Correction to Perruchet et al. (2006).

Reports an error in "Do We Need Algebraic-Like Computations? A Reply to Bonatti, Pena, Nespor, and Mehler (2004)" by Pierre Perruchet, Ronald Peereman, and Michael D. Tyler (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2006[May], 135(2), 322-326). The page numbers that Dr. Perruchet cited from Dr. Bonatti et al.'s article were printed incorrectly. These page numbers should appear as follows in the correction. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2006-06642-011.) L. L. Bonatti, M. Pena, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (see record 2006-06642-010) argued that P. Perruchet, M. D. Tyler, N. Galland, and R. Peereman (see record 2004-21166-008) confused the notions of segmentation and generalization by ignoring the evidence for generalization in M. Pena, L. L. Bonatti, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (see record 2002-06215-001). In this reply, the authors reformulate and complement their initial arguments, showing that their way of dealing with segmentation and generalization is not due to confusion or ignorance but rather to the fact that the tests used in Pena et al. make it likely that neither segmentation nor generalization were captured in their experiments. Finally, the authors address the challenge posed by Pena et al. of accounting for the whole pattern of their results without invoking rule-based, algebraic-like computations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do we need algebraic-like computations? A reply to Bonatti, Pe?a, Nespor, and Mehler (2006).

L. L. Bonatti, M. Pe?a, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (see record 2006-06642-010) argued that P. Perruchet, M. D. Tyler, N. Galland, and R. Peereman (see record 2004-21166-008) confused the notions of segmentation and generalization by ignoring the evidence for generalization in M. Pe?a, L. L. Bonatti, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (see record 2002-06215-001). In this reply, the authors reformulate and complement their initial arguments, showing that their way of dealing with segmentation and generalization is not due to confusion or ignorance but rather to the fact that the tests used in Pe?a et al. make it likely that neither segmentation nor generalization were captured in their experiments. Finally, the authors address the challenge posed by Pena et al. of accounting for the whole pattern of their results without invoking rule-based, algebraic-like computations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning Nonadjacent Dependencies: No Need for Algebraic-Like Computations.

Is it possible to learn the relation between 2 nonadjacent events? M. Pe?a, L. L. Bonatti, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (2002) claimed this to be possible, but only in conditions suggesting the involvement of algebraic-like computations. The present article reports simulation studies and experimental data showing that the observations on which Pe?a et al. grounded their reasoning were flawed by deep methodological inadequacies. When the invalid data are set aside, the available evidence fits exactly with the predictions of a theory relying on ubiquitous associative mechanisms. Because nonadjacent dependencies are frequent in natural language, this reappraisal has far-reaching implications for the current debate on the need for rule-based computations in human adaptation to complex structures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit learning of nonlocal musical rules: A comment on Kuhn and Dienes (2005).

In a recent study, G. Kuhn and Z. Dienes (2005) reported that participants previously exposed to a set of musical tunes generated by a biconditional grammar subsequently preferred new tunes that respected the grammar over new ungrammatical tunes. Because the study and test tunes did not share any chunks of adjacent intervals, this result may be construed as straightforward evidence for the implicit learning of a structure that was only governed by nonlocal dependency rules. It is shown here that the grammar modified the statistical distribution of perceptually salient musical events, such as the probability that tunes covered an entire octave. When the influence of these confounds was removed, the effect of grammaticality disappeared. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditioning, Expectancy, and the Placebo Effect: Comment on Stewart-Williams and Podd (2004).

Comments on article by Stewardt-Williams and Podd (2004; see record 2004-11156-007). Classical conditioning is included as a component in the response expectancy model of placebo responding. Though introspectable when attention is drawn to them, expectancies need not be in awareness while guiding behavior. Most placebo effects are linked to expectancies, and classical conditioning is one factor (but not the only factor) by which these expectancies can be produced and altered. Conditioned placebo effects without expectancies exist but are relatively rare in humans. The adaptive advantage of cognition is increased response flexibility. For it to convey that benefit, however, it must be capable of overriding the influence of simpler automatic processes. Thus, the higher up the phylogenetic scale, the smaller the role of nonconscious conditioning processes and the larger the role of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirically Supported Psychotherapies: Comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004).

D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004; see record 2004-15935-005) suggested that efforts to identify empirically supported treatments are misguided because they are based on assumptions that are not appropriate for some types of treatment and patients. The authors of this comment argue that Westen and colleagues are simply incorrect when they assert that empirically supported treatments require that psychopathology must be highly malleable, that treatments must be brief, or that the samples studied are unrepresentative of the kinds of patients typically encountered in clinical practice--comorbidity is common in many clinical trials. Randomized controlled trials remain the most powerful way to test notions of causal agency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biases and fallacies, memories and predictions: Comment on Roy, Christenfeld, and McKenzie (2005).

Comparative theory testing is a useful method for assessing the value of a new theoretical account such as the memory bias account of optimistic time predictions. However, such comparisons can be misleading when they do not carefully consider the domain limitations of the respective theories. M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, and C. R. M. McKenzie (see record 2005-11504-008) have contrasted the memory bias and planning fallacy accounts in their ability to explain the prevalence and degree of optimistic bias in time predictions. However, the authors argue that many of the points of distinction they draw are actually reflections of the domain limitations of the 2 theories. The authors clarify the definition and scope of the planning fallacy account and show how the apparent contradictions diminish or disappear. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Jousting With Straw Men: Comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004).

Empirically supported treatments (ESTs) do not cure every patient, and the randomized trial is not a flawless methodology. Upon these often-noted and widely accepted points, D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004a; see record 2004-15935-005) built a critique of ESTs and EST research. However, important work developing effective, clinically relevant treatments for serious problems was omitted from the Westen et al. (2004a) review. Little documentation was offered for the purported "assumptions" of EST methodology that Westen et al. (2004a) criticized; and different review standards were applied to studies supporting versus those disagreeing with Westen et al.'s (2004a) views. Finally, the correlational research designs proposed as a remedy by Westen et al. (2004a) have far more serious weaknesses than randomized trials, thoughtfully applied to real-world clinical care. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The contribution of covariation to skill improvement is an ambiguous measure: Comment on Müller and Sternad (2004).

It has been proposed that it is possible to decompose changes in variability of human motor behavior into 3 independent components: covariation, task tolerance, and stochastic noise (H. Müller & D. Sternad, see record 2004-10560-014). The authors simulate learning to throw accurately and show that for this task the proposed analysis does not give an unambiguous answer to the question of what the 3 components contribute to the simulated skill improvement. It is argued that this is caused by the fact that the component covariation depends on the choice of control variables. The authors conclude that it is not possible to distinguish between the 3 components of noise reduction without knowing the controlled variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fear, Conditioning, and Aging: Theoretical Comment on LaBar et al. (2004).

Age-related impairments in associative learning have been found in studies using classical conditioning of motor responses. However, it is as yet unclear whether conditioning of fear responses is similarly affected by aging. K. S. La Bar et al. (2004; see record 2004-19432-004) aimed to address this issue by studying age effects on fear conditioning applying a discrimination paradigm. Considering these results, this commentary discusses methodological issues in investigating fear conditioning as well as similarities and differences between associative learning of motor and autonomic responses with respect to neuronal substrates, susceptibility to aging, and the role of awareness of stimulus contingencies in mediating aging effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A Healthy Dose of Criticism for Randomized Trials: Comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004).

D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004; see record 2004-15935-005) identified many important concerns in their critique of methods typically used in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of psychotherapy outcome and by extension in methods of identifying empirically supported therapies (ESTs). Some of the concerns would be mitigated if empirical support of treatments were assessed multidimensionally (separating favorability of results from definitiveness of research methods used) and continuously rather than categorically. Other concerns can and should be addressed within the existing framework of RCTs and ESTs, including consideration of inclusion criteria other than a single Axis I condition, experimental evaluation of some of the procedural assumptions codified in psychotherapy manuals, and far more detailed reporting of RCT results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the Need for a New Psychotherapy Research Paradigm: Comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004).

Basic, process, and outcome research have the potential to inform clinical practice. However, as D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004; see record 2004-15935-005) observed in their timely analysis, the current dominant paradigm for psychotherapy outcome research--the randomized clinical trial--is not fulfilling this potential. The field's reliance on the medical model and manual-based interventions has contributed to the gap between research and clinical practice. Greater collaboration between practitioners and researchers, a focus on therapeutic principles rather than treatment packages, and systemic changes in how scholarly efforts are reinforced are needed to shift the current research paradigm. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decreasing Effect Sizes for Effectiveness Studies- Implications for the Transport of Evidence-Based Treatments: Comment on Curtis, Ronan, and Borduin (2004).

The most important finding from the N. M. Curtis, K. R. Ronan, and C. M. Borduin (2004) meta-analysis for the broader field is likely the difference in effect sizes between multisys- multisystemic therapy efficacy versus effectiveness studies. This difference has important implications for research on the transport of evidence-based treatments to community practice settings. For example, factors rarely considered in efficacy research (e.g., funding structures, organizational climate, program maturity, site characteristics) are emerging as important determinants of treatment fidelity and, in turn, clinical outcomes for practice in real-world settings. Current research is clearly demonstrating that evidence-based practices can be successfully transported, but much remains to be learned regarding the optimal parameters of such transport. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stop and think: Is an impairment model of learning disabilities true progress? Comment on Brueggemann, Kamphaus, and Dombrowski (2008).

In this critical response to A. E. Brueggemann, R. W. Kamphaus, and S. C. Dombrowski's (2008; see record 2008-10899-006) article, "An Impairment Model of Learning Disabilities," the authors identify 2 very important shortcomings. First, the proposed achievement deficit cut score seriously overestimates the proportion of the population that ought to be diagnosed with learning disabilities. Second, the additional diagnostic criterion of "functional impairment in adaptive functioning" is poorly defined, misrepresents the relation between achievement and socioemotional wellness in children with learning disabilities, and is impossible to measure reliably given current assessment technology. More research is needed before it would be appropriate to advocate for the proposed impairment model in research or practice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Putting Some Feeling Into It--The Conceptual and Empirical Relationships Between the Classic and Emotional Stroop Tasks: Comment on Algom, Chajut, and Lev (2004).

D. Algom, E. Chajut, and S. Lev (see record 2004-17825-001) presented a series of definitional, conceptual, and empirical arguments in support of their conclusion that the classic and emotional Stroop effects are, in their words, "unrelated phenomena" (p. 336), such that the term emotional Stroop effect is a misnomer in reference to the relatively greater interference in ink color naming of emotional versus neutral words. These are strong claims. In this comment, the author critically examines each component of Algom et al.'s case and argues that, in fact, none of these components represents compelling evidence in support of their eventual conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why aggregated learning follows the power law of practice when individual learning does not: Comment on Rickard (1997, 1999), Delaney et al. (1998), and Palmeri (1999).

The power law of practice is often considered a benchmark test for theories of cognitive skill acquisition. Recently, P. F. Delaney, L. M. Reder, J. J. Staszewski, and F. E. Ritter (1998), T. J. Palmeri (1999), and T. C. Rickard (1997, 1999) have challenged its validity by showing that empirical data can systematically deviate from power-function fits. The main purpose of the present article is to extend their explanations in two ways. First, the authors empirically show that abrupt changes in performance are not necessarily based on a shift from algorithm to memory-based processing, but rather and more generally, that they occur whenever a more efficient task strategy is generated. Second, the authors show mathematically and per simulation that power functions can perfectly fit aggregated learning curves even when all underlying individual curves are discontinuous. Therefore, the authors question conclusions drawn from fits to aggregated data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

What Difference Does a Civil Union Make? Changing Public Policies and the Experiences of Same-Sex Couples: Comment on Solomon, Rothblum, and Balsam (2004).

Comments on the article by Solomon, et al. (see record 2004-14778-001). When Vermont became the first state in the United States to legalize civil unions for same-sex couples, it marked an important milestone in lesbian and gay Americans' struggle for equal rights. Against this background, S. E. Solomon, E. D. Rothblum, and K. F. Balsam's (2004) study, the first to examine experiences of same-sex couples who have undertaken civil unions, is a significant effort. The study provides valuable data about these couples, yet much remains to be learned. Further study of the impact of changing legal landscapes on experiences of same-sex couples and their families has the potential to add significantly to knowledge about contemporary family lives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

(Part of) the case for a pragmatic approach to validity: Comment on De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, and Moors (2009).

In their review of validity of the Implicit Association Test and affective priming, J. De Houwer, S. Teige-Mocigemba, A. Spruyt, and A. Moors (see record 2009-05290-001) identified validity with establishment of “basic theoretical understanding” of the measures. It is agreed that theoretical understanding has an important role in making measures more valid and useful. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that scientific advancement will more often be well served by prioritizing pragmatic goals of establishing the predictive validity of the measures and their adequate sensitivity to individual differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)