Game Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Stimulation and Security in Autonomous Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

In autonomous mobile ad hoc networks, nodes belong to different authorities and pursue different goals; therefore, cooperation among them cannot be taken for granted. Meanwhile, some nodes may be malicious, whose objective is to damage the network. In this paper, we present a joint analysis of cooperation stimulation and security in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under a game theoretic framework. We first investigate a simple yet illuminating two-player packet forwarding game and derive the optimal and cheat-proof packet forwarding strategies. We then investigate the secure routing and packet forwarding game for autonomous ad hoc networks in noisy and hostile environments and derive a set of reputation-based cheat-proof and attack-resistant cooperation stimulation strategies. When analyzing the cooperation strategies, besides Nash equilibrium, other optimality criteria, such as Pareto optimality, subgame perfection, fairness, and cheat-proofing, have also been considered. Both analysis and simulation studies have shown that the proposed strategies can effectively stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks under noise and attacks, and the damage that can be caused by attackers is bounded and limited     

Nash equilibria of packet forwarding strategies in wireless ad hoc networks

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model,based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios.. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stab le-cooperation needs to be encouraged.     

Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks

The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay packets for each other may not be realistic for commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous (selfish) node in a wireless network has two disincentives for forwarding for others: energy expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for its own data (opportunity cost). We introduce a mechanism that "fosters cooperation through bribery" in the context of forwarding in ad hoc networks. Using a microeconomic framework based on game theory, we design and analyze a pricing algorithm that encourages forwarding among autonomous nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the revenue maximizing network and utility (measured in bits-per-Joule) maximizing nodes interact through prices for channel use, reimbursements for forwarding, transmitter power control, as well as forwarding and destination preferences. In a three-node (two-sources, one-access-point) network, the network converges to an architecture that induces forwarding only when the network geometries are such that forwarding is likely to increase individual benefits (network revenue and node utilities). For other geometries, the network converges to architectures that do not favor forwarding. We then generalize to a multinode network, where it is seen that the nodes' willingness to forward decrease for large ratios of the average internodal distance to the smallest distance between the access point and any source node. Pricing with reimbursement generally improves the network aggregate utility (or aggregate bits-per-Joule), as well as utilities and revenue compared with the corresponding pricing algorithm without reimbursement.     

On the tradeoff between altruism and selfishness in MANET trust management

Mobile ad hoc and sensor networks may consist of a mixture of nodes, some of which may be considered selfish due to a lack of cooperativeness in providing network services such as forwarding packets. In the literature, existing trust management protocols for mobile ad hoc networks advocate isolating selfish nodes as soon as they are detected. Further, altruistic behaviors are encouraged with incentive mechanisms. In this paper, we propose and analyze a trust management protocol for group communication systems where selfish nodes exist and system survivability is highly critical to mission execution. Rather than always encouraging altruistic behaviors, we consider the tradeoff between a node’s individual welfare (e.g., saving energy to prolong the node lifetime) vs. global welfare (e.g., achieving a given mission with sufficient service availability) and identify the best design condition of this behavior model to balance selfish vs. altruistic behaviors. With the system lifetime and the mission success probability as our trust-based reliability metric, we show that our behavior model that exploits the tradeoff between selfishness vs. altruism outperforms one that only encourages altruistic behaviors.     

基于博弈理论的无线自组织网增强协作模型研究

为了解决无线自组织网络中转发节点因自身能量与存储空间限制而拒绝协作的自私性问题,该文从分析数据包源节点与转发节点的收益与开销特性出发,基于虚拟货币的奖励机制,结合博弈理论提出无线自组织网络增强协作模型。该模型将网络协作问题转化为数据包转发路径中多转发节点与源节点收益的博弈均衡问题,在保障双方利益的基础上提出最优的激励方式,促进通信协作的进行。另外,为最大化网络生存时间与避免拥塞,该模型对转发节点的电量与存储空间状态做了相应的约束。     

DECADE: Distributed Emergent Cooperation through ADaptive Evolution in mobile ad hoc networks

The scarce resources of a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) should not be wasted attending selfish nodes (those nodes that use resources from other nodes to send their own packets, without offering their own resources to forward other nodes’ packets). Thus, rational nodes (those nodes willing to cooperate if deemed worthy) must detect and isolate selfish nodes in order to cooperate only among themselves. To achieve this purpose, in this paper we present a new game theoretic trust model called DECADE (Distributed Emergent Cooperation through ADaptive Evolution). The design of DECADE is shown by first, analyzing a simple case of packet forwarding between two nodes, and then the results are extended to bigger networks. In DECADE, each node seeks individually to maximize its chance to deliver successfully their own packets, so that the cooperation among rational nodes and the isolation of selfish nodes appear as an emergent collective behavior. This behavior emerges as long as there is a highly dynamic interaction among nodes. So, for those cases where the mobility alone does not suffice to provide this interaction, DECADE includes a sociability parameter that encourages nodes to interact among them for faster learning and adaptability. Additionally, DECADE introduces very low overhead on computational and communication resources, achieving close to optimal cooperation levels among rational nodes and almost complete isolation of selfish nodes.     

基于博弈理论的移动自组网激励机制研究

摘 要：针对移动自组网中节点在报文转发过程中的表现出的自私行为,利用博弈理论,从静态和动态2个方面对其进行了完整的建模与分析。首先,提出了一种严厉针锋相对策略,并建立了一个无限重复报文转发博弈模型,求得了激励一致性条件。然后,利用演化博弈理论对节点由自私向协作转变的动态过程进行了分析,并证明了严厉针锋相对策略的演化稳定性。仿真结果表明,即使在自私节点比率为1的条件下,只要合理选择惩罚参数,均可有效激励自私节点的协作转发行为,整体网络性能最多可提升80%。     

Co-operation Enforcing Reputation-Based Detection Techniques and Frameworks for Handling Selfish Node Behaviour in MANETs: A Review

In Mobile Ad hoc Network, co-operation between mobile nodes is inevitable for enabling reliable network connectivity due to the absence of pre-deployed infrastructure. In such a network, mobile nodes spend significant amount of energy for detecting routes and forwarding packets in order to enforce co-operation. The energy drain of mobile nodes due to the above fact induces them to refuse forwarding of packets for their neighbouring nodes in order to participate in the network. The mobile nodes that forward their own packets but drop the packets received from neighbours are known as selfish nodes. Detecting selfish nodes is one of the most challenging issues that need to be addressed for enforcing co-operation. The core objective of this research work is to essentially identify and highlights various reputation-based selfish node mitigation approaches available in the literature with their merits and limitations. This paper presents context-aware reputation-based selfish node mitigation approaches that are classified into three categories viz., History-based reputation mechanism, Condition probability-based reputation mechanism and Futuristic probability-based reputation mechanism. This paper further presents a review on a number of selfish node mitigation frameworks and also aims in emphasizing the role of statistical reliability co-efficient that could aid in effective and efficient mitigation of selfish nodes.     

Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes

Nodes in an ad hoc wireless network incur certain costs for forwarding packets since packet forwarding consumes the resources of the nodes. If the nodes are rational, free packet forwarding by the nodes cannot be taken for granted and incentive based protocols are required to stimulate cooperation among the nodes. Existing incentive based approaches are based on the VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism which leads to high levels of incentive budgets and restricted applicability to only certain topologies of networks. Moreover, the existing approaches have only focused on unicast and multicast. Motivated by this, we propose an incentive based broadcast protocol that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility and minimizes the incentive budgets required by the individual nodes. The proposed protocol, which we call BIC-B (Bayesian incentive compatible broadcast) protocol, also satisfies budget balance. We also derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the ex-post individual rationality of the BIC-B protocol. The BIC-B protocol exhibits superior performance in comparison to a dominant strategy incentive compatible broadcast protocol.     

Analytical Model of Cooperation in Ad Hoc Networks

The problem of cooperation among selfish nodes in ad hoc networks has gained recently a considerable attention. In this paper we propose a dynamic game theoretical model of cooperation in ad hoc networks, based on evolutionary game theory. Our model enables us to make predictions about possible equilibrium points of the network composed of the selfish and learning nodes, which can dynamically adjust their strategy in order to maximize their own payoff. In particular, we show that if an ad hoc network implements a reputation mechanism, all long term equilibrium points of the system will include cooperating nodes. In fact, in most of the equilibrium points, the cooperators will constitute a majority of the nodes. We believe that this new approach, borrowing from biological research, can have broader applications for studying dynamics of distributed communication systems.     

感知无线电自私网络低开销诚实能效路由

在感知无线电自私ad hoc网络环境下提出一种低代销的诚实能效路由(Lowest Cost Path,LCP),将路由的开销结合对主用户的干扰和节点剩余能量,利用格罗夫斯-克拉克-威科瑞(Vickrey-Clark-Groves,VCG)定价机制给LCP上每个中继节点以一定报酬促使节点之间的合作,并证明VCG机制下节点真实的反映自身的类型是一个占优策略。仿真结果表明,该路由算法有效实现了感知无线电自私ad hoc网络的诚实能效路由,与现有最短路径路由协议比较,该协议具有更好的性能。     

Stimulating Cooperation in Self-Organizing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

In military and rescue applications of mobile ad hoc networks, all the nodes belong to the same authority; therefore, they are motivated to cooperate in order to support the basic functions of the network. In this paper, we consider the case when each node is its own authority and tries to maximize the benefits it gets from the network. More precisely, we assume that the nodes are not willing to forward packets for the benefit of other nodes. This problem may arise in civilian applications of mobile ad hoc networks. In order to stimulate the nodes for packet forwarding, we propose a simple mechanism based on a counter in each node. We study the behavior of the proposed mechanism analytically and by means of simulations, and detail the way in which it could be protected against misuse.     

Attack-resistant cooperation stimulation in autonomous ad hoc networks

In autonomous ad hoc networks, nodes usually belong to different authorities and pursue different goals. In order to maximize their own performance, nodes in such networks tend to be selfish, and are not willing to forward packets for the benefits of other nodes. Meanwhile, some nodes might behave maliciously and try to disrupt the network and waste other nodes' resources. In this paper, we present an attack-resilient cooperation stimulation (ARCS) system for autonomous ad hoc networks to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes and defend against malicious attacks. In the ARCS system, the damage that can be caused by malicious nodes can be bounded, the cooperation among selfish nodes can be enforced, and the fairness among nodes can also be achieved. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results have confirmed the effectiveness of the ARCS system. Another key property of the ARCS system lies in that it is completely self-organizing and fully distributed, and does not require any tamper-proof hardware or central management points.     

Incentive based scheme for improving data availability in vehicular ad-hoc networks

Vehicular networks are popular in recent years to provide low cost communication medium during mobility. Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are one of the major categories of emerging technology. DTNs work on carry and forward mechanism to deliver data to the destination. The network performance gets severely affected due to reluctance shown by selfish nodes where few nodes show no interest in forwarding others data due to lack of any personal profit. The proposed mechanism is based on coalition game theory and discusses about incentive based mechanism which provides incentive to nodes which are forwarding data to forward to destination and motivates other vehicles in the network to participate in coalition to forward data. This scheme not only encourages other selfish nodes to forward their private data and other nodes’ public data as early as possible to destination but also increases reliability in the network as more nodes show their interest in selected routing protocol. The proposed scheme outperforms in overall benefit earned by individual node and whole coalition, and increases mutual cooperation which improves availability of data in the network.     

OMH—Suppressing Selfish Behavior in Ad hoc Networks with One More Hop

In ad hoc networks, wireless nodes rely on each other to transmit data over multi-hops by forwarding packets. A selfish node may decide not to forward packets for other nodes to save its own resource but still use the network to send and receive data. Such a selfish behavior can degrade network performance significantly. Most existing work took observation, reputation and token based mechanisms. However observation based mechanism suffers from mobility and collusion; reputation and token based mechanisms suffer from system complexity and efficiency. In this paper, we propose One More Hop (OMH) protocol which suppresses selfish behavior from a totally new angle. Basing on the fact that the selfish but rational nodes still want to receive and send packets, if a node can not determine whether a packet is destined for it or not, it can not drop the packet. With modified routing protocol and cryptographic techniques, OMH achieves this design target. It is robust and efficient. The simulation shows that OMH works well under different network situations.     

Trust Based Intrusion Detection Technique to Detect Selfish Nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The applications and protocols conceived for mobile ad hoc networks rely on the assumption of cooperation amongst the mobile nodes because of lacking infrastructure. All nodes have to spend their precious resources (e.g. battery power, memory, computational power, and network bandwidth) for routing and packet forwarding operations for other nodes, in a cooperative way in the network. However, there are some nodes that may intentionally turn themselves to behave selfishly in order to conserve their valuable resources. The selfish behaviour of such nodes drastically reduces the desired degree of cooperation amongst the mobile nodes. Over the course of time, the non-cooperative activities of, such selfish nodes would paralyze the normal functioning of the whole network. Therefore, these types of nodes should be detected and isolated from the network, as soon as they begin to exhibit their selfish behaviour. In this paper, a dynamic trust based intrusion detection technique is presented to detect and isolate the selfish nodes from the network, where the direct trust degree based on direct communication interactions and indirect (recommended) trust degree based on the neighbours’ recommendations are taking into account to accurately judge the selfishness nature of the nodes. The results obtained throughout the simulation experiments clearly show the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed intrusion detection technique.     

An incentive energy-efficient routing for data gathering in wireless cooperative networks

Because of energy-constraint, it is an attractive problem to select energy-efficient paths from source nodes to sink for data gathering in wireless ad hoc networks. Cooperative communication is a promising mechanism to reduce transmit energy in such kind of case. One of the fundamental assumptions for cooperative communication is that each node should be unselfish, responsible, and willing to forwarding data he has received. However, in energy-constrained environment, because of limited energy, each node hates participating in data transmission without any incentive and tries to avoid forwarding data (this behavior is selfish). In this paper, a utility function is proposed to stimulate nodes to behave unselfishly. We prove that it is a Nash Equilibrium when nodes work in an unselfish manner. Also, we show that the selection of forwarding nodes and relay nodes for data transmission is a NP-hard problem even when nodes behave unselfishly. A heuristic algorithm (Algorithm for Node Selection Problem, ANSP) is provided to solve this selection problem. We also prove the convergence of this algorithm. The analysis shows that this algorithm can reach the approximate performance ratio of 2?(1+α), where α is the maximal ratio of two power consumptions on two adjacent links in the network. The numerical results show that in a 100 node network, if nodes behave unselfishly, they will obtain a better utility, and more energy will be saved. The average saved energy when each node takes a selfish behavior, is 52.5% less than the average when nodes behave in an unselfish manner.     

The COMMIT Protocol for Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing in Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

We consider the problem of establishing a route and sending packets between a source/destination pair in ad hoc networks composed of rational selfish nodes whose purpose is to maximize their own utility. In order to motivate nodes to follow the protocol specification, we use side payments that are made to the forwarding nodes. Our goal is to design a fully distributed algorithm such that (1) a node is always better off participating in the protocol execution (individual rationality), (2) a node is always better off behaving according to the protocol specification (truthfulness), (3) messages are routed along the most energy-efficient (least cost) path, and (4) the message complexity is reasonably low. We introduce the COMMIT protocol for individually rational, truthful, and energy-efficient routing in ad hoc networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ad hoc routing protocol with these features. COMMIT is based on the VCG payment scheme in conjunction with a novel game-theoretic technique to achieve truthfulness for the sender node. By means of simulation, we show that the inevitable economic inefficiency is small. As an aside, our work demonstrates the advantage of using a cross-layer approach to solving problems: Leveraging the existence of an underlying topology control protocol, we are able to simplify the design and analysis of our routing protocol and reduce its message complexity. On the other hand, our investigation of the routing problem in the presence of selfish nodes disclosed a new metric under which topology control protocols can be evaluated: the cost of cooperation.     

Reputation based selfishness prevention techniques for mobile ad-hoc networks

Mobile ad-hoc networks require nodes to cooperate in the relaying of data from source to destination. However, due to their limited resources, selfish nodes may be unwilling to forward packets, which can deteriorate the multi-hop connectivity. Different reputation-based protocols have been proposed to cope with selfishness in mobile ad-hoc networks. These protocols utilize the watchdog detection mechanism to observe the correct relaying of packets, and to compile information about potential selfish nodes. This information is used to prevent the participation of selfish nodes in the establishment of multi-hop routes. Despite its wide use, watchdog tends to overestimate the selfish behavior of nodes due to the effects of radio transmission errors or packet collisions that can be mistaken for intentional packet drops. As a result, the availability of valid multi-hop routes is reduced, and the overall performance deteriorates. This paper proposes and evaluates three detection techniques that improve the ability of selfishness prevention protocols to detect selfish nodes and to increase the number of valid routes.     

An evolutionary bargaining‐based approach for incentivized cooperation in opportunistic networks

Opportunistic networking enables users to communicate in an environment where connectivity is intermittent or unstable. However, such networking scheme assumes that mobile nodes voluntary cooperate, which cannot be guaranteed. Some nodes can simply exhibit selfish behavior and thus diminish the effectiveness of the approach. In this paper, a game scenario is formulated in which the nodes try to convince each other to participate in packets forwarding. Each node is considered as a player in this game. When a node comes in the communication range of another, a bargaining game starts between them as part of the message forwarding process. Both players try to have a mutual agreement on a price for message forwarding. We present a new incentive mechanism called evolutionary bargaining‐based incentive scheme (EBIS) to motivate selfish nodes to cooperate in data forwarding. In EBIS, a node negotiates with other nodes to obtain an agreeable amount of credit for its forwarding service. Nodes apply a sequential bargaining game and then adapt their strategies using an evolutionary model to maximize the probability of reaching an agreement. Unlike classical bargaining games, nodes in our model are boundedly rational. In addition, we use the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept to determine the adaptive strategies for the nodes. The comparison of EBIS with a benchmarked model demonstrates that EBIS performs better in terms of packet delivery ratio and average latency.