Recognition instructions and recognition practice can alter the confidence–response time relationship.

Three face-recognition experiments examined how instructions for a recognition test (e.g., emphasize speed or emphasize accuracy) can impact the confidence–response time relationship for episodic memory reports. In all 3 experiments, the confidence–response time correlation was smaller when participants were told to speed up their responding rate, which suggests that participants in these conditions relied less on the artificially compressed response times in forming their confidence judgments than they would under "normal" circumstances. Also, recognition practice before the final memory test eliminated the effect of the recognition instruction manipulation. These results support J. S. Shaw's (1996) suggestion that witnesses rely in part on the fluency of their memory reports when generating confidence judgments, and these findings have important implications for understanding the relationships among witness confidence, accuracy, and response time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Different confidence–accuracy relationships for feature-based and familiarity-based memories.

Participants studied naturalistic pictures presented for varying brief durations and then received a recognition test on which they indicated whether each picture was old or new and rated their confidence. In 1 experiment they indicated whether each “old”/“new” response was based on memory for a specific feature in the picture or instead on the picture's general familiarity; in another experiment, we defined pictures that tended to elicit feature versus familiarity responses. Thus, feature/familiarity was a dependent variable in 1 experiment and an independent variable in the other. In both experiments feature-based responses were more accurate than those that were familiarity based, and confidence and accuracy increased with duration for both response types. However, when confidence was controlled for, mean accuracy was higher for familiarity-based than for feature-based responses. The theoretical implication is that confidence and accuracy arise from different underlying information. The applied implication is that confidence differences should not be taken as implying accuracy differences when the phenomenal basis of the memory reports differ. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Neural basis for recognition confidence in younger and older adults.

Although several studies have examined the neural basis for age-related changes in objective memory performance, less is known about how the process of memory monitoring changes with aging. The authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine retrospective confidence in memory performance in aging. During low confidence, both younger and older adults showed behavioral evidence that they were guessing during recognition and that they were aware they were guessing when making confidence judgments. Similarly, both younger and older adults showed increased neural activity during low- compared to high-confidence responses in the lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and left intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, older adults showed more high-confidence errors than younger adults. Younger adults showed greater activity for high compared to low confidence in medial temporal lobe structures, but older adults did not show this pattern. Taken together, these findings may suggest that impairments in the confidence–accuracy relationship for memory in older adults, which are often driven by high-confidence errors, may be primarily related to altered neural signals associated with greater activity for high-confidence responses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A model of the go/no-go task.

In this article, the first explicit, theory-based comparison of 2-choice and go/no-go variants of 3 experimental tasks is presented. Prior research has questioned whether the underlying core-information processing is different for the 2 variants of a task or whether they differ mostly in response demands. The authors examined 4 different diffusion models for the go/no-go variant of each task along with a standard diffusion model for the 2-choice variant (R. Ratcliff, 1978). The 2-choice and the go/no-go models were fit to data from 4 lexical decision experiments, 1 numerosity discrimination experiment, and 1 recognition memory experiment, each with 2-choice and go/no-go variants. The models that assumed an implicit decision criterion for no-go responses produced better fits than models that did not. The best model was one in which only response criteria and the nondecisional components of processing changed between the 2 variants, supporting the view that the core information on which decisions are based is not different between them. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects' judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2-5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2-5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

On the difference between strength-based and frequency-based mirror effects in recognition memory

According to the standard signal-detection model of recognition memory, confidence judgments for recognition responses are reached in much the same way that old-new decisions are reached (i.e., on the basis of criteria situated along the strength-of-evidence axis). The question investigated here is how the confidence criteria shift when recognition accuracy is manipulated across conditions. Although several theories assume that the old-new decision criterion shifts when recognition accuracy changes, less is known about how the confidence criteria move. An analysis of data previously reported by R. Ratcliff, G. McKoon, and M. Tindall (1994) and some new data reported here suggest that the confidence criteria fan out on the decision axis as d' decreases. This result is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of a likelihood ratio model, although the data did not support the stronger quantitative predictions of this account.     

What is memory aging the aging of?

Tested 64 males and females in their 20s and 60s, with high school and doctoral-level educations, on a variety of memory tasks. There were sizable age decrements in word recall and recognition independent of education. Age differences in the pattern of performance on incidental and intentional recall and recognition tests and in semantic elaboration suggested that older Ss suffer from associative processing production deficiencies and inefficiencies. No age differences in number of overt free associations, responses on the memory questionnaire, study time, reported strategy use, accuracy at memory prediction, accuracy at confidence rating, intrusions in recall, or response criterion in recognition suggested that age differences in word memory were not related to amount of semantic processing, knowledge about memory, inclination to strategically engage in activities to enhance retention, memory monitoring, or memory selection or decision. There were age increments in fact recall and recognition, also independent of education. These trends may have been related to age differences in preexperimental familiarity with materials, but also suggested limitations in the generalizability of findings from typical laboratory tasks. There were weak but positive relations between poor memory and both poor health and acceptance of "aging" roles. (39 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age differences in source forgetting: Effects on reality monitoring and on eyewitness testimony.

Age differences in memory for the source of memories were investigated using two different experimental paradigms. Experiment 1 used a reality monitoring paradigm. A series of actions were either performed, imagined, or watched, and subjects were later tested for their ability to recognize the actions and identify their origins. Elderly subjects made more false positive responses than did young subjects, and they made more source confusion errors, attributing actions to the wrong sources. Both new and imagined actions were most often misclassified as watched. Experiment 2 used an eyewitness testimony paradigm. After watching a film, subjects read a written version of the story. A recognition test showed that elderly subjects were more often misled by false information in the story than were the younger subjects, and were more confident that their erroneous responses were correct. The findings suggest that a decline in memory for sources may diminish the accuracy of elderly witnesses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decision rules for recognition memory confidence judgments.

According to the standard signal-detection model of recognition memory, confidence judgments for recognition responses are reached in much the same way that old-new decisions are reached (i.e., on the basis of criteria situated along the strength-of-evidence axis). The question investigated here is how the confidence criteria shift when recognition accuracy is manipulated across conditions. Although several theories assume that the old-new decision criterion shifts when recognition accuracy changes, less is known about how the confidence criteria move. An analysis of data previously reported by R. Ratcliff, G. McKoon, and M. Tindall (1994) and some new data reported here suggest that the confidence criteria fan out on the decision axis as d' decreases. This result is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of a likelihood ratio model, although the data did not support the stronger quantitative predictions of this account. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: Judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS).

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember–know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes–no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and others.

Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1–3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions." In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly," again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

ROC curves and confidence judgments in recognition memory.

Most models of recognition memory rely on a strength/familiarity-based signal detection account that assumes that the processes giving rise to a confidence judgment are the same as those giving rise to an old-new decision. Confidence is assumed to be scaled directly from the perceived familiarity of a probe. This assumption was tested in 2 experiments that examine the shape of confidence-based z receiver operating characteristic (zROC) curves under different levels of response bias induced by changing stimulus probabilities (Experiment 1) and payoffs (Experiment 2). Changes in the shape of the zROC curves with bias indicate that confidence is not scaled directly from perceived familiarity or likelihood. A model of information accumulation in recognition memory is proposed that can account for the observed effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and fluency-based illusions in recognition memory.

We examined age-related differences in susceptibility to fluency-based memory illusions. The results from 2 experiments, in which 2 different methods were used to enhance the fluency of recognition test items, revealed that older and young adults did not differ significantly in terms of their overall susceptibility to this type of memory illusion. Older and young adults were also similar in that perceptual fluency did not influence recognition memory responses when there was a mismatch in the sensory modality of the study and test phases. Likewise, a more conceptual fluency manipulation influenced recognition memory responses in both older and young adults regardless of the match in modality. Overall, the results indicate that older adults may not be more vulnerable than young adults to fluency-based illusions of recognition memory. Moreover, young and older adults appear to be comparable in their sensitivity to factors that modulate the influence of fluency on recognition decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correlation and letter recognition.

Used correlation functions obtained in 2 experiments with undergraduate Os (N = 10) as a basis for describing human visual letter recognition. Visual images were filtered by means of autocorrelation for pattern information. This operation gave the relative visibilities or legibilities of the characters. The visual impressions were then cross-correlated with a set of memory records whose outputs described the relative probabilities that the stimulus was a given character. This operation described confusion errors. Finally "response bias" was described in terms of the reliability with which a memory record provides identification of a given stimulus. In these terms response bias represented an attempt by the recognition system to minimize errors in high-information responses, at the expense of producing more low-information responses as errors. (French summary) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Berry et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming" by Christopher J. Berry, David R. Shanks, Selina Li, Luke Sheridan Rains and Richard N. A. Henson (Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 2010[Dec], Vol 64[4], 241-255). In the article there was an error in Equation B2 in Appendix B. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-26226-002.) Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory—that its contents are not accessible to awareness—has remained elusive. Such a finding of “pure” implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Predicting reasoning from memory.

In an effort to assess the relations between reasoning and memory, in 8 experiments, the authors examined how well responses on an inductive reasoning task are predicted from responses on a recognition memory task for the same picture stimuli. Across several experimental manipulations, such as varying study time, presentation frequency, and the presence of stimuli from other categories, there was a high correlation between reasoning and memory responses (average r = .87), and these manipulations showed similar effects on the 2 tasks. The results point to common mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning and recognition memory abilities. A mathematical model, GEN-EX (generalization from examples), derived from exemplar models of categorization, is presented, which predicts both reasoning and memory responses from pairwise similarities among the stimuli, allowing for additional influences of subtyping and deterministic responding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The overconfidence effect in social prediction.

In 5 studies with overlapping designs and intents, Ss predicted a specific peer's responses to a variety of stimulus situations, each of which offered a pair of mutually exclusive and exhaustive response alternatives. Each prediction was accompanied by a subjective probability estimate reflecting the Ss' confidence in its accuracy—a measure validated in Study 5 by having Ss choose whether to "gamble" on the accuracy of their prediction or on the outcome of a simple aleatory event. In social prediction, as in other judgmental domains, Ss were highly overconfident. Regardless of the type of prediction item (e.g., responses to hypothetical dilemmas) and regardless of the type of information available about the person whose responses they were predicting (e.g., predictions about roommates), Ss' accuracy levels fell below levels required to justify their confidence levels. Analysis revealed 2 sources of overconfidence. Ss generally were overconfident to the extent that they were highly confident. Also, Ss were most likely to be overconfident when they knowingly or unknowingly made predictions that ran counter to the relevant response base rates and, as a consequence, achieved low accuracy rates that their confidence estimates failed to anticipate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Know thy memory: The use of questionnaires to assess and study memory.

Reviews the properties of 14 questionnaires (including the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, the Inventory of Learning Processes, and the Memory Change Questionnaire) developed independently to assess people's beliefs about their memory performance in natural circumstances. Research has found that responses to these questionnaires are reliable but that they correspond only moderately with a person's memory performance. Apparently, people's beliefs about their memory performance are stable but not accurate. Research also has found that responses to memory questionnaires vary with several variables: the kind of memory failure, susceptibility to cognitive failures under stress, confidence in memory performance, and age of Ss. Thus, although memory questionnaires are only moderately successful indicators of memory performance, they may nevertheless elucidate the properties of beliefs that underlie performance. (93 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correcting a metacognitive error: Feedback increases retention of low-confidence correct responses.

Previous studies investigating posttest feedback have generally conceptualized feedback as a method for correcting erroneous responses, giving virtually no consideration to how feedback might promote learning of correct responses. Here, the authors show that when correct responses are made with low confidence, feedback serves to correct this initial metacognitive error, enhancing retention of low-confidence correct responses. In 2 experiments, subjects took an initial multiple-choice test on general knowledge facts and made a confidence judgment after each response. Feedback was provided for half of the questions, and retention was assessed by a final cued-recall test. Taking the initial test improved retention relative to not testing, and feedback further enhanced performance. Consistent with prior research, feedback improved retention by allowing subjects to correct initially erroneous responses. Of more importance, feedback also doubled the retention of correct low-confidence responses, relative to providing no feedback. The function of feedback is to correct both memory errors and metacognitive errors. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the nature of the decision axis in signal-detection-based models of recognition memory.

Most models of recognition memory involve a signal-detection component in which a criterion is placed along a decision axis. Older models generally assume a familiarity-decision axis, but newer models often assume a likelihood ratio axis instead because it allows for a more natural account of the ubiquitous mirror effect. In 3 experiments reported here, item strength was differentially manipulated to see whether a mirror effect would occur. Within a list, the items from 1 category were strengthened by repetition, but the items from another category were not. On the subsequent recognition test, the hit rate was higher for the strong category, but the false-alarm rates for the weak and strong categories were the same (i.e., no mirror effect was observed). This result suggests that the decision axis represents a familiarity scale and that participants adopt a single decision criterion that they maintain throughout the recognition test. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)