Is EBE theory supported by the evidence? Is it androcentric? A reply to Peplau et al. (1998).

In their critique of the author's Exotic-Becomes-Erotic (EBE) theory of sexual orientation (D. J. Bem, see record 1996-01742-006), L. A. Peplau, L. D. Garnets, L. R. Spalding, T. D. Conley, and R. C. Veniegas (see record 1998-01102-009) challenge his reading of the evidence concerning the antecedents of sexual orientation; they also contend that the theory neglects women's experiences. In reply, the author argues that L. A. Peplau et al. have misunderstood the critical antecedent variable of the theory and, hence, have misidentified the particular empirical findings that would serve to confirm or disconfirm its central contentions. The author also argues that the sex differences they cite are not relevant to the theory, whereas an important sex difference they do not cite is actually anticipated by it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Sacred space, not sacred cows, or it's never fun being prophetic.

Replies to comments by E. F. Loftus (see record 1998-00766-029), S. Buchholz (see record 1998-00766-030), L. G. Humphreys (see record 1998-00766-031), D. S. Lindsay (see record 1998-00766-032), and T. Dineen (see record 1998-00766-033) regarding the article (see record 84-26142) concerning managed care and false memory movement issues in social justice-oriented psychology. Firstly, Brown contends that Loftus"s assertions of misrepresentation are inaccurate. Secondly, Brown argues that making memory retrieval per se the guiding strategy and goal of therapy is more likely to be detrimental than helpful to abuse survivors, and is not consistent with a pro-survivor stance. It is also stated that each claim of recovered memories must be evaluated carefully and on an individual basis in light of all available evidence. Lastly, Brown argues that her goal for her colleagues and readers was for them to develop and assert their own strategies for the achievement of tikkunolam, to be the authors of their own actions, as she attempts to create a therapy in which clients are the authors of their own lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Physics, Ballistics, and Psychology: A History of the Chronoscope in/as Context, 1845-1890.

In Wilhelm Wundt's (1832-1920) Leipzig laboratory and at numerous other research sites, the chronoscope was used to conduct reaction time experiments. The author argues that the history of the chronoscope is the history not of an instrument but of an experimental setup. This setup was initially devised by the English physicist and instrument maker Charles Wheatstone (1802-1875) in the early 1840s. Shortly thereafter, it was improved by the German clockmaker and mechanic Matth?us Hipp (1813-1893). In the 1850s, the chronoscope was introduced to ballistic research. In the early 1860s, Neuchatel astronomer Adolphe Hirsch (1830-1901) applied it to the problem of physiological time. The extensions and variations of chronoscope use within the contexts of ballistics, physiology, and psychology presented special challenges. These challenges were met with specific attempts to reduce the errors in chronoscopic experiments on shooting stands and in the psychological laboratory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Comment on "Recall, retention, and Ritalin."

E. D. Rie and H. E. Rie (see record 1978-27952-001) concluded that Ritalin enhances story recall after a 2-hr retention interval but not after 2 days and that the lack of difference in later recall argues against a facilitation of scholastic achievement due to Ritalin. The present author argues that the former conclusion is questionable because of inappropriate statistical analyses and because of the effects of confoundings contained in the experimental design. The latter conclusion, it is stated, appears to arise from the misconception of equating achievement with long-term memory independently of amount learned. Achievement is a function of both learning and memory, and the distinction should be maintained in examining Ritalin's effects. (2 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Television violence and aggression: A rejoinder.

Replies to the criticisms by L. Friedrich-Cofer and A. C. Huston (see record 1987-09776-001) of the author's literature review (see record 1984-30860-001) on the effect of TV violence on aggression. The present author argues that there are sound reasons for exercising caution in generalizing from laboratory results and that research outside the laboratory provides only weak and inconsistent support for the causal hypothesis. Moreover, it is asserted that the bidirectional model suggested by Friedrich-Cofer and Huston is not supported by the available evidence. (35 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Chaos theory, sensitive dependence, and the logistic equation.

Comments on S. Barton's (see record 1994-27839-001) discussion of nonlinear dynamical systems theory (chaos theory) and argues that it is premature to claim that chaos theory offers a new paradigm for psychology. For most psychologists, who lack the mathematical sophistication to fully apply chaos theory to problems in psychology, this theory will only offer some new conceptual insights. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comment on "Phonological recoding and reading."

Discusses 2 points raised in an article by L. X. McCusker et al (see record 1981-11846-001) on the role of phonological recoding in reading: (1) McCusker et al equated phonological mediation with the application of spelling–sound correspondence rules. The present study argues that such an assumption is not valid. (2) McCusker et al concluded that phonologically mediated semantic access decreases with reading skill. The present study argues that current data do not support this view. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: A reply to Bonatti and to O'Brien, Braine, and Yang.

D. P. O'Brien et al (see record 1995-08272-001) argue that the mental model theory of propositional reasoning is easy to refute, and they report 3 experiments that they believe falsify the theory. In contrast, L. Bonatti (see record 1995-08253-001) argues that the model theory is too flexible to be falsified. It is shown that the experiments by O'Brien et al do not refute the model theory and that Bonatti's claims are ill founded. Formal rule theories of propositional reasoning have 3 major weaknesses in comparison with the model theory: (1) They have no decision procedure; (2) they lack predictive power, providing no account of several robust phenomena (e.g., erroneous conclusions tend to be consistent with the premises); and (3) as a class of theories, they are difficult to refute experimentally. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Role of self-concept in vocational theory.

R. G. Pryor (see record 1985-14577-001) argues that more attention should be devoted to the study of the structural properties of the self and less to the study of the self-concept, because the self-concept lacks explanatory power and reliance on it obfuscates attempts to derive a genuinely causal explanation of human behavior. The major problem with the self-concept, Pryor argues, is that it is relational and therefore is not genuinely causal. However, the present author argues that the relational aspects of the self-concept are in fact useful in explaining the paths individuals take to fulfill their more basic needs and goals. Although the self-concept has promise for explaining vocational behavior, it nevertheless has not been well-conceptualized or well-measured in vocational psychology. (10 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

I am wanting to tell you: Reply to Borgen (1995) and Dawis (1995).

This reply to F. H. Borgen (see record 1995-27394-001) and R. V. Dawis (see record 1995-27395-001)) argues that studying the causes, attributes, and benefits of participants' psychological experiencing of leisure is more likely to advance knowledge of leisure's effects on participants than efforts that recapitulate the study of vocational interests. The conceptual relation of the construct of needs to interests and values is explained, and it is suggested that K. Holmberg, D. Rosen, and J. L. Holland's (1990) taxonomy may lack validity because of its reliance on the armchair judgments of "experts." This article disagrees with Borgen's suggestion that H. E. A. Tinsley and B. D. Eldredge's (see record 1995-27399-001) findings are critical of J. L. Holland's (1985) theory and suggests a procedure for attempting to develop a valid taxonomy of leisure activities using Holland's theory. Nevertheless, Holland's theory largely ignores the amount of exertion intrinsic to an activity, and exertion is the most important dimension for distinguishing among leisure activities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Response to Cronbach and Furby's "How we should measure 'change': Or should we?"

L. J. Cronbach and L. Furby (see record 1970-15658-001) estimated linear combinations of variables by combining least squares estimators of their components. The present author argues that the more conventional least squares estimator of the linear combination as a unit should be used for this purpose. The 2 procedures produce the same formula for estimating true gain, but for estimating true residual gain the procedure advocated here is more precise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Plausible models of alphabetic search: Reply to Scharroo, Leeuwenberg, Stalmeier, and Vos (1994).

D. Klahr et al (see record 1984-05777-001) proposed a model of the cognitive processes involved in alphabetic retrieval in terms of a 2-level hierarchy of forward-linked associations. J. Scharroo et al (see record 1994-24216-001) attempt to demonstrate that a simple associative model is more plausible, more parsimonious, and a better fit to the data than is the Klahr et al model. In this commentary the author argues that Scharroo et al misrepresent the way in which Klahr et al evaluated their model and that they fail to demonstrate the superiority of a simple associative model. In addition, it is suggested that a composite model that integrates the distinctive features of both models would advance understanding of the process of alphabetic retrieval. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Religion and science are mutually exclusive.

Contends that S. L. Jones's (see record 1994-29392-001) proposed similarities between religion and science rested, in large part, on superficial similarities. Furthermore, Ward argues that Jones ignored the fundamental distinctions that separate scientific endeavors from religious beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

McClelland on the Terman data.

Comments on D. C. McClelland's (see record 1973-22126-001) article, which argues that psychometricians have overemphasized IQ tests, noting that McClelland based his premise largely on L. M. Terman's (1925) and Terman and M. H. Oden's (1959) studies of genius. It is argued that McClelland misinterpreted Terman's data, and doubt is cast on McClelland's premise. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clients deserve empirically supported treatments, not romanticism.

Comments on the article by K. J. Schneider (see record 1998-00122-001) on clinical psychology that spelled out implications for the entire discipline, elaborated the reasons for the threat to romanticism, the consequences that are associated with it, and the rich and practical advantages for reclaiming romanticism's legacy. The author mentions that romanticism can and should play a significantly greater role in our profession than it currently does. Finally, romanticism is discussed in light of another major alternative to mainstream psychology—postmodernism. The author argues that romanticism does have its place in psychology, but good science should not be sacrificed to revive it, particularly in clinical practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Belief versus faith.

Commends S. L. Jones (see record 1994-29392-001) for his delineation of a practicable interface between religion and psychology. However, Cox argues that the integration of science and religion must ultimately go beyond Jones's "perhaps boldest model yet." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Publishing opinions: A note on the usefulness of commentaries": Comment.

Comments on J. J. Christensen-Szalanski and L. R. Beach's (see record 1984-21471-001) conclusion that the attention given to commentaries and replies to articles did not justify the extra space and argues that citation indexes do not measure the major usefulness of these commentaries. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the relation between data and theory.

Comments on F. L. Schmidt's (see record 1993-04195-001) article on the impact of meta-analysis on the practice of science in psychology. The author (1) explains that Schmidt's distinction between meta-analysis and single-study statistical methods is illusory and (2) argues for the critical value of the primary research study and the traditional literature review in the enterprise of scientific psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to "The empirical basis of ethnocultural and linguistic bias in mental health evaluations of Hispanics."

Replies to S. López (see record 1989-16799-001) on the present authors' (see record 1987-22971-001) article, and argues that both true and treated prevalence data are needed in studies on Hispanic mental health. Issues concerning test bias and language expression (i.e., Spanish or English) of mental health problems are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Freud, biology, and sociobiology.

Concurs with T. Parisi's (see record 1987-21061-001) suggestion that human psychodynamics cannot be profitably reduced to physiological events, but argues that Parisi's understanding of Freud and his conclusions regarding evolutionary sociobiology are seriously flawed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)