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1.
This paper considers the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. There are one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain, one manufacturer produces the new product directly from raw material, while the other manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into the original production system. Based on different industry organisation structures and the chain members’ competing forms, five game decision models are established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or remanufacturing, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Finally, we carry out the sensitivity analysis through numerical studies of some key parameters for examining their influences on the pricing decisions and chain members’ maximum profits. On the basis of comparison and analysis, some managerial insights are derived. 相似文献
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For a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, Stackelberg game analyses are conducted to examine pricing and warranty decisions under two warranty models depending on who offers warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark models with a warranty for new products only. Next, we identify the conditions under which warranty for remanufactured products is offered and investigate how this warranty affects the CLSC operations. Subsequently, comparative studies are carried out to examine equilibrium decisions, profitability and consumer surplus of the CLSC between the two warranty models. Analytical results show that offering warranty for remanufactured products does not affect new product pricing in period 2, but influences the pricing of new products in period 1 and remanufactured products in period 2, thereby enhancing remanufacturing, individual and channel profitability, and consumer surplus. Compared to the retailer warranty for remanufactured products, the manufacturer warranty can attain a more equitable profit distribution. If the warranty cost advantage of the manufacturer (retailer) is significant relative to that of the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) arises as a natural choice to offer warranty for remanufactured products as this decision enhances both profitability and consumer surplus. 相似文献
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针对具有不同渠道权力结构和回收拆解产品质量差异、新产品与再制造产品价格差异的再制造闭环供应链,主要研究其成员企业最优定价决策问题。构建了包含制造/再制造商、零售商、消费者和回收拆解商的三级再制造闭环供应链决策模型;采用Stackelberg主从博弈确定不同渠道权力结构下各成员企业的最优定价策略及其利润,并重点探讨废旧产品回收率τ、产品替代系数δ两个关键参数对它们的影响;将该决策模型应用到汽车发电机再制造闭环供应链案例。研究结果表明:1) 对于3种渠道权力结构,当制造/再制造商和零售商为主导者时,其自身利润和再制造闭环供应链总利润均最大;而当回收拆解商为主导者时,其自身利润和总利润却最小;2) 随着τ和δ的提高,单位新产品与再制造产品的最优批发价、最优零售价均增加,单位废旧产品的最优回收价则降低;制造/再制造商和零售商的利润下降,回收拆解商的利润上升,导致再制造闭环供应链的总利润呈U形。研究能够为各成员企业的最优定价决策提供有效支持与参考。 相似文献
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This paper investigates a reward-driven policy, employed in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), for acquiring used products earmarked for remanufacture. Under the examined model, a single manufacturer sells products through a retailer as well as directly to end users in a forward supply chain. In the reverse supply chain, three different modes of collection are employed to capture used products for remanufacture: they are through a third party, directly by the manufacturer and from the retailer. Mathematical models for both non-cooperative and centralised scenarios are developed to characterise the pricing decisions and remanufacturing strategies that indicate individual and overall supply chain performance. Optimality of all the proposed models is examined with theory. To coordinate and achieve a win–win outcome for channel members, we proposed a three-way discount mechanism for the manufacturer. Extended numerical investigation provides insights on ways to manage an efficient reward-driven CLSC in a dual-channel environment. 相似文献
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This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either. 相似文献
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在消费者对绿色产品存在偏好的背景下,针对由1个绿色产品制造商、1个普通产品制造商以及1个零售商构成的竞争性闭环供应链系统,分别确定了在合作博弈和非合作博弈情形下的最优定价和绿色度决策,并分析了消费者绿色偏好、绿色投资系数和制造商竞争强度对供应链产品选择和各节点企业利润的影响。研究表明,产品零售价、绿色度、供应链企业的利润均与消费者绿色偏好呈正相关而与绿色投资系数呈负相关。制造商的利润随竞争强度增大而减小,零售商的利润却随之增大,并且非合作博弈下绿色产品制造商的利润要高于普通产品制造商。此外,通过数值算例验证了结论。 相似文献
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While the previous literature overlooks value-added service in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), we consider new research problems with embedding value-added service into remanufacturing models. In this paper, we mainly study the role of value-added service in a CLSC and investigate how the value-added service influences profits and other decision variables. Then, we evaluate the performance of the CLSC in different service structures, where a manufacturer or a retailer provide the value-added service. Systematic comparisons and numerical studies show that the supply chain is more effective when service is provided by a manufacturer rather than by a retailer. Also, value-added service improves the whole supply chain performance and plays a regulatory role in a CLSC and influences the decisions of supply chain members. We also show that while a service cost-sharing mechanism can only optimise rather than achieve the supply chain coordination, and the degree of optimisation depends on cost-sharing percentage, the two-part tariff contract can be an effective mechanism to coordinate decentralised service scenarios by generating the same supply chain performance in a centralised service architecture model. 相似文献
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产品回收再利用率对闭环供应链利润的影响 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
针对由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级闭环供应链系统,制造商委托零售商回收旧产品,然后制造商生产新产品和再制造产品,零售商销售产品.采用stackelberg博弈方法,对制造商占主导的正向供应链和闭环供应链的利润进行了比较,分析了回收再利用率对闭环供应链利润的影响.研究结果表明:在产品存在最低或强制回收要求的前提下,当其他参数不变时,回收再利用率满足一定的阈值,并且回收再利用率越大,制造商实施闭环供应链管理就越有利. 相似文献
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This study considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, customers and a returnable and modular product with uncertain demand, in which customers return the unsatisfactory products to the retailer, and the retailer returns the unsold products to the manufacturer. We investigate the effects of the manufacturer’s refund for the retailer’s unsold products and the product modularity under the decentralised and the centralised strategies. We confirm that the order quantity and customer’s return probability both affect the optimal modularity level of the product, and that the optimal modularity level is related to the refund policy. Also, a strategic alliance between the supply chain members is more advantageous to product innovation based on modularity for a returnable chain. Finally, managerial insights and remarks are offered. 相似文献
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This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer sell homogeneous durable goods bundled with warranty service that is provided by the manufacturer, and they compete for customers by offering free value-added service. Both the warranty and value-added services can affect the purchasing behaviour of customers. We examine the warranty service decision of the manufacturer and the value-added service competition between the manufacturer and the retailer. Three types of warranty service strategies that can affect the value-added service competition are proposed. By analysing the equilibriums of the value-added service level decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, we find that when the manufacturer increases its warranty service level, the value-added service competition will be weakened, and when the warranty service level is high enough, there is no value-added service competition. In addition, we examine the optimal warranty service strategy and warranty service level of the manufacturer under different conditions, and we find that the stronger the manufacturer’s bargaining power is, or the stronger the value-added service competition intensity is, the more motivation the manufacturer has to provide a high warranty service level. Numerical examples reveal that differentiation strategy in value-added service may hurt the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the entire supply chain. 相似文献
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研究了新产品质量对闭环供应链回收再制造模式选择的影响。借助博弈论,建立了原制造商外包再制造和授权再制造的Stackelberg博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法解得两个模型的均衡解和供应链利润,并对均衡结果进行了比较分析。研究发现:外包再制造模式的供应链利润、消费者剩余、社会福利均优于授权再制造模式。原制造商选择外包再制造模式的利润要高于授权再制造模式,而第三方制造商最优策略受再制品价值折扣与新产品质量的影响。当再制品价值折扣系数与回收规模满足一定条件,而且新产品质量较高时,原制造商采取外包模式对环境更加友好。 相似文献
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Kartick Dey 《国际生产研究杂志》2019,57(7):1915-1948
This study analyses the impact of power structures and strategic inventory on the development-intensive and marginal-cost-intensive green product types under three procurement strategies. The results suggest that (i) in the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, the retailer retains strategic inventory to earn higher profits. The retailer's decision improves profit for the manufacturer and greening level of the product; (ii) for the marginal-cost-intensive green product, the power structures and procurement strategies cannot make any impact on the greening level and the retailer cannot build up strategic inventory under retailer-Stackelberg game; (iii) under the Nash game, the procurement decision creates conflict between the supply chain members for marginal-cost-intensive green products; (iv) if the retailer does not maintain strategic inventory or procures product in a single lot, then the manufacturer prefers to produce marginal-cost-intensive products and retailer prefers to sale development-intensive products to receive maximum profits under manufacturer-Stackelberg game. The optimal preferences are concurrent under retailer-Stackelberg game, but not under the Nash game; (v) single-period equilibrium solutions may exhibit sub-optimal characteristics, but two-period planning can lead to exemplary outcomes in the perspective of the greening level and profits of the supply chain members. 相似文献
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This paper investigates the channel structure and pricing problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. There are four common channel structures: (1) traditional retail channel, (2) the retailer’s traditional and online channel, (3) traditional retail channel and the manufacturer’s online channel, (4) traditional retail channel and online channel of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four Models (Model R, Model RD, Model MR, and Model MRD) are established and analysed based on four channel structures. Considering the influence of logistic services on consumers’ channel choice, this paper uses Stackelberg game and consumer utility function to analyse the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain, and obtains the optimal channel strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer in the four models. In addition, our study also finds that First, the manufacturer’s online channel opening can indirectly stimulate consumers to buy products in the traditional retail channel, which increases the demand for traditional retail channel. Second, the manufacturer’s online channel is more conducive to improving the profit of the whole supply chain than the retailer’s online channel under the dual channel structure. Third, multiple channels consisting of traditional retail channel and online channel of the manufacturer and the retailer can provide consumers with the lowest retail price, which is most beneficial to the retailer. 相似文献
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Integrated product design,shelf-space allocation and transportation decisions in green supply chains
In this paper, we examine a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and retailer where the manufacturer undertakes greening efforts in terms of pack-size reduction and transportation cost reduction. The retailer decides on shelf-space allocation for the product. Both the players benefit from the greening efforts of the manufacturer. In such a setting, we examine strategic decisions of the players and compare and contrast the performance of the decentralised supply chain with the centralised supply chain. We also examine the effect of collaborative mechanisms by modelling two contracts in which the retailer offers a transportation cost reduction effort based contract and a two-part tariff contract. We find that the decentralised supply chain leads to lower greening efforts and shelf-space allocation decisions. We also find that the contracts improve pack-size reduction effort, transportation cost reduction effort and shelf-space allocation, while also improving the profitability of individual players. The findings demonstrate a scope for supply chain collaboration between manufacturer–retailer pairs in this setting. The paper uniquely combines three critical elements in supply chains, namely, product design, transportation and retailing decisions, and aims to provide insights into the decision making of players considering environmental waste and pollution. The paper also reflects consumer behavior and trade-offs that the supply chain players face. 相似文献
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考虑由单一的制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链,制造商不仅通过正向供应链销售新产品,还通过激励措施从消费者那里回收旧产品,且将动态回收过程、HJB阶段控制纳入到供应链中。除探讨不同情形下均衡决策外,还设计激励成本分担契约来促进废旧产品的回收。研究表明:集中决策较分散决策供应链系统利润更高,产品回收率更高,回收激励强度更高;产品的销售价格、批发价格、零售商收益、制造商收益与回收率呈正相关,回收激励强度与回收率呈负相关;激励成本分担契约下,制造商的回收强度、回收率达到集中决策的水平,有趣的是激励成本分担契约下,产品的批发价格、销售价格均略高于分散决策的水平,制造商的收益实现帕累托改进,零售商的收益只有在一定情形下才会实现帕累托改进,供应链系统的整体收益实现帕累托改进。此外,还探讨了激励成本分担情形下零售商不出现破产的条件。最后给出算例分析验证了相关结论。 相似文献
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研究双渠道供应链中生产商负责的网上直销渠道对零售商负责的传统零售渠道的信息服务搭便车行为。假定产品需求随机且依赖于零售商信息服务水平,利用条件风险值准则和均衡分析方法建立了生产商与零售商均为风险厌恶者时双渠道供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,利用合同理论给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴契约,利用数值仿真方法验证了模型的合理性和协调契约的有效性。研究表明,增加直销渠道对供应链而言是把“双刃剑”,既可吸引潜在需求,也应避免需求由零售渠道向直销渠道的大规模转移;直销渠道的信息服务搭便车行为有利于供应链各方;决策者越厌恶风险,其订货量越低,此时生产商、零售商和供应链的利润都将下降;当风险厌恶因子等于1时,决策者风险厌恶时双渠道供应链的决策与决策者风险中性时一致。 相似文献
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以N条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象,分别讨论了多供应链间Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈问题,对N条供应链间博弈均衡解进行了分析和求解,证明了N条供应链博弈下均衡解的存在性和唯一性。在实例分析中,以两条供应链为例,比较了不同博弈框架下定价策略和系统利润的差异。结果表明,对于供应链1来说,链间Nash博弈时的零售商利润、制造商利润和供应链利润均大于链间Stackelberg博弈情形,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于放弃作为领导者的先动优势;对于供应链2来说,情况则相反,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于作为追随者发挥后动优势。 相似文献