Effects of prior experience on coalition bargaining.

Tested S. S. Komorita's (see record 1981-01237-001) equal excess model. 126 male undergraduates played 3-person multivalued games. All groups played 4 trials of a test game either for points that were later converted to prizes or for money. Prior to the test game, triads in different conditions were exposed to a varying number of coalition games. Results show a large and significant effect on coalition payoffs: The greater the experience, the greater the deviation of payoffs from equal splits. Thus, the results of many coalition experiments may be restricted to naive bargainers and may not be generalized to experienced, sophisticated bargainers. (28 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Level of aspiration in coalition bargaining.

Although some theories of coalition formation are quite accurate and promising, they are unable to explain the large variability of coalition outcomes. It is hypothesized that the variability of outcomes can be attributed to the variability of subjects' aspiration levels in coalition experiments. A bargainer with high aspirations is likely to make high demands and is likely to be rejected as a coalition partner. To manipulate aspiration level, the points-to-money conversion scales of subjects (105 college students) were systematically varied in three-person coalition games. As hypothesized, the results indicate that bargainers who have high aspirations (relative to other bargainers) are more likely to be excluded from coalitions. The implications of these results for current theories of coalition formation and for the development of a process theory are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Changes in outcomes in coalition bargaining.

Examined the results of earlier coalition experiments that concluded that the coalition with the largest payoff per member occurs most frequently and the reward division is close to an equal split (except for frequent deviations from equal share payoffs). The present authors hypothesized that inconsistencies in previous research were due to differences in experimental procedure and to Ss' familiarity with coalition games. In the present study, 240 male undergraduates played a 4-person multivalued apex game for 6 trials. Three games and 2 procedures were used. The 2 procedures differed in the number of rounds of offers and counteroffers required to form a coalition. As hypothesized, results indicate that deviations from equal shares increased over trials of the game and were greater with the procedure that required more rounds of bargaining. Findings regarding payoff divisions are in the direction predicted by the bargaining theory and equal excess model of coalition formation, but findings regarding frequencies of coalitions are contrary to the predictions of both theories. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Coalition bargaining in four games that include a veto player.

Tested the predictions of 3 models of coalition behavior. 120 graduate students played each of 4 games, rotating among the 5 player positions (including a veto player) between games. The games were played under 1 of 3 time pressure/default conditions: (a) no time pressure, (b) a condition such that the constant payoff to coalitions was lost if an agreement was not reached in 3 attempts, and (c) a condition such that the payoff for no agreement was fixed at 60 points for the veto player and 10 for the other players. The veto players' payoffs varied over games and tended to increase as play continued, at times approaching the entire payoff. Thus, the weighted probability (S. S. Komorita, 1974) and Roth-Shapley (A. E. Roth, 1977; L. S. Shapley, 1953) models were not supported; the core model received some support. The default conditions had little effect. The likelihood of socially beneficial behavior in competitively motivating situations is discussed. (30 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The functions of resources in coalition bargaining.

An important factor that distinguishes theories of coalition formation is their assumptions regarding the role of "resources" (Rs) in coalition bargaining. Two basic functions of Rs are hypothesized: a normative function, in which Rs provide a norm or frame of reference for a fair (equitable) division of rewards, and a strategic function, in which Rs affect the number and size of winning coalitions. It is shown that minimum R theory is based entirely on the normative function; minimum power and weighted probability models are based entirely on the strategic function; and bargaining theory and equal excess model are based on both functions. An experiment was conducted with 200 male undergraduates to contrast these theories in terms of the 2 functions of Rs. Results provide the greatest support for bargaining theory and equal excess model, and it is hypothesized that a theory that ignores one or the other function is not likely to yield accurate predictions. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of communication timing on duopoly bargaining outcomes.

Examined the effects of timing of communication on bargaining outcomes in a conflict of interest task by contrasting an autism hypothesis and a strategic hypothesis. In a design that replicated and extended under more controlled conditions an earlier study by R. M. Krauss and M. Deutsch (see record 1967-00554-001), 40 dyads of male undergraduates played 20 trials of a duopoly game and were allowed (a) verbal communication on all 20 trials, (b) communication for only the 1st 10 trials, (c) communication for the last 10 trials, or (d) no communication. Dyads able to communicate on the last 10 trials obtained superior profits and played more cooperatively. Findings are more consistent with the strategic hypothesis. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of group size.

This paper reviews 31 empirical studies of small groups in which the major independent variable, group size, was related to several classes of dependent variables: group performance, distribution of participation, the nature of interaction, group organization, member performance, conformity and consensus, and member satisfaction. Many of these variables were found to be significantly affected by group size, but methodological shortcomings characterizing this group of studies preclude the assertion of broad generalizations. Several dependable and nondependable intervening variables are suggested which may help to account for many of the observed effects. Conclusions are: group size is an important variable which should be taken into account in any theory of group behavior, and future research on group size should proceed more systematically than in the past. (46 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Number of coalitions and resources as sources of power in coalition bargaining.

Investigated, using 80 female and 50 male undergraduates, the importance of 2 potential sources of power in coalition situations (number of coalitions in which the person is included and assigned resources), a potentially influential individual-differences factor (gender), and the validity of 4 theories of coalition formation (minimum power theory, the Roth-Shapely value, the weighted probability model, and bargaining theory). Five-person groups of males or females played 20 trials of a coalition game that varied the number of coalitions available to the players. Games were presented either with or without resources being assigned. Results indicate that both resources and number of alternatives influenced coalition outcomes. Players' payoffs were directly related to both factors, and coalition frequency was inversely related to the total number of alternatives available to the coalition members. Minor gender differences were also obtained. Implications for coalition theories in general and the weighted probability model in particular are discussed. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of resources and alternatives on coalition formation.

Previous research has indicated that coalition formation is influenced by the players' resources and alternatives (game structure). However, on almost all occasions when both resources and game structure have been varied, they have been confounded. In the present study with 224 undergraduates, 4 different 4-person simple games were used, based on the same distribution of resources. These games were played both with and without resources being assigned. Thus, resource assignment and game structure were not confounded. Coalition frequencies and reward divisions were minimally influenced by assigned resources. Coalition frequency was inversely related to coalition size. Players' outcomes were inversely related to the size of the winning coalition and directly related to the number of their alternative small coalitions. Players' mean payoffs over all trials were related to the number and mean size of their minimal winning coalitions, relative to the other players. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of group size and item type in the "group shift" effect.

Recent research on the "risky shift" phenomenon in group decision-making has uncovered evidence of items which evoke cautious shifts instead of risky shifts. R. Brown's social comparison version of the value hypothesis predicts that (a) the magnitude of both risky and cautious shifts will increase with group size when group members are randomly selected from a normally distributed population; and (b) on risk-evoking items the magnitude of s's risky shift should be inversely related to his relative riskiness position in the group; on caution-evoking items the magnitude of cautious shift should be directly related to s's riskiness position. 180 male undergraduates were divided into groups of 2-5 ss and given risk- and caution-evoking items on a questionnaire. Basic predictions were supported. The relative risk position factor accounted for a large proportion of the experimental variance (42-54%). (french summary) (31 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of group size, problem difficulty, and sex on group performance and member reactions.

Examined the influence of group size, task difficulty, and member sex on the relationship between actual productivity and potential productivity proposed by I. D. Steiner (1972), and tested the predictive accuracy of hierarchical and equalitarian latency models proposed by F. Restle and J. H. Davis (1962). 349 undergraduates worked 3 intellectual problems of varying difficulty, either as individuals or in same-sex groups of 2, 3, 6, and 10 members. Actual performance was assessed using indexes of the proportion of solvers and time to solution. Potential performance scores were generated from theoretical models for the same indexes. Group size and problem difficulty were important determinants of group performance, whereas member sex generally was not. Size and difficulty effects varied depending on choice of performance measure. For the proportion index, groups often worked up to potential, but those same groups usually fell below potential on the latency index; they were effective but inefficient. Group performance on both indexes generally fell below potential as size and difficulty increased. The concept of "functional size" is advanced to explain the observed pattern of group performance: As group size increases the number of nonparticipators also increases, resulting in a functional group size smaller than actual size. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Test of the bargaining and equal excess theories of coalition formation: Effects of experience, information about payoffs, and monetary stakes.

Compared the bargaining and equal excess theories of coalition formation for their accuracy in predicting the effects of bargaining experience, information about coalition payoffs, and monetary stakes on coalition behavior in a 5-person game. 380 male undergraduates served as Ss. Manipulation of bargaining experience involved having each group play 4 trials of the game. Information about payoffs was varied by giving players in half the groups information about the payoffs for all the possible coalitions, and those in the other half of the groups information only about the payoffs for the coalitions of which they could be a member. Monetary stakes were manipulated by having Ss in half the groups play the game for the chance of winning $3, and Ss in the other half of the groups play the game for the chance of winning $50. Consistent with previous findings, monetary stakes had no effect on coalition behavior. Both bargaining experience and payoff information, however, had effects on coalition behavior, and these effects tended to support bargaining theory rather than equal excess theory. (37 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of self- and competitor goals on performance in an interdependent bargaining task.

We investigated the relation between goal specificity and difficulty and performance on an interdependent bargaining task. In all, 102 subjects competed as buyers and sellers in a 25-min market simulation in which each negotiator was assigned either a nonspecific do-your-best objective or a specific easy, moderate, or difficult goal. Results showed that negotiators who were assigned specific, difficult goals were individually more profitable than negotiators who were assigned easier or nonspecific goals. Concerning dyadic performance, nonspecific or easy goals led to compromise agreements. Integrative agreements that benefited both parties to the transaction were facilitated by assigning both negotiators a moderate goal or difficult-moderate disparate goals. When both negotiators had difficult goals, dyadic performance did not approach the integrative level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of goal setting and group size on performance in a social dilemma.

Examined the effect of self-set personal and assigned group goal setting on an individual's behavior in 3- and 7-person groups confronted with a social dilemma. 274 Ss earned between $1.82 and $4.94 by investing money in either a personal account or a group account. Self-set personal goals that were compatible with an assigned group goal led to higher group performance than self-set incompatibly high ("greedy") personal goals. Collective-efficacy in making money, outcome expectancies that cooperation with others leads to the attainment of the group's goal, and group goal commitment correlated positively with group performance. Ss in 7-person groups (N?=?28) were less cooperative than those in 3-person groups (N?=?26). Ss in 7-person groups had lower collective-efficacy, lower outcome expectancies, and lower commitment to the group goal than did Ss in 3-person groups. Furthermore, individual performance in 7-person groups was significantly lower than individual performance in 3-person groups. A social dilemma appears to be a boundary condition for the normally positive effect of group goal setting on group performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Ten years of research on group size and helping.

Reviews research that attempts to replicate and extend B. Latané and J. M. Dabbs's (1970) discovery that the presence of other people inhibits an individual from intervening in an emergency. Particular attention is paid to the nature of the precipitating incident, the ambiguity of the helping situation, laboratory vs field settings, characteristics of the Ss, victims, and other bystanders, and the amount and kinds of communication among bystanders. It is concluded that, despite the diversity of styles, settings, and techniques among the studies, the social inhibition of helping is a remarkably consistent phenomenon; however, victims are more likely to receive assistance when only a single individual witnesses the emergency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Indirect portraits. An attempt of non-verbal communication in a psychoanalytic group

A collection of 7 own drawing and 15 related sketches are presented. They have been produced during the time of my participation in an analytic group. Fairly detailed information can be given about how the drawing process developed (first inspiration, initial situation, considerations during drawing). The formative and constituent elements of the drawing conceived consciously during its production are contrasted with those that have only later become conscious. The discussion of this own series of drawings and sketches should facilitate the comprehension of, and approach to, the drawings of the patients, which can also be considered to be 'indirect portraits' of their own personality and of their current environmental situatiion. The drawings were also an attempt at better integration in the group, with regard to group interaction. Advantages and disadvantages of this trial in nonverbal communication are discussed.     

Deindividuation: Effects of group size, density, number of observers, and group member similarity on self-consciousness and disinhibited behavior.

Predictions about the social causes of self-consciousness in groups were derived from the theory of deindividuation and tested in 3 experiments with 618 university students and adults. In Exp I, it was found that increasing group size was related to a decrease in self-consciousness. Group density did not influence self-consciousness. In Exp II, it was found that increases in the number of observers increased self-consciousness. In Exps I and II, self-reports of self-consciousness were independent of one's group, whereas the degree of behavioral disinhibition was highly correlated within groups. In Exp III, it was found that gender similarity within a group was related to lower self-consciousness. Findings support a perceptual/attentional model of self-consciousness within groups. Contrary to deindividuation theory predictions, however, behavior intensity did not vary across conditions in Exps I and II, even though self-consciousness did differ. This finding suggests that deindividuation theory is incomplete in its present form. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Members' reactions to apparent group approval of a counternorm communication.

"In a study of the use of one-way communications to change group-anchored attitudes, members of a college group listened to a recorded speech contrary to their norms. An audience that was heard to applaud the main points in the speech was described for some Ss (the members' applause Ss) as composed of members of the college group; for others (the outside applause Ss) it was composed of anonymous outsiders… . The members' applause Ss exhibited more immediate opinion change in the direction advocated by the speech than did the other Ss. The members' applause Ss also showed a greater tendency to misinterpret the speaker's point of view, judging it to be more similar to the college norms than did the outsider's applause Ss." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)