Optimal green tax reforms yielding double dividend

In an stylized endogenous growth economy with a negative externality created by CO2 emissions and in which abatement activities are made by private firms, we find a wide range of dynamically feasible green tax reforms yielding the double dividend without any need to assume a complex production structure or tax system, or a variety of externalities in production. As a remarkable finding, we obtain certain scenarios in which increasing the emissions tax up to the Pigouvian level and removing completely the income tax is dynamically feasible and, also, it is the second-best reform. Hence, as a difference to previous literature, in these scenarios the first-best tax mix is implementable, allowing for the elimination of both environmental and non-environmental inefficiencies. Our result arises because of the consideration of public debt issuing and the management of the government budget balance with an intertemporal perspective. The result is obtained for an intermediate range of environmental bearing in preferences, the valid range being contingent on the pre-existing income tax rate. The type of tax reform that we propose could also be implemented for different energy taxes.     

Environmental policy and the energy efficiency of vertically differentiated consumer products

We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how distributional goals in addition to environmental goals shape the choice of policy instruments. We find that an industry-friendly government levies an energy tax to supplement a lax product standard, but shies away from subsidies to firms. By contrast, a consumer-friendly government relies heavily on a strict product standard and additionally implements a moderate subsidy to firms, but avoids energy taxes.     

Analyzing the distributional effects of fuel taxation in China

As an effective policy instrument to reduce energy consumption and CO₂ emissions, the effects of fuel taxation on income distribution have been the critical factor that determines whether a fuel tax could be acceptable in China. This paper estimates the distributional effects of a fuel tax on households in various income groups by using the input-output model. Results indicate that the total distributional effects of fuel taxes are moderately progressive; that is, high-income households would bear more tax burden compared to low-income households. In addition, the indirect effects are larger than the direct effects. Moreover, the Kakwani and Suits indices show that fuel excise taxes are progressive, implying that a fuel tax could improve the unfair income distribution. In order to reduce the negative impact of fuel taxes on low-income households, it is necessary for the government to design a reasonable redistribution mechanism of tax revenue or adopt compensatory measures such as the transfer payments targeted on low-income groups.     

Emission trading and international competition: The impact of labor market rigidity on technology adoption and output

Emission trading systems have been proposed in different regions to reduce polluting emissions and are in use in the European Union for carbon dioxide emissions. One of the objectives of these systems is to encourage firms to adopt advanced abatement technologies. However, permits also create an incentive to reduce output, which may be seen as negative by policy makers. We analyze the impact of a rigid labour market on these two outcomes, showing the conditions necessary to avoid reductions in production while keeping the incentives to improve abatement technologies. The analysis is done for oligopolistic firms engaged in international rivalry.     

Modelling the impacts of a carbon emission-differentiated vehicle tax system on CO2 emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases in Ireland

The increasing awareness of the effects of climate change on the environment and the economic pressure on oil supply has focused international attention on reducing CO₂ emissions and energy usage across all sectors. In order to meet their Kyoto protocol commitments and in line with European Union policy, the Irish government has introduced a carbon-based tax system for new vehicles purchased from the 1st of July 2008. This new legislation aims to reduce carbon emissions in the transport sector, a sector which is responsible for a significant proportion of both. This paper presents the results of the development, calibration, and application of a car choice model which predicts the changes in CO₂ emissions intensity from new vehicle purchases as a result of the changes in vehicle tax policy and fuel price in Ireland. The model also predicts the impact of such changes on tax revenue for the Irish government and the changes in the split between the number of diesel and petrol vehicles purchased. The investigation found that the introduction of these new carbon-based taxes in Ireland will result in a reduction of 3.6–3.8% in CO₂ emissions intensity and a reduction in annual tax revenue of €191 M.     

Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform

The most common notion of environmental tax reform (ETR) is the use of the revenue from environmental taxes to reduce distortionary labour taxes. The PETRAS project¹ has shown that there are a number of social and political impediments to implementing such reform. This paper firstly outlines some of the environmental and economic implications of environmental taxes generally. It goes on to explore three broad approaches to ETR, based on the allocation of the tax revenues, and explores the environmental and economic implications of each approach and the likelihood of political and social acceptance. Particular attention is paid to reducing regressive impacts and impacts on competitiveness. It is concluded that some combination of earmarking a proportion of revenues to environmental projects and diverting rest to reduce labour taxes is probably the best approach in light of the results of the project. The balance should depend upon local labour market and macroeconomic conditions, the extent to which environmental projects are already funded and the extent of government failure, i.e., the problems of resource allocation that occur as a result of government intervention in markets. Funding should only be provided to environmental projects if it can be shown that, in themselves, they are economically efficient. In addition, it is most important that a proportion of the funds be used to ameliorate any regressive impacts. It is also important to bear in mind that hypothecation or recycling of revenue is not the same as a tax shift, which is a reform of the entire system, so some of these approaches may take away from the integrity of ETR. The paper concludes with some of the initiatives that are likely to be necessary to facilitate social and political acceptance of this approach to ETR.     

Energy demand and environmental taxes: the case of Greece

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that energy taxes may have on reducing environmental pollution in Greece. We study the demand for residential energy for the period 1965–1998, and on the basis of these estimates we make forecasts for CO₂ emissions in the coming years. Furthermore we develop alternative scenarios for tax changes, and study their effects on CO₂ emissions. According to our findings the harmonization of the Greek energy taxes to the average European Union levels implies an increase of total CO₂ emissions by 6% annually. If taxes are raised, however, to the highest European Union levels, the CO₂ emissions are restricted significantly. These empirical findings may indicate that environmental taxation cannot be the unique instrument for combating pollution.     

The impact of tax reform on new car purchases in Ireland

We examine the impact of recent tax reforms in Ireland on private car transport and its greenhouse gas emissions. A carbon tax was introduced on fuels, and purchase (vehicle registration) and ownership (motor) taxes were switched from engine size to potential emissions. We use a demographic model of the car stock (by age, size, and fuel) and a car purchase model that reflects the heterogeneous distribution of mileage and usage costs across various engine sizes. The model shows a dramatic shift from petrol to diesel cars, particularly for large engines. The same pattern is observed in the latest data on car sales. This has a substantial impact on tax revenue as car owners shift to the lower tax rates. The tax burden has shifted from car ownership to car use, and that the overall tax burden on private car transport falls. As diesel engines are more fuel efficient than petrol engines, carbon dioxide emissions fall modestly or, if we consider the rebound effect of travel costs on mileage, minimally. From the perspective of the revenue, the costs per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided are (very) high.     

When environmental and redistribution concerns collide: The case of electricity pricing

Countries worldwide face major income inequality and environmental challenges. However, recent social upheavals reveal the conflict of interests induced by policies designed to address these concerns. One example relates to residential electricity, where volumetric grid charges and taxes may impede the affordability of electricity. We develop and calibrate a model that captures the social planner's trade-off between inequality aversion and environmental concerns. We employ panel data on 105,000 households in the Swiss Canton of Bern from 2008 to 2013, including electricity consumption, household income and tax payment characteristics. The results show that with inequity aversion and no negative environmental externalities electricity consumption should be subsidised by income tax revenue. With negative environmental externalities, or asymmetric information between the government and the utility, end-user electricity prices are shifted upwards. For high degrees of inequality aversion, the optimal electricity end-user price is below the marginal cost, even in the presence of negative environmental externalities.     

Atmospheric externalities and environmental taxation

The paper reviews the theory of environmental taxation under first best and second best conditions. It argues that negative environmental externalities lead to reductions of the provision of public goods, while investment in abatement increases the supply of public goods. Together with optimal tax rules, the paper therefore also derives conditions for the optimal use of resources on abatement. After brief discussions of the dimensions of time and uncertainty, tax reform and the double dividend, and taxes vs. quotas, the optimal tax model is applied to the problem of global warming with a discussion of the particular incentive problems that arise in designing and implementing global climate policy.     

Effectiveness of local air pollution and GHG taxes: The case of Chilean industrial sources

In 2017, environmental taxes began to be applied to CO₂, PM, NOx and SO₂ emissions in Chile to reduce the negative environmental effects of fossil fuels burned in industrial and thermoelectric sources with a thermal power greater than or equal to 50 MW. In this context, the present study generates an economic optimization model to simulate how different tax scenarios would modify the behavior of regulated industrial sources considering the alternatives they have to minimize their costs (tax payment, fuel change and/or installation of abatement technologies). The main results show that, under the current tax scenario, CO₂, PM and SO₂ emissions would decrease by 11%, 48% and 49% respectively, while NO_X emissions would increase by 5%. By extending the tax to all industrial sources regardless of their thermal power, CO₂, PM and SO₂ emissions would decrease respectively by 14%, 98% and 66%, while NO_X emissions would increase by 7.1%. Finally, it is determined that modifying the tax rate of a single pollutant while maintaining the rest of the constant rates generates a low impact on the other pollutants emissions.     

The effect of carbon taxation on cross-border competition and energy efficiency investments

Carbon taxes increase costs for energy-consuming firms and can impact firms‘ ability to compete with other firms located in regions without that tax. This paper considers the effect of asymmetric carbon taxation when firms are able to adjust their energy efficiency investment levels to reflect the presence of the tax. Using a dynamic model of firm competition, we find that allowing firms to adjust their energy efficiency levels in response to a carbon tax could potentially allow firms to significantly mitigate the competition effects of that carbon tax. In our baseline parameterization, additional energy efficiency investments non-trivially mitigates profit loss for the firm facing the carbon tax as well as spurring adding energy efficiency investments in the non-taxing jurisdiction, thus reducing carbon leakage. This increase in energy efficiency can potentially reduce total energy usage by the firm in the taxing jurisdiction by more than the carbon tax alone. While the quantitative impact of energy efficiency investments on firm competitiveness depends on the nature of the industry, from a policy standpoint, the ability of energy efficiency investments to mitigate cross-border emissions leakage and negative competition effects without policy interventions such as a carbon border tax softens these two common criticisms of unilateral regional carbon taxes.     

Energy taxation and the double dividend effect in Taiwan's energy conservation policy—an empirical study using a computable general equilibrium model

Faced with pressure from greenhouse gas reductions and energy price hikes, the Taiwan government is in the process of developing an energy tax regime to reflect environmental external costs and effectively curb energy consumption, as well as mitigate CO₂ emissions through an adequate pricing system. This study utilizes a CGE model to simulate and analyze the economic impacts of the draft Energy Tax Bill and its complementary fiscal measures. Under the assumption of tax revenue neutrality, the use of energy tax revenue generated for the purpose of reducing income tax is the best choice with double dividend effects since it will effectively stimulate domestic consumption and investment, and, consequently, mitigate the negative impacts of the distortionary tax regime. The double dividend effect is less significant, however, when the supplementary measures being used are for government expenditure. Nevertheless, all supplementary measures have effectively reduced energy consumption, which means they have delivered at least the first dividend—in the sense of CO₂ emissions control. It has been verified in this study that having adequate public-finance policy measures is the key to realizing the double dividend effect.     

Two birds,one stone? Local pollution regulation and greenhouse gas emissions

In most countries, environmental regulation focuses on local pollution, which causes damages near the emission source, while regulation on global pollutants such as greenhouse gases (GHGs) has been slow. Theoretically, local and global pollutants can either be substitutes or complements in production. A firm's response to local pollution regulation can lead greenhouse gas emissions to decrease if the firm switches energy source from oil to natural gas, or to increase if it reduces the temperature of a natural gas-fired boiler, which causes NOx emissions to fall but CO₂ emissions to rise. Consequently, local pollution regulation may either intensify or reduce global warming concerns. We exploit new data on US GHG emissions and variation in local pollution regulation across US counties to estimate this relationship. We find no evidence that more stringent local pollution regulation changes GHG emissions from the non-energy sectors. The lack of a statistically detectable effect cannot be explained by a decrease in production or by firms switching production to less regulated countries, and it is true on aggregate as well as for individual polluting industries, though in some instances the coefficients are not precisely estimated. Therefore, local pollution regulation is unlikely to suffice to address global warming.     

Taxation of nuclear rents: Benefits,drawbacks, and alternatives

This paper studies the taxation of nuclear energy using a stylized model of the electricity sector, with one dominant nuclear producer and a competitive fringe of non-nuclear plants. First, we find that the optimal nuclear tax is different depending on the time horizon: the optimal short-run tax has the same order of magnitude as the nuclear taxes imposed in Belgium and Germany, while in the long run the optimal tax may be negative, i.e. a subsidy. Second, government credibility is important: when a government cannot credibly commit, the mere possibility of a short-run tax could severely harm incentives for future investments in lifetime-extending refurbishment or new plants. Third, when there is natural scarcity in nuclear potential, other policies like inviting multiple competitive bidders for lifetime extension franchises or for investments in new plants, may be more efficient ways to increase government revenue.     

Carbon tariffs and cooperative outcomes

In the absence of an international environmental agreement (IEA) on climate change, a country may be reluctant to unilaterally implement environmental actions, as this may lead to the relocation of firms to other, lax-on-pollution countries. To avoid this problem, while still taking care of the environment, a country may impose a carbon tariff that adjusts for the differences between its own carbon tax and the other country's tax. We consider two countries with a representative firm in each one, and characterize and contrast the equilibrium strategies and outcomes in three scenarios. In the first (benchmark) scenario, in a first stage the regulators in the two countries determine the carbon taxes noncooperatively, and in a second stage, the firms compete à la Cournot. In the second scenario, the regulators cooperate in determining the carbon taxes, while the firms still play a noncooperative Cournot game. In the third scenario, we add another player, e.g., the World Trade Organization, which announced a border tax in a prior stage; the game is then played as in the first scenario. Our two major results are (i) a border-tax adjustment (BTA) mimics quite well the cooperative solution in setting the carbon taxes as in scenario two. This means that a BTA may be a way around the lack of enthusiasm for an IEA. (ii) All of our simulations show that a partial correction of the difference in taxes is sufficient to maximize total welfare. In short, the conclusion is that a BTA may be used as a credible threat to achieve an outcome that is very close to the cooperative outcome.     

Double dividend effectiveness of energy tax policies and the elasticity of substitution: A CGE appraisal

There is a considerable body of literature that has studied whether or not an adequately designed tax swap, whereby an ecotax is levied and some other tax is reduced while keeping government income constant, may achieve a so-called double dividend, that is, an increase in environmental quality and an increase in overall efficiency. Arguments in favor and against are abundant. Our position is that the issue should be empirically studied starting from an actual, non-optimal tax system structure and by way of checking the responsiveness of equilibria to revenue neutral tax regimes under alternate scenarios regarding technological substitution. With the use of a CGE model, we find that the most critical elasticity for achieving a double dividend is the substitution elasticity between labor and capital whereas the elasticity that would generate the highest reduction in carbon dioxide emissions is the substitution elasticity among energy goods.     

Energy taxation in a small, open economy: Social efficiency gains versus industrial concerns

Welfare analyses of energy taxes typically show that systems with uniform rates perform better than differentiated systems, especially if revenue can be recycled by cutting taxes that are more distortionary. However, in practical policy, efficiency gains must be traded off against industrial concerns. Presumably, energy-dependent industries of small, open economies will suffer relatively more if taxed. This computable general equilibrium (CGE) study examines the social costs of compensating the energy-intensive export industries in Norway for their profit losses from imposing the same electricity tax on all industries. The costs are surprisingly modest. This is explained by the role of the Nordic electricity market, which is still limited enough to respond to national energy tax reforms. Thus, an electricity price reduction partly neutralizes the direct impact of the tax on profits. In addition, we examine the effects of different compensation schemes and find significantly lower compensation costs when the scheme is designed to release productivity gains.     

Marginal CO2 abatement costs: Findings from alternative shadow price estimates for Shanghai industrial sectors

Shanghai, one of the most developed cities in China, is implementing a pilot regional carbon emission trading scheme. Estimating the marginal abatement costs of CO₂ emissions for the industrial sectors covered in Shanghai's emission trading scheme provides the government and participating firms useful information for devising compliance policies. This paper employs multiple distance function approaches to estimating the shadow prices of CO₂ emissions for Shanghai industrial sectors. Our empirical results show that the overall weighted average of shadow price estimates by different approaches ranges between 394.5 and 1906.1 Yuan/ton, which indicates that model choice truly has a significant effect on the shadow price estimation. We have also identified a negative relationship between the shadow price of CO₂ emissions and carbon intensity, and the heavy industries with higher carbon intensities tend to have lower shadow prices. It has been suggested that Shanghai municipal government take various measures to improve its carbon market, e.g. using the marginal abatement costs of participating sectors/firms as a criterion in the initial allocation of carbon emission allowances.     

Emission trading schemes: potential revenue effects, compliance costs and overall tax policy issues

The case for the imposition of carbon (emission) taxes or tradable carbon permits in important tax jurisdictions is arguably strong, based upon the polluter pays principle first proposed by Pigou almost a century ago. This paper briefly reviews the arguments for and against these market-based instruments, and discusses their relative advantages and disadvantages in a practical context. In the case of Australia, the revenue effect of the proposed tradable carbon permits scheme is estimated to be A$11.5 billion in 2010–11. For comparison, this is roughly equivalent to a quarter of the revenue from the Goods and Services Tax. The paper focuses on three neglected aspects of climate change taxation discussion to date: how much tax revenue is likely to be raised, and the administrative and compliance costs of an emissions trading scheme, with particular reference to Australia. In discussing these issues, the paper draws upon selected and relevant international experience, particularly the European Union emissions trading scheme. The challenges of an emissions trading scheme, including integration with the existing tax system, particularly in an Australian context, are also discussed. The paper concludes by emphasising the key challenges and issues facing this ‘ultimate externality’ debate, particularly from a taxation policy perspective.