Provably secure three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol in the standard model

Three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is a very practical mechanism to establish secure session key through authenticating each other with the help of a trusted server. Most three-party password authenticated key exchange protocols only guarantee security in the random oracle model. However, a random oracle based cryptographic construction may be insecure when the oracle is replaced by real function. Moreover, some previous unknown attacks appear with the advance of the adversary capability. Therefore, a suitable standard model which can imitate a wider variety of attack scenarios for 3PAKE protocol is needed. Aim at resisting dictionary attack, unknown key-share attack and password-compromise impersonation attack, an expanded standard model for 3PAKE protocol is given. Meanwhile, through applying ElGamal encryption scheme and pseudorandom function, a specific three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed. The security of the proposed protocol is proven in the new standard model. The result shows that the present protocol has stronger security by comparing with other existing protocols, which covers the following security properties: (1) semantic security, (2) key privacy, (3) client-to-server authentication, (4) mutual authentication, (5) resistance to various known attacks, and (6) forward security.     

An efficient password-based three-party authenticated multiple key exchange protocol for wireless mobile networks

With the rapid development of wireless mobile communication, the password-based three-party authenticated key exchange protocol has attracted an increasing amount of attention. To generate more session keys at one time for different applications, Li et al. proposed a password-based three-party authenticated multiple key exchange (3PAMKE) protocol for wireless mobile networks. They claimed that their protocol could withstand various attacks. In this paper, we will show Li et al.’s protocol is not secure off-line password guessing. Furthermore, we proposed an improved 3PAMKE protocol to overcome weakness in Li et al.’s protocol. Security analysis and performance analysis shows our protocol not only overcomes security weakness, but also has better performance. Therefore, our protocol is more suitable for wireless mobile networks.     

Provably secure authenticated key exchange protocol under the CDH assumption

Constructing a secure key exchange protocol is one of the most challenging problems in information security. We propose a provably secure two-round two-party authenticated key exchange (2AKE) protocol based on the well-studied CDH assumption in eCK model to provide the strongest definition of security for key exchange protocol when using the matching session to define the partnership. The underlying hardness assumption (CDH assumption) of our protocol is weaker than these of four other provably secure 2AKE protocols in CK model or eCK model and the computational cost of our protocol is reasonable. We also present a three-round variant of our protocol to realize key conformation.     

Efficient and secure three-party authenticated key exchange protocol for mobile environments

Yang and Chang (2009) proposed a three-party authenticated key exchange protocol for securing communications in mobile-commerce environments. Their protocol reduces computation and communication costs by employing elliptic curve cryptosystems. However, Tan (2010) pointed out that Yang and Chang (2009)’s protocol cannot withstand impersonation and parallel attacks, and further proposed an enhanced protocol to resist these attacks. This paper demonstrates that Tan (2010)’s approach still suffers from impersonation attacks, and presents an efficient and secure three-party authenticated key exchange protocol to overcome shown weaknesses.     

Simple password-based three-party authenticated key exchange without server public keys

Password-based three-party authenticated key exchange protocols are extremely important to secure communications and are now extensively adopted in network communications. These protocols allow users to communicate securely over public networks simply by using easy-to-remember passwords. In considering authentication between a server and user, this study categorizes password-based three-party authenticated key exchange protocols into explicit server authentication and implicit server authentication. The former must achieve mutual authentication between a server and users while executing the protocol, while the latter only achieves authentication among users. This study presents two novel, simple and efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocols. One protocol provides explicit server authentication, and the other provides implicit server authentication. The proposed protocols do not require server public keys. Additionally, both protocols have proven secure in the random oracle model. Compared with existing protocols, the proposed protocols are more efficient and provide greater security.     

新的基于椭圆曲线的三方口令认证密钥协商协议

口令认证密钥协商使得参与通信的用户用一个低熵的口令就可以实现实体认证,并能通过不安全的信道安全地生成共享的高熵会话密钥。为此,设计了一种新的基于椭圆曲线的三方口令认证密钥协商协议,新协议将参与者的口令巧妙地隐藏在传输的消息中,确保了口令的安全性。新协议的安全性基于椭圆曲线离散对数问题,服务器并不需要完全可信。安全性分析和性能分析显示,新协议以较低的代价实现了通信双方的安全通信。     

新型三方口令认证密钥协商协议的安全性分析与改进

口令认证密钥协商(PAKA)是认证密钥协商(AKA)中的重要分支之一。研究了一种新型三方口令认证密钥协商--3REKA的安全性,发现如果参与双方的验证值丢失,将导致严重的中间人攻击,这一攻击的结果是敌手可以与参与者各自建立独立的会话密钥。描述了这一攻击,并对原协议进行了改进,提出了I-3REKA协议。安全性和性能分析表明,所提出的协议以较低的计算量实现了参与双方的安全通信。     

A communication-efficient three-party password authenticated key exchange protocol

Three-party password authenticated key exchange (3PAKE) protocols allow two users (clients) to establish a session key through an authentication server over an insecure channel. Clients only share an easy-to-remember password with the trusted server. In the related literature, most schemes employ the server public keys to ensure the identities of both the servers and symmetric cryptosystems to encrypt the messages. This paper describes an efficient 3PAKE based on LHL-3PAKE proposed by Lee et al. Our 3PAKE requires neither the server public keys nor symmetric cryptosystems such as DES. The formal proof of security of our 3PAKE is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model along with a parallel version of the proposed 3PAKE. The comparisons have shown that our 3PAKE is more practical than other 3PAKEs.     

一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议的安全性分析

2010年,Mohammad等人提出了一种新的双方认证密钥协商协议(MOHAMMAD Z, CHEN Y, HSU C, et al. Cryptanalysis and enhancement of two-pass authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocols. IETE Technical Review, 2010,27(3):252-65)。新协议以较高的运算效率实现了参与者双方的身份认证和密钥协商。对该协议的单轮版本进行了安全性分析,通过模拟协议中某些信息丢失后协议双方的通信过程,发现如果协议中的一些秘密信息丢失,敌手可以发起信息泄露伪装攻击、密钥泄露伪装攻击和一般定义下的伪装攻击,也无法抵抗中间人攻击。这些攻击都可以使得敌手冒充合法参与者发起或回应会话。     

可证明安全的后量子两方口令认证密钥协商协议

口令认证密钥协商可以在客户机和服务器之间建立安全的远程通信,且可以将一个低熵口令放大为一个高熵的会话密钥。然而,随着量子计算技术的快速发展,基于大数分解和离散对数等经典数学难题的PAKA协议面临着严峻的安全挑战。因此,为了构建一个高效安全的后量子PAKA协议,依据改进的Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway(BPR)模型,提出了一个基于格的匿名两方PAKA协议,并且使用给出严格的形式化安全证明。性能分析结果表明,该方案与相关的PAKA协议相比,在安全性和执行效率等方面有一定优势,更适用于资源受限的物联网(Internet of Things, IoT)智能移动设备。     

An novel three-party authenticated key exchange protocol using one-time key

Three-party authenticated key exchange protocol (3PAKE) is an important cryptographic technique for secure communication which allows two parties to agree a new secure session key with the help of a trusted server. In this paper, we propose a new three-party authenticated key exchange protocol which aims to achieve more efficiency with the same security level of other existing 3PAKE protocols. Security analysis and formal verification using AVISPA tools show that the proposed protocol is secure against various known attacks. Comparing with other typical 3PAKE protocols, the proposed protocol is more efficient with less computation complexity.     

Scalable protocol for cross-domain group password-based authenticated key exchange

Cross-domain password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have been studied for many years. However, these protocols are mainly focusing on multi-participant within a single domain in an open network environment. This paper proposes a novel approach for designing a cross-domain group PAKE protocol, that primarily handles with the setting of multi-participant in the multi-domain. Moreover, our protocol is proved secure against active adversary in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model. In our protocol, no interaction occurs between any two domain authentication servers. They are regarded as ephemeral certificate authorities (CAs) to certify key materials that participants might subsequently use to exchange and agree on group session key. We further justify the computational complexity and measure the average computation time of our protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to analyze and discuss a provably secure multi-participant cross-domain group PAKE protocol.     

A round- and computation-efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol

In three-party authenticated key exchange protocols, each client shares a secret only with a trusted server with assists in generating a session key used for securely sending messages between two communication clients. Compared with two-party authenticated key exchange protocols where each pair of parties must share a secret with each other, a three-party protocol does not cause any key management problem for the parties. In the literature, mainly there exist three issues in three-party authenticated key exchange protocols are discussed that need to be further improved: (1) to reduce latency, communication steps in the protocol should be as parallel as possible; (2) as the existence of a security-sensitive table on the server side may cause the server to become compromised, the table should be removed; (3) resources required for computation should be as few as possible to avoid the protocol to become an efficiency bottleneck. In various applications over networks, a quick response is required especially by light-weight clients in the mobile e-commerce. In this paper, a round- and computation-efficient three-party authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed which fulfils all of the above mentioned requirements.     

全安全的属性基认证密钥交换协议

因在细粒度访问控制、定向广播等方面的广泛应用,基于属性的密码机制逐渐受到关注。以一个全安全的属性基加密(ABE)机制为基本构件,结合NAXOS技巧,提出了一个全安全的属性基认证密钥交换协议,并利用可证明安全理论在基于属性的eCK模型中进行了严格的形式化证明。相比已有的同类协议,提出的协议具有更高的安全性,并在提供丰富的属性认证策略的同时,减小了通信开销。     

Design of a password-based authenticated key exchange protocol for SIP

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling communications protocol, which has been chosen for controlling multimedia communication in 3G mobile networks. In recent years, password-based authenticated key exchange protocols are designed to provide strong authentication for SIP. In this paper, we address this problem in two-party setting where the user and server try to authenticate each other, and establish a session key using a shared password. We aim to propose a secure and anonymous authenticated key exchange protocol, which can achieve security and privacy goal without increasing computation and communication overhead. Through the analysis, we show that the proposed protocol is secure, and has computational and computational overheads comparable to related authentication protocols for SIP using elliptic curve cryptography. The proposed protocol is also provably secure in the random oracle model.     

Provably secure lightweight certificateless lattice-based authenticated key exchange scheme for IIoT

Through the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), the manufacturing enterprises have significantly enhanced the production efficiency. The transmission of data in IIoT over public channels has brought about information leakage issues. Therefore, it is crucial to agree on a session key among the participants. In recent years, numerous authenticated key exchange (AKE) schemes have been designed. However, those AKE schemes which adopt the certificateless approach to tackle certificate management and key escrow may remain vulnerable to quantum attacks, and other AKE schemes which are based on lattice hard problem so as to achieve the post quantum security may incur key management issues. To simultaneously address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a lightweight certificateless lattice-based authenticated key exchange (C2LAKE) scheme. Upon the hardness assumptions of the inhomogeneous small integer solution (ISIS) and computational bilateral inhomogeneous small integer solution (CBi-ISIS) problems, the C2LAKE scheme has been demonstrated to be secure in the eCK model and the random oracle model (ROM). Better trade-off among security and functionality features, and communication and computation costs make the C2LAKE scheme suitable and applicable in the IIoT environment.     

标准模型下可证安全的认证密钥协商协议

提出了一个标准模型下的基于身份认证的密钥协商协议。协议的设计采用了双线性配对的思想,协议的安全性分析,则综合运用了串空间知识以及可证安全中Game证明的方法,给出了严格的证明。协议具有良好的前向安全性和会话密钥无托管性,通过利用显式的身份认证,提高了协议的执行效率。与随机预言模型中的协议相比,在计算和通信效率方面相当。     

Security weakness in a three-party pairing-based protocol for password authenticated key exchange

Authentication and key exchange are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks. Password-based protocols for authenticated key exchange are designed to work even when user authentication is done via the use of passwords drawn from a small known set of values. Recently, Wen et al. (H.-A. Wen, T.-F. Lee, T. Hwang, Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using Weil pairing, IEE Proceedings—Communications 152 (2) (2005) 138-143) proposed a new protocol for password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting, where the clients trying to establish a common secret key do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Wen et al.’s protocol carries a claimed proof of security in a formal model of communication and adversarial capabilities. However, this work shows that the protocol for three-party key exchange is completely insecure and the claim of provable security is seriously incorrect. We conduct a detailed analysis of flaws in the protocol and its security proof, in the hope that no similar mistakes are made in the future.