Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

考虑零售商延期付款的供应链协调机制研究

在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链中,供应商允许零售商进行延期付款,研究了零售商所采取的单期订购决策及供应链协调问题.研究表明,允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型存在角点解均衡,供应商会占有所有供应链利润.分析得出了允许零售商延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链达到整体协调的条件.最后还研究了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同,得出了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同所实现的供应链利润优于允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型合同的条件.研究表明通过延期付款,供应商和零售商可以设计一个线性转移支付实现供应链效率的提升以及供应链协调.     

Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Supply chain coordination with trade credit under the CVaR criterion

Trade credit is a popular payment method in the supply chain. However, it may transfer the market risk facing by the retailer to the manufacturer in the form of default risk. To reduce the default loss, we set up a modified newsvendor model incorporating random default probability. Under the goal of loss minimisation, the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is derived with the criterion of conditional value at risk, and compared with the retailer’s optimal order quantity. It is found that, compared with traditional newsvendor setting, the setting of default possibility in trade credit can increase the order quantity but decrease the production quantity. If the risk aversion level and gross profit of product are low, the manufacturer may deliver below the quantity ordered. Although the default loss can be reduced by cutting order, the profits of both agents decrease, thereby leading to a deviation from the supply chain coordination. Trade credit coordinating the supply chain requires an extremely long credit period, which is not feasible. Moreover, quantity discount contract is able to improve the retailer’s order quantity, but insufficient to achieve coordination, which also depends on the manufacturer’s risk aversion level.     

Supply chain coordination with two-part tariffs under information asymmetry

Supply chain coordination literature indicates that two-part tariff contracts cannot coordinate a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer under information asymmetry, but can coordinate the channel under full information, while leaving the retailer zero profit. Motivated by the practice of Costco Business Centres, we incorporate customer heterogeneity, near-saturated retail market and asymmetric information into a stylised model. The retailer has the knowledge of customer heterogeneity while the supplier does not. The supplier, on the other hand, designs a menu of two-part tariffs for the retailer to choose from. We have found that two-part tariffs can coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric information, while leaving the retailer a positive profit. In addition, a one-size-fits-all two-part tariff can coordinate the supply chain at equilibrium, i.e. there is no need for the supplier to design different two-part tariffs for the retailer who may possess different types of information.     

考虑零售商过度自信的供应链决策与协调

将过度自信引入到供应链中,通过构建由一个供应商和一个过度自信的零售商组成的二级供应链模型,分析了过度自信的零售商与供应商的决策。结果表明,零售商过度自信能够实现供应链协调,但供应商的回购契约会破坏这种协调;当零售商接收到市场不利信息时供应商的回购契约失效,当零售商接收到市场有利信息时供应商利润随过度自信程度增加而减少。进一步在模型中引入收益共享契约,使得订购量和供应商的利润均增加,并实现了供应链协调。最后,通过数值算例验证并阐明了相关结论。     

公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。     

双层延期支付及价格折扣条件下零售商的最优库存策略

研究了在双层延期支付及价格折扣条件下零售商的库存策略。假设零售商在供应链中占据决策的主导地位,即零售商从供应商处得到延期支付及相应的现金折扣,而零售商仅为其顾客提供延期支付。建立了以零售商利润最大化为目标的EOQ（经济订购批量）模型,对模型分析求解,得到零售商的最优订货周期,并且通过一个简易算法,使得模型更容易运用于实践。通过数值算例验证了结论,并为企业物流管理实践提供了建议。     

损失厌恶供应链应对突变风险的收益共享契约

研究一个风险中性的供应商和具有损失厌恶特性的零售商组成的二阶供应链,在供应链遭遇突变风险的情况下,收益共享契约能否协调该供应链的问题。利用损失厌恶模型对零售商的损失厌恶程度进行了刻画,分别讨论了突变风险发生后分散和集中控制的情况下供应链的整体利润。研究发现,收益共享契约能够协调该供应链,并且零售商的损失厌恶程度越强,契约参数的上下限越大。通过数值算例的方法对上述结论进行了验证,且发现当突变风险导致需求发生变动时,零售商的效用和供应商的利润呈反方向变化。     

谎报行为下生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

目的研究存在生产商谎报生鲜农产品鲜活度信息的情况下,生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题。方法由单一生产商和单一零售商构成生鲜农产品供应链,其中产品的鲜活度信息为生产商私有信息;基于单周期报童模型,构建供应链各方的利润函数;应用Stackelberg博弈的基本思想,分析供应链上的定价订货决策,并引入收益共享契约进行供应链协调,同时用Matlab软件做数值仿真,以验证结论的有效性。结果生产商的谎报行为会损害供应链系统各方的利润,且谎报因子越低(谎报度越高)对供应链利润的影响越大。引入的收益共享比例在一定范围内时,收益共享契约可以有效地协调生鲜农产品供应链。结论收益共享契约不仅可以有效地协调生鲜供应链,也可以抑制生产商的谎报行为,实现帕累托改进,提高供应链的稳定性。     

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策

考虑零售商的公平关切行为特征,研究鲜活农产品供应链最优订货决策问题。引入公平关切度和参考依赖因子,构建基于零售商公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策模型。理论分析与数值算例表明：分散式决策中,零售商考虑公平关切时的订购量少于其无公平关切时的订购量,批发价随着公平关切程度的上升而下降;批发价契约下考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链无法实现协调,但订购量、供应链成员的利润均随着公平关切程度的上升而减少。     

基于存货促销的供应链协调问题的研究

讨论了零售阶段需求依赖于货架展示量的供应链的协调问题,特别地,由于货架空间的稀缺,零售商的存货持有成本假设为非线性的成本函数。在一个零售商的情况下,给出了决策变量及供应链利润分配的显式解。当存在两个相同的零售商竞争时,给定市场份额按比例分配原则．证明此时存在唯一对称的Nash均衡解,供应商可以用相同的合同协调供应链。最后通过数值算例说明所得结果。     

Supply chain management using put option contracts with information asymmetry

We study the problem of hedging demand uncertainty in a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under a buyback contract. We use semi-variance of the possible profit values as a measure of the retailer’s risk attitude. We first study the setting where the supplier can observe the risk type of the retailer and find that in this case the supplier can design a buyback contract that extracts the maximum profit for the supplier. When the retailer’s type is unobservable, a new contract needs to be designed (the ‘option buyback contract’) and we show that in this case the retailers will self-select and chose an order quantity that maximises the total supply chain profit. Through numerical computations, we analyse the dynamics between the benefits of hedging risk, information rent and the retailer’s type, and outline cases when, depending on the shape of the reservation utilities of the retailers, it is too costly for the supplier to manage risk. In conclusion, our results show that whereas semi-variance has appealing properties as a measure of risk, its use introduces analytical challenges that can only be overcome through numerical computation.     

存货影响销售量的两阶段供应链的VMI协调

研究在VMI环境下存货影响销售量的单供应商、单零售商的两阶段供应链的协调问题。建立了集中决策下的供应链模型,求出了整体供应链的利润函数;在分散决策下,采用收益共享契约对供应链进行协调,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析,发现收益共享契约无法协调供应链,即在利益分配上,与供应商相比,零售商获得了更多的供应链收益,而且分散式系统的收益始终低于集中决策下的水平;采用Nash协商对VMI供应链进行协调,完成了供应商和零售商收益的帕累托改进,不仅实现供应链的协调,而且达到了集中决策下的水平,最后通过算例进行了验证。     

Newsvendor model for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

The paper investigates newsvendor problem for a dyadic supply chain in which both the supplier and the retailer have the preference of status-seeking with fairness concerns. Nash bargaining solution is introduced as the fairness reference point and equilibrium results are derived. The effects of fairness-concerned status-seeking behaviors on optimal decisions as well as channel efficiency are further analyzed. It is shown that the channel efficiency will decrease because of such behavioral preference. The retailer’s share will be larger when the supplier concerns fairness less, and the supplier’s sensitivity to fairness plays a relatively more important role for the channel efficiency. Additionally, another interesting managerial insight is concluded that fairness concerns will not change the status of channel coordination in certain conditions. More specifically, those contracts able (unable) to coordinate fairness-neutral supply chain, based on affine transformations with scale factors within certain ranges, still succeed (fail) to coordinate the fairness-concerned. Furthermore, several insights on bargaining powers are given as well.     

Coordination of pricing,inventory, and production reliability decisions in deteriorating product supply chains

In this article, we study a two-level supply chain model for deteriorating items, in which the supplier’s production system is unreliable and the retailer’s demand is price-sensitive. The supplier’s production line may randomly shift from the in-control state to the out-of-control state. When the production line is in the out-of-control state, a proportion of the produced products will have bad quality. To mitigate the out-of-control risks, the supplier can improve the production line reliability by investing in high-quality machines, highly skilled workers, or advanced maintenance technologies. We start with the study of pricing and inventory problems concerning endogenous reliability in the integrated and decentralised scenario. To better illustrate the proposed models, two applicable algorithms are designed to determine the optimal production reliability, ordering quantity, and prices. Then, a cooperative reliability investment and revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters (e.g. deterioration rate, production rate, etc.) are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some managerial insights.     

Channel coordination for multi-stage supply chains with revenue-sharing contracts under budget constraints

Real-life situations show that revenue-sharing (RS) contracts used in multi-stage supply chains have more complex structures than those that have been studied in recent research. In this paper, we study RS contracts in multi-stage supply chains where some members work with more than one upstream member. This general supply chain structure closely resembles those in actual practice under RS contracts. The literature on supply chain contracts has not adequately addressed contract design for supply chains with members who face budget constraints. We show that the RS contract could fail to coordinate supply chains when members are under particular budget constraints. In response, we propose a revenue-sharing with budget constraints (RSB) contract that adds no administrative cost. A properly designed RSB contract can be used to achieve supply chain coordination and to arbitrarily allocate profits in multi-stage supply chains. Our numerical results provide insights into ways supply chain coordination can be achieved under budget constraints through the RSB contract.     

Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.     

Coordination of a supply chain with loss-averse consumers in service quality

We develop a two-period game model to study the coordination mechanism for a supply chain with loss-averse consumers who are assumed to have dwindling sensitivity to service quality gain relative to loss. We find that all-unit quantity discount coupling with service subsidy rate can coordinate the retailer’s price and service quality decisions together in each period. When consumers become more loss-averse in service quality, the coordinated wholesale price in the first period might increase; whereas that in the second period decreases. With Pareto coordination mechanism, larger loss-aversion might weaken the supplier’s bargaining power. We provide managerial insights on how to adjust the coordinated contract when the consumers’ loss-aversion and reference value of service quality level change.     

公平偏好下基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约研究

引入公平偏好,构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型,采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好,回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外,供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低,但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。