Electronic Markets on platform complexity

Electronic Markets -     

Electronic Markets on platform transformation

Electronic Markets -     

Electronic Markets for Architects—The Architecture of Electronic Markets

In recent years there has been a move towards more cooperation in the construction industry. While the traditional practice is that the architect chooses the trades, provides the construction plan, and tells the trades what to do, a new initiative has been formed to create cooperative construction teams. Here the architect will discuss details of the construction plan with the trades concerned and all parties work cooperatively on the construction project. This means that there will be many coordination tasks and that communication plays a pivotal role. The paper presents a framework for and an implementation of an electronic marketplace to support such cooperative construction teams. It will be argued that there must be a co-design of the business system (i.e. cooperative construction teams) and the IT system (i.e. the marketplace including the search, negotiation, and fulfilment phases) for efficiently supporting small and medium-sized companies participating in cooperative teams and interacting on electronic marketplaces.     

Designing Agent-Based Electronic Employment Markets

Two modes of matching people with jobs prevail at present: 1) hierarchical planning and 2) distributed markets. Each has strengths and limitations, but few systems have been designed to take advantage of strengths corresponding to both. With evolving information technology, however, the job-matching process could be accomplished far more equitably and efficiently using web-based markets within the firm, and intelligent agents offer excellent potential to help both potential employees and employers find one another in a distributed, electronic marketplace. But realizing this potential goes well beyond simply changing the rules of internal job matching or making agent technology available to job searchers. Rather, the corresponding markets and technologies must be designed, together, to mutually accomplish the desired results (e.g., efficient and effective matching) and conform to necessary properties (e.g., market clearing). Through the research described in this paper, we draw from Game Theory results to assess the feasibility of using two-sided matching algorithms to address this market-design problem. We also draw from current agent research to address the information technology dimension of the problem by implementing a proof-of-concept multi-agent system to enact, automate and support the corresponding market solution. This paper integrates the key economic and technological elements required to design robust electronic employment markets. And the corresponding research provides new knowledge and insight into co-development of the requisite economic markets and agent technologies.     

专业市场电子商务系统研究

本文探讨了专业市场电子商务系统的特点，提出了建立一套由网站系统、市场管理系统、商户管理系统相结合的完整的专业市场电子商务解决方案，其特点是针对专业市场的需要，采用分散管理与集中应用相结合的模式，同时为商户、消费者和专业市场管理者提供良好的应用平台。     

基于Multi—Agent的电子商务中的恶意Agent研究

描述并讨论了以Agent为中介的电子商务中的恶意Agent问题.恶意Agent是一种带有不良意图,能够攻击标准代理,扰乱交易,欺骗用户,盗窃机密信息,浪费资源和破坏市场等的软件实体,在某些方面它们比PC病毒更有危害.为此提出了SCAAM,并且用一些策略来具体描述这种模型的工作过程.     

On Negotiations and Deal Making in Electronic Markets

Negotiation has traditionally been an important element in all types of commerce. As electronic commerce systems become generally available on the Internet, there is a need to support negotiation in the context of deal making. However, as in the physical world, the type of negotiation mechanism required is context dependent. In particular, we distinguish between the support required in the context of single deal and support required in coordinating negotiations across multiple deals. A framework is presented to describe deal making and negotiation in the context of a single deal. It is used to illustrate four representative Internet-based automated trading scenarios and to help understand the success of the scenario featuring online auctions. While popular, online auctions are limited in that they permit negotiation only along a single dimension such as price. We present ongoing work on multi-attribute negotiation mechanisms, and outline important new concepts relevant to supporting coordination across multiple deals.     

The Effect of Electronic Markets on Forecasts of New Product Success

In this paper, we extend field experiments of real money prediction markets to the problem of forecasting the success of a new product. We collect forecasts using a traditional survey mechanism and a market mechanism. Our results suggest that market prices summarize the information contained in survey forecasts and improve those forecasts by reducing the variability of the forecast. However, we find no evidence of a crystal ball equilibrium. Our markets have considerable variability and predict only as well as the public signal provided by the HSX movie market game.