Unpriming: The Deactivation of Thoughts Through Expression.

Unpriming is a decrease in the influence of primed knowledge following a behavior expressing that knowledge. The authors investigated strategies for unpriming the knowledge of an answer that is activated when people are asked to consider a simple question. Experiment 1 found that prior correct answering eliminated the bias people normally show toward correct responding when asked to answer yes-no questions randomly. Experiment 2 revealed that prior answering intended to be random did not unprime knowledge on subsequent attempts to answer randomly. Experiment 3 found that exposure to the correct answer did not influence the knowledge bias but that exposure to the incorrect answer increased bias. Experiment 4 revealed that merely expressing the answer for oneself was sufficient to unprime knowledge. Experiment 5 found that each item of activated knowledge needs to be unprimed specifically, in that correctly answering 1 question does not reduce the knowledge bias in randomly answering another. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A multiprocess account of hindsight bias in children.

In hindsight, that is, after receiving the correct answers to difficult questions, people's recall of their own prior answers tends to be biased toward the correct answers. We tested 139 participants from 3 age groups (9- and 12-year-olds and adults) in a hindsight-bias paradigm and found that all groups showed hindsight bias. Multinomial model-based analyses indicated that all age groups used the correct answers to reconstruct their original answers. In addition, the youngest group showed memory impairment caused by the presentation of the correct answers as well as an increased belief that they knew the correct answers all along. These results support a multiprocess explanation of hindsight bias in children. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 37(3) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2011-08992-005). On page 381, the notation in Figure 1 is incorrect. The corrected notations are discussed in the correction.] Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight.

After having received feedback about the correct answer to a question, a memory judgment about one's own past answer, the original judgment (OJ), is often biased toward the feedback. The authors present a multinomial model that explains this hindsight bias effect in terms of both memory impairments and reconstruction biases for nonrecollected OJs. The model was tested in 4 experiments. As predicted, the parameters measuring OJ recollection could be influenced selectively by contrasting items whose OJs were or were not retrieved successfully earlier (Experiment 1). Increasing the feedback-recall delay reduced reconstruction biases exclusively (Experiment 2), whereas discrediting the feedback enhanced recollection of the OJs to feedback items (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, the model's guessing parameters, but no other parameters, varied as a function of the number of response alternatives. The authors discuss implications for hindsight bias theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Bernstein et al. (2011).

Reports an error in "Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age" by Daniel M. Bernstein, Edgar Erdfelder, Andrew N. Meltzoff, William Peria and Geoffrey R. Loftus (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2011[Mar], Vol 37[2], 378-391). On page 381, the notation in Figure 1 is incorrect. The corrected notations are discussed in the correction. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-02006-001.) Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does incorrect guessing impair fact learning?

Taking a test has been shown to produce enhanced retention of the retrieved information. On tests, however, students often encounter questions the answers for which they are unsure. Should they guess anyway, even if they are likely to answer incorrectly? Or are errors engrained, impairing subsequent learning of the correct answer? We sought to answer this question in 3 experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects read 80 obscure facts (e.g., “Where is Disko Island? Greenland”) and then took a cued recall test. When a subject reported being unable to answer a question, on a randomly chosen half of those questions the computer program insisted upon a guess. Corrective feedback was provided either immediately (Experiment 1) or after a delay (Experiment 2). Forced guessing did not affect subjects' performance on a final test given 1 day later. We extended the investigation to more complex material in Experiment 3. Subjects saw a question (e.g., “Why do ice cubes often pop as they melt in your drink?”) and its answer, but for half of the questions, subjects did not see the answer until they first provided a plausible explanation. On a test administered either on the same day or 1 week later, recall performance was again unaffected by a prior wrong guess. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Surprise, memory, and retrospective judgment making: Testing cognitive reconstruction theories of the hindsight bias effect.

Hindsight bias has been shown to be a pervasive and potentially harmful decision-making bias. A review of 4 competing cognitive reconstruction theories of hindsight bias revealed conflicting predictions about the role and effect of expectation or surprise in retrospective judgment formation. Two experiments tested these predictions examining the effects of manipulating the information presented in a text-based scenario and its congruency with the given outcome on surprise, hindsight bias, and recall. The results of Experiment 1 revealed evidence of hindsight bias after exposure to incongruent and ambivalent outcomes but not after exposure to congruent outcomes. Experiment 2 replicated the hindsight bias results and found that the ratio of outcome consistent information recalled was higher than expected in the incongruent and ambivalent conditions but equaled the ratio presented to participants in the congruent condition. The results were interpreted as supporting the general predictions of sense-making models of the hindsight bias. A refined version of this model is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Subjective confidence in one's answers: The consensuality principle.

In answering general-information questions, a within-person confidence-accuracy (C-A) correlation is typically observed, suggesting that people can monitor the correctness of their knowledge. However, because the correct answer is generally the consensual answer--the one endorsed by most participants--confidence judgment may actually monitor the consensuality of the answer rather than its correctness. Indeed, the C-A correlation was positive for items with a consensually correct answer but negative for items with a consensually wrong answer. Results suggest that the consensuality-confidence correlation may be mediated by 2 internal mnemonic cues that are correlated with consensuality: Consensual answers are reached faster and are selected more consistently by the same person on different occasions than nonconsensual answers. The results argue against a direct-access view of confidence judgments and suggest that such judgments will be accurate only as long as people's responses are by and large correct across the sampled items, thus stressing the criticality of a representative design. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How well do people recall risk factor test results? Accuracy and bias among cholesterol screening participants.

The authors conducted a community-based cholesterol screening study to examine accuracy of recall for self-relevant health information in long-term autobiographical memory. Adult community residents (N = 496) were recruited to participate in a laboratory-based cholesterol screening and were also provided cholesterol counseling in accordance with national guidelines. Participants were subsequently interviewed 1, 3, or 6 months later to assess their memory for their test results. Participants recalled their exact cholesterol levels inaccurately (38.0% correct) but their cardiovascular risk category comparatively well (88.7% correct). Recall errors showed a systematic bias: Individuals who received the most undesirable test results were most likely to remember their cholesterol scores and cardiovascular risk categories as lower (i.e., healthier) than those actually received. Recall bias was unrelated to age, education, knowledge, self-rated health status, and self-reported efforts to reduce cholesterol. The findings provide evidence that recall of self-relevant health information is susceptible to self-enhancement bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phonological priming effects on word retrieval and tip-of-the-tongue experiences in young and older adults.

In a repetition priming paradigm, young and older participants read aloud prime words that sometimes shared phonological components with a target word that answered a general knowledge question. In Experiment 1, prior processing of phonologically related words decreased tip-of-the-tongue states (TOTs) and increased correct responses to subsequent questions. In Experiment 2, the priming task occurred only when the participant could not answer the question. Processing phonologically related words increased correct recall, but only when the participant was in a TOT state. Phonological priming effects were age invariant, although older adults produced relatively more TOTs. Results support the transmission deficit model that the weak connections among phonological representations that cause TOTs are strengthened by production of phonologically related words. There was no evidence that phonologically related words block TOT targets. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Postreading question–answer interactions and children's learning from text.

111 average and above-average 5th grade students read 1 of 7 short, nonnarrative passages and wrote answers to a set of either textually explicit (TE), textually implicit (TI), schema-based (SB), or text-irrelevant (control) questions. One week later Ss were given a written free-recall test. The results of the analysis of the S's responses to the treatment questions indicate that TE and TI questions promoted text-based question–answer interactions, whereas SB questions promoted both text-based and SB interactions. The recall data indicate that TI question–answer interactions resulted in the generation of larger proportions of text-based inferences than the other types of interactions, without any loss in the amount of explicit information, text-based inferences, and SB inferences. Finally, SB question–answer interactions and interactions with text-irrelevant questions both resulted in larger proportions of SB inferences than either TE or TI interactions. These results are consistent with a schema–theoretic view of reading comprehension. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response bias and Murdock's D scale.

Murdock's D scale predicts a U shaped curve of % correct identification as a function of the position of the stimulus. An inadequacy in the D scale was brought to light in an absolute judgment study by this author. Ss displayed a powerful response bias, avoiding end responses, when judging line lengths. A simple correction for such a response frequency imbalance is suggested, and with this correction the line-length data support the D scale approach to the quantification of distinctiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory bias for threatening information in anxiety and anxiety disorders: A meta-analytic review.

Although some theories suggest that anxious individuals selectively remember threatening stimuli, findings remain contradictory despite a considerable amount of research. A quantitative integration of 165 studies with 9,046 participants (clinical and nonclinical samples) examined whether a memory bias exists and which moderator variables influence its magnitude. Implicit memory bias was investigated in lexical decision/stimulus identification and word-stem completion paradigms; explicit memory bias was investigated in recognition and recall paradigms. Overall, effect sizes showed no significant impact of anxiety on implicit memory and recognition. Analyses indicated a memory bias for recall, whose magnitude depended on experimental study procedures like the encoding procedure or retention interval. Anxiety influenced recollection of previous experiences; anxious individuals favored threat-related information. Across all paradigms, clinical status was not significantly linked to effect sizes, indicating no qualitative difference in information processing between anxiety patients and high-anxious persons. The large discrepancy between study effects in recall and recognition indicates that future research is needed to identify moderator variables for avoidant and preferred remembering. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dynamic memory processes in retrieving answers to questions: Recall failures, judgments of knowing, and acquisition of information.

Three experiments were conducted to show that engaging in an effort to answer a question markedly influences the processing of information subsequently encountered in the environment. On each of 2 successive days, participants were given a definition test that involved the recall of rare English words cued by their definitions. A lexical-decision task was administered between the 2 definition tests; the timing of the lexical-decision task varied across experiments. A strong target-to-definition priming effect occurred such that prior exposure to words during the lexical-decision task increased their likelihood of being recalled in the final definition test. It also appears that earlier attempts to answer questions affected the acquisition of relevant new material in long-term memory. The role of these priming effects is discussed with respect to the process of updating memory representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Imagery, verbatim and paraphrased questions, and retention of meaningful sentences.

90 male and female college students learned a list of 28 declarative sentences and rated the sentences for imagery or pronounceability. Ss were given either verbatim or paraphrased test questions during acquisition and were tested with a 2nd paraphrased question on the retention test. Imagery instructions and paraphrased acquisition questions, which guided subsequent encoding of the sentences, produced superior retention. Levels-of-processing ideas and the encoding specificity principle were invoked to explain these results. Finally, paraphrased test questions did, but imagery rating did not, increase the conditional probability of a correct recall on the retention test given a correct recall during acquisition. This latter result seems to support A. Paivo's (1974) dual process theory of memory. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Croyle et al. (2006).

Reports an error in the original article by R. Croyle et al (Health Psychology, 2006[Apr], 25[3], 425-432). On page 427, the operational definition of cholesterol levels was printed incorrectly. The first full paragraph on the right column of p. 427 should begin "After participants were told their total serum cholesterol level (in mg/dL) and risk category (desirable, 239), they received cholesterol education and follow-up information that complied with the NCEP II guidelines (Expert Panel on Population Strategies for Blood Cholesterol Reduction, 1991)." (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2006-05891-020). The authors conducted a community-based cholesterol screening study to examine accuracy of recall for self-relevant health information in long-term autobiographical memory. Adult community residents (N = 496) were recruited to participate in a laboratory-based cholesterol screening and were also provided cholesterol counseling in accordance with national guidelines. Participants were subsequently interviewed 1, 3, or 6 months later to assess their memory for their test results. Participants recalled their exact cholesterol levels inaccurately (38.0% correct) but their cardiovascular risk category comparatively well (88.7% correct). Recall errors showed a systematic bias: Individuals who received the most undesirable test results were most likely to remember their cholesterol scores and cardiovascular risk categories as lower (i.e., healthier) than those actually received. Recall bias was unrelated to age, education, knowledge, self-rated health status, and self-reported efforts to reduce cholesterol. The findings provide evidence that recall of self-relevant health information is susceptible to self-enhancement bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of improper sets of information on judgment: How irrelevant information can bias judged probability.

This article introduces 2 new sources of bias in probability judgment, discrimination failure and inhibition failure, which are conceptualized as arising from an interaction between error prone memory processes and a support theory like comparison process. Both sources of bias stem from the influence of irrelevant information on participants' probability judgments, but they postulate different mechanisms for how irrelevant information affects judgment. The authors used an adaptation of the proactive interference (PI) and release from PI paradigm to test the effect of irrelevant information on judgment. The results of 2 experiments support the discrimination failure account of the effect of PI on probability judgment. In addition, the authors show that 2 commonly used measures of judgment accuracy, absolute and relative accuracy, can be dissociated. The results have broad implications for theories of judgment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Cognitive processes underlying context effects in attitude measurement.

We begin this article with the assumption that attitudes are best understood as structures in long-term memory, and we look at the implications of this view for the response process in attitude surveys. More specifically, we assert that an answer to an attitude question is the product of a four-stage process. Respondents first interpret the attitude question, determining what attitude the question is about. They then retrieve relevant beliefs and feelings. Next, they apply these beliefs and feelings in rendering the appropriate judgment. Finally, they use this judgment to select a response. All four of the component processes can be affected by prior items. The prior items can provide a framework for interpreting later questions and can also make some responses appear to be redundant with earlier answers. The prior items can prime some beliefs, making them more accessible to the retrieval process. The prior items can suggest a norm or standard of comparison for making the judgment. Finally, the prior items can create consistency pressures or pressures to appear moderate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Confidence judgments in children's and adult's event recall and suggestibility.

The present work investigated the role of children's and adults' metacognitive monitoring and control processes for unbiased event recall tasks and for suggestibility. Three studies were conducted in which children and adults indicated their degree of confidence that their answers were correct after (Study 1) and before (Study 2) answering either unbiased or misleading questions or (Study 3) forced-choice recognition questions. There was a strong tendency for overestimation of confidence regardless of age and question format. However, children did not lack the principal metacognitive competencies when these questions were asked in a neutral interview. Under misleading questioning, in contrast, children's monitoring skills were seriously impaired. Within each age group, better metacognitive differentiation was positively associated with recall accuracy in the suggestive interview. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)