medical model in Psychiatry." During the first afternoon of the conference, Dr. Kraus read a paper entitled "The significance of Phenomenology for diagnosis in Psychiatry." The symposium's third paper presentation was Dr. Wyss' "Saintliness and psychosis: A phenomenological study of St. Theresa of Avila." In the final presentation, Dr. Condrau, director of the Daseinanalytic Institute of Zurich, delivered a paper entitled "Daseinanalytic psychotherapy." All four symposium presentations were followed-up by pointed commentaries and replies by fellow symposiasts. In addition, lively exchanges ensued between audience members and the panel. The audience included psychiatrists and psychologists from both the Pittsburgh area and various U.S. locales, non-professionals interested in phenomenology, and Duquesne faculty members and graduate students, both past and present. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenology is not metaphysics: Reply to Philip Ringstrom.

The author refutes Ringstrom’s characterizations of his view of trauma, showing that they misrepresent phenomenological claims as if they were metaphysical ones. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Special Section: Philosophy of Science and Counseling Research: Editor's Introduction.

Introduces readers to a special subsection on philosophy of science and counseling research and provides an overview of the articles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Executive Function and Theory of Mind: Stability and Prediction From Ages 2 to 3.

Several studies have demonstrated a relation between executive functioning (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in preschoolers, yet the developmental course of this relation remains unknown. Longitudinal stability and EF-ToM relations were examined in 81 children at 24 and 39 months. At Time 1, EF was unrelated to behavioral measures of ToM but was significantly related to parent report of children's internal-state language, independent of vocabulary size. At Time 2, behavioral batteries of EF and ToM were significantly related (r=.50, p     

Making Sense of Self-Conscious Emotion: Linking Theory of Mind and Emotion in Children With Autism.

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment and shame are associated with 2 aspects of theory of mind (ToM): (a) the ability to understand that behavior has social consequences in the eyes of others and (b) an understanding of social norms violations. The present study aimed to link ToM with the recognition of self-conscious emotion. Children with and without autism identified facial expressions conscious of self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions from photographs. ToM was also measured. Children with autism performed more poorly than comparison children at identifying self-conscious emotions, though they did not differ in the recognition of non-self-conscious emotions. When ToM ability was statistically controlled, group differences in the recognition of self-conscious emotion disappeared. Discussion focused on the links between ToM and self-conscious emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What do i think you're doing? Action identification and mind attribution.

The authors examined how a perceiver's identification of a target person's actions covaries with attributions of mind to the target. The authors found in Study 1 that the attribution of intentionality and cognition to a target was associated with identifying the target's action in terms of high-level effects rather than low-level details. In Study 2, both action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, and in Study 3, they were reduced for a target suffering misfortune. In Study 4, it was again found that action identification and mind attribution were greater for a liked target, but like that for the self or a liked other, positive actions were identified at higher levels than negative actions, with the reverse being true for disliked others. In Study 5, the authors found that instructing participants to adopt the target's perspective did not affect mind attribution but did lead to higher level identifications of the target's actions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Idols of the psychologist: Johannes Linschoten and the demise of phenomenological psychology in the Netherlands.

Before and after World War II, a loose movement within Dutch psychology solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology. Dutch phenomenological psychologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on Husserlian interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. This movement came to a halt in the 1960s, even though it had been exported to North America and elsewhere as "phenomenological psychology." Frequently referred to as the "Utrecht school," most of the activity of the group was centered at Utrecht University. In this article, the authors examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology: its rise in North America and Europe, and its institutional demise. By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a purely phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his own empirical work, especially his 1956 dissertation published in German, can be seen to be a form of empiricism inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Philosophy and psychotherapy.

In the course of responding to Elliott's (2008) provocative article, the authors tour some precincts of the intellectual foundations of psychotherapy. In particular the authors review the philosophical underpinnings of contemporary research on psychotherapy and provide a context that allows for an examination and critique of Elliott's proposals for new research methods and new approaches to conceptualizing the data of psychotherapy research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aristotle, teleology, and modern psychology.

After first discussing the symbiotic relationship between science and philosophy of science in mind, the author then presents a very selective glimpse of the path that science traversed from Aristotle and the ancients to the modern science of psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mind, body, and psychoanalysis: The science of psychotherapy.

Along with the contributions of the psychoanalytic century to the science of the mind, there appears to be a diminished interest in and training for psychotherapy in favor of genetic, organic, and psychopharmacologic approaches. New advances should not be accompanied by the elimination of achieved ones. R. Waelder (1967) stated that progress has victims as well as beneficiaries. Psychopathology consists of complex psychological mechanisms and developmental factors, which, although they can now be demonstrated by cerebral radiography, must still be recognized as the center of therapeutic efforts. The opportunity is greater than ever to achieve an integration of our combined knowledge of brain and mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Relevance of Early Lacan for Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism: Preliminary Communication.

In this article, the author attempts to show that Lacan's early writings are relevant to the author's own psychoanalytic perspective by virtue of Lacan's view of the psychoanalytic method and process as phenomenological, hermeneutic, and dialogic. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)