Tobacco industry litigation strategies to oppose tobacco control media campaigns

Objective

To document the tobacco industry''s litigation strategy to impede tobacco control media campaigns.

Methods

Data were collected from news and reports, tobacco industry documents, and interviews with health advocates and media campaign staff.

Results

RJ Reynolds and Lorillard attempted to halt California''s Media Campaign alleging that the campaign polluted jury pools and violated First Amendment rights because they were compelled to pay for anti‐industry ads. The American Legacy Foundation was accused of violating the Master Settlement Agreement''s vilification clause because its ads attacked the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies lost these legal challenges.

Conclusion

The tobacco industry has expanded its efforts to oppose tobacco control media campaigns through litigation strategies. While litigation is a part of tobacco industry business, it imposes a financial burden and impediment to media campaigns'' productivity. Tobacco control professionals need to anticipate these challenges and be prepared to defend against them.     

Philip Morris's website and television commercials use new language to mislead the public into believing it has changed its stance on smoking and disease

Objectives

This paper analyses Philip Morris''s evolving website and the legal strategies employed in its creation and dissemination.

Methods

Internal tobacco documents were searched and examined and their substance verified and triangulated using media accounts, legal and public health research papers, and visits to Philip Morris''s website. Various drafts of website language, as well as informal discussion of the website''s creation, were located in internal Philip Morris documents. I compared website statements pertaining to Philip Morris''s stance on cigarette smoking and disease with statements made in tobacco trials.

Results

Philip Morris created and disseminated its website''s message that it agreed that smoking causes disease and is addictive in an effort to sway public opinion, while maintaining in a litigation setting its former position that it cannot be proved that smoking causes disease or is addictive.

Conclusions

Philip Morris has not changed its position on smoking and health or addiction in the one arena where it has the most to lose—in the courtroom, under oath.     

Tobacco industry use of judicial seminars to influence rulings in products liability litigation

Objectives

This paper examines the tobacco industry''s efforts to influence litigation by sponsoring judicial seminars.

Methods

Thousands of internal tobacco documents were examined, including memos, reports, presentations, and newsletters. Connections to outside organisations were corroborated by examining tobacco industry financial records, budgets, and letters pledging funds. Facts about outside organisations were triangulated through examining their websites and publicly‐filed financial records, and verifying facts through their representatives'' statements in newspaper and law review articles.

Results

There are direct financial ties between the tobacco industry and groups that organise judicial seminars in an effort to influence jurisprudence, and judges who attend these seminars may be breaching judicial ethics either by not inquiring about the source of funding or by ignoring funding by potential litigants.

Conclusions

The tobacco industry''s attempts to clandestinely influence judges'' decisions in cases to which they are a party endangers the integrity of the judiciary.     

German tobacco industry's successful efforts to maintain scientific and political respectability to prevent regulation of secondhand smoke

Objective

To examine the tactics the tobacco industry in Germany used to avoid regulation of secondhand smoke exposure and to maintain the acceptance of public smoking.

Methods

Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available on the internet between June 2003 and August 2004.

Results

In West Germany, policymakers were, as early as the mid 1970s, well aware of the fact that secondhand smoke endangers non‐smokers. One might have assumed that Germany, an international leader in environmental protection, would have led in protecting her citizens against secondhand smoke pollution. The tobacco manufacturers in Germany, however, represented by the national manufacturing organisation “Verband” (Verband der Cigarettenindustrie), contained and neutralised the early debate about the danger of secondhand smoke. This success was achieved by carefully planned collaboration with selected scientists, health professionals and policymakers, along with a sophisticated public relations programme.

Conclusions

The strategies of the tobacco industry have been largely successful in inhibiting the regulation of secondhand smoke in Germany. Policymakers, health professionals, the media and the general public should be aware of this industry involvement and should take appropriate steps to close the gap between what is known and what is done about the health effects of secondhand smoke.     

Paradoxical increase in cigarette smuggling after the market opening in Taiwan

Objectives

To assess the magnitude of cigarette smuggling after the market opened in Taiwan.

Methods

Review of tobacco industry documents for references to smuggling activities related to Taiwan and government statistics on seizure of smuggled cigarettes.

Results

The market opening in 1987 led to an increase in smuggling. Contraband cigarettes became as available as legal ones, with only a small fraction (8%) being seized. Being specifically excluded from the market‐opening, Japan entered the Taiwan market by setting up a Swiss plant as a legal cover for smuggling 10–20 times its legal quota of exports to Taiwan. Smuggling in Taiwan contributed to increased consumption of foreign brands, particularly by the young. Taiwan, not a member of the World Health Organization, was excluded from the East Asian 16‐member “Project Crocodile”, a regional anti‐smuggling collaborative effort to implement the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

Conclusions

Taiwan showed a sharp increase in smuggling after market liberalisation. Being excluded from the international community, Taiwan faces an uphill battle to fight smuggling alone. If Taiwan remained as its weakest link, global efforts to reduce tobacco use will be undermined, particularly for countries in the East Asian region.     

Tobacco interests or the public interest: 20 years of industry strategies to undermine airline smoking restrictions

Objectives

To understand the evolution of 20 years of tobacco industry strategies to undermine federal restrictions of smoking on aircraft in the United States.

Design

We searched and analysed internal tobacco industry records, public documents, and other related research.

Results

The industry viewed these restrictions as a serious threat to the social acceptability of smoking. Its initial efforts included covert letter‐writing campaigns and lobbying of the airline industry, but with the emergence of proposals to ban smoking, the tobacco companies engaged in ever increasing efforts to forestall further restrictions. Tactics to dominate the public record became especially rigorous. The industry launched an aggressive public relations campaign that began with the promotion of industry sponsored petition drives and public opinion surveys. Results from polling research that produced findings contrary to the industry''s position were suppressed. In order to demonstrate smoker outrage against a ban, later efforts included the sponsorship of smokers'' rights and other front groups. Congressional allies and industry consultants sought to discredit the science underlying proposals to ban smoking and individual tobacco companies conducted their own cabin air quality research. Faced with the potential of a ban on all domestic flights, the industry sought to intimidate an air carrier and a prominent policymaker. Despite the intensification of tactics over time, including mobilisation of an army of lobbyists and Congressional allies, the tobacco industry was ultimately defeated.

Conclusions

Our longitudinal analysis provides insights into how and when the industry changed its plans and provides public health advocates with potential counterstrategies.     

Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it

Objective

To analyse the implications of Philip Morris USA''s (PM''s) overtures toward tobacco control and other public health organisations, 1995–2006.

Data sources

Internal PM documents made available through multi‐state US attorneys general lawsuits and other cases, and newspaper sources.

Methods

Documents were retrieved from several industry documents websites and analysed using a case study approach.

Results

PM''s Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995 and proposed to continue through 2006, was a long‐term plan to address tobacco industry delegitimisation and ensure the social acceptability of smoking and of the company itself. Project Sunrise laid out an explicit divide‐and‐conquer strategy against the tobacco control movement, proposing the establishment of relationships with PM‐identified “moderate” tobacco control individuals and organisations and the marginalisation of others. PM planned to use “carefully orchestrated efforts” to exploit existing differences of opinion within tobacco control, weakening its opponents by working with them. PM also planned to thwart tobacco industry delegitimisation by repositioning itself as “responsible”. We present evidence that these plans were implemented.

Conclusion

Sunrise exposes differences within the tobacco control movement that should be further discussed. The goal should not be consensus, but a better understanding of tensions within the movement. As the successes of the last 25 years embolden advocates to think beyond passage of the next clean indoor air policy or funding of the next cessation programme, movement philosophical differences may become more important. If tobacco control advocates are not ready to address them, Project Sunrise suggests that Philip Morris is ready to exploit them.     

Eliminating child labour in Malawi: a British American Tobacco corporate responsibility project to sidestep tobacco labour exploitation

Objectives

To examine British American Tobacco and other tobacco industry support of the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation.

Design

Analyses of internal tobacco industry documents and ethnographic data.

Results

British American Tobacco co‐founded the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco Growing Foundation (ECLT) in October 2000 and launched its pilot project in Malawi. ECLT''s initial projects were budgeted at US$2.3 million over four years. Labour unions and leaf dealers, through ECLT funds, have undertook modest efforts such as building schools, planting trees, and constructing shallow wells to address the use of child labour in tobacco farming. In stark contrast, the tobacco companies receive nearly US$40 million over four years in economic benefit through the use of unpaid child labour in Malawi during the same time. BAT''s efforts to combat child labour in Malawi through ECLT was developed to support the company''s “corporate social responsibility agenda” rather than accepting responsibility for taking meaningful steps to eradicate child labour in the Malawi tobacco sector.

Conclusion

In Malawi, transnational tobacco companies are using child labour projects to enhance corporate reputations and distract public attention from how they profit from low wages and cheap tobacco.     

An ethnographic study of tobacco control in hospital settings

Background

Tobacco control in hospital settings is characterised by a focus on protection strategies and an increasing expectation that health practitioners provide cessation support to patients. While practitioners claim to have positive attitudes toward supporting patient cessation efforts, missed opportunities are the practice norm.

Objective

To study hospital workplace culture relevant to tobacco use and control as part of a mixed‐methods research project that investigated hospital‐based registered nurses'' integration of cessation interventions.

Design

The study was conducted at two hospitals situated in British Columbia, Canada. Data collection included 135 hours of field work including observations of ward activities and designated smoking areas, 85 unstructured conversations with nurses, and the collection of patient‐care documents on 16 adult in‐patient wards.

Results

The findings demonstrate that protection strategies (for example, smoking restrictions) were relatively well integrated into organisational culture and practice activities but the same was not true for cessation strategies. An analysis of resources and documentation relevant to tobacco revealed an absence of support for addressing tobacco use and cessation. Nurses framed patients'' tobacco use as a relational issue, a risk to patient safety, and a burden. Furthermore, conversations revealed that nurses tended to possess only a vague awareness of nicotine dependence.

Conclusion

Overcoming challenges to extending tobacco control within hospitals could be enhanced by emphasising the value of addressing patients'' tobacco use, raising awareness of nicotine dependence, and improving the availability of resources to address addiction issues.     

Death at a discount: how the tobacco industry thwarted tobacco control policies in US military commissaries

Background

The US military is perhaps the only retailer consistently losing money on tobacco. Military stores (commissaries and exchanges) have long sold discount‐priced cigarettes, while the Department of Defense (DoD) pays directly for tobacco‐related healthcare costs of many current and former customers. Tobacco use also impairs short‐term troop readiness.

Objective

To examine the long struggle to raise commissary tobacco prices and the tobacco industry''s role in this policy effort.

Methods

Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, searches of government and military websites and newspaper databases, and interviews with key informants identified in the documents.

Results

Efforts to raise commissary tobacco prices began in the mid‐1980s. Opposition quickly emerged. Some military officials viewed tobacco use as a “right” and low prices as a “benefit”. Others raised issues of authority, and some saw the change as threatening the stores. The tobacco industry successfully exploited complex relationships among the Congress, the DoD, commissaries, exchanges and private industry, obstructing change for over a decade. Leadership from the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries of Defense, presidential support and procedural manoeuvring finally resulted in a modest price increase in 1996, but even then, high‐level military officials were apparently threatened with retaliation from pro‐tobacco Congressmen.

Conclusions

The longstanding military tradition of cheap cigarettes persists because of the politics of the military sales system, the perception within the military of tobacco use as a right, and tobacco industry pressures. Against its own best interests, the US military still makes tobacco available to service members at prices below those in the civilian sector.The US military includes 1.4 million active duty personnel, stationed worldwide. Their smoking prevalence is higher (33.8% in 2002) than the US Department of Defense (DoD) goal of ⩽20%,¹ exceeding the civilian rate of 23.6%.² Smoking diminishes even short‐term troop health and readiness^3,4 and increases medical and training costs.^5,6 As an authoritarian, hierarchical institution, DoD should, theoretically, be able to establish and implement strong tobacco control policies. Nonetheless, DoD sells its personnel tobacco products virtually tax free. Military health personnel and some members of Congress have long sought to address this contradiction. This case study shows how for more than a decade, the tobacco industry worked to defeat policy changes by framing cheap cigarettes as a “benefit”, mobilising Congressional and military‐affiliated allies, and exploiting DoD ambivalence about tobacco.     

The Philip Morris External Research Program: results from the first round of projects

Background

Philip Morris (PM) launched the Philip Morris External Research Program (PMERP) in 2000, two years after the company agreed to the dissolution of two industry‐wide, external research programmes: the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) and the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR). Our previous analysis of PMERP''s Request for Applications noted that PMERP''s structure, while ostensibly concerned with new product development, was remarkably similar to that of CIAR. We also found the majority of designated peer‐reviewers had previous ties to the tobacco industry and the research solicitation seemed to invite mitigating evidence concerning cigarettes and constituent risks. We concluded that a prime reason for PMERP''s existence was to garner scientific credibility for PM.

Objective

To examine the grants awarded in the first round of PMERP and subsequent peer‐reviewed publications.

Methods

Searches of industry documents available on the internet using PMERP and its variations as initial keywords; searches on Medline for publications from PMERP grantees.

Results

Of 153 applications, 61 proposals were funded, 36 of which generated 78 scientific publications. Of these, 65% deal specifically with the tobacco plant or constituents. Over half the researchers listed as PMERP participants had previously received or applied for tobacco funding. One internal document indicated PMERP''s objectives included gaining “credibility” and “goodwill”, and finding “young scientists”. In addition, PM has launched its own and more extensive internal product design research programme.

Conclusion

PMERP appears to exist less as a conduit for critical scientific inquiry than to fit into a corporate strategy intended to burnish PM''s public image.     

Finding the Kool Mixx: how Brown & Williamson used music marketing to sell cigarettes

Objective

To describe the history of Kool''s music‐themed promotions and analyse the role that music played in the promotion of the brand.

Methods

Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents, legal documents, and promotional materials.

Results

Brown & Williamson started Kool sponsorship of musical events in 1975 with Kool Jazz concerts. Music was considered to be an effective marketing tool because: (1) music helped consumers make emotional connections with the brand; (2) music concerts were effective for targeted marketing; (3) music tied together an integrated marketing campaign; and (4) music had potential to appeal widely to a young audience. Brown & Williamson''s first music campaigns successfully targeted young African‐American male audiences. Subsequent campaigns were less effective, exploring different types of music to achieve a broader young adult appeal.

Conclusions

This case study suggests Brown & Williamson used music most successfully for targeted marketing, but they failed to develop a wider audience using music because their attempts lacked consistency with the Kool brand''s established identity. The 2004 “Kool Mixx” campaign both returned to Brown & Williamson''s historic practice targeting young African‐American males, and also exploited a musical genre with much more potential to bring Kool more universal appeal, as hip‐hop music is increasingly popular among diverse audiences. Tobacco control efforts led by African‐American community activists to oppose these marketing strategies should continue; expanding these coalitions to include the hip‐hop community may further increase their effectiveness.     

Asian herbal‐tobacco cigarettes: “not medicine but less harmful”?

Objective

To describe the development and health claims of Asian herbal‐tobacco cigarettes.

Methods

Analysis of international news sources, company websites, and the transnational tobacco companies'' (TTC) documents. PubMed searches of herbs and brands.

Results

Twenty‐three brands were identified, mainly from China. Many products claimed to relieve respiratory symptoms and reduce toxins, with four herb‐only products advertised for smoking cessation. No literature was found to verify the health claims, except one Korean trial of an herb‐only product. Asian herbal‐tobacco cigarettes were initially produced by China by the 1970s and introduced to Japan in the 1980s. Despite initial news about research demonstrating a safer cigarette, the TTC analyses of these cigarettes suggest that these early products were not palatable and had potentially toxic cardiovascular effects. By the late 1990s, China began producing more herbal‐tobacco cigarettes in a renewed effort to reduce harmful constituents in cigarettes. After 2000, tobacco companies from Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand began producing similar products. Tobacco control groups in Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand voiced concern over the health claims of herbal‐tobacco products. In 2005, China designated two herbal‐tobacco brands as key for development.

Conclusion

Asian herbal‐tobacco cigarettes claim to reduce harm, but no published literature is available to verify these claims or investigate unidentified toxicities. The increase in Asian herbal‐tobacco cigarette production by 2000 coincides with the Asian tobacco companies'' regular scientific meetings with TTCs and their interest in harm reduction. Asia faces additional challenges in tobacco control with these culturally concordant products that may discourage smokers from quitting.     

Industry sponsored anti-smoking ads and adolescent reactance: test of a boomerang effect

Objective

To examine whether adolescents'' exposure to youth smoking prevention ads sponsored by tobacco companies promotes intentions to smoke, curiosity about smoking, and positive attitudes toward the tobacco industry.

Design

A randomised controlled experiment compared adolescents'' responses to five smoking prevention ads sponsored by a tobacco company (Philip Morris or Lorillard), or to five smoking prevention ads sponsored by a non‐profit organisation (the American Legacy Foundation), or to five ads about preventing drunk driving.

Setting

A large public high school in California''s central valley.

Subjects

A convenience sample of 9th and 10th graders (n  =  832) ages 14–17 years.

Main outcome measures

Perceptions of ad effectiveness, intention to smoke, and attitudes toward tobacco companies measured immediately after exposure.

Results

As predicted, adolescents rated Philip Morris and Lorillard ads less favourably than the other youth smoking prevention ads. Adolescents'' intention to smoke did not differ as a function of ad exposure. However, exposure to Philip Morris and Lorillard ads engendered more favourable attitudes toward tobacco companies.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates that industry sponsored anti‐smoking ads do more to promote corporate image than to prevent youth smoking. By cultivating public opinion that is more sympathetic toward tobacco companies, the effect of such advertising is likely to be more harmful than helpful to youth.     

Comprehensive smoke-free legislation in England: how advocacy won the day

Objective

To examine how a government committed to a voluntary approach was forced by an effective advocacy coalition to introduce comprehensive smoke‐free legislation.

Methods

A diary was kept from the start of the campaign in 2003, backed up by journal and press articles, and information downloaded from the web. Regular public opinion polls were also carried out to supplement government surveys and polls conducted by the media.

Results

The 1997 Labour Government was committed to a voluntary approach to deal with the problem of secondhand smoke. By 2003, efforts to persuade government to introduce regulation of workplace secondhand smoke through a health and safety code of practice with exemptions for the hospitality trade, had failed. Despite a lack of support from the government, including the health minister, a new strategy by health advocates focusing on comprehensive workplace legislation was able to succeed.

Conclusions

In a democracy it is crucial to develop public knowledge and belief in the extent of the risks of secondhand smoke. Gaining public and media support for the issue can ensure that government has to take action and that the legislation will be enforceable. The interests of the tobacco industry and the hospitality trade differ and this can be used to gain hospitality trade support for comprehensive national legislation in order to ensure a level playing field and protection from litigation.     

British American Tobacco's tactics during China's accession to the World Trade Organization

Background

China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 after years of negotiations. As a WTO member, China had to reduce tariffs on imported cigarettes and remove non‐tariff barriers to allow foreign cigarettes to be more competitive in the Chinese market. Among foreign tobacco companies, British American Tobacco (BAT) was the most active lobbyist during China''s WTO negotiations.

Objective

To review and analyse BAT''s tactics and activities relating to China''s entry into the WTO.

Methods

Internal tobacco industry documents were reviewed and are featured here. Industry documents were searched mainly on the website of BAT''s Guildford Depository and other documents'' websites. 528 documents were evaluated and 142 were determined to be relevant to China''s entry into the WTO.

Results

BAT was extremely active during the progress of China''s entry into the WTO. The company focused its lobbying efforts on two main players in the negotiations: the European Union (EU) and the US. Because of the negative moral and health issues related to tobacco, BAT did not seek public support from officials associated with the WTO negotiations. Instead, BAT lobbyists suggested that officials protect the interests of BAT by presenting the company''s needs as similar to those of all European companies. During the negotiation process, BAT officials repeatedly spoke favourably of China''s accession into the WTO, with the aim of presenting BAT as a facilitator in this process and of gaining preferential treatment from their Chinese competitor.

Conclusions

BAT''s activities clearly suggest that tobacco companies place their own interests above public health interests. Today, China struggles with issues of tobacco control that are aggravated by the aggressive practices of transnational tobacco companies, tobacco‐tariff reductions and the huge number of smokers. For the tobacco‐control movement to progress in China, health advocates must understand how foreign tobacco companies have undermined anti‐tobacco activities by taking advantage of trade liberalisation policies. China should attach importance to public health and comprehensive tobacco‐control policies and guarantee strong protection measures from national and international tobacco interests supported by international trade agreements.China is the largest tobacco producing and consuming country in the world, with over 350 million smokers in a population of 1.2 billion.^1,2 China''s cigarette market is dominated by a state‐owned monopoly, the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration, which strongly protects the domestic tobacco industry.³ This largest cigarette market in the world is nearly 3½ times the size of the US cigarette market and over 12 times the size of the German cigarette market, which is the largest in Western Europe.⁴ However, as smoking rates have fallen in North America and Western Europe,⁵ transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) from the US and Great Britain have turned to international cigarette markets to seek greater profits.China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 after years of negotiations.⁶ As a condition of WTO membership, China had to reduce tariffs on imported cigarettes and remove non‐tariff barriers to allow greater competitiveness for foreign cigarettes in the Chinese market.⁷ O''Sullivan and Chapman⁸ and Lee et al⁹ studied TTC industry documents and described TTC aims and conduct in China. Those studies mainly focused on the heavy reliance on contraband and the undermining of national advertising bans. However, no previous papers have examined China''s entry into the WTO on the basis of tobacco‐industry documents. British American Tobacco (BAT) was engaged in the most active lobbying during China''s accession to the WTO. This paper reviews and analyses BAT documents related to China''s WTO negotiations to clarify BAT''s tactics and use of international trade policies to support their corporate interests.     

Youth smoking prevention and tobacco industry revenue

Objectives

Epidemiological surveys make it clear that youth smoking contributes to both current and future tobacco industry revenue: over 80% of adult smokers reportedly began smoking before age 18. This paper estimates annual and lifetime revenue from youth smoking, and highlights the association between declines in youth smoking and declines in tobacco industry revenue.

Main outcome measures

This paper reports the amount of tobacco industry revenue generated by youth smoking at two points in time (1997 and 2002), and describes the distribution of youth generated tobacco income among the major tobacco companies. The authors project the amount of tobacco industry revenue that will be generated by members of two cohorts (the high school senior classes of 1997 and 2002) over the course of their lifetimes.

Results

In 1997, youth consumed 890 million cigarette packs, generating $737 million in annual industry revenue. By 2002, consumption dropped to 541 million packs and revenue increased to nearly $1.2 billion. Fifty eight per cent of youth generated revenue goes to Philip Morris USA, 18% to Lorillard, and 12% to RJ Reynolds. The authors project that, over the course of their lives, the 1997 high school senior class will smoke 12.4 billion packs of cigarettes, generating $27.3 billion in revenue. The 2002 high school senior class is projected to smoke 10.4 billion packs, generating $22.9 billion in revenue over the course of their lives.

Conclusions

Cigarette price increases from 1997 to 2002 have resulted in greater revenue for the tobacco industry, despite declines in youth smoking prevalence. However, in the absence of further cigarette price increases, declines in youth smoking are projected to lead ultimately to a loss of approximately $4 billion in future tobacco industry revenue from a single high school cohort.     

Community guide recommendations and state level tobacco control programmes: 1999-2004

Objective

To identify the level of effort state tobacco control programmes and partners have expended on interventions recommended by the community guide and how those efforts have changed over time between 1999 and 2004.

Design

Longitudinal study.

Setting

United States.

Participants

State tobacco control partners, including the state health department, voluntary agencies and tobacco control coalitions.

Main outcome measure

We used the Strength of Tobacco Control survey responses in 1999, 2002 and 2004 to calculate the mean proportion of state tobacco control partners working on recommended interventions and subsequently analysed changes in effort over time.

Results

The proportion of state tobacco control partners working to promote clean indoor air legislation remained at more than 70% in all three years. The proportion working to increase taxes on tobacco rose significantly between 1999 and 2002 (from 54% to 70%), and those working to reduce patient costs for tobacco cessation treatments never exceeded 31% in any year. Use of mass media targeting youths decreased significantly in all years (from 40% to 32% to 26%), and the proportion of state tobacco control partners participating in a quitline has increased steadily and significantly in all years (from 24% to 36% to 41%). The level of effort in each area varied widely between states and over time.

Conclusions

State tobacco control partners are implementing evidence based interventions, but more focus is needed on the tobacco cessation and mass media campaign components of comprehensive tobacco control programmes.     

Working to make an image: an analysis of three Philip Morris corporate image media campaigns

Objective

To describe the nature and timing of, and population exposure to, Philip Morris USA''s three explicit corporate image television advertising campaigns and explore the motivations behind each campaign.

Methods

: Analysis of television ratings from the largest 75 media markets in the United States, which measure the reach and frequency of population exposure to advertising; copies of all televised commercials produced by Philip Morris; and tobacco industry documents, which provide insights into the specific goals of each campaign.

Findings

Household exposure to the “Working to Make a Difference: the People of Philip Morris” averaged 5.37 ads/month for 27 months from 1999–2001; the “Tobacco Settlement” campaign averaged 10.05 ads/month for three months in 2000; and “PMUSA” averaged 3.11 ads/month for the last six months in 2003. The percentage of advertising exposure that was purchased in news programming in order to reach opinion leaders increased over the three campaigns from 20%, 39% and 60%, respectively. These public relations campaigns were designed to counter negative images, increase brand recognition, and improve the financial viability of the company.

Conclusions

Only one early media campaign focused on issues other than tobacco, whereas subsequent campaigns have been specifically concerned with tobacco issues, and more targeted to opinion leaders. The size and timing of the advertising buys appeared to be strategically crafted to maximise advertising exposure for these population subgroups during critical threats to Philip Morris''s public image.