基于可中断负荷拍卖模型电力双边交易阻塞管理

提出了基于可中断负荷拍卖模型的电力双边交易阻塞管理构架,通过市场机制来确定最优的负荷削减程序.在该构架中阻塞调度过程可以分为三个阶段:调度前阶段、无约束调度阶段和考虑可中断负荷拍卖的阻塞调度阶段.在第三阶段,用户可以向调度机构提交各自的可中断负荷服务报价曲线.构建了阻塞调度模型,综合考虑了最小化所中断的负荷量和最小化向用户支付的可中断负荷服务费这两个优化目标.最后用算例对所提出的阻塞调度模型进行了验证.     

基于可中断负荷拍卖模型的电力双边交易阻塞管理

提出了基于可中断负荷拍卖模型的电力双边交易阻塞管理方法,通过市场机制来确定最优的负荷削减程序。阻塞调度过程可以分为三个阶段：调度前阶段、无约束调度阶段和考虑可中断负荷拍卖的阻塞调度阶段。在第三阶段,用户可以向调度机构提交各自的可中断负荷服务报价曲线。构建了阻塞调度模型,综合考虑了最小化所中断的负荷量和最小化向用户支付的可中断负荷服务费这两个优化目标。最后用算例对所提出的模型进行了验证。     

基于可中断负荷的阻塞管理研究

随着电力市场的逐步完善,将可中断负荷引入输电阻塞管理成为缓解阻塞和消除市场力的有效手段。提出通过潮流优化并将可中断负荷引入输电阻塞管理,提出潮流优化与可中断负荷联合调度模型解决输电阻塞问题。对该模型以及IEEE 6节点仿真表明,在电力市场下,采用潮流优化与可中断负荷联合调度模型,可以有效缓解输电阻塞。     

引入可中断负荷的新型阻塞管理研究

传统的阻塞管理从发电侧调整机组出力消除阻塞,但调用高价电能消除阻塞使电网的购电成本较高.文章通过可中断负荷应用于阻塞管理的可行性分析,提出了引入可中断负荷的新型阻塞管理模式,并阐述了该模式下电网总体购电成本的计算方法.3节点算例表明该新型阻塞管理模式下电网的购电成本更低.     

计及可中断负荷影响的阻塞管理定价模型研究

在电力市场环境下,利用可中断负荷参与阻塞管理能有效缓解阻塞和消除市场力,合理的定价是有效利用可中断负荷的关键.作者指出,利用负荷需求的弹性特点并将可中断负荷参与到阻塞管理机制中,通过市场供需关系确定电价可显著减轻阻塞.文中提出了一种定价模型,在此基础上给出了两种定价方法,即节点定价法和分摊定价法,并比较了两种定价方法的特点.最后对两种定价方法进行了仿真,并讨论了电价与负荷弹性的关系,算例结果说明,所提出的定价模型正确合理、简单、实用.     

可中断负荷参与输电阻塞管理的模型与算法

在市场环境下,输电阻塞严重威胁系统安全,并加剧了市场力滥用行为.可中断负荷作为一种电力资源可有效缓解阻塞.文中建立了一个可中断负荷参与电力批发市场竞价的阻塞管理模型.该模型是一个2层优化模型:外层优化潮流模型可确定节点电价,并进行电能调度;内层优化模型旨在选取有效消除阻塞的可中断负荷.在模型求解时,针对出现的非线性互补问题(NCP),通过NCP函数将其转化为一组非线性代数方程,然后用改进的Levenberg-Marquardt算法求解.最后以一个修改的IEEE 30节点系统验证了该模型和算法的有效性.     

基于可中断负荷的新型输电阻塞调度研究

可中断负荷管理是电力需求侧管理的一项重要内容。在电力市场条件下，传统的阻塞调度方法往往会使得阻塞线路节点的电价攀升许多，在对可中断负荷应用于阻塞管理的可行性分析的基础上，提出了一种新型的输电网络阻塞调度方法，利用最优潮流辅助以可中断负荷控制加以实现。与传统调度方法之间的经济比较以及3节点的算例表明，在电力市场条件下，应用最优潮流与可中断负荷控制相结合的阻塞调度方式能够有效地降低电网的阻塞成本，为电力用户带来尽可能大的收益，因而值得推广和应用。     

电力市场双边交易的阻塞管理

双边交易是电力市场中的一种重要交易形式,其相应的阻塞管理也具有重要的意义。鉴此．在潮流计算中应用直流法的基础上,提出了应用灵敏度的概念解决输电阻塞问题,将削减量与所占支路的容量的比例结合起来,做到公正、公平的阻塞管理。最后给出了一个5节点系统的算例,证明该方法的有效性。     

可中断负荷参与阻塞管理的多目标模糊优化

给出了一种可中断负荷参与的阻塞管理多目标模型,该模型同时考虑了可中断负荷用户数最少、可中断负荷量最少和独立系统操作员支付给可中断负荷的总成本最少三个目标来消除阻塞。文章结合模型的特点提出了一种基于模糊理论隶属度的多目标线性优化算法。对IEEE 30节点系统正常运行情况及意外事故引起的输电线路阻塞情况进行了仿真计算和比较。结果表明,所提方法不仅在模型上比单目标具有更好的综合优势,而且算法快速可靠。     

可中断负荷参与阻塞管理模型与特性分析

确定用户中断损失是可中断负荷参与电力市场运行的难点。提出基于投入产出的中断损失评价方法,指出每单位负荷的价值是不同的,中断损失应根据电力边际价值评价,并通过两种电力需求曲线量化分析。Pool模式下,以阻塞成本最小为目标,构建协调机组出力调整与可中断负荷调度的直流最优潮流模型,该模型为一个二次规划问题,求解方便,降低了阻塞管理的复杂性。最后,IEEE-14节点算例验证模型有效性,并给出可中断负荷参与电力市场运行几点建议。     

Transmission congestion management in bilateral markets: An interruptible load auction solution

This paper demonstrates that appropriate invocation of interruptible loads by the independent system operator (ISO) can aid in relieving transmission congestion in power systems. An auction model is proposed, for an ISO operating in a bilateral contract dominated market, for real-time selection of interruptible load offers while satisfying the congestion management objective. The proposed congestion management scheme using interruptible loads can specifically identify load buses where corrective measures are needed for relieving congestion on a particular transmission corridor. The N − 1 contingency criterion has been taken into account to simulate various cases, and hence, examine the effectiveness of the proposed method. It has been shown that the method can assist the ISO to remove the overload from lines in both normal and contingency conditions in an optimal manner.     

电力市场可中断负荷用户属性研究

可中断负荷管理是电力市场环境下需求侧管理的重要组成部分,与电力系统安全经济运行密切相关.介绍了可中断负荷管理及相关市场组织形式;分析了可中断电价及可中断负荷成本效益.对某地区主要行业进行了用户调查,并采用基于信息熵进行属性相关分析的方法对用户数据进行研究,得出了用户典型属性在实施可中断负荷管理中的相关性,对实际工作制定中可中断负荷管理方法有一定借鉴意义.     

LMP机制下可中断负荷用于阻塞管理的最优调度方法

节点边际价格LMP（Locational Marginal Price）在解决交易的公平性和电网阻塞方面具有很大的优势,它从时间和空间两个层面反映电力系统的运行成本。可中断负荷作为需求侧管理的重要手段,可以有效地缓解阻塞。文中对发电出力再调度和可中断负荷量进行了均衡分析,提出了LMP机制下可中断负荷用于阻塞管理的最优调度原则。验证了可中断负荷在降低节点电价、增加社会效益以及解决阻塞方面的优势。文中采用IEEE30节点系统进行仿真,证明了该理论的正确性和合理性。     

LMP机制下可中断负荷用于阻塞管理的最优调度方法

节点边际价格LMP(Locational Marginal Price)在解决交易的公平性和电网阻塞方面具有很大的优势,它从时间和空间两个层面反映电力系统的运行成本.可中断负荷作为需求侧管理的重要手段,可以有效地缓解阻塞.文中对发电出力再调度和可中断负荷量进行了均衡分析,提出了LMP机制下可中断负荷用于阻塞管理的最优调度原则.验证了可中断负荷在降低节点电价,增加社会效益以及解决阻塞方面的优势.文中采用IEEE30节点系统进行仿真,证明了该理论的正确性和合理性.     

Multi-agent based experimental analysis on bidding mechanism in electricity auction markets

Determining the best market pricing rule is a controversial issue in the design of electricity auction markets. Pay-as-bid (PAB) has been proposed to replace the market-clearing price (MCP) in deregulated electricity markets, with the expectation that it would lower market prices and reduce price volatility. A multi-agent based experiment was constructed to compare and analyze the balanced process of the two auction mechanisms. Each adaptive agent represents a generator who develops a bid price and quantity based on a reinforcement learning algorithm. In the simulation experiments, the experimental results are not as expected. Before the market reaches equilibrium, the market price with the PAB mechanism is lower than it is with the MCP mechanism. However, the market price in the PAB mechanism is higher than it is with the MCP when the market achieves a state of equilibrium. With the PAB mechanism, the volatility of volume and price of each generator is less than it is with the MCP system, as expected. The experimental results also show that unconscious collusion behaviors by generators during the game process are a key reason for producing generator market power in the two auction mechanisms.     

Coordinated spot market for congestion management of inter-regional electricity markets

The rapid growth of inter-regional trading among electricity markets requires the development of new market-oriented mechanisms for the inter-regional congestion management of such trading. In this paper, we deal with the operation of power systems consisting of several interconnected electricity markets. We propose an alternative approach to inter-regional trade that avoids the flaws of forward markets with explicit auctioning of interconnections capacities. We propose the integration of a forward market with a balancing (spot) market for inter-regional exchanges based on nodal pricing. The interaction of transmission system operators (TSOs) belonging to adjacent markets is efficiently taken into account through a decentralized optimal power flow (OPF), which is solved by interior point methods.     

Transmission congestion and voltage profile management coordination in competitive electricity markets

This paper describes a generalized active/reactive iterative coordination process between GENCOs and the Independent System Operator (ISO) for active (transmission congestion) and reactive (voltage profile) management in the day-ahead market. GENCOs apply priced-based unit commitment without transmission and voltage security constraints, schedule their units and submit their initial bids to the ISO. The ISO executes congestion and voltage profile management for eliminating transmission and voltage profile violations. If violations are not eliminated, the ISO minimizes the transmission and voltage profile violations and sends a signal via the Internet to GENCOs. GENCOs reschedule their units taking into account the ISO signals and submit modified bids to the ISO. The voltage problem is addressed and a linear model is formulated and used in the proposed method. The voltage problem is formulated as a linear programming with a block-angular structure and Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition is applied to generate several smaller problems for a faster and easier solution of large-scale power systems. Two 36 unit GENCOs are used to demonstrate the performance of the proposed generalized active/reactive coordination algorithm.     

Locating series FACTS devices for congestion management in deregulated electricity markets

This paper proposes two new methodologies for the placement of series FACTS devices in deregulated electricity market to reduce congestion. Similar to sensitivity factor based method, the proposed methods form a priority list that reduces the solution space. The proposed methodologies are based on the use of LMP differences and congestion rent, respectively. The methods are computationally efficient, since LMPs are the by-product of a security constrained OPF and congestion rent is a function of LMP difference and power flows. The proposed methodologies are tested and validated for locating TCSC in IEEE 14-, IEEE 30- and IEEE 57-bus test systems. Results obtained with the proposed methods are compared with that of the sensitivity method and with exhaustive OPF solutions. The overall objective of FACTS device placement can be either to minimize the total congestion rent or to maximize the social welfare. Results show that the proposed methods are capable of finding the best location for TCSC installation, that suite both objectives.     

电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型与分析

我国实行“厂网分开、竞价上网”的电力改革中,形成了电网公司双边垄断模式。为与原有厂网合一、垂直一体化的完全垄断模式作效率比较,构造了国家电网公司双边垄断最优拍卖模型,深入分析了这种模式给电网公司、发电商和用电户带来的期望效用和社会福利水平及变化情况,结果证明改革后社会福利增加、效率提高,但仍未达到电力市场的社会最优。这表明应该坚持引入竞争的市场化改革方向,但需要打破电网公司双边垄断局面,进一步在发电、购电环节引入更充分的竞争。