Some aspects on harmonization between IAEA 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material' and UN 'Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods'

Abstract

Since 2001, the IAEA 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material' are directly implemented into the UN 'Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods', Model Regulations (the so called 'Orange Book') as class 7: radioactive material. At the same time, consistent with the time schedule of the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and the relevant international modal organisations, a regular review process of the IAEA Transport Regulations intended to issue a revised or amended edition, as necessary, every two years, was established. The last published version, the fourteenth revised edition of the 'Orange Book', includes the IAEA Transport Regulations, 2005 edition. However, the IAEA had decided not to publish a 2007 edition of the Transport Regulations, and as a consequence, did not recommend to the UN to implement the changes which had been adopted in the IAEA review cycle 2004–2005. In the last two years, further efforts have been made for better harmonisation between both documents. The harmonisation and assimilation with the UN Model Regulations concerning the transport of all nine classes of dangerous goods brings the class 7 'radioactive material' in line with the other classes for a worldwide implementation into the national and international modal regulations. The paper will discuss the benefits as well as some problems of this harmonisation process. The option to publish the 2009 edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations with the changes from the review revision cycle 2004–2005 and the harmonisation changes with the UN is considered to be important to keep the leading role of the IAEA in the further development of all aspects concerning the safe transport of radioactive material based on their competence in radiation protection.     

Movements of radioactive material on nuclear licensed sites

Abstract

The regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials are prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then introduced into modal regulations and national legislation. These regulations are based on a graded approach to contents limits for packages and conveyances and to performance standards applied to package designs depending upon the hazard of the radioactive contents.

They apply to the transport of radioactive material in the public domain in which the packages can be conveyed by road, rail, sea, inland waterways or air transport modes and may share transport routes with movements of people and cargoes in close proximity.

In contrast, the movement of radioactive materials on nuclear sites is a much more controlled operation. Normally, only road or rail transport is involved, there are much lower volumes of other traffic and any hazards during the movement are generally less severe than the test conditions in the IAEA transport regulations representing accident conditions of transport.

Furthermore, there is no internationally accepted set of design standards applicable to packages intended purely for onsite movements.

In the UK, suitable safety cases need to be prepared to demonstrate the acceptability of the onsite movement of radioactive material to the regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII). The safety case includes engineering substantiation against appropriate design standards. However, the criteria in the design standards do not need to be as demanding as those in the IAEA transport regulations because of the controlled environment within which onsite movements take place.

The principles of the graded approach in the IAEA transport regulations can be applied to onsite movements of radioactive material. However, the high level of safety resulting from compliance with these regulations can be achieved for movements of radioactive material packages on a nuclear licensed site by amending limits and test criteria to take account of the stringent onsite controls and environment. Examples of this are increasing the package contents limits for a particular package type, reducing the package test requirements or a combination of the two.

There are also general requirements in the IAEA transport regulations for all packagings and packages, and aspects of these can be applicable for packages used for onsite movements of radioactive material. However, there are aspects of these where the detailed implementation can be relaxed for onsite movements, such as the acceleration values experienced at the typically low speeds of onsite movements and the limited ambient temperature and pressure ranges for a specific site.

The present paper discusses various differences between transport of radioactive material in the public domain and on nuclear licensed sites.     

Fostering Member State Implementation of the Iaea's Transport Regulations

Abstract

In the area of radioactive material transport, the IAEA has concentrated its efforts since the 1950s on developing and keeping up-to-date its 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material'. The transport regulations were first published in 1961 and revised in 1967, 1973, 1985 and 1996. Many countries throughout the world apply the safety requirements embodied in the transport regulations. This high level of implementation has resulted in an excellent safety record, there having been no transport accident with radiological consequences for people, property or the environment arising from the radioactive nature of the material being transported. Nevertheless, the IAEA has not relaxed its efforts to ensure that its transport regulations stay abreast of scientific and technical developments; on the contrary, it has been undertaking a regular and vigorous review of its safety requirements, and continues to do so with the assistance of Member States and relevant international organisations. Beyond providing the regulatory basis for the safe transport of radioactive material, however, the IAEA started, in the mid-1980s, a programme under which it provides assistance to Member States in implementing its transport regulations. Such assistance comes in the form of providing training and publishing documents that facilitate the exchange of information.

To help Member States prepare for implementing the transport regulations, the IAEA has developed a standardised approach to training that addresses the requirements of the different parties (or training audiences) involved, and provides training material that can be used at both international and national training activities. Following the IAEA's standardised approach will help to ensure a consistent, high level of training and facilitate the enhancement of competence on the subject throughout the world. For actual operational activities, the IAEA publishes documents that facilitate coordination and cooperation among competent authorities, package designers and manufacturers, carriers, port authorities and other interested parties. These documents include periodical reports generated from the data-collecting activities of the IAEA. The paper describes the IAEA's transport safety training programme and documents to facilitate transport operational activities.     

Radioactive and nuclear material transport security: awareness and application of new recommendations

Abstract

Transport of radioactive and nuclear material is highly regulated and transport safety regulations have been in effect for decades. International nuclear material transport security has been governed for many years on the basis of a binding international convention, the 'Convention for the physical protection of nuclear material', and its supporting document 'The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities' INFCIRC/225, revision 4 (corrected). On the other hand, transport security guidance for the radioactive material was published in 2008 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an implementing guide, 'Security in the transport of radioactive material', nuclear security series no. 9, and is just now being implemented in many countries. Experience in implementing the radioactive material transport security guidance is being gained by countries as they make decisions on which specific security provisions to require, provide training to their regulatory staff and licensees, and begin reviewing and approving transport security plans. This experience has led to the development of practical approaches that minimise impacts as the guidance is put into practice. The nuclear material transport security recommendations in INFCIRC/225 are in the process of being revised to update them to address the current threat environment and to incorporate recommendations based on the recent amendments made to the Convention. INFCIRC/225, revision 5 will be a recommendation level document in the IAEA nuclear security series of documents. The interface between the nuclear and radioactive material transport security documents is important in order to ensure that appropriate security measures, based on both the nuclear and radioactive properties of the material being transported, are defined and implemented. This paper provides up to date information on the development of the IAEA transport security documents and presents information on implementation of the radioactive material transport security recommendations. It explains how the documents interface with each other and provides examples of how they should both be used in defining transport security requirements for shipments.     

The Industry Commitment to Global Transport Safety Standards

Abstract

Standards and regulations have no intrinsic practical effect without taking into account those who are the object of such standards and regulations. Standards and regulations do not become operationally effective until they are implemented by the entities which are subject to them. Accordingly, there is a necessary synergy between the regulator and the regulated— the regulators whose task it is to make and enforce the rules for safe, efficient and reliable transport, and those whose job it is to transport within the rules. One has no full meaning without the other. Harmonisation issues which can impede efficient and timely implementation of regulations can occur at any stage of the process, starting with the timely publication of the IAEA regulations, incorporation by the modal organisations, adoption by national competent authorities and finally, rendered operational by industrial transport organisations. Both the regulator and the transporter can be more effective in achieving their purposes when they co-operate in the interest of mutual understanding. PATRAM provides one excellent opportunity for such exchange between the regulator and the regulated—there are other important opportunities within the IAEA and international modal organisations. It is suggested, however, that more could be done between the regulators and the regulated collectively to share real-life experiences with actually implementing the regulations and operating within them, and to draw appropriate lessons.

In the case of the international transport safety regulatory regime, it is the nuclear transport industry, such as represented by the World Nuclear Transport Institute (WNTI), which is, of course, the object of transport safety standards and regulations. And as such, the nuclear transport industry is a principal stakeholder in the regime.

Regulatory compliance is a cornerstone of the nuclear transport industry. The international nature of the fuel cycle mandates transnational movement of radioactive materials on a regular basis; this means that a single shipment may fall under the jurisdiction of numerous regional, national and local regulatory schemes as well as the overarching international system. That is why, in the interest of safe and efficient transport, it is important to strive for maximum harmonisation.     

Guidance for Package Approvals in the United Kingdom

Abstract

Approval is required under the transport regulations for a wide range of package designs and operations, and applications for competent authority approval and validation are received from many sources, both in the UK and overseas. To assist package designers and applicants for approval, and to promote consistency in applications and their assessment, the UK Department for Transport issues guidance on the interpretation of the transport regulations and the requirements of an application for approval and its supporting safety case.The general guidance document, known as the Guide to an Application for UK Competent Authority Approval of Radioactive Material in Transport, has been issued for many years and updated to encompass the provisions of each successive edition of the IAEA transport regulations. The guide has been referred to in a number of international fora, including PATRAM, and was cited as a 'good practice' in the report of the IAEA TRANSAS appraisal of the UK in 2002. Specialist guides include the Guide to the Suitability of Elastomeric Seal Materials, and the Guide to the Approval of Freight Containers as Types IP-2 and IP-3 Packages. This paper discusses the guidance material and summarises the administrative and technical information required in support of applications for approval of package designs, special form and low-dispersible radioactive materials, shipments, special arrangements, modifications and validations.     

Regulations on Transport of Radioactive Material in Spain

Abstract

There are several national and international regulations that have to be considered when a shipment of radioactive material is going to take place in Spain. Some of them are specific for the transport of dangerous goods and others are general and affect all activities involving radioactive material, as for instance regulations on radiological protection or liability insurance. All these regulations are described and how those on transport follow the IAEA recommendations. Furthermore, other points considered fundamental are dealt with: competent authorities and their responsibilities, the control of package designs and shipments and training of personnel.     

Security in transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The basis of safety regulation and practice in the handling (including transport) of radioactive materials has been the premise that any mishaps or accidents occur unintentionally, with a desire among all parties involved to avoid such incidents and to minimise their effects. The strategic importance of nuclear materials for military purposes has made these materials a potential target for unauthorised acquisition, however, and international conventions have been in place for many years to ensure the security of nuclear materials from theft and from interception during transport. Until recently, only nuclear materials were subject to such security measures, but concern over the consequences of incidents involving radioactive sources has led to a review of security measures for non-nuclear radioactive materials. The IAEA has encouraged governments to institute effective systems of control to ensure the security of radioactive materials and has published its 'Code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources' and other guidance material. Three principal stages are recommended for the maintenance of security. The first and most important is the prevention of malevolent acts through the fostering of a security culture, the effective management of material within a regulated legal framework, the appropriate design of sources and the use of secure vehicles and physical means to deter unauthorised access. The second line of defence is the detection of any breach of security, by means of radiation monitoring, accounting checks and reports of unusual occurrences. The third stage, response, includes means to ensure that the effect of a breach of security on public safety is minimised, and to take steps to recover any material that has fallen outside secure control. Specific provisions for security have been added to the UN Model Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods (the Orange Book) and these have been incorporated in the international modal regulations and enacted in the domestic legislation of individual states. The regulations include general provisions applicable to all dangerous goods including radioactive materials and additional provisions for 'high consequence dangerous goods', which include radioactive materials in quantities above 3000 A ₁ (special form radioactive material) or 3000 A ₂, in Type B(U), Type B(M) or Type C packages. Training in security, including the nature of risks and methods to address them is also required. The Department for Transport in the United Kingdom has produced guidance material in support of the regulatory security requirements for transport by rail and road. The rail transport guidance follows the structure of the regulations and the road transport guidance is grouped into three main aspects of security, namely people, procedures and assets. Therefore, the importance of ensuring a reliable and trustworthy workforce and the use of known and trusted contractors is stressed, together with assurance of adequate and verifiable standards of education and training. Procedural matters include the establishment of standards of responsibility, the supervision of contractors, the maintenance of contacts and risk assessment. The control of assets includes surveillance and access control of premises, and the secure storage of vehicles, which should be fitted with appropriate alarms and immobilisers. The guidance material is available from the Department for Transport and may be viewed on its website www.dft.gov.uk/security/dangerousgoods.     

The 1996 Edition of the IAEA's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material — What's New?

Abstract

The 1996 Edition of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material has been published and is being implemented by Member States and international transport organisations. Several major changes were made in the requirements, particularly those applicable to uranium hexafluoride packaging, air transport of larger quantities of material, and the specification of material which is exempt from the regulations. The international transport organisations are working toward a uniform effective implementation date of 1 January 2001. Shippers and carriers should begin preparation for compliance with the revised requirements in order to ease implementation.     

Safe transport of radioactive material in Brazil

Abstract

The objectives of this article are to briefly present an updated review of the regulatory framework and activities related to the transport of radioactive material in Brazil, to provide an analysis of the appraisal service performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002 and to identify questions that require action plans from the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), including those actions which will involve neighbouring countries regulatory authorities.     

Development of the System for Transporting Radioactive Materials between Chapel Cross and Sellafield

Abstract

The development of the radioactive material transport link between the nuclear power station at Chapelcross in Dumfriesshire and the reprocessing plant and waste management facilities at Sellafield and Drigg in Cumbria is described in relation to the development of the IAEA Regulations and their application in the United Kingdom, from the early days when formal regulations barely existed to the present when detailed regulations and full quality assurance are applied to all aspects of radioactive material transport. The range of transport containers now in use is described, from 50 ton spent fuel flasks to 10 kg sample containers, and these include designs that have interesting possibilities for use elsewhere in the national and international nuclear industry.     

Scale model impact limiter in type assessment of radioactive material transport packages

Abstract

In Germany, the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) is the competent authority for the mechanical and thermal design safety assessment of transport packages for radioactive material according to IAEA regulations. The combination of experimental and numerical safety proof forms the basis for a state of the art evaluation concept. Reduced scale models are often used in experimental investigation for design assessment of transport packages corresponding to IAEA regulations. This approach is limited by the fact that a reduced scale model cask can show different behaviours from a full scale cask. The paper focuses on the peculiarities of wood filled impact limiter of reduced scale models. General comments on drop testing with reduced scale models are given, and the relevant paragraphs of the IAEA regulations and Advisory Material are analysed. Possible factors likely to influence the energy absorbing capacity of wood filled impact limiting devices are identified on the basis of similarity mechanics. Among possible significant influence factors on the applicability of small scale models are strain rate and size effects, failure mechanisms, underground compliance, gravitational and friction effects. While it was possible to derive quantitative estimations for the influence of strain rate, size effects and target compliance, it was not possible to evaluate the influence of compression mechanisms and gravitation. In general, if reduced scale models are used in proof of safety, uncertainties increase in comparison with full scale models. Additional safety factors to exclusively cover the uncertainties of reduced scale model testing have to be demanded. The possible application of reduced scale models in regard to crucial aspects for proof of safety has to be analysed critically.     

The Foratom Transport Working Group

Abstract

Based in Brussels, the European atomic forum FORATOM is the trade association of the European nuclear industry which was established in the early 1960s to promote nuclear power and to facilitate relations with the European institutions. One of the main mechanisms which FORATOM uses, in its dealings with the European Commission and other international organisations, is the involvement of several working groups bringing together groups of experts drawn from the industrial companies in order to identify the issues and to develop the widest possible common views on which the industry must express its representative, substantial and deliverable opinion. The Transport Working Group (TWG) has the objective of dealing with transport of radioactive material, especially nuclear materials. The TWG usually meets three times a year in Brussels or another selected location. It has strong links with the European Commission which are evidenced by the fact that it officially represents the European nuclear industry, with the status of observer, at the meetings of the Standing Working Group on Safe Transport of Radioactive Material which was set up in 1982, upon a request of the European Parliament, to advise the European Commission in the field of safe transport of radioactive materials. The Standing Working Group (SWG) assists the European Union's Member States in the revision process of IAEA recommendations and helps a correct and harmonious application of these recommendations within the European Union. In previous years, the Standing Working Group has proposed over 40 different studies, fmanced by the European Commission, on important transport issues. The FORATOM TWG encourages its member organisations to participate in studies proposed by the Commission and has been cooperating for many years with the Commission in the field of many studies aimed to improve the application of transport regulations. The need to maintain the safe and reliable operation of plants that generate 35% of the electricity in western Europe is taking on growing importance at a time when it is becoming clear that nuclear power has definite advantages in terms of economics, security of supply and environment protection. The prospect of new countries joining the European Union in the foreseeable future is also enhancing these concerns. Transport is an essential link in the nuclear industry and safe transport of radioactive material is a major issue because any disruption of transport has serious consequences for the management of the power generation. The challenges are double, on the one hand to maintain the economic and safe operation of nuclear transport, on the other to ensure that the community and its leaders fully appreciate the contribution of the industry in this field. Both are part of the tasks of the FORATOM Transport Working Group.     

Transport of radioactive materials: the need for radiation protection programmes

Abstract

The increase in the use of radioactive materials worldwide requires that these materials be moved from production sites to the end user, or in the case of radioactive waste, from the waste generator to the repository. Tens of millions of packages containing radioactive material are consigned for transport each year throughout the world. The amount of radioactive material in these packages varies from negligible quantities in shipments of consumer products to very large quantities in shipments of irradiated nuclear fuel. Transport is the main way in which the radioactive materials being moved get into the public domain. The public is generally unaware of the lurking danger when transporting these hazardous goods. Thus radiation protection programmes are important to assure the public of the certainty of their safety during conveyance of these materials. Radioactive material is transported by land (road and rail), inland waterways, sea/ocean and air. These modes of transport are regulated by international 'modal' regulations. The international community has formulated controls to reduce the number of accidents and mitigate their consequences should they happen. When accidents involving the transport of radioactive material occur, it could result in injury, loss of life and pollution of the environment. In order to ensure the safety of people, property and the environment, national and international transport regulations have been developed. The appropriate authorities in each state utilise them to control the transport of radioactive material. Stringent measures are required in these regulations to ensure adequate containment, shielding and the prevention of criticality in all spheres of transport, i.e.routine, minor incidents and accident conditions. Despite the extensive application of these stringent safety controls, transport accidents involving packages containing radioactive material have occurred and will continue to occur. When a transport accident occurs, it is unlikely to result in a significant release of radioactive material, loss of shielding or loss of criticality control.     

IAEA Co-ordinated Research Programme on the Transport of Low Specific Activity Materials and Surface Contaminated Objects

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prepares regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material, and periodically revised editions of these are published. These regulations are adopted by individual countries across the world and by international organisations concerned with transport. Whilst it is desirable to have a stable framework of regulatory requirements, there is also a need to take account of technical advances and operational experience and revise the regulations. From time to time Co-ordinated Research Programmes (CRP) are established to investigate particular areas of the regulations that are giving concern. In 1996 the IAEA Standing Advisory Group on the Transport of Radioactive Material (SAGSTRAM) concluded that the requirements for classification, packaging and transport of low specific activity (LSA) material and surface contaminated objects (SCO) did not always have a strong radiation protection basis. Accordingly SAGSTRAM established a CRP with an overall objective to develop a dose-based approach for establishing LSA/SCO requirements. Six countries are participating in this CRP: Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom and United States. Each country is carrying out work that is outlined in agreements with the IAEA, with the work aimed at meeting the specific objectives of the agreement and also contributing to achieving the overall objective of the CRP. Completion of the CRP usually involves the preparation of an IAEA TECDOC by a Consultant Services Meeting (CSM), and this TECDOC will summarise the work performed under the CRP and include any recommendations made by the CRP. Following the establishment of the CRP in 1997, the first Research Co-ordination Meeting (RCM) was held in December 1997. The second RCM was held in March 1999, with the final RCM planned for the end of 2000. The work being carried out by Brazil and Canada is focussed upon the transport of uranium and thorium ores, and is a mixture of theoretical and experimental work. A key driver in this work is the transport of ores in these countries with a high uranium content. The regulations allow ores to be classified as LSA-I, which means that they can be transported unpackaged and with no requirement for containment. Radiological modelling indicates that this approach is not conservative. France, Germany and the UK have been working together on a new system, with a robust radiological basis, to regulate the transport of LSA material and SCO. In order to assess the implications of introducing this new system, material that is currently being moved or is planned for future movement has been assessed against the existing regulations and the new system. The work in the USA has been directed towards the production of practical guidance material for consignors involved in the transport of LSA material and SCO, with support from radiological modelling, where appropriate. The paper provides details of the work that has been carried out to date by the various participants and of the work that is planned for the remainder of the CRP.     

Threat analysis for transport of radioactive material using morphological analysis

Abstract

The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) was commissioned by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate to carry out a pilot study which would serve as the basis for a revised set of regulations regarding physical protection and administrative routines for the transport of radioactive material. The pilot study was to develop a prototype model by which a comprehensive threat analysis could be carried out. The study employed computer aided morphological analysis, which is a flexible, non-quantified modelling method developed at FOI during the 1990s. The paper will present the methodological foundations of morphological analysis and present the prototype models involving general threat scenarios, transport situations, antagonists and strategic measures.     

Feedback from IAEA TranSAS appraisal mission in France

Abstract

In 2002, France requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to organise a mission to assess its organisation for the control of transport of radioactive materials and its implementation of international regulations. The Transport Safety Appraisal Service (TranSAS) mission was conducted in 2004 by a team composed of thirteen independent experts. The scope of the appraisal was broad and covered all aspects of the implementation of regulations for the safe transport of radioactive materials. The main conclusion is that the implementation of the Transport Regulations is performed in accordance with IAEA requirements. Nevertheless, this mission issued three recommendations and sixteen suggestions. It led France to strengthen its control of non-competent authority approved. Moreover, the findings include twelve good practices that can serve as a model for other competent authorities, in particular in the area of maritime transport. The present paper presents the French Nuclear Safety Authority's feedback from this mission, in order to reach a high safety level in the field of transports.     

New Basic Safety Regulations for Radioactive Material Transport in Russia

Abstract

In this paper the system of standards regulating the transport of radioactive material in Russia, the basic principles and provisions of the new Russian regulations and some deviations from IAEA rules and regulations are briefly considered. The problems connected with putting into force the new transport regulations, including problems with the use of packages designed and manufactured prior to these regulations, are also considered.     

Transport of low-level NORM – a case for consistency and practicality

Abstract

In 1996 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a system for exemption of lowlevel radioactive material from transport regulations based on the principle that exemption values should be commensurate with the risk posed by the material as represented by the maximum potential radiation dose to individuals. For many naturally occurring radionuclides the derived dose-based, radionuclide-specific exemption concentrations were substantially lower than the previous radionuclide-independent definition of radioactive material (70 Bq g^–1) [1900 pCi g^–1] due to the stringent dose criterion applied. It was recognised that this would bring large quantities of previously unregulated naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) handled in industry into the scope of the transport regulations. To minimise the economic impact of the dose-based values, a special provision was included to provide for a 10-fold increase in exemption values for radionuclides in natural material provided the material is not intended to be, and has not previously been, processed for recovery of its radionuclides (the wording regarding previous use was added in 2003). This '10 times' or '10×' provision for certain natural material reflects a second concept underlying IAEA guidance, namely, that a dose criterion may be relaxed within cautious bounds to achieve a balance between practical issues and radiological concerns. On the other hand, restriction of the provision on the basis of past or intended use of the material is inconsistent with the basic principle underlying the Transport Regulations in that there is no risk basis for assigning different exemption values to identical materials on the basis of their past or anticipated use. In fact, the same material can move in and out of the scope of regulatory control as its anticipated use changes. As a practical matter, safety guidelines for potentially hazardous material should be based on measurable properties of the material and not the whims of human intentions. To improve the practicality as well as the consistency of the Transport Regulations as applied to NORM, the 10× provision should be revised to apply to all natural materials, regardless of their intended use.