风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响。运用博弈论中个人理性和激励相容原则建立单渠道和双渠道供应链需求模型,得出均衡情况下供应链各成员的最优决策及社会福利。研究发现,仅当决策者风险规避度和直销渠道销售成本满足一定条件时,制造商开通直销渠道有利可图;且直销渠道并非总侵蚀零售商效用。当决策者风险规避度较大且直销渠道成本适中时,供应链价值减少。社会福利总随着制造商风险规避度的增大呈现先减少后增加的趋势。     

Dual-channel closed loop supply chains: forward channel competition,power structures and coordination

This paper examines the effect of forward channel competition and power structure on dual-channel closed loop supply chains (CLSC), which consists of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector. The manufacturer can either wholesale products to the retailer or directly sell them to the market, the collector undertakes the collection activity of used products. Under different channel power structures, a centralised and three decentralised models are explored under symmetric and asymmetric relative status between direct and retail channels. Through a comprehensive comparison among these models, the result shows that each channel member has an incentive to play the channel leader’s role. Meanwhile, from the total channel system’s perspective, we find that the manufacturer-led or retailer-led model can either be the most effective CLSC under symmetric relative channel status, which depends on the channel substitution rate between two channels. While under asymmetric relative channel status, the numerical result shows that the whole CLSC should select collector-led, manufacturer-led and retailer-led CLSC model in turn with the retail channel’s relative status becoming stronger. Finally, with the benchmark of the centralised decision-making system, we design modified two-part tariff contracts to coordinate dual-channel CLSCs under different channel power structures.     

A coordination theoretic model for three level supply chains using contracts

Typically, supply chain members are dependent on each other to manage various resources and information. The conflicting objectives and lack of coordination between supply chain members may often cause uncertainties in supply and demand. The basic elements of coordination theory like interdependency, coherency and mutuality may help in effective flow of information and material between the dependent supply chain members. Supply chain contract can be an effective coordination mechanism to motivate all the members to be a part of the entire supply chain. There are different types of supply chain contracts such as buy back and quantity flexibility contracts. Supply chain performance may be substantially improved by properly designing the contracts to share risks and rewards. The objective of this paper is to explore the applicability of coordination elements through an analytical model in three-level (Manufacturer-distributor-retailer) serial supply chains using contracts. The model evaluates the impact of supply chain contracts on various performance measures. The impact of some contract may be on some specific performance measure only, which helps managers to choose the type of contract if there is an objective of improving certain performance measure before hand. In three-level supply chains, the contracts are designed at two distinct interfaces: Manufacturer-distributor and distributor-retailer. The model demonstrates the complexity in evaluating the decision variables of three level supply chains. The proposed model is a novel approach to apply coordination theory at various levels of supply chain. The model also presents how the coordination elements are related to each other in various coordination cases.     

Equilibrium analysis of distribution channel structures under power imbalance and asymmetric information

This paper investigates the problem of channel choice game in two power-imbalanced supply chains consisting of the leader supply chain and the follower supply chain. We assume that there exists symmetric and asymmetric cost information between the two supply chains, and that the two chains as well as the two members in each chain follow the Stackelberg game setting. We analyse four competition scenarios: both chains are decentralised, where individual members of both supply chains maximise their own profits by independently selecting their price policies; both chains are integrated, where manufacturers and retailers coordinate their decisions to maximise supply chain profits; the leader chain is decentralised and the follower integrated; the leader is integrated and the follower decentralised. The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of power imbalance, information asymmetries, and the degree of product substitutability under channel choice equilibrium. We find that, in contrast to earlier literature where all manufacturers share equal or balanced decision-making power, an integrated distribution channel is the dominant strategy for the leader under symmetric and asymmetric information Stackelberg game. As the degree of product substitutability increases, the follower will gradually switch from integrated distribution channel to decentralised distribution channel; the follower can gain from constructing a decentralised distribution channel as the prediction accuracy of the leader increases.     

具有延保服务的闭环供应链回收渠道选择

针对具有延保服务的闭环供应链（CLSC）回收渠道选择问题，构建了3种回收渠道（制造商回收、零售商回收、第三方回收）和2种延保服务提供者（制造商、零售商）组合而成的6种分散决策CLSC模型，基于博弈论方法研究了每种情形下的最优回收渠道选择及其对CLSC决策的影响。结果表明，无论是制造商还是零售商提供延保，零售商都是产品回收最有效的承担者，此时制造商、零售商和整个CLSC都可以获得最大的利润，且产品回收率也最高。     

Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

Pricing and remanufacturing decisions in two competing supply chains

This paper considers the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. There are one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain, one manufacturer produces the new product directly from raw material, while the other manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into the original production system. Based on different industry organisation structures and the chain members’ competing forms, five game decision models are established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or remanufacturing, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Finally, we carry out the sensitivity analysis through numerical studies of some key parameters for examining their influences on the pricing decisions and chain members’ maximum profits. On the basis of comparison and analysis, some managerial insights are derived.     

Pricing and ordering decisions of two competing supply chains with different composite policies: a Stackelberg game-theoretic approach

In today’s global highly competitive markets, competition happens among supply chains instead of companies, as the members of supply chains. So, the partners of the chains seek to apply efficient coordinating strategies like discount, return, refund, buyback, or the other coordinating policies to abate the operation costs of the chains and subsequently increase market shares. Hence, because of the importance and application of these strategies in the current non-exclusive markets, in this study, we introduce different composite coordinating strategies to enhance the coordination of the supply chains. Here, we consider two competing supply chains where both chains launch the same product under different brands to the market by applying different composite coordinating strategies. Each supply chain comprises one manufacturer and a group of non-competing retailers where the manufacturer receives raw materials from an outside supplier and transforms them into a finished product; then, the products are sold to the retailers to satisfy the demands of market. In the first chain, a composite (QFF) policy, which is the combination of quantity and freight discount, as well as free shipping quantity policies, are considered between upstream and downstream members while in the second one, different composite polices are considered between upstream and downstream members such that the supplier offers a composite policy, as the first chain, to the manufacturer and the manufacturer proposes a composite (QPR) policy, which is the combination of quantity discount and partial-refund customer return policies, to the retailers. The main objective of the paper is to determine the optimal selling prices and the order quantities of the manufacturer and the retailers in each chain in presence of different composite coordinating strategies. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is employed between the members of each chain where the manufacturer is a follower and the retailers are leaders. The concavity of profit functions is proved. Finally, the applicability of the models is justified by presented numerical examples. Moreover, the effects of these strategies on the decisions of the chains’ partners are examined.     

双边竞争型闭环供应链回收渠道的决策分析

为了提高回收渠道决策的效率,主要采用非合作博弈的方法,以2个竞争的制造商和2个竞争的零售商组成的双边竞争型闭环供应链为对象,研究了回收渠道的决策过程。经过分析论证得出制造商之间和零售商之间的竞争程度共同影响回收渠道的决策结果,但制造商之间的竞争程度对决策结果的影响作用更大。     

三级竞争供应链的渠道选择研究

在供应链链间竞争的背景下,研究三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构。利用非线性规划、纳什博弈和Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了2条三级竞争供应链的渠道选择问题,求解了3种情景：全分布式结构;全一体化结构和混合结构（一条供应链为一体化,另一条为分布式）下的决策变量的最优解,并分别依据3种决策标准,即制造商利润最大化、渠道利润最大化和供应链系统利润最大化,分析了不同决策标准下供应链纳什均衡结构。研究表明,三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构,依赖于产品之间的替代系数及决策标准,并且当供应链链间的竞争强度较大时,无论何种决策准则下,全分布式结构均为供应链的纳什均衡结构。     

基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

Influence of logistic service level on multichannel decision of a two-echelon supply chain

This paper investigates the channel structure and pricing problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. There are four common channel structures: (1) traditional retail channel, (2) the retailer’s traditional and online channel, (3) traditional retail channel and the manufacturer’s online channel, (4) traditional retail channel and online channel of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four Models (Model R, Model RD, Model MR, and Model MRD) are established and analysed based on four channel structures. Considering the influence of logistic services on consumers’ channel choice, this paper uses Stackelberg game and consumer utility function to analyse the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain, and obtains the optimal channel strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer in the four models. In addition, our study also finds that First, the manufacturer’s online channel opening can indirectly stimulate consumers to buy products in the traditional retail channel, which increases the demand for traditional retail channel. Second, the manufacturer’s online channel is more conducive to improving the profit of the whole supply chain than the retailer’s online channel under the dual channel structure. Third, multiple channels consisting of traditional retail channel and online channel of the manufacturer and the retailer can provide consumers with the lowest retail price, which is most beneficial to the retailer.     

多供应链间的Nash和Stackelberg博弈决策模型

以N条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象,分别讨论了多供应链间Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈问题,对N条供应链间博弈均衡解进行了分析和求解,证明了N条供应链博弈下均衡解的存在性和唯一性。在实例分析中,以两条供应链为例,比较了不同博弈框架下定价策略和系统利润的差异。结果表明,对于供应链1来说,链间Nash博弈时的零售商利润、制造商利润和供应链利润均大于链间Stackelberg博弈情形,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于放弃作为领导者的先动优势;对于供应链2来说,情况则相反,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于作为追随者发挥后动优势。     

CVaR准则下双渠道供应链订货与信息搭便车行为

研究双渠道供应链中生产商负责的网上直销渠道对零售商负责的传统零售渠道的信息服务搭便车行为。假定产品需求随机且依赖于零售商信息服务水平,利用条件风险值准则和均衡分析方法建立了生产商与零售商均为风险厌恶者时双渠道供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,利用合同理论给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴契约,利用数值仿真方法验证了模型的合理性和协调契约的有效性。研究表明,增加直销渠道对供应链而言是把“双刃剑”,既可吸引潜在需求,也应避免需求由零售渠道向直销渠道的大规模转移;直销渠道的信息服务搭便车行为有利于供应链各方;决策者越厌恶风险,其订货量越低,此时生产商、零售商和供应链的利润都将下降;当风险厌恶因子等于1时,决策者风险厌恶时双渠道供应链的决策与决策者风险中性时一致。     

Channel coordination for multi-stage supply chains with revenue-sharing contracts under budget constraints

Real-life situations show that revenue-sharing (RS) contracts used in multi-stage supply chains have more complex structures than those that have been studied in recent research. In this paper, we study RS contracts in multi-stage supply chains where some members work with more than one upstream member. This general supply chain structure closely resembles those in actual practice under RS contracts. The literature on supply chain contracts has not adequately addressed contract design for supply chains with members who face budget constraints. We show that the RS contract could fail to coordinate supply chains when members are under particular budget constraints. In response, we propose a revenue-sharing with budget constraints (RSB) contract that adds no administrative cost. A properly designed RSB contract can be used to achieve supply chain coordination and to arbitrarily allocate profits in multi-stage supply chains. Our numerical results provide insights into ways supply chain coordination can be achieved under budget constraints through the RSB contract.     

Pricing decisions in closed-loop supply chains with marketing effort and fairness concerns

We investigate closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) under four reverse channel structures where a central planner, a manufacturer (M), a retailer (R) or a third party (T), respectively, serves as the collector of used product and demand depends on R’s marketing effort. We derive supply chain profitability under both the centralised and decentralised CLSCs and furnish the optimal marketing effort, collection rate and pricing decisions for the supply chain members. We then extend the base models along two directions: the first extension incorporates R’s distributional fairness concerns into the M collection model and the second extension considers potential recycle cost advantages by R and T compared to the M collection model.     

Moral hazard problem and collaborative coordination in supply chain with capacity reservation contract

This paper has considered collaborative coordination in supply chains with capacity reservation contracts using the game theory. In some traditional papers, the capacity reservation contracts have contained a capacity quantity, a reservation quantity and a reservation fee as a decision variable. Each decision variable is determined separately based on individual profit functions of a supplier and a manufacturer under the noncooperative game theory. Those papers have assumed that the supplier is always forced to build sufficient capacity to cover the reservation amount of the manufacturer. However, the supplier might not always comply with the reservation amount of the manufacturer since the capacity quantity is a private decision in the supplier and not released to external companies in practice. For instance, the supplier may choose to under-build knowingly to ensure high utilisation of his capacity. This is a kind of moral hazard problems. This paper has investigated such a strategy that the supplier and manufacturer voluntarily comply with the contract for the purpose of solving the moral hazard problem in the capacity reservation contract. Consequently, we have proposed a method of determining the decision variables collaboratively in the contract such that a consensus of the supplier and manufacturer is built.     

基于均值-CVaR的回购契约供应链创新协调机制

为了研究制造商创新情形下回购契约供应链的订货及协调机制,构建了回购契约Stackelberg博弈模型,运用均值-CVaR的方法探讨了回购契约供应链创新协调问题。研究表明,均值-CVaR方法比CVaR度量准则更能提高零售商的订货量,指出零售商的风险规避程度影响供应链的创新和需求。当零售商喜好风险,将使制造商的创新投入度增大,供应链渠道的总需求增加。考虑到零售商过度订购的潜在风险,通过对回购商品数量的限制,改进制造商创新投入回购契约供应链,结果表明,改进的制造商创新投入回购契约能够降低零售商的订货量,同时,在一定条件下能够使供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了β和λ对最优订货量和创新投入度的影响。     

Bullwhip effect and complexity analysis in a multi-channel supply chain considering price game with discount sensitivity

This paper constructs a multi-channel supply chain that includes a manufacturer, a dual-channel retailer and an online retailer. The dual-channel retailer has a traditional channel and an online channel, while the manufacturer cooperates with the retailers and opens a direct channel simultaneously. The horizontal and historical price discount sensitivities are taken into account to establish the price-sensitive demand functions. A price game model with the heterogeneous expectations is proposed and analysed with the methods of the stability domain, the bifurcation diagram and the maximum Lyapunov exponent. The complexity and bullwhip effect of each channel are investigated with respect to the price adjustment speed and historical price discount sensitivity. The results show that a moderate or low price discount sensitivity keeps the system stable and a high price discount sensitivity brings the system into the twofold cycle state or chaotic state. It is interesting that if both online channels increase the adjustment speeds with similar strategy the system will enter chaos through the Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. The bullwhip effect is affected by the price adjustment speed and the price discount sensitivity, especially in the double-period or chaotic state, where the bullwhip of the overall supply chain is increased significantly. The results show that controlling price discount sensitivity is useful for supply chain node companies.     

商业信用与促销努力下垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商的协调

在垄断制造商和竞争性双寡头零售商构成的两级供应链中,通过考虑零售商所做的促销努力和制造商提供的商业信用,建立两个零售商之间Nash均衡、合谋和Stackelberg均衡3种情况下的供应链分散和集中决策模型,分析供应链成员和整个渠道的绩效,得到信用期限和促销努力的最优值。在此基础上,同时考虑供应链成员的竞争与协调,通过兼顾供应链成员的个体利益和渠道整体利益,确定实现协调的契约参数与条件。最后通过数值算例对模型进行比较和验证。结果表明,所建立的协调机制既能保证供应链成员的参与,又提高了渠道的整体利益,从而实现供应链的协调。