Multiple memory systems are unnecessary to account for infant memory development: An ecological model.

How the memory of adults evolves from the memory abilities of infants is a central problem in cognitive development. The popular solution holds that the multiple memory systems of adults mature at different rates during infancy. The early-maturing system (implicit or nondeclarative memory) functions automatically from birth, whereas the late-maturing system (explicit or declarative memory) functions intentionally, with awareness, from late in the first year. Data are presented from research on deferred imitation, sensory preconditioning, potentiation, and context for which this solution cannot account and present an alternative model that eschews the need for multiple memory systems. The ecological model of infant memory development (N. E. Spear, 1984) holds that members of all species are perfectly adapted to their niche at each point in ontogeny and exhibit effective, evolutionarily selected solutions to whatever challenges each new niche poses. Because adults and infants occupy different niches, what they perceive, learn, and remember about the same event differs, but their raw capacity to learn and remember does not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of short-term memory capacity and task experience for overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty.

Research with general knowledge items demonstrates extreme overconfidence when people estimate confidence intervals for unknown quantities, but close to zero overconfidence when the same intervals are assessed by probability judgment. In 3 experiments, the authors investigated if the overconfidence specific to confidence intervals derives from limited task experience or from short-term memory limitations. As predicted by the naive sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), overconfidence with probability judgment is rapidly reduced by additional task experience, whereas overconfidence with intuitive confidence intervals is minimally affected even by extensive task experience. In contrast to the minor bias with probability judgment, the extreme overconfidence bias with intuitive confidence intervals is correlated with short-term memory capacity. The proposed interpretation is that increased task experience is not sufficient to cure the overconfidence with confidence intervals because it stems from short-term memory limitations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgments of frequency and recognition memory in a multiple-trace memory model.

The multiple-trace simulation model, {minerva} 2, was applied to a number of phenomena found in experiments on relative and absolute judgments of frequency, and forced-choice and yes–no recognition memory. How the basic model deals with effects of repetition, forgetting, list length, orientation task, selective retrieval, and similarity and how a slightly modified version accounts for effects of contextual variability on frequency judgments were shown. Two new experiments on similarity and recognition memory were presented, together with appropriate simulations; attempts to modify the model to deal with additional phenomena were also described. Questions related to the representation of frequency are addressed, and the model is evaluated and compared with related models of frequency judgments and recognition memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separating bias and sensitivity in judgments of associative memory.

Ratings of the degree of association between words are linearly related to normed associative strengths, but the intercept is high, and the slope is shallow (the judgments of associative memory [JAM] function). Two experiments included manipulations intended to decrease the intercept and increase the slope. Discrimination training on many pairs of words and constraining ratings to sum to a constant both reduced the intercept but failed to change the slope. The intercept of the JAM function appears to contain a bias component that can be manipulated independently of the slope, which reflects sensitivity to associative strengths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Overconfidence effects in category learning: A comparison of connectionist and exemplar memory models.

Exemplar and connectionist models were compared on their ability to predict overconfidence effects in category learning data. In the standard task, participants learned to classify hypothetical patients with particular symptom patterns into disease categories and reported confidence judgments in the form of probabilities. The connectionist model asserts that classifications and confidence are based on the strength of learned associations between symptoms and diseases. The exemplar retrieval model (ERM) proposes that people learn by storing examples and that their judgments are often based on the first example they happen to retrieve. Experiments 1 and 2 established that overconfidence increases when the classification step of the process is bypassed. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that a direct instruction to retrieve many exemplars reduces overconfidence. Only the ERM predicted the major qualitative phenomena exhibited in these experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the nature of the decision axis in signal-detection-based models of recognition memory.

Most models of recognition memory involve a signal-detection component in which a criterion is placed along a decision axis. Older models generally assume a familiarity-decision axis, but newer models often assume a likelihood ratio axis instead because it allows for a more natural account of the ubiquitous mirror effect. In 3 experiments reported here, item strength was differentially manipulated to see whether a mirror effect would occur. Within a list, the items from 1 category were strengthened by repetition, but the items from another category were not. On the subsequent recognition test, the hit rate was higher for the strong category, but the false-alarm rates for the weak and strong categories were the same (i.e., no mirror effect was observed). This result suggests that the decision axis represents a familiarity scale and that participants adopt a single decision criterion that they maintain throughout the recognition test. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the age-related effects of proactive interference on working memory tasks using the Rasch model.

Inhibition-reduction theory (L. Hasher & R. Zacks, 1988) hypothesizes that the age-related decline in working memory (WM) span is a result of a decrease in the ability to inhibit irrelevant information in WM. Using the Rasch psychometric model, this study found that later trials on 2 WM span tasks were more difficult for older adults than for younger adults, consistent with inhibition-reduction theory's hypothesis that older adults are more susceptible to the effects of proactive interference (PI). Furthermore, after accounting for differential susceptibility to the effects of PI, age-related variance in WM span was reduced by about half. These results suggest that differential susceptibility to PI may account for a substantial portion, although not all, of the age-related decline in WM span. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of interruptions on postcompletion and other procedural errors: An account based on the activation-based goal memory model.

A postcompletion error (PCE) is a specific kind of cognitive slip that involves omitting a final task step after the main goal of the task is accomplished. It is notoriously difficult to provoke (and hence study) slips under experimental conditions. In this paper, the authors present an experimental task paradigm that has been shown to be effective for studying PCEs in routine procedural tasks. Two studies were carried out to examine the effect of interruption position and task structure on the prevalence of PCEs. It was found that significantly more PCEs were obtained when an interruption occurred just before the PC step than when an interruption occurred at any other position in the task. The authors account for this effect in terms of Altmann and Trafton's activation-based goal memory model. The same interruption effect was obtained for some, but not all, other procedural errors; the authors discuss the nature of these errors and likely explanations for the differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conjunction error rates on a continuous recognition memory test: Little evidence for recollection.

Two experiments examined conjunction memory errors on a continuous recognition task where the lag between parent words (e.g., blackmail, jailbird) and later conjunction lures (blackbird) was manipulated. In Experiment 1, contrary to expectations, the conjunction error rate was highest at the shortest lag (1 word) and decreased as the lag increased. In Experiment 2 the conjunction error rate increased significantly from a 0- to a 1-word lag, then decreased slightly from a 1- to a 5-word lag. The results provide mixed support for simple familiarity and dual-process accounts of recognition. Paradoxically, searching for an item in memory does not appear to be a good encoding task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A constant error approach to the study of dimensions of social perception.

"A method was described for use in the study of dimensions of social perception which consisted of the factor analysis of intercorrelations between trait judgments of photographs where each judgment was made of a different stimulus." 4 factors were isolated, and the findings were related to other research on social perception and personality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive niches: An ecological model of strategy selection.

How do people select among different strategies to accomplish a given task? Across disciplines, the strategy selection problem represents a major challenge. We propose a quantitative model that predicts how selection emerges through the interplay among strategies, cognitive capacities, and the environment. This interplay carves out for each strategy a cognitive niche, that is, a limited number of situations in which the strategy can be applied, simplifying strategy selection. To illustrate our proposal, we consider selection in the context of 2 theories: the simple heuristics framework and the ACT–R (adaptive control of thought—rational) architecture of cognition. From the heuristics framework, we adopt the thesis that people make decisions by selecting from a repertoire of simple decision strategies that exploit regularities in the environment and draw on cognitive capacities, such as memory and time perception. ACT–R provides a quantitative theory of how these capacities adapt to the environment. In 14 simulations and 10 experiments, we consider the choice between strategies that operate on the accessibility of memories and those that depend on elaborate knowledge about the world. Based on Internet statistics, our model quantitatively predicts people's familiarity with and knowledge of real-world objects, the distributional characteristics of the associated speed of memory retrieval, and the cognitive niches of classic decision strategies, including those of the fluency, recognition, integration, lexicographic, and sequential-sampling heuristics. In doing so, the model specifies when people will be able to apply different strategies and how accurate, fast, and effortless people's decisions will be. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing signal-detection models of yes/no and two-alternative forced-choice recognition memory.

The current study compared 3 models of recognition memory in their ability to generalize across yes/no and 2-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) testing. The unequal-variance signal-detection model assumes a continuous memory strength process. The dual-process signal-detection model adds a thresholdlike recollection process to a continuous familiarity process. The mixture signal-detection model assumes a continuous memory strength process, but the old item distribution consists of a mixture of 2 distributions with different means. Prior efforts comparing the ability of the models to characterize data from both test formats did not consider the role of parameter reliability, which can be critical when comparing models that differ in flexibility. Parametric bootstrap simulations revealed that parameter regressions based on separate fits of each test type only served to identify the least flexible model. However, simultaneous fits of receiver-operating characteristic data from both test types with goodness-of-fit adjusted with Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) successfully recovered the true model that generated the data. With AIC and simultaneous fits to real data, the unequal-variance signal-detection model was found to provide the best account across yes/no and 2AFC testing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective adult age differences in an age-invariant multifactor model of declarative memory.

Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test competing models of declarative memory. Data from middle-aged participants provided support for a model comprised of 2 2nd-order (episodic and semantic memory) and 4 1st-order (recall, recognition, fluency, and knowledge) factors. Extending this model across young-old and old-old participants established support for age invariance. Tests of group differences showed an age deficit in episodic memory that was more pronounced for recall than for recognition. For semantic memory, there was an increase in knowledge from middle to young-old age and thereafter a decrease. Overall, the results support the view that episodic memory is more age sensitive than semantic memory, but they also indicate that aging has differential effects within these 2 forms of memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing text representations with recognition: The interaction of domain knowledge and text coherence.

Readers construct at least 2 interrelated mental representations when they comprehend a text: a textbase and a situation model. Two experiments were conducted with recognition memory to examine how domain knowledge and text coherence influence readers' textbase and situation-model representations. In Experiment 1, participants made remember-know judgments to text ideas. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence remember judgments differently than know judgments. In Experiment 2, the authors used the process-dissociation procedure to obtain recollection and familiarity estimates. Knowledge and coherence interacted to influence recollection estimates but not familiarity estimates. The authors claim that recollection and familiarity can be used as markers of the different processes involved in constructing a textbase and a situation model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Process demands of rejection mechanisms of recognition memory.

A surge of research has been conducted to examine memory editing mechanisms that help distinguish accurate from inaccurate memories. In the present experiment, the authors examined the ability of participants to use novelty detection, recollection rejection, and plausibility judgments to reject lures presented on a recognition memory test. Participants studied a list of word pairs that were arranged in a category relationship (both words from the same category) or an unrelated relationship (both words from different categories) under full or divided attention. At test, participants were given a yes/no recognition test in which they were to respond after seeing the test items for 400 ms or 2,800 ms. Some of the test items were rearranged word pairs that were consistent with the study relationship, whereas others were inconsistent with the study relationship. The results demonstrate that the participants required full attention at study to use novelty detection, recollection rejection, and plausibility judgments to reject lures. Moreover, the results indicate that a long response deadline at test was needed for participants to use both recollection rejection and plausibility judgments to reject lures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 29(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2007-16865-001). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a pp then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differentiation and response bias in episodic memory: Evidence from reaction time distributions.

In differentiation models, the processes of encoding and retrieval produce an increase in the distribution of memory strength for targets and a decrease in the distribution of memory strength for foils as the amount of encoding increases. This produces an increase in the hit rate and decrease in the false-alarm rate for a strongly encoded compared with a weakly encoded list, consistent with empirical data. Other models assume that the foil distribution is unaffected by encoding manipulations or the foil distribution increases as a function of target strength. They account for the empirical data by adopting a stricter criterion for strongly encoded lists relative to weakly encoded lists. The differentiation and criterion shift explanations have been difficult to discriminate with accuracy measures alone. In this article, reaction time distributions and accuracy measures are collected in a list-strength paradigm and in a response bias paradigm in which the proportion of test items that are targets is manipulated. Diffusion model analyses showed that encoding strength is primarily accounted for by changes in the rate of accumulation of evidence (i.e., drift rate) for both targets and foils and manipulating the proportion of targets is primarily accounted for by changes in response bias (i.e., starting point). The diffusion model analyses is interpreted in terms of predictions of the differentiation models in which subjective memory strength is mapped directly onto drift rate and criterion placement is mapped onto starting point. Criterion shift models require at least 2 types of shifts to account for these findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clearing the mind: A working memory model of distraction from negative mood.

The present research examined whether and how loading working memory can attenuate negative mood. In three experiments, participants were exposed to neutral, weakly negative, or strongly negative pictures followed by a task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating task presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). Participants in all three experiments reported less negative moods in negative trials with high compared to low working memory demand. Working memory demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These findings suggest that loading working memory prevents mood-congruent processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Revisiting the affect regulation model of binge eating: A meta-analysis of studies using ecological momentary assessment.

The affect regulation model of binge eating, which posits that patients binge eat to reduce negative affect (NA), has received support from cross-sectional and laboratory-based studies. Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) involves momentary ratings and repeated assessments over time and is ideally suited to identify temporal antecedents and consequences of binge eating. This meta-analytic review includes EMA studies of affect and binge eating. Electronic database and manual searches produced 36 EMA studies with N = 968 participants (89% Caucasian women). Meta-analyses examined changes in affect before and after binge eating using within-subjects standardized mean gain effect sizes (ESs). Results supported greater NA preceding binge eating relative to average affect (ES = 0.63) and affect before regular eating (ES = 0.68). However, NA increased further following binge episodes (ES = 0.50). Preliminary findings suggested that NA decreased following purging in bulimia nervosa (ES = –0.46). Moderators included diagnosis (with significantly greater elevations of NA prior to bingeing in binge eating disorder compared to bulimia nervosa) and binge definition (with significantly smaller elevations of NA before binge vs. regular eating episodes for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders definition compared to lay definitions of binge eating). Overall, results fail to support the affect regulation model of binge eating and challenge reductions in NA as a maintenance factor for binge eating. However, limitations of this literature include unidimensional analyses of NA and inadequate examination of affect during binge eating, as binge eating may regulate only specific facets of affect or may reduce NA only during the episode. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A 'landscape' model of reading comprehension: Inferential processes and the construction of a stable memory representation.

The theoretical model of reading proposed in this paper captures the processes that take place during reading and specifies how these processes result in a stable memory representation of the text. The model is based on the premise that, during reading, the ideas and concepts associated with the text fluctuate in their activation. The result is a dynamically shifting landscape of activations. Two factors contribute to the shape of this landscape: readers' limited attentional resources and their attempts to maintain standards for coherence. As a result, at any point during reading the following concepts are most likely to be activated: information described in or associated to the current sentence, information retained from the prior reading cycle, and information that is reinstated from prior text or drawn from background knowledge in order to maintain coherence. Readers' standards for coherence vary between as well as within individuals (e.g., as a function of reading goal), but here the focus is on two types of coherence that seem to be employed by the modal reader: anaphoric/referential and causal coherence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)