放射性物质运输货包试验工作进展

运输货包的固有安全性是放射性物质运输安全的前提,货包要经受多种条件的试验验证,国际原子能机构的《放射性物质安全运输规程》规定了放射性物质运输货包要经受的正常和事故运输条件下的试验要求。本文简要介绍了货包试验的主要内容及国内外货包试验验证工作的进展状况,建议加强国内的放射性物质运输货包试验验证工作,保证我国放射性物质的运输安全。     

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (AEA Technology,Winfrith, UK)

Abstract

Transport packages for radioactive materials are tested to demonstrate compliance with national and international regulations. The involvement of AEA Technology is traced from the establishment of the early IAEA Regulations. Transport package design, testing, assessment and approval requires a wide variety of skills and facilities. The comprehensive capability of AEA Technology in these areas is described with references to practical experience in the form of a short bibliography. The facilities described include drop-test cranes and targets (up to 700te); air guns for impacts up to sonic velocities; pool fires, furnaces and rigs for thermal tests including heat dissipation on prototype flasks; shielding facilities and instruments; criticality simulations and leak test instruments. These are illustrated with photographs demonstrating the comprehensive nature of package testing services supplied to customers.     

Historical background: early deliberations on and assessments of need for dynamic crush test

Abstract

Beginning in the late 1970s, discussions were fostered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the need for additional tests for some type B packages. Consideration at the international level of these early deliberations and tests ultimately led to the inclusion in the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material of the third mechanical (drop) test for demonstrating the ability of the package design to withstand accident conditions of transport, commonly known as the ‘dynamic crush test’. This test included the requirement that the package be positioned so as to sustain maximum damage. Recently discussions have been occurring as to what constitutes positioning on an unyielding target, where considerations are being put forward for clarifying this phrasing and possibly changing the test requirement. Some of these proposed changes could make the test more demanding than originally envisioned. This paper, developed in support of a panel discussion at PATRAM 2010, provides an overview of some of the very early thinking behind the crush test. It includes a graphic demonstration that was used at the time to demonstrate the concerns that then existed. It also provides a brief review of the results of various tests performed in the US, UK and Canada from the mid-1960s through the early 1980s.     

Large Package Tests for Normal Conditions of Transport

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations (1985) for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material specify requirements for packagings and packages (Section 5). These include tests for normal conditions of transport (Paras 619–625) and accident conditions for packages containing larger quantities of activity (Paras 626–633). The tests for normal conditions include drop tests from heights which vary with the package mass (Para 622). The ‘Explanatory Material’ (1987) describes these drop-tests as ‘a falloff the platform of a vehicle’ after which ‘packages would continue the journey’. There is clear implication that any damage which obviously degrades important functions of the packaging system results from ‘accident’ damage rather than ‘normal conditions of transport’. The important functions include containment, criticality control, shielding, impact protection and fire protection. Large packages, such as ISO containers, may exceed 6 m in length and when subject to a corner drop of 1 m or less, the centre of gravity will fall more than 3 m. The secondary impact will be much more severe than the initial impact. Neither the corner drop nor the secondary impact simulate normal conditions of transport. An alternative specification for normal condition drop testing of large containers is proposed, avoiding the more severe damage resulting from secondary impacts.     

The First 40 FT Freight Container in Europe Qualified as an IP-2/IP-3 and Type a Package

Abstract

The first successful free fall drop test with a 40 ft ISO freight container in Europe (as far as we know also in the world) took place in Bremen (Germany) at the dry dock of the former Vulkan ship yard on 25 September 1998. This drop test was performed to qualify the ISO Boxcontainer as an IP-2/IP-3 and Type A package in accordance with IAEA Regulations Safety Series No 6 (1985 edition, as amended 1990) and the new IAEA Safety Standards Series No ST-1 (1996 Edition). The freight container has successfully passed the whole sequence of required tests to demonstrate compliance with Type A requirements (free drop test, stacking test, penetration test and, instead of the water spray test, the more stringent pressure and bubble test was performed) of the IAEA Regulations. This paper concentrates on the free fall drop test because this is the most difficult of the required Type A tests which needs to be passed. Further, the free fall drop test is required to qualify a freight container in accordance with the alternative requirements for industrial packages IP-2,3 (new ST-1, § 627), the requirements for industrial packages (new and old IAEA Regulations) and Type A requirements. Therefore, the freight container was qualified as IP-2,3 and Type A package performing a free fall drop test. The overall dimensions of the so called LONGFORCE® container are: length 12192 mm (40 ft); width 2438 mm (8 ft); height 2491 mm (8 ft 6 in). The 40 ft ISO freight container prototype was fully loaded with 28 t of steel plates together with shock absorbing material to simulate the load and load securing system. The total drop test weight was 35·6 t. In accordance with IAEA Regulations Safety Series No 6 and ST-1, the LONGFORCE® container was dropped onto an unyielding foundation in a position which suffered the maximum damage in respect of the package safety features. The package was dropped on its corner, door side down on the roof, with the centre of gravity over the impact area (slap-down drop). The container was lifted 12·6 m high (highest point) respectively 0·3 m (lowest point) under a drop angle of 70°. The combined mass of the concrete block and the steel plate (impact pad) was way above 100 times that of the container test specimen. The first impact resulted in an acceleration of about 100 g where the maximum was near the impact. The second impact, in general, yielded far higher acceleration values in the vertical direction of 160 up to 200 g. A third impact was recorded which turned out to be decisive, showing maximum acceleration readings in the range of about 200 up to 250 g. The container was inspected after the drop test and deformations of the container rear corner castings (area second impact) and a small weld crack in one of the corner castings welds was found. On the container floor one third of transverse support beams showed Sform distortion. The LONGFORCE container was leak tested prior to and after the drop test in compliance with the STM (STM stands for Safety Technology Management GmbH, owner of the container design and rights and sponsor of the drop test work) leak test procedure. The leak tests consisted of filling the container with pressurised air up to 5 kPa and recording a possible pressure drop over a determined test period. The container was considered leak tight prior to and after the drop test based on the permissible limits set in the leak test procedure. The free fall drop test is considered a full success qualifying the 40 ft LONGFORCE container as an IP-2/IP-3 Type A package in compliance with the IAEA SS No 6 and also with the new IAEA ST-1 regulations.     

The relevance of IAEA tests to severe accidents in nuclear fuel cycle transport

Abstract

The design and performance standards for packages used for the transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials are defined in the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, TS-R-1, in order to ensure safety under both normal and accident conditions of transport. The underlying philosophy is that safety is vested principally in the package and the design and performance criteria are related to the potential hazard. Type B packages are high-duty packages which are used for the transport of the more radioactive materials, notably spent fuel and vitrified high-level waste (VHLW). Tests are specified in the IAEA regulations to ensure the integrity of these packages in potential transport accidents involving impacts, fires or immersion in water. The mechanical tests for Type B packages include drop tests onto an unyielding surface without giving rise to a significant release of radioactivity. The objects which could impact upon a package in real-life transport accidents, such as concrete roads, bridge abutments and piers, will yield to some extent and absorb some of the energy of the moving package. Impact tests onto an unyielding surface are therefore relevant to impacts onto real-life objects at much higher speeds. The thermal test specifies that Type B packages must be able to withstand a fully engulfing fire of 800°C for 30 min without significant release of radioactivity, and this has to be demonstrated, for example, by analytical studies backed up by experimental tests. The regulations also specify immersion tests for Type B packages of 15 m for 8 h without significant release of radioactivity; and in addition for spent fuel and VHLW packages, 200 m for 1 h without rupture of the containment. There is a large body of evidence to show that the current IAEA Type B test requirements are severe and cover all the situations which can be realistically envisaged in the transport of spent fuel, VHLW and other fuel cycle materials. Any proposals for more severe tests, which have little technical justification, should therefore be treated with caution since this could result in a loss of public confidence in the current regulations, and the ratcheting up of design requirements which could not be justified on quantitative safety grounds.     

Characterising polyurethane foam as impact absorber in transport packages

Abstract

Transport and storage packages used for the safe transport of radioactive materials are required to satisfy IAEA regulations. One key design requirement for a radioactive material transport package is that under a 9 m regulatory drop test, containment functions are maintained. For certain payload types, such as fuel assemblies, impact loads on the payloads may need to be controlled in order to maintain spacing and confinement. To achieve all of this, detailed and accurate characterisation of the impact absorbing material is important in order to design an effective shock absorber. Polyurethane foam is an excellent energy absorbing material because it has a relatively high specific strength, a large compressive deformation, much of this at constant force, and a predictable compressive strength characteristic. Traditionally various types of wood have been used for this purpose, however foams are a more cost effective alternative, which are readily available, and can be formed and shaped easily. Some grades may have the added advantage of providing an almost isotropic crush response, combined with significant thermal protection. The general compressive strength properties of foams and their temperature dependencies are well documented by manufacturers; however, strain rate sensitivity and stiffness variation with orientation are not readily available. Hence impact compression tests for polyurethane foams for a range of densities from 56 to 320 kg m^–3 were specified by Rolls-Royce and performed by the Health and Safety Laboratory. These tests included dynamic conditions for a range of strain rates and temperatures and a selection of orientations of the foam. Following collation of the test results, property curves were derived for the range of temperatures at which the package was expected to operate in service between –10 and +75°C. The properties for a given specification of foam will vary within a defined tolerance range, mainly due to the variables inherent during manufacture. Hence nominal static curves were derived for each foam and a number of factors were taken into account to derive the full range of foam properties: density, compressive strength, temperature and manufacturer supplied tolerance. The net result of this work was a series of force displacement plots, depicting upper and lower bounds to account for the cumulative effects of many variables. Accounting for these upper and lower performance bounds is an essential approach in justification of any modern package design. This paper describes the characterisation and mathematical modelling of polyurethane foam for use as the main impact energy absorber in a new design of package for transporting fresh fuel. The non-linear finite element (FE) code LS-DYNA was used to carry out simulation of the tests. The HONEYCOMB material model available in LS-DYNA was used to accurately predict the test measurements of the foam material. The properties derived for the foam were then used as input to the full FE model used for the licensing of the new package design. Full scale drop testing of the package demonstrated good correlation of deformations between test and FE model analysis, providing good validation evidence of the foam characterisation in the transport package.     

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (Oak Ridge National Laboratory,USA)

Abstract

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has extensive capabilities to test full-scale and model packages that have been designed to the testing requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71.73. These are the same teststhat are specified in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No.6, 1985 edition as amended in 1990. This report provides information about the facilities, personnel qualifications, prior test experience, and quality assurance capabilities which are available to support package testing.     

Excluded,exempt and LSA quantities for transport of NORM radioactive material

Abstract

The main objectives of this research work are the determination of the quantities of naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) that can be excepted from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Transport Regulations, the establishment of quantities of NORM that can be transported in excepted packages as well as the provision of sound basis for the establishment of limiting values for the classification of NORM as low specific activity material I raw for transport purposes, in order to compare with the actual transport limits established in the IAEA Transport Regulations for this type of material.     

放射性物质运输货包安全试验

介绍了中国放射性物质运输遵守的法规和中国辐射防护研究院用于放射性物质运输货包试验的下落试验设施、耐热试验设施和数据获取能力。试验设施根据IAEA的《放射性物质安全运输条例》（TS-R-1）和中国的《放射性物质安全运输规程》（GB 11806-2004）的要求建设。下落试验设施能用于13 t级以下的A型和B型货包的自由下落试验、贯穿试验、力学试验（自由下落试验Ⅰ、自由下落试验Ⅱ和自由下落试验Ⅲ）。耐热试验设施能完成B型货包的耐热试验。利用这些设施已进行了FCo70-YQ型货包、30A-HB-01型货包、SY-I型货包和XAYT-I型货包的遵章取证试验     

解读《放射性物质安全运输规程》GB 11806-2004中的货包试验

本文总结归纳了《放射性物质安全运输规程》GB 11806-2004中关于货包试验(包括货包试验的准备、货包试验的要求、货包试验结果的评定等)的内容,以期对理解和执行该《规程》有关货包试验部分有所帮助。     

Transport Packages for Radioactive Materials: Potential Simplifications to Regulatory Requirements

Abstract

Simplified packaging requirements for radioactive materials are proposed. The range of Industrial Packages for Low Specific Activity materials and Surface Contaminated Objects can be reduced, simplifying the choice of package and providing clearer aims for consignors and package designers. Alternative approaches, such as the use of other forms of approval, are retained, enabling ISO Freight Containers and UN-approved drums to be specified. In line with these simplifications, proposals for testing requirements are described. These retain the existing safety standards while permitting a broader range of package design options. The range of package groups proposed is Excepted, Industrial, Type A, Type B and Type C. The sub-groups of Industrial Package are abandoned. The tests for Normal Conditions of Transport are amended to reflect conditions likely to be experienced. Tests representing accident conditions are not changed in these proposals. The main change suggested is to restrict impact tests representing Normal Conditions to packages of mass less than 100 kg. Arguments justifying this change are presented. The proposals should be considered for the 1996 Edition of the IAEA Regulations. Alternatively they should be developed, with appropriate research if necessary, for the subsequent Edition, probably to be published in about 2005.     

The Design,Manufacture and Testing of a Container Module to Satisfy the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material – 1985 Edition (as Amended 1990), for the Transport of an Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) Gas Circulator

Abstract

Heysham 1 and Hartlepool Nuclear Power Stations share a common design of gas circulator and a requirement was identified to transport a spare circulator between the Stations. The circulators are 6 m long, 2 m diameter and weigh approximately 38 tonnes. The circulator becomes contaminated in use and is classified as suitable for transport as SCO-II. It can therefore be transported within a Type 2 Industrial Package (IP-2), in accordance with the IAEA Transport Regulations. An appropriate package, the Gas Circulator Transportation Module, based on ISO container standards, was designed, manufactured and tested, and a Safety Case prepared addressing the radiological hazards associated with the transport of a gas circulator and demonstrating regulatory compliance. Following the issue of a Certificate of Regulatory Compliance, the container module was used· to transport a gas circulator from Heysham 1 to Hartlepool, paving the way for similar purpose-designed modules for the transport of large components.     

Revised guidelines for the procedure for approval of package designs in Germany

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material TS-R-1 are applied in Germany through the implementation of the Dangerous Goods Transport Regulations for Class 7 of the International Modal Organisations (ADR, RID, IMDG-Code, ICAO-TI). Based on this the procedures for the approval of package designs used in Germany are in compliance with the provisions of TS-R-1. BfS is the competent authority for the approval of Type B(U), Type B(M) and Type C packages and all packages containing fissile material, and BAM is the competent authority for approval of H(U)/H(M) packages for UF6, special form and low-dispersible radioactive material. The basis for the procedure for approval of package design in Germany are the R 003 guidelines, first issued by the Ministry of Transport, Building and Housing (BMVBW) in 1991. These guidelines have been reviewed and revised to reflect the latest developments in the regulations as well as in regulatory practice. In particular they have been extended to the procedures for approval of Type C packages and packages subject to transitional arrangements, special form and low-dispersible radioactive material, and provide more detailed information to the applicant about the requested documentation. This paper gives an overview of the main parts and provisions of the revised R 003 guidelines issued in December 2004 including scope, responsibilities, application, documentation, evaluation and certification for the various approval procedures.     

Safety considerations during transport of radioactive material

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations establish requirements that must be satisfied to ensure safety and to protect people, property and the environment from the effects of ionisation radiation during the transport of radioactive material (RAM). The package types A and B most frequently used for the transport of RAM in Romania are subjected to various qualification tests in accordance with the National Regulations and IAEA recommendations; these tests are carried out by the Reliability and Testing Laboratory of the Institute for Nuclear Research, Pitesti. These tests include the evaluation of non-fixed contamination, as is described in the present paper. Regulatory requirements related to contamination for packages used for transport and storage of RAM and the method used to monitor the evaluation of the surface contamination of packages are also presented. These test requirements are performed under a strict quality assurance programme based on specific procedures given prior approval by the Romanian Nuclear Regulatory Body (National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control).     

The Integrated Management System of BNFL Transport

Abstract

Quality Assurance (QA) is a requirement of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Series No 6 Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials and is also increasingly becoming a customer requirement. BNFL Transport has established an integrated management system which includes quality, safety and environmental aspects and covers the design, manufacture, testing, documentation, use, maintenance, inspection and decommissioning of all packages used for the transport of radioactive materials. The management system also covers planning, programming and transport operations, and covers all modes of transport by road, rail, sea and air. The management system, which was certificated in 1994 to ISO 9001 and BS 5882 by an independent third-party certification body, Lloyds Register Quality Assurance Limited (LRQA), was developed to enable BNFL Transport to demonstrate to Competent Authorities, customers and the general public that the arrangements are in place, being adhered to and meet all regulatory requirements. The requirements of the quality and environmental standards that the Company has adopted are described.     

Developing historical technical basis for radiological safety requirements of international transport safety regulations

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for developing safety requirements for the transport of radioactive material. These requirements were first published in 1961 as ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No. 6 (the Regulations), and have been revised at regular intervals, in consultation with Member States, and with input from other relevant organisations, as appropriate. The current regular review and revision of the Regulations has been driven by problems, challenges and the demand for improvements, as well as the need to take into account experiences in transport, newly identified issues, new technologies, best practices, the demand for sustainable transport and harmonisation. After 50 years, 15 editions of the Regulations have been published. With the passage of time, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development in transport safety has begun to fade. The need to capture valuable knowledge, which needs to be preserved for future reference, has become clear. In general, every requirement in the regulations was developed on the basis of deliberations among international experts and an appropriate technical basis. The knowledge bases for these often exist in a decentralised manner in many Member States with mature nuclear programmes. Easier access to the existing technical bases for the Regulations could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the Regulations. Knowledge capture and transfer can contribute to the development of and innovations in transport safety. This paper provides an overview of international level efforts that began in 2010 to develop a comprehensive and detailed technical basis document (TecBasDoc) to support the current and future revisions of the Regulations. The draft TecBasDoc has so far resulted from efforts by IAEA staff and a large number of international transport experts. It exceeds 150 pages in length using, to the greatest extent possible, historical documents dating as far back as the 1950s as reference material. The intent of this effort is to record, for those Member States new to transport and for future generations, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development that has occurred in transport safety and to capture valuable knowledge so it can be preserved for future reference. The latest effort has involved consultants to the IAEA adapting the draft to reflect guidance from the IAEA’s Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) and delving into the IAEA’s archives and other sources of historical documents, searching out many long sought, older supporting documents. The draft is currently structured into 12 chapters, embodying multiple supporting appendixes. This paper elaborates on the first chapters of the document, which include General History, Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Objectives and Principles for Transport, General Safety Requirements, Radiation Protection and Controls for Transport. Two companion papers at PATRAM 2013 address the status of the TecBasDoc in the topical areas of package testing and criticality control. In all cases, the chapters of the TecBasDoc address how early decisions were made citing well known historical experts and discussing how these initial decisions have been adapted to meet the emerging international safety guidelines.     

Testing of packages with LSA materials in very severe mechanical impact conditions with measurement of airborne release

Abstract

To assess the risks associated with transport accidents involving solid LSA-II and LSA III materials a comprehensive experimental programme was conducted to quantify and characterise airborne release of radioactive particulate matter in transport and handling accidents with mechanical impact of varying severities and to determine the dependency from influencing parameters such as LSA material and packaging properties and size. The experimental approach combined well-controlled and very reproducible impact experiments with small scale specimens and drop tests of larger scale specimens from different heights up to 27m. In both cases the associated airborne release of particulate matter is determined by measuring the amount and aerodynamic particle size characteristics of released dust. The small scale tests revealed fundamental results on airborne release and size distribution which helped to design the test matrix of the large scale experiments, especially with brittle material. In the large scale tests, volumes of specimens were varied systematically up to 200L and the LSA material was contained either within packaging or without protective packaging in order to determine the influence of the packaging on the airborne release and to be able to extrapolate other configurations of package sizes and impact severities. The LSA surrogate materials were either concrete, used to immobilize radioactive wastes as representative brittle material, or appropriately chosen powders representing dispersible materials. Based on the experimental results it can be concluded that the requirements of the current IAEA Transport Regulations sufficiently limit potential radiological consequences from transport accidents with mechanical impact involving packages with LSA-II or LSA-III materials.     

Some aspects on harmonization between IAEA 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material' and UN 'Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods'

Abstract

Since 2001, the IAEA 'Regulations for the safe transport of radioactive material' are directly implemented into the UN 'Recommendations on the transport of dangerous goods', Model Regulations (the so called 'Orange Book') as class 7: radioactive material. At the same time, consistent with the time schedule of the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and the relevant international modal organisations, a regular review process of the IAEA Transport Regulations intended to issue a revised or amended edition, as necessary, every two years, was established. The last published version, the fourteenth revised edition of the 'Orange Book', includes the IAEA Transport Regulations, 2005 edition. However, the IAEA had decided not to publish a 2007 edition of the Transport Regulations, and as a consequence, did not recommend to the UN to implement the changes which had been adopted in the IAEA review cycle 2004–2005. In the last two years, further efforts have been made for better harmonisation between both documents. The harmonisation and assimilation with the UN Model Regulations concerning the transport of all nine classes of dangerous goods brings the class 7 'radioactive material' in line with the other classes for a worldwide implementation into the national and international modal regulations. The paper will discuss the benefits as well as some problems of this harmonisation process. The option to publish the 2009 edition of the IAEA Transport Regulations with the changes from the review revision cycle 2004–2005 and the harmonisation changes with the UN is considered to be important to keep the leading role of the IAEA in the further development of all aspects concerning the safe transport of radioactive material based on their competence in radiation protection.     

New Package for the Transport of Fresh MOX Fuel Assemblies in Europe

Abstract

The use of Mixed Oxide Fuels (MOX) in commercial reactors has increased significantly over the past 10 years as an effective way of using stocks of plutonium produced from reprocessing uranium fuels. Now, with advances in fuel design, MOX can give performance approaching that of enriched uranium fuel. To meet demand from European and Japanese utilities, British Nuclear Fuels are in the process of commissioning a large capacity plant at Sellafield to assemble MOX fuels. This has required a new transport package to be developed capable of carrying high specification fuels to customers in Europe whilst complying with the 1996 IAEA ST-1 Transport Regulations. This package is known as Euromox and currently under development to enter service in 2003. Relatively few packages exist for the transport of MOX fuels and Euromoxis the first designed by BNFL for shipments to Europe. Euromox has provided several technical challenges in its development arguably exceeding those typically encountered during the development of new package for irradiated fuel transports.