Scientific psychology and radical behaviorism: Important distinctions based in scientism and objectivism.

It is essential that a distinction be drawn between scientific psychology and radical behaviorism, if only to qualify the claims made by some orthodox behaviorists that their approach represents the only hope for or expression of psychological science. After some brief historical review, the declining popularity of radical (as contrasted with liberal) behaviorism is discussed. Although orthodox behaviorists report having changed their beliefs less often than their cognitive and cognitive–behavioral colleagues, recent longitudinal survey data suggest that they are beginning to show signs of basic ideological shifts. The intolerance of some radical behaviorists for other views (characterized as a scientistic rather than a scientific attitude) is discussed as one possible factor in the apparent decline of radical behaviorism. Also influential may have been the failure of orthodox behaviorists to recognize the impossibility of absolute objectivism in any epistemic venture, including scientific inquiry. It is concluded that traditions in science reflect a valuable legacy and that future developments in scientific psychology would be well served by open dialectical exchanges both within and among differing ideologies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The quest for primary motives: Biography and autobiography of an idea.

Suggests that behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and cognitive theory each relegate affect to the status of a dependent variable. The "cognitive revolution" emancipated the study of cognition from its cooption and distortion by behaviorism and by psychoanalytic theory. An "affect revolution" is now required to emancipate this radical new development from an overly imperialistic cognitive theory. The present author's theory is presented as a critique and as a remedy for this situation. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pre-unified separatism and rapprochement between behaviorism and cognitive psychology: The case of the reinforcer.

Psychology is in a preparadigmatic or pre-unified stage of scientific development. Two characteristics of psychology's status are: (1) lack of cumulative scientific growth and (2) experimental-theoretical overgeneralization. The reinforcer, as a construct in theories and as a critical element of behavioral change, has been a casualty of the separatism between such factions as radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology. In the end, psychology as a progressive science has been impeded, and psychological practitioners have been left to use intervention techniques that are not the most effective or efficient. In order to improve upon this situation, unification is needed between radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology, among other disciplines. However, the issue of the reinforcer is only one of many areas where such unification should be pursued and attained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From mechanistic to functional behaviorism.

A shift from mechanistic behaviorism to functional behaviorism is presented against the background of 2 historical traditions, one with an emphasis on form, the other with an emphasis on function. Skinner's work, which made more contributions to a functional behaviorism than to a mechanistic behaviorism, exemplifies this shift. The 2 traditions and an account of Skinner's development of functional relations are presented in order to show Skinner's contributions to aligning modern behavior analysis with the functional tradition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Which behaviorism? A reply to Mahoney.

Comments on M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) discussion of scientific psychology and radical behaviorism (RB). Although the discussion raises valid points, there are important problems that require clarification to preclude the discussion from being taken as the last word on RB and scientific psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

There is no room for scientism in scientific psychology: A comment on Mahoney.

Although M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) distinction between scientific psychology (SP) and radical behaviorism (RB) is accurate, Mahoney has underestimated the intolerance engendered by RB and the consequences of resulting scientistic views. It is suggested that if the American Psychological Association is to retain its role as a representative of SP, a distinction between scientific and scientistic activities must be maintained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why methodological behaviorism is mentalistic.

To be familiar with Skinner's radical behaviorism is to be familiar with its objections to both methodological behaviorism and mentalism. However, the relation between methodological behaviorism and mentalism is often not clear. Methodological behaviorism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inter subjectively verifiable phenomena, whereas mentalism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inner causes. The central issue is why does methodological behaviorism adopt the position that observable data constitute the leverage by which to speak meaningfully and respectably of phenomena that are not publicly verifiable. The answer to this question deals with the epistemology of the scientist, and will reveal at least three ways in which methodological behaviorism is mentalistic: its view of language, its conventional interpretation of operationism, and its view of logic. These topics are discussed, along with the non-mentalistic epistemology of radical behaviorism. Although radical behaviorism does share some of the same history as methodological behaviorism, it is clear that it seeks a nonmentalistic, behaviorally consistent epistemology that is very different from that of methodological behaviorism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes.

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Funtionalism, Darwinism, and the psychology of women.

Examines the psychology of women as it was studied from the middle of the 19th century to the 1st 3rd of the 20th century. During that period 3 topics received the most attention: sex differences in brain size and complexity and their implications for cognitive and affective behavior; the hypothesis of greater male variability (a corollary of evolutionary theory) and its social implications; and the expression of maternal instinct. Each topic is examined in relation to evolutionary theory and its influence on the conduct of 19th century science. The antecedents of each topic are traced as is the subsequent redefinition of each within the paradigm of behaviorism. It is proposed that each of these topics functioned as "scientific myth" which justified and explained contemporary cultural values. (71 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Radical behaviorism misrepresented: A response to Mahoney.

Comments on M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) discussion of scientific psychology (SP) and radical behaviorism (RB). The difference between SP and RB lies not in what Mahoney takes to be RB's failure to be scientific, but in the fact that Mahoney simply equates SP to cognitive psychology. Five misconceptions about fundamental issues in RB are addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An existential look at B. F. Skinner.

Perhaps surprisingly, radical behaviorism has much in common with the modern rebellion against classical philosophy known as existentialism. Similarities could have been shaped by a verbal community that included Skinner. Radical behaviorism is seen as part of a discussion becoming increasingly reliable in its treatment of human behavior, and as an effective philosophy of science. The concept of despair is discussed, followed by a consideration of modernist thinking in general. Six dimensions of inquiry on which radical behaviorism and existentialism share similar positions are treated, and the concept of freedom is discussed. Skinner's lifelong devotion to writing is viewed as a bridge linking science with art. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Kimble and behaviorism.

Contends that G. A. Kimble's (see record 1989-28023-001) suggestion that psychology can be seen as an integrated discipline misrepresents radical behaviorism (i.e., behavior analysis). The behavior-analytic approach to "private events" preserves the goals outlined by Kimble for an integrated psychology, yet avoids the problems associated with logical positivism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behaviorism and neuroscience.

The influence of the methods and theories of behaviorism on theory and research in the neurosciences is examined, partly in light of J. B. Watson's (1913; see also PA, Vol 81:27851) original call-to-arms. Behaviorist approaches to animal behavior, particularly in the study of processes of learning and memory, have had a profound and continual influence in the area of neuroscience concerned with animal studies of brain substrates of behavior. Similarly, contemporary behaviorists have not been opposed to the study of neurobiological substrates of behavior. On the other hand, classical behaviorist views of thinking (i.e., as reflex chains) have been largely discounted by developments in neuroscience. Classical behaviorism is viewed by many as being most at odds with the modern fields of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience, particularly regarding "mind" and "consciousness." A modest attempt at reconciliation is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Case histories in the great power of steady misinterpretation.

The widespread misrepresentation of behaviorism in the scientific and popular literature has caused its contributions to the understanding of behavior to be systematically ignored or denied. This misrepresentation is manifested, in large part, as a form of academic folklore that codifies erroneous accounts of behaviorism's assumptions, findings, and goals. This article examines 3 representative "case histories" of the academic folklore about behaviorism: its alleged environmentalism, totalitarian aims, and intellectual intolerance. Because academic folklore has been highly resistant to the corrective efforts of behaviorists, explicit strategies are suggested for identifying and correcting folklore and for promoting more effective interdisciplinary communication. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Is psychology relevant to new priorities?

Discusses ways in which psychology participates in establishing and in implementing new social priorities through theory, methods, applied research, and professional skills. The social import of the "metapsychological" assumptions about human nature purveyed by psychologists is stressed. The assumptions of Skinnerian behaviorism and of "humanistic psychology" are both challenged in terms of their scientific base and social consequences. A humanized scientific psychology is advocated. (37 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The artist speaks: Sigmund Koch on aesthetics and creative work.

Sigmund Koch is widely recognized as a prime mover of the radical transformation of psychology from a discipline dominated by behaviorism and related views to a multivalenced set of inquiries into human mentality and functioning. It is less widely remarked that Koch saw aesthetic endeavors as standing at the center of human life and thus warranting psychologists' closest attention. Koch's interest in aesthetics and art making is evident in his writings from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s on different states of mind, the notion of value properties, and the theory of definition. Koch's study of creative work in the latter decades of his life with artists of high accomplishment was guided by a set of methodological signposts for the study of creative work, contains formulations relevant to contemporary psychoaesthetics, and generates significant questions for further inquiry. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Erratum.

Reports and error in the original article by Constance T. Fischer's (American Psychologist, Jan [1973], Vol no. 28 [1], 90-91) "Psychology as a Human Science contra Humane Behaviorism", should read: "While its [humanistic psychology's] argument with behaviorism thus is not an opposition to being scientific, it is a stance against being scientific with humans (cf. Giorgi, 1970)." The printed version renders "scientistic" as "scientific," thus obfuscating a critical point. Scientism is the position that to be scientific a discipline must model itself after the physical sciences. The point was that, in contrast, psychology as a human science seeks to develop methods that are appropriate to man recognized as more than physical object. (The following abstract of this article originally appeard in record 1990-57039-001.) Challenges D. L. Avila's (1972) assertion that humanism refers only to the development and use of knowledge toward humane ends in his proposal to "kill" humanism and unite humaneness and behaviorism. Humanistic psychologists are described as being not merely humanitarians but as being committed toward dealing with humanness in its own right. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Diatribe is not dialogue: On selected attempts to attack and defend behaviorism.

Describes the emotional nature of responses to M. J. Mahoney's (see record 1990-03226-001) discussion of the differences between scientific psychology and radical behaviorism. Responses are offered to comments from R. W. Proctor and D. J. Weeks (see record 1991-06227-001), E. K. Morris (see record 1991-06224-001), C. J. Lonigan (see record 1991-06220-001), and W. J. Wyatt (see record 1991-06231-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Behaviourism? Cognitive theory? Humanistic psychology? To Hull with them all.

Examines current theories of psychology, including the view that psychology is undergoing a paradigm shift and that the paradigm due for suppression can be identified with "behaviorism." It is suggested that, although a return to C. L. Hull's behavior theory (1930) can scarcely be advocated, some characteristics of Hull's approach which have now been widely abandoned, could with advantage be revived. These include (a) the objective of integration, (b) attention to motivational problems, and (c) the recognition of the important contrasts, as well as continuities, between behavior controlled by symbolic processes and behavior not so controlled. These might avoid the opposite shortcomings of contemporary Skinnerian and neo-cognitivist positions. (52 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The "discovery" of social behaviorism and social learning theory, 1870–1980.

Divergent viewpoints regarding social behaviorism raise the more fundamental issue of just what social behaviorism is. One area of convergence is a functional feedback approach expressed in terms of "self-reinforcement." The core theme is the gradual process of operationally defining the laws of contiguity, effect, and observational learning. Three generations of social behaviorists have disputed whether 1, 2, or 3 factors are necessary to encompass social activity. The tacit agreement on functional feedback is historical evidence that the clinical and experimental traditions may have found their paradigm in an "evolutionary behaviorism" based on all 3 factors in the post-Darwinian psychologies of James, Freud, and Piaget. (117 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)