Qualifying a 40 ft ISO Freight Container as a Type IP-2, IP-3 Package by Performing a Full Scale Drop Test

Abstract

The first successful worldwide free fall drop test with a 40 ft ISO freight container took place in Bremen (Germany) at the dry dock of the former Vulkan shipyard on 25 September 1998. This drop test had to be performed to qualify the ISO Boxcontainer as a Type IP-2, IP-3 package in accordance with the new IAEA Safety Standards Series No ST-1 (1996 Edition). Dynamic impact requirements will become mandatory for freight containers to be qualified as Type IP-2,3 packages in compliance with IAEA ST-1 paragraph §627 ‘Alternative Requirements for IP-2,3 Packages’ (comes into force in January 2001). STM has fulfilled the dynamic impact requirements in performing a full scale drop test. The 40 ft ISO freight container prototype (L × W × H = 12192mm × 2438 mm × 2491 mm) was fully loaded with 28 t of steel plates together with shock absorbing material to simulate the load and load securing system. The total drop test weight was 35.6 t. In accordance with the new IAEA Safety Standards Series No ST-1 requirements, the so-called LONGFORCE® container was dropped onto an unyielding foundation in a position which produced the maximum damage in respect of the package safety features. The package was dropped on its comer, door side down on the roof, with the centre of gravity over the impact area (slap-down drop). The container was lifted 12.6 m high (highest point) and 0.3 m (lowest point) under a drop angle of 70°. The combined mass of the concrete block and the steel plate was more than 100 times that of the container test specimen. The first impact resulted in an acceleration of about loog where the maximum was just before the impact. The second impact, however, turned out to be decisive showing maximum acceleration readings in the range of 250g. The container has been inspected after the drop test and deformations of the container rear comer castings (area of second impact) and a small weld crack in one of the comer casting welds was found. On the container floor one third of transverse profiles showed S-form distortion. The LONGFORCE container was leak tested prior to and after the drop test in compliance with the STM leak test procedure. The leak tests consisted of filling the container with pressurised air up to 5 kPa and recording a possible pressure drop over a determined test period. The container was considered leak tight prior to and after the drop test based on the permissible limits set in the leak lest procedure. The free fall drop test is considered a full success qualifying the 40 ft LONGFORCE container as Type IP-2, Ip-3 package in compliance with the new IAEA Safety Standards Series No ST-1 requirements.     

Freight Containers as IP-2 Packagings

Abstract

A range of standard freight containers has been designed and manufactured to meet the needs of users and the requirements of the 1985 Edition of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material for Industrial Packages. The development of freight containers as IP-2 Packagings (Industrial Package Type 2) is described.     

The Design,Manufacture and Testing of a Container Module to Satisfy the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material – 1985 Edition (as Amended 1990), for the Transport of an Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) Gas Circulator

Abstract

Heysham 1 and Hartlepool Nuclear Power Stations share a common design of gas circulator and a requirement was identified to transport a spare circulator between the Stations. The circulators are 6 m long, 2 m diameter and weigh approximately 38 tonnes. The circulator becomes contaminated in use and is classified as suitable for transport as SCO-II. It can therefore be transported within a Type 2 Industrial Package (IP-2), in accordance with the IAEA Transport Regulations. An appropriate package, the Gas Circulator Transportation Module, based on ISO container standards, was designed, manufactured and tested, and a Safety Case prepared addressing the radiological hazards associated with the transport of a gas circulator and demonstrating regulatory compliance. Following the issue of a Certificate of Regulatory Compliance, the container module was used· to transport a gas circulator from Heysham 1 to Hartlepool, paving the way for similar purpose-designed modules for the transport of large components.     

Test Facilities for Radioactive Materials Transport Packages (Chicago Bridge & Iron,USA)

Abstract

Chicago Bridge & Iron, Research and Development Center located in Plainfield, Illinois offers the total capabilities required to perform design verification testing of hazardous waste shipping containers. The tests, defined in the US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71 (10CFR71), include vertical drop tests, puncture tests, crush tests, immersion tests, thermal tests, and container leak rate tests. Container structural design analysis, container manufacturing analysis, materials development testing plus dimensional analysis of individual components is also available. The test facilities meet or exceed the requirements given in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide, Safety Series No. 37, 1987. Additional capabilities for the design and fabrication of scale models and components for the test programme are also presented.     

Use of impact analysis in licensing industrial container for transporting new fuel

Abstract

The finite element (FE) method is a powerful tool for the simulation of mechanical and thermal behaviour of structures. In recent years, the explicit FE method has increasingly been used in the development of transport packages and as part of approval applications to demonstrate the performance of packages. Testing and analysis are the two methods specified in the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material for demonstrating the structural and thermal performance of a transport package against the requirements of the Transport Regulations. The roles of testing and analysis, and the relative prominence of the two, may vary between Competent Authorities in different countries. This can range from analysis being regarded as the primary mode of demonstration with testing as confirmatory, to testing being the primary mode of demonstration supplemented by analysis. This paper describes the use of the non-linear FE code LS-DYNA in the licensing of a new container for the transport of new nuclear fuel. The package was classified as an Industrial Package (Fissile) in accordance with the IAEA Regulations, and hence it was necessary, among other things, to demonstrate that criticality criteria were satisfied under postulated impact conditions. Physical drop tests were carried out and the results are compared with LS-DYNA computer calculations using the same FE models developed to support the design of the new container. The analyses and tests clearly demonstrate the novel use of polyurethane foam as the container main energy absorber. The FE predictions are compared for accelerations, bolt loadings and global deformations of the container. In general good correlation was obtained between predictions and tests and the differences, which did occur, particularly for accelerations, are discussed and reconciled. The paper concludes that explicit analysis codes are now so reliable for container impact calculations that minimal test work should be pursued basically for key confirmatory impact scenarios.     

Demonstration of structural performance of IP-2 package by simulation and full-scale horizontal free drop test

Packaging systems for the transportation of radioactive wastes have to be designed according to rigorous acceptance criteria and requirements in order to protect people and environment against radiation exposure and contamination risk. The IAEA requirements for type IP2 (Industrial Package Type 2) packages include to carry out free drop tests that represent normal conditions of transport. In such conditions, obviously, the required containment capability of the package has to be ensured.In this study the mechanical performances of a new Italian packaging system for the transportation of low and intermediate level wastes (LILW) undergoing horizontal free drop test are investigated. Especially, deformations caused in the sealing area of the package, which can affect the capability of the containment system, are evaluated.The carried out numerical analyses and experimental tests, at the lab. Scalbatraio of the DICI- University of Pisa, are presented and discussed.Numerical analyses (by qualified MARC^® code) have been performed to investigate the stress histories in the bolts, lid, and package body as well as the deformations in the sealing area and the compression conditions of the gasket.Localised stress appeared at the flange and at the bottom of packaging system. The maximum stresses resulted lower than the stress limits, so the structural integrity of the package was maintained and confirming its tightness. As a consequence of the primary impact a local deformation appeared at the primary lid, no cliff edge or loss of the safety features resulted.     

A summary of recent package testing activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Abstract

The history of testing of radioactive material packages at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) dates back to the early 1960s, and includes the testing of hundreds of different packages of all shapes and sizes. This paper provides an overview of ORNL's new Packaging Research Facility at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC), and describes recent package testing successes conducted at the NTRC from September 2002 to September 2003. This paper also provides an overview of the package testing capabilities available at NTRC. Between 2002 and 2003, ORNL conducted tests on the following packages: rackable can storage box (RCSB); ES-2100; DT-20; DPP-2; BRM shielded overpack; Fernald Silos IP-2 waste package; and RAJ II BWR fresh fuel package. Tests of the RCSB, a storage package for highly enriched uranium, involved two test specimens, dropped from 28 ft(8.4 m) in different orientations. The ES-2100 and DPP-2 involved four and six test units, respectively, subjected to the entire Type B normal conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions testing sequence, including thermal tests. A single DT-20 package was subjected to a subset of the Type B tests to confirm package performance. The BRM shielded overpack, weighing about 500 kg, was subject to the Type A package tests. Three Fernald Silos waste package test units — a large package weighing about 10,000 kg for shipping grouted waste removed from the Fernald site — were subjected to IP-2 tests. And finally, two RAJ II boiling water reactor fresh fuel test units were subjected to Type B 9 m drop and 1 m puncture tests.     

IP-2 package containing plutonium contaminated slag pots

Abstract

Croft Associates were approached by PC Richardson to carry out the licensing of an industrial package, IP-2 package containing plutonium contaminated slag pots. This project provided several unique challenges for all those involved. The slag pots belonged to Outokumpu a steel company based in Sheffield. During use, sampling indicated a high level of plutonium in the form of Pu-238 was present in a slag pot. Further sampling identified that four slag pots were contaminated with Pu-238 and required disposal. The source of the Pu-238 contamination was believed to be a single heart pacemaker present in scrap that was melted down for reuse. All four slag pots weighed between 50 and 65 t and three of the pots had large patched cracks. The size and nature of the contamination prevented the slag pots being broken up therefore they had to be packaged and transported intact. REMAC designed a steel box to package the slag pots. It was the responsibility of Croft to license this package. Several challenges were faced when licensing: first, the weight, size and contents prevented any physical drop testing of the package; second, the box was to be assembled around the slag pot, limiting the leak testing that could be carried out. All of the evaluation of the ability of the package to withstand the regulatory drop tests was therefore carried out by finite element analysis by AMEC NNC. This approach was also used to check the tie down and lifting systems. Leak testing was carried out via the soap bubble method on the assembled box before grouting. The transportation box, once assembled and licensed as an IP-2 package, was transported to Drigg from Sheffield by road.     

Demonstration of structural performance of IP-2 packages by advanced analytical simulation and full-scale drop test

Two new types of IP-2 (Industrial Package Type 2) to transport low and intermediate level radioactive waste (LILW) steel drums from nuclear power plants to a disposal facility have been developed in accordance with the IAEA and Korean regulations for radioactive materials. According to the regulations, both packages must preserve their structural performance after they are subjected to 0.9 m free drop tests, which are prescribed as normal conditions.In this study, an advanced analytical simulation and an evaluation process using the finite element (FE) method have been developed for the design assessment of the newly developed IP-2s. Then, analytical simulations for the various drop orientations were performed to evaluate the structural performance of the packages and demonstrate their compliance with the regulatory requirements. Also, full-scale drop tests were carried out to verify the numerical tools and modeling methodology used in the analyses and to confirm the performance of the IP-2s. In addition, parametric studies are carried out to investigate the sensitivity of the analytical variables, such as the material model and modeling methodology.In addition, this paper intends to provide basic guidance on the analytical simulation and evaluation process specifically for Korean types of transport packages, because numerous transport packages must now be developed for the various kinds of LILW that have accumulated in temporary storage facilities in Korea.     

放射性物质运输货包安全试验

介绍了中国放射性物质运输遵守的法规和中国辐射防护研究院用于放射性物质运输货包试验的下落试验设施、耐热试验设施和数据获取能力。试验设施根据IAEA的《放射性物质安全运输条例》（TS-R-1）和中国的《放射性物质安全运输规程》（GB 11806-2004）的要求建设。下落试验设施能用于13 t级以下的A型和B型货包的自由下落试验、贯穿试验、力学试验（自由下落试验Ⅰ、自由下落试验Ⅱ和自由下落试验Ⅲ）。耐热试验设施能完成B型货包的耐热试验。利用这些设施已进行了FCo70-YQ型货包、30A-HB-01型货包、SY-I型货包和XAYT-I型货包的遵章取证试验     

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (Oak Ridge National Laboratory,USA)

Abstract

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has extensive capabilities to test full-scale and model packages that have been designed to the testing requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 71.73. These are the same teststhat are specified in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No.6, 1985 edition as amended in 1990. This report provides information about the facilities, personnel qualifications, prior test experience, and quality assurance capabilities which are available to support package testing.     

The relevance of IAEA tests to severe accidents in nuclear fuel cycle transport

Abstract

The design and performance standards for packages used for the transport of nuclear fuel cycle materials are defined in the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, TS-R-1, in order to ensure safety under both normal and accident conditions of transport. The underlying philosophy is that safety is vested principally in the package and the design and performance criteria are related to the potential hazard. Type B packages are high-duty packages which are used for the transport of the more radioactive materials, notably spent fuel and vitrified high-level waste (VHLW). Tests are specified in the IAEA regulations to ensure the integrity of these packages in potential transport accidents involving impacts, fires or immersion in water. The mechanical tests for Type B packages include drop tests onto an unyielding surface without giving rise to a significant release of radioactivity. The objects which could impact upon a package in real-life transport accidents, such as concrete roads, bridge abutments and piers, will yield to some extent and absorb some of the energy of the moving package. Impact tests onto an unyielding surface are therefore relevant to impacts onto real-life objects at much higher speeds. The thermal test specifies that Type B packages must be able to withstand a fully engulfing fire of 800°C for 30 min without significant release of radioactivity, and this has to be demonstrated, for example, by analytical studies backed up by experimental tests. The regulations also specify immersion tests for Type B packages of 15 m for 8 h without significant release of radioactivity; and in addition for spent fuel and VHLW packages, 200 m for 1 h without rupture of the containment. There is a large body of evidence to show that the current IAEA Type B test requirements are severe and cover all the situations which can be realistically envisaged in the transport of spent fuel, VHLW and other fuel cycle materials. Any proposals for more severe tests, which have little technical justification, should therefore be treated with caution since this could result in a loss of public confidence in the current regulations, and the ratcheting up of design requirements which could not be justified on quantitative safety grounds.     

Independent Design Appraisal and Container Certification

Abstract

Under the IAEA Safety Series 6, waste and transport containers for radioactive materials must comply with specified standards of design, manufacture and test. In all cases, the consignor carries responsibility, but will generally neither design nor manufacture the container himself. Design appraisal, inspection during manufacture, and witnessing of tests by an independent third party can therefore be of benefit. In the case of ISO freight containers, such services can also incorporate Certification of containers as required by the International Container Safety Convention (CSC).     

Large Package Tests for Normal Conditions of Transport

Abstract

The IAEA Regulations (1985) for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material specify requirements for packagings and packages (Section 5). These include tests for normal conditions of transport (Paras 619–625) and accident conditions for packages containing larger quantities of activity (Paras 626–633). The tests for normal conditions include drop tests from heights which vary with the package mass (Para 622). The ‘Explanatory Material’ (1987) describes these drop-tests as ‘a falloff the platform of a vehicle’ after which ‘packages would continue the journey’. There is clear implication that any damage which obviously degrades important functions of the packaging system results from ‘accident’ damage rather than ‘normal conditions of transport’. The important functions include containment, criticality control, shielding, impact protection and fire protection. Large packages, such as ISO containers, may exceed 6 m in length and when subject to a corner drop of 1 m or less, the centre of gravity will fall more than 3 m. The secondary impact will be much more severe than the initial impact. Neither the corner drop nor the secondary impact simulate normal conditions of transport. An alternative specification for normal condition drop testing of large containers is proposed, avoiding the more severe damage resulting from secondary impacts.     

一种医疗放射源运输容器冲击试验和数值仿真

设计了一种用于运输和储存医疗用密封放射源的运输容器,外形尺寸为 1 141 mm×1 206 mm,质量约3 600 kg,满载 444 TBq(12 000 Ci)⁶⁰Co放射源时属于B型货包,根据GB 11806和SSR-6的要求进行验证货包经受事故能力的自由下落试验I(冲击试验)。采用三维非线性显式动力分析软件ANSYS/LS-DYNA对货包顶角下落冲击试验进行了计算分析,结果表明在冲击部位约 200 mm×200 mm范围内受力较大,2条螺栓可能断裂,冲击部位最大变形量为 45.9 mm。进行了顶角下落试验,测量了外容器外壳的应力和容器的变形。将计算结果与试验结果进行了比较,其结果相互吻合,表明了有限元算法应用于大冲击的破坏性试验中,可很好地预测应力最大区和形变量。     

Test Facilities for Radioactive Material Transport Packages (AEA Technology,Winfrith, UK)

Abstract

Transport packages for radioactive materials are tested to demonstrate compliance with national and international regulations. The involvement of AEA Technology is traced from the establishment of the early IAEA Regulations. Transport package design, testing, assessment and approval requires a wide variety of skills and facilities. The comprehensive capability of AEA Technology in these areas is described with references to practical experience in the form of a short bibliography. The facilities described include drop-test cranes and targets (up to 700te); air guns for impacts up to sonic velocities; pool fires, furnaces and rigs for thermal tests including heat dissipation on prototype flasks; shielding facilities and instruments; criticality simulations and leak test instruments. These are illustrated with photographs demonstrating the comprehensive nature of package testing services supplied to customers.     

Transport of large nuclear power plant components: experiences in mechanical design assessment

Abstract

In the course of decommissioning of power plants in Germany large nuclear components (steam generator, reactor pressure vessel) must be transported over public traffic routes to interim storage facilities, where they are dismantled or stored temporarily. Since it concerns surface contaminated objects or low specific activity materials, a safety evaluation considering the IAEA transport regulations mainly for industrial packages (type IP-2) is necessary. For these types of industrial packages the requirements from normal transport conditions are to be covered for the mechanical proof. For example, a free drop of the package from a defined height, in dependence of its mass, onto an unyielding target, and a stacking test are required. Since physical drop tests are impossible generally due to the singularity of such 'packages', a calculation has to be performed, preferably by a complex numerical analysis. The assessment of the loads takes place on the basis of local stress distributions, also with consideration of radiation induced brittleness of the material and with consideration of recent scientific investigation results. Large nuclear components have typically been transported in an unpackaged manner, so that the external shell of the component provides the packaging wall. The investigation must consider the entire component including all penetration areas such as manholes or nozzles. According to the present IAEA regulations the drop position is to be examined, which causes the maximum damage to the package. In the case of a transport under special arrangement a drop only in an attitude representing the usual handling position (administratively controlled) is necessary. If dose rate values of the package are higher than maximum allowable values for a public transport, then it is necessary that additional shielding construction units are attached to the large component.     

Developing historical technical basis for radiological safety requirements of international transport safety regulations

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for developing safety requirements for the transport of radioactive material. These requirements were first published in 1961 as ‘Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material’, Safety Series No. 6 (the Regulations), and have been revised at regular intervals, in consultation with Member States, and with input from other relevant organisations, as appropriate. The current regular review and revision of the Regulations has been driven by problems, challenges and the demand for improvements, as well as the need to take into account experiences in transport, newly identified issues, new technologies, best practices, the demand for sustainable transport and harmonisation. After 50 years, 15 editions of the Regulations have been published. With the passage of time, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development in transport safety has begun to fade. The need to capture valuable knowledge, which needs to be preserved for future reference, has become clear. In general, every requirement in the regulations was developed on the basis of deliberations among international experts and an appropriate technical basis. The knowledge bases for these often exist in a decentralised manner in many Member States with mature nuclear programmes. Easier access to the existing technical bases for the Regulations could lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the Regulations. Knowledge capture and transfer can contribute to the development of and innovations in transport safety. This paper provides an overview of international level efforts that began in 2010 to develop a comprehensive and detailed technical basis document (TecBasDoc) to support the current and future revisions of the Regulations. The draft TecBasDoc has so far resulted from efforts by IAEA staff and a large number of international transport experts. It exceeds 150 pages in length using, to the greatest extent possible, historical documents dating as far back as the 1950s as reference material. The intent of this effort is to record, for those Member States new to transport and for future generations, the scientific and technical heritage of several decades of development that has occurred in transport safety and to capture valuable knowledge so it can be preserved for future reference. The latest effort has involved consultants to the IAEA adapting the draft to reflect guidance from the IAEA’s Transport Safety Standards Committee (TRANSSC) and delving into the IAEA’s archives and other sources of historical documents, searching out many long sought, older supporting documents. The draft is currently structured into 12 chapters, embodying multiple supporting appendixes. This paper elaborates on the first chapters of the document, which include General History, Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Objectives and Principles for Transport, General Safety Requirements, Radiation Protection and Controls for Transport. Two companion papers at PATRAM 2013 address the status of the TecBasDoc in the topical areas of package testing and criticality control. In all cases, the chapters of the TecBasDoc address how early decisions were made citing well known historical experts and discussing how these initial decisions have been adapted to meet the emerging international safety guidelines.     

Disposal container safety assessment – drop tests with 'Yoyushindo-Disposal' waste container onto concrete target

Abstract

This paper presents technical details of the drop test performance as well as some experimental results of tests carried out with the Japanese 'Yoyushindo-Disposal' waste container for intermediate depth disposal. The drop test program comprised three single 8 m drop tests at the specimen's corner edge orientation onto a concrete slab. The slab was connected to the unyielding IAEA target of the BAM's 200 t drop test facility. The three tested specimens had masses between 20 000 and 28 000 kg depending on their content mass. The tests were accompanied by various metrology, such as strain and deceleration measurements, optical three-dimensional deformation methods, leak tightness testing and test installation for potential particle release measurements to collect a set of data for establishing a basis for safety assessment.     

放射性物质运输货包试验工作进展

运输货包的固有安全性是放射性物质运输安全的前提,货包要经受多种条件的试验验证,国际原子能机构的《放射性物质安全运输规程》规定了放射性物质运输货包要经受的正常和事故运输条件下的试验要求。本文简要介绍了货包试验的主要内容及国内外货包试验验证工作的进展状况,建议加强国内的放射性物质运输货包试验验证工作,保证我国放射性物质的运输安全。