Some views on 2 year review/revision cycle of IAEA regulations for safe transport of radioactive material

Abstract

In the past the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) transport regulations have normally been reviewed or revised within a 10 year cycle to support changes in transport operations arising from administrative and technical developments and new knowledge in fields concerning the transport of radioactive material. Beginning in 2003, consistent with the time schedules of the United Nations (UN) Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and of the relevant international modal organisations, a regular 2 year review of the IAEA transport regulations was established, with a view to issuing a revised or amended edition as necessary. This paper describes the process of the review/revision itself, the transfer to the regulations of the UN and the modal organisations as well as implementation within the legislation of the member states. The advantages and disadvantages of the more frequent process are analysed: on the one hand harmonisation with the UN and the modal organisations, on the other hand a possible lack of sufficient stability in the regulations themselves. The need for the 'Schedules of requirements for the transport of specified types of radioactive material consignment', which are an integral part of the IAEA transport regulations TS-R-1 but which from 1 January 2005 are no longer a part of the international modal regulations, is discussed.     

The Iaea Transport Regulations in the New Millennium

Abstract

Since the publication of the most recent edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material in 1996, two parallel but closely interlinked processes have taken place: incorporation of those Regulations in their entirety into the United Nations Committee of Experts Model Regulations, and a review of the procedures which will be used to keep the IAEA Regulations effective and up to date in future. These developments are expected to lead to more efficient, responsive and timely regulation, greater harmonisation of dangerous goods regulation between modes, and improved ease of use.     

Security in transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The basis of safety regulation and practice in the handling (including transport) of radioactive materials has been the premise that any mishaps or accidents occur unintentionally, with a desire among all parties involved to avoid such incidents and to minimise their effects. The strategic importance of nuclear materials for military purposes has made these materials a potential target for unauthorised acquisition, however, and international conventions have been in place for many years to ensure the security of nuclear materials from theft and from interception during transport. Until recently, only nuclear materials were subject to such security measures, but concern over the consequences of incidents involving radioactive sources has led to a review of security measures for non-nuclear radioactive materials. The IAEA has encouraged governments to institute effective systems of control to ensure the security of radioactive materials and has published its 'Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources' and other guidance material. Three principal stages are recommended for the maintenance of security. The first and most important is the prevention of malevolent acts through the fostering of a security culture, the effective management of material within a regulated legal framework, the appropriate design of sources and the use of secure vehicles and physical means to deter unauthorised access. The second line of defence is the detection of any breach of security, by means of radiation monitoring, accounting checks and reports of unusual occurrences. The third stage, response, includes means to ensure that the effect of a breach of security on public safety is minimised, and to take steps to recover any material that has fallen outside secure control. Specific provisions for security have been added to the UN Model Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (the Orange Book) and these have been incorporated in the international modal regulations and enacted in the domestic legislation of individual states. The regulations include general provisions applicable to all dangerous goods including radioactive materials and additional provisions for 'high consequence dangerous goods', which include radioactive materials in quantities above 3000 A ₁ (special form radioactive material) or 3000 A ₂, in Type B(U), Type B(M) or Type C packages. Training in security, including the nature of risks and methods to address them is also required. The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has produced guidance material in support of the regulatory security requirements for transport by rail and road. The rail transport guidance follows the structure of the regulations and the road transport guidance is grouped into three main aspects of security, namely people, procedures and assets. Therefore, the importance of ensuring a reliable and trustworthy workforce and the use of known and trusted contractors is stressed, together with assurance of adequate and verifiable standards of education and training. Procedural matters include the establishment of standards of responsibility, the supervision of contractors, the maintenance of contacts and risk assessment. The control of assets includes surveillance and access control of premises, and the secure storage of vehicles, which should be fitted with appropriate alarms and immobilisers. The guidance material is available from the Department for Transport and may be viewed on its website www.dft.gov.uk/security/dangerousgoods.     

Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract

Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licensees, and begin reviewing and approving transport security plans. This experience has led to the development of practical approaches that minimise impacts as the guidance is put into practice. The nuclear material transport security recommendations in INFCIRC/225 are in the process of being revised to update them to address the current threat environment and to incorporate recommendations based on the recent amendments made to the Convention. INFCIRC/225, revision 5 will be a recommendation level document in the IAEA nuclear security series of documents. The interface between the nuclear and radioactive material transport security documents is important in order to ensure that appropriate security measures, based on both the nuclear and radioactive properties of the material being transported, are defined and implemented. This paper provides up to date information on the development of the IAEA transport security documents and presents information on implementation of the radioactive material transport security recommendations. It explains how the documents interface with each other and provides examples of how they should both be used in defining transport security requirements for shipments.     

Developing historical technical basis for radiological safety requirements of international transport safety regulations

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for developing safety requirements for the transport of radioactive material. These requirements were first published in 1961 as ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No. 6 (the Regulations), and have been revised at regular intervals, in consultation with Member States, and with input from other relevant organisations, as appropriate. The current regular review and revision of the Regulations has been driven by problems, challenges and the demand for improvements, as well as the need to take into account experiences in transport, newly identified issues, new technologies, best practices, the demand for sustainable transport and harmonisation. After 50 years, 15 editions of the Regulations have been published. With the passage of time, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development in transport safety has begun to fade. The need to capture valuable knowledge, which needs to be preserved for future reference, has become clear. In general, every requirement in the regulations was developed on the basis of deliberations among international experts and an appropriate technical basis. The knowledge bases for these often exist in a decentralised manner in many Member States with mature nuclear programmes. Easier access to the existing technical bases for the Regulations could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the Regulations. Knowledge capture and transfer can contribute to the development of and innovations in transport safety. This paper provides an overview of international level efforts that began in 2010 to develop a comprehensive and detailed technical basis document (TecBasDoc) to support the current and future revisions of the Regulations. The draft TecBasDoc has so far resulted from efforts by IAEA staff and a large number of international transport experts. It exceeds 150 pages in length using, to the greatest extent possible, historical documents dating as far back as the 1950s as reference material. The intent of this effort is to record, for those Member States new to transport and for future generations, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development that has occurred in transport safety and to capture valuable knowledge so it can be preserved for future reference. The latest effort has involved consultants to the IAEA adapting the draft to reflect guidance from the IAEA’s Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) and delving into the IAEA’s archives and other sources of historical documents, searching out many long sought, older supporting documents. The draft is currently structured into 12 chapters, embodying multiple supporting appendixes. This paper elaborates on the first chapters of the document, which include General History, Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Objectives and Principles for Transport, General Safety Requirements, Radiation Protection and Controls for Transport. Two companion papers at PATRAM 2013 address the status of the TecBasDoc in the topical areas of package testing and criticality control. In all cases, the chapters of the TecBasDoc address how early decisions were made citing well known historical experts and discussing how these initial decisions have been adapted to meet the emerging international safety guidelines.     

Excluded,exempt and LSA quantities for transport of NORM radioactive material

Abstract

The main objectives of this research work are the determination of the quantities of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) that can be excepted from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Transport Regulations, the establishment of quantities of NORM that can be transported in excepted packages as well as the provision of sound basis for the establishment of limiting values for the classification of NORM as low specific activity material I raw for transport purposes, in order to compare with the actual transport limits established in the IAEA Transport Regulations for this type of material.     

Dangerous Goods Regulations in Europe: Inland Navigation and Other Modes of Transport

Abstract

For thousands of years trade has moved goods allover Europe, and once gunpowder had been invented, this trade included dangerous goods. As early as 1831 regulations were introduced for the Rhine river - the world's busiest inland waterway today - to cover the transport of those goods. Another mode of transport was added in 1890 when the foundation for the International Regulations concerning the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail was laid with the Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Rail at Berne, Switzerland. Today these regulations are known as the RID. Air transport, road transport and carriage by sea, each followed during the 1950s. These international regulatory regimes have been supplemented by national regulations; in Germany alone, for example, these amount to some 4000+ pages. Because dangerous goods regulations have been developed separately for each mode of transport, there now exist several different regulatory regimes. For Europe, these uncoordinated regulations pose a serious problem. Carriage of radioactive materials had not reached significant volumes until approximately 1950 and in 1961 the International Atomic Energy Agency published their Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material for the first time. This meant that, at least as far as radioactive materials were concerned, a single umbrella covering all modes of transport was available. It is due to these IAEA regulations that a unified set of rules governs radioactive materials transport allover Europe, and indeed the whole world. Accordingly hardly any problems exist. The IAEA regulations and the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods are discussed as well as the international conventions based upon them (International Civil Aviation Organisation - Technical Instructions, International Air Transport Association - Dangerous Goods Regulations, International Maritime Dangerous Goods - Code, RID, ADR, ADN and ADNR). Special emphasis is placed on the rules for inland navigation in Europe, since these are bound to gain importance after two of Europe's large inland waterways, the Rhine and Donau rivers, were connected by canal on September 25, 1992.     

IAEA Transport Regulations—what has Changed in 40 years

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials were first published in 1961. It was stated in the foreword of the first edition that the transport of increasing amounts of radioactive materials posed technical problems because of the hazards involved and it also stated that the procedures to be complied with should not be too complex and should apply to any mode of transport. The requirements for the packaging of radioactive materials for transport were expressed in terms of provisions and were described in general qualitative terms. Satisfying these requirements would provide safety for the transport of radioactive materials. Since 1961 the regulations have been revised on a number of occasions in order to add clarity and provide detail to the various requirements. These revisions have added a greater complexity to the provisions but the underlying principles used to provide for safe transport are still the fundamental bases for the regulations. This paper looks at some key requirements, as they first appeared, and their subsequent development.     

IAEA《放射性物质安全运输条例》(2018版)主要变化内容与修订GB11806的适用性研究

现行国标《放射性物质安全运输规程》(GB 11806—2004)等同采用了IAEA《放射性物质安全运输条例》(以下简称“IAEA《条例》”)(2003年版),技术内容完全相同。其后,IAEA多次修订了《条例》,其中2012和2018年修订版的技术内容变化较大,部分变化内容对相关行业实施放射性物品运输产生了重大影响。本文扼要阐述了IAEA《条例》(2018版)的重要变化内容,结合我国实践,进行剖析及适用性例证,以期更好地修订和理解GB 11806。     

Regulations Relevant to the Transport of Radioactive Materials in Switzerland

Abstract

As is the case in many countries, the transport of radioactive materials in Switzerland is primarily regulated by the national regulations for the transport of dangerous goods. Currently these regulations, in the case of radioactive material, incorporate the 1985 IAEA Safety Series 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (As amended 1990). However, as is also the case in some other countries, consignors, shippers and carriers of radioactive materials must also comply with additional laws when shipping radioactive materials. The most important of these other laws and their accompanying regulations are those concerned with radiation protection (import, export and carriers licences) and nuclear power (import, export, inland transport and transit licences). This paper sets out to describe the collective requirements resulting from all three of these sets of regulations.     

Fostering Member State Implementation of the Iaea's Transport Regulations

Abstract

In the area of radioactive material transport, the IAEA has concentrated its efforts since the 1950s on developing and keeping up-to-date its 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material'. The transport regulations were first published in 1961 and revised in 1967, 1973, 1985 and 1996. Many countries throughout the world apply the safety requirements embodied in the transport regulations. This high level of implementation has resulted in an excellent safety record, there having been no transport accident with radiological consequences for people, property or the environment arising from the radioactive nature of the material being transported. Nevertheless, the IAEA has not relaxed its efforts to ensure that its transport regulations stay abreast of scientific and technical developments; on the contrary, it has been undertaking a regular and vigorous review of its safety requirements, and continues to do so with the assistance of Member States and relevant international organisations. Beyond providing the regulatory basis for the safe transport of radioactive material, however, the IAEA started, in the mid-1980s, a programme under which it provides assistance to Member States in implementing its transport regulations. Such assistance comes in the form of providing training and publishing documents that facilitate the exchange of information.

To help Member States prepare for implementing the transport regulations, the IAEA has developed a standardised approach to training that addresses the requirements of the different parties (or training audiences) involved, and provides training material that can be used at both international and national training activities. Following the IAEA's standardised approach will help to ensure a consistent, high level of training and facilitate the enhancement of competence on the subject throughout the world. For actual operational activities, the IAEA publishes documents that facilitate coordination and cooperation among competent authorities, package designers and manufacturers, carriers, port authorities and other interested parties. These documents include periodical reports generated from the data-collecting activities of the IAEA. The paper describes the IAEA's transport safety training programme and documents to facilitate transport operational activities.     

Ten years of Romanian experience on risk assessment owing to radioactive materials transport in Romania

Abstract

The transport of radioactive materials is a very important problem considering the potential risks and radiological consequences in carrying out the present activity. Based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Safety Standard TS-R-1 (1996 edition, as amended 2003), Romanian National Nuclear Regulatory Body – Romanian National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) was adopted and implemented by act no. 374/October 2001, the safety regulations for the transport of radioactive materials in Romania under the title 'Fundamental regulations for a safe transport of radioactive materials, in Romania'. The present paper will present the main sources of radioactive materials in Romania, their transport routes with a particular interest paid to the radioactive wastes. Hypothetical scenarios for specific problems related to the identification and evaluation of the risks and potential radiological consequences associated with the transport of radioactive materials in Romania, for all these situations: routine transport (incident free) and possible accidents.     

Transport of low-level NORM – a case for consistency and practicality

Abstract

In 1996 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a system for exemption of lowlevel radioactive material from transport regulations based on the principle that exemption values should be commensurate with the risk posed by the material as represented by the maximum potential radiation dose to individuals. For many naturally occurring radionuclides the derived dose-based, radionuclide-specific exemption concentrations were substantially lower than the previous radionuclide-independent definition of radioactive material (70 Bq g^–1) [1900 pCi g^–1] due to the stringent dose criterion applied. It was recognised that this would bring large quantities of previously unregulated naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) handled in industry into the scope of the transport regulations. To minimise the economic impact of the dose-based values, a special provision was included to provide for a 10-fold increase in exemption values for radionuclides in natural material provided the material is not intended to be, and has not previously been, processed for recovery of its radionuclides (the wording regarding previous use was added in 2003). This '10 times' or '10×' provision for certain natural material reflects a second concept underlying IAEA guidance, namely, that a dose criterion may be relaxed within cautious bounds to achieve a balance between practical issues and radiological concerns. On the other hand, restriction of the provision on the basis of past or intended use of the material is inconsistent with the basic principle underlying the Transport Regulations in that there is no risk basis for assigning different exemption values to identical materials on the basis of their past or anticipated use. In fact, the same material can move in and out of the scope of regulatory control as its anticipated use changes. As a practical matter, safety guidelines for potentially hazardous material should be based on measurable properties of the material and not the whims of human intentions. To improve the practicality as well as the consistency of the Transport Regulations as applied to NORM, the 10× provision should be revised to apply to all natural materials, regardless of their intended use.     

Can the IAEA Radioactive Materials Transport Regulations be Made more User Friendly?

Abstract

A comprehensive regulatory system governing the national and international transport of radioactive materials was put in place 30 years ago by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Time has demonstrated that it has resulted in an excellent safety record without being a significant hindrance to economic transport. The IAEA Regulations are maintained up to date in a continuous structured manner managed by the IAEA. The Regulations and the supporting explanatory and advisory material are extensive, being published in five books. However, they have tended to be more oriented to regulators than operators. Significantly, the latest revision of the IAEA Transport Regulations, issued in 1985, added provisions for quality and compliance assurance applying to all aspects of the Regulations. It is suggested in this paper that Quality Assurance could be assisted by augmenting the Regulations with computerised systems to aid the choice of packaging and to provide a check of all the actions needed for a particular transport operation, thereby making very positive steps to aid compliance. It is proposed that systems of this nature should be brought into operation at the next major revision of the Regulations, planned for 1995.     

六氟化铀安全运输相关要求及我国运输实践中存在的问题探讨

本文梳理了《放射性物质安全运输规程》(IAEA SSR6)和《核能——六氟化铀(UF₆)的运输包装》(ISO 7195)中关于六氟化铀运输容器以及装运等相关运输的安全要求,结合六氟化铀运输核与辐射安全分析报告书的审查情况,针对我国六氟化铀运输实践中存在的问题进行了探讨,并提出了建议。     

Current Activities and Issues Affecting the International Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material: An Update at the Turn of the Century

Abstract

There are many activities and issues affecting the international regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material. A review of these activities and issues is here presented. This includes: an overview of recent actions taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors and General Conference; a review of the status of updated. advisory material to support the application of the new (1996 Edition) international Transport Regulations; a discussion of steps being taken to simplify and better rationalise the Transport Regulations; a review of the status of the Agency's Coordinated Research Projects, training, and database efforts, which are performed in support of the Transport Regulations, the newly emerging activity of a Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TransSAS) which Member States are being encouraged to utilise; and a brief discussion of some emerging issues.     

Feedback from IAEA TranSAS appraisal mission in France

Abstract

In 2002, France requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to organise a mission to assess its organisation for the control of transport of radioactive materials and its implementation of international regulations. The Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission was conducted in 2004 by a team composed of thirteen independent experts. The scope of the appraisal was broad and covered all aspects of the implementation of regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The main conclusion is that the implementation of the Transport Regulations is performed in accordance with IAEA requirements. Nevertheless, this mission issued three recommendations and sixteen suggestions. It led France to strengthen its control of non-competent authority approved. Moreover, the findings include twelve good practices that can serve as a model for other competent authorities, in particular in the area of maritime transport. The present paper presents the French Nuclear Safety Authority's feedback from this mission, in order to reach a high safety level in the field of transports.     

Multiple water barriers: alternative to assessment of fuel assemblies during accident conditions of transport

Abstract

Packages for the transport of radioactive material have to comply with national and/or international regulations. These regulations are widely based on the requirements set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material'. In this framework, packages to transport fuel assemblies (including spent fuel assemblies) have to meet the requirements for packages containing fissile material. In accident conditions of transport, the applicant for the package design approval has to show that the package remains subcritical taking due account of the status of the contents in these conditions. In most cases, considering water ingress in the package, it is not possible to assume that the fissile material included in the fuel assemblies is dispersed in the package with the most severe conceivable distribution regarding criticality. In order to alleviate this difficulty, during the last years, we have provided a significant better knowledge of the conditions of the fuel assemblies to be transported. This was part of the Fuel Integrity Project, whose progress was regularly reported during PATRAM 2001 and PATRAM 2004 Symposia. However, for packages which encounter a large g-load during accident conditions of transport and/or which contain spent fuel assemblies with very high burn-up, it can be difficult to demonstrate that the fuel assemblies are not significantly damaged. Then, to make the criticality assessment considering water inleakage into the flask and a large release of fissile material within its cavity will not allow meeting the subcriticality criteria. For that reason, for our package designs, which use a gas and not water as an internal coolant and which fall into that category, the author has decided to take credit of the possibilities provided by the subparagraph 677 (b) of the Regulations. This paragraph allows not taking into account water in the package, provided that the package exhibits 'multiple high standard water barriers'. The paper describes the author's experience with the implementation of this paragraph. Two different cases are considered: either a double vessel, or a double lid. It will be explained when each of these solutions is implemented, and give examples of package designs with such features, as well as the approvals which were granted for these designs in various countries.     

Abstracts on packaging,transport, storage and security of radioactive material

Abstract

New legislation concerning transport of radioactive materials in the Czech Republic is being prepared and will be issued as the new Atomic Law and two supporting regulations Approval of Packaging for Transport or Storage of Nuclear of Nuclear Materials and Radionuclide Sources and Transport of Nuclear Materials and Radionuclide Sources. This legislation will be compatible with IAEA regulations and ED legislation. In this paper the present system of legislation is described and the slight differences between IAEA recommendations and the requirements of Czech Republic regulations are noted.