基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

Pricing decisions for a supply chain with refurbished products

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where a fixed portion of new products sold will be returned to the retailer and then be repaired and resold as refurbished products at a lower price. Using the utility model, we formulate how consumers will make their choices when facing both new and refurbished products. Then, using the divide-and-conquer method, we derive the supplier and retailer's equilibrium decisions, including the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's prices for both the new and refurbished products. The main findings include the following. First, refurbished products will be sold in the market only when the refurbishing cost is small. In this situation, as the refurbishing cost increases, most of the negative impact on the retailer will be transferred to the supplier. Second, in the same condition, as the refurbishing cost increases, the wholesale price and retail price of the new product will change in opposite directions. This result contrasts with the traditional pass-through effect. Third, when the repair cost is moderate, the retailer will eventually not sell refurbished products, but its profit can be significantly improved and the double marginalisation effect can be mitigated.     

A note on ‘Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items’

Taleizadeh, Noori-daryan, and Tavakkoli-Moghaddam consider pricing and ordering decisions in a three-level supply chain with defective items and inspection processes in their paper published in 2015. They examine three scenarios for defective items at the manufacturer: disposal, rework and selling at a lower price. Unfortunately, this interesting and innovative paper suffers from some shortcomings that are addressed in our note.     

Consumer search,transshipment, and bargaining power in a supply chain

We study a decentralised supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers who could transship their excess inventory between each other. Without transshipment, the retailer’s unsatisfied customers search and buy the product at the other retailer with some probability. With transshipment, the retailer can transship the other retailer’s excess inventory to fulfil its own unmet demand. However, a transshipment price is often charged by one retailer for transshipping goods to another. We show the retailer’s profit is unimodal in the transshipment price, and the manufacturer’s profit increases in the customer search probability. Although the retailer’s preference over transshipment depends on the magnitude of search probability and transshipment price, the retailer may always prefer the transshipment no matter their magnitude. We then study the effect of bargaining power over the transshipment decision (whether to transship between retailers and at what transshipment price). Our analysis suggests that the manufacturer always prefers to control the transshipment price rather than to control whether to transship, while the retailer can prefer both. We also find that increasing bargaining power always benefits the manufacturer but could hurt the retailer. We finally check the robustness of our results by investigating the case with asymmetric retailers     

考虑价格和时间敏感性需求的两周期供应链鲁棒优化模型

在不确定需求下,考虑需求的时间和价格敏感性,研究两周期供应链定价及订货联合决策问题。利用分段函数构建需求的价格和时间敏感性,并采用区间不确定集描述需求不确定性。根据制造商是否给予零售商回扣,分别建立主从对策鲁棒优化模型,并转化为可解的数学规划。结果表明,需求不确定性以及需求的时间和价格敏感性对双方的定价、订货和利润具有影响。具有回扣的主从策略使双方获得更高利润,需求的不确定性以及需求的时间和价格敏感性增加会降低双方利润。     

考虑零售商风险态度的绿色供应链契约协调模型

以风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑风险规避度和产品绿色度等因素,建立了集中决策博弈模型和制造商领导Stackelberg博弈模型。比较了两博弈模型中,产品绿色度、转移价格、产品价格与风险规避度的相互影响,以及风险规避度对制造商利润和零售商效用的影响。研究表明：(1)在集中决策模型中,零售商的单位产品利润和总利润均为零;(2)在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中,随着零售商风险规避度的提高,产品价格会逐渐降低;制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中的转移价格大于集中决策模型中的转移价格;(3)收益共享契约能够协调绿色供应链。     

基于存货促销的供应链协调问题的研究

讨论了零售阶段需求依赖于货架展示量的供应链的协调问题,特别地,由于货架空间的稀缺,零售商的存货持有成本假设为非线性的成本函数。在一个零售商的情况下,给出了决策变量及供应链利润分配的显式解。当存在两个相同的零售商竞争时,给定市场份额按比例分配原则．证明此时存在唯一对称的Nash均衡解,供应商可以用相同的合同协调供应链。最后通过数值算例说明所得结果。     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

Manufacturer's product choice in the presence of environment-conscious consumers: brown product or green product

Nowadays, the brown products are losing market coverage to their green alternatives due to consumers' increasing environmental awareness. Confronted with this threat, many traditional manufacturers currently producing only brown product are contemplating the launch of green product. Base on this background, this paper explores the optimal product choice for the manufacturer. We first derive the optimal results for each product choice. Then we analyse the optimal product choice for the manufacturer. Next, we study how to induce the production of green product. Finally, the fraudulent behaviour on product's environmental attributes is addressed. Main findings are as follows. First, manufacturer's optimal product choice is to produce green product if the investment-to-value ratio and the unit production cost for green product are low and to produce brown product if the investment-to-value ratio and the unit production cost for green product are high. Second, the two-part tariff contract is applicable to stimulate the manufacturer to produce green product under certain conditions. While exterior intervention is necessary under other conditions. Third, when the manufacturer and the retailer diverge in product preference, the manufacturer has a strong incentive to behave fraudulently, and this type of manufacturer needs strict supervision.     

基于制造商—销售商供应链双向补贴博弈研究

基于制造商对销售商进行广告补贴,销售商对制造商进行研发补贴的异质性供应链合作模式,构建了博弈模型,并提出两种违约风险解决方案。分析论证了制造商研发投入与边际收益正相关,销售商广告投入与边际收益正相关。在制造商单向补贴博弈均衡时,销售商的广告投入与制造商给予的补贴系数的关系由参数决定,销售商的广告投入与制造商的研发投入负相关,补贴系数与制造商边际收益正相关,与销售商边际收益负相关。在制造商—销售商供应链双向补贴博弈均衡时的供应链收益大于单向补贴博弈均衡时的供应链收益。     

Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract

This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper.     

供应链中两类信息失真问题的博弈分析

对因机制设计造成的信息失真和因互不信任导致的信息失真进行了博弈分析,并对因分段激励机制造成的信息失真进行了分析,探讨了导致分销商进行欺骗的诱因,并对供应链之间因互不信任造成的信息共享的失败利用囚徒困境模型进行了分析。     

博弈理论在协同营销中的应用初探

应用博弈论的相关模型分析了制造商和销售商在不同市场结构情况下的博弈行为,共探讨了三种营销模式,其中两种是非合作营销,一种是合作营销。重点研究了两者在协同情况下的博弈行为,找出了对于制造商和销售商来说都是最优的可接受帕累托(Pareto)有效方案。     

Contingent sourcing under supply disruption and competition

With the increasing awareness of the serious consequences of supply disruption risk, firms adopt various kinds of strategies to mitigate it. We consider a supply chain in which two suppliers sell components to two competing manufacturers producing and selling substitutable products. Supplier U is unreliable and cheap, while Supplier R is reliable and expensive. Firm C uses a contingent dual-sourcing strategy and Firm S uses a single-sourcing strategy. We study the implications of the contingent sourcing strategy under competition and in the presence of a possible supply disruption. The time of the occurrence of the supply disruption is uncertain and exogenous, but the procurement time of components is in the control of the firms. We show that supply disruption and procurement times jointly impact the firms’ buying decisions. We characterise the firms’ optimal order quantities and their expected profits under different cases. Subsequently, through numerical computations, we obtain additional managerial insights. Finally, as extensions, we study the impact endogenizing equilibrium sourcing strategies of asymmetric and symmetric firms, and of capacity reservation by Firm C with Supplier R to mitigate disruption.     

绿色供应链协同创新合作策略研究

考虑供应链绿色声誉对整体收益的影响,运用微分博弈方法,研究由单一核心企业和单一配套企业组成的绿色供应链协同创新合作问题,分别考察了在不合作契约、成本分担契约和合作契约3种情形下,核心企业和配套企业的最优绿色创新投入、各自的最优收益以及绿色供应链整体的最优收益情况。通过比较分析发现：1) 成本分担契约作为激励机制,可提高配套企业绿色创新投入、双方最优收益和整体收益;2) 合作契约下的绿色供应链整体收益和参与双方的绿色创新投入达到最优。研究结论从理论层面论证绿色供应链核心企业与配套企业协同创新合作行为的有效性。     

生鲜农产品供应链保鲜投入的演化博弈分析与仿真研究

目的 考虑生鲜农产品保鲜投入的市场正外部性效应,解决供应链成员的“搭便车”问题。方法 以2级生鲜农产品供应链为研究对象,构建有限理性特性下的供应商-零售商保鲜投入演化博弈模型,通过雅克比矩阵求解和MATLAB仿真模拟来分析参与者策略的动态演化过程。结果 供应商与零售商的保鲜投入策略与双方单位投入产出效益密切相关,当该参数取值条件位于不同阈值区间时,系统呈现出多种演化稳定均衡;博弈初始状态、市场敏感度、搭便车收益等因素影响系统最终演化稳定结果的形成。 结论 通过分析生鲜农产品供应链成员的保鲜投入策略,为提高生鲜农产品保鲜水平提供了对策建议。     

谎报行为下生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

目的研究存在生产商谎报生鲜农产品鲜活度信息的情况下,生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题。方法由单一生产商和单一零售商构成生鲜农产品供应链,其中产品的鲜活度信息为生产商私有信息;基于单周期报童模型,构建供应链各方的利润函数;应用Stackelberg博弈的基本思想,分析供应链上的定价订货决策,并引入收益共享契约进行供应链协调,同时用Matlab软件做数值仿真,以验证结论的有效性。结果生产商的谎报行为会损害供应链系统各方的利润,且谎报因子越低(谎报度越高)对供应链利润的影响越大。引入的收益共享比例在一定范围内时,收益共享契约可以有效地协调生鲜农产品供应链。结论收益共享契约不仅可以有效地协调生鲜供应链,也可以抑制生产商的谎报行为,实现帕累托改进,提高供应链的稳定性。     

Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

On measuring company performance within a supply chain

Emerging research strengthens the connection between supply chain performance and a company's financial performance (D’Avanzo, R., Von Lewinski, H. and Van Wassenhove, L. N., 2003. The link between supply chain and financial performance. Supply Chain Management Review, November/December, 40–47). The focus on integrating functional internal processes has expanded to include the need for integrating these with external processes of business partners (Edwards, P., Peters, M. and Sharman, G., 2001. The effectiveness of information systems in supporting the extended supply chain. Journal of Business Logistics, 22(1), 1–27). This need for enterprise efficiency is compelling companies to review, to identify, and to adopt supply chain initiatives. This research investigates the use of common measurement metrics in an attempt to determine which one(s) are most useful for measuring performance as companies implement SCM practices. For firms that were engaged in SCM we found inventory and cycle time to be the most significant metrics.