Mother-child participation in conversation about the past: relationships to preschoolers' theory of mind

Forty 3.5 to 4.5-year-olds discussed 3 past events with their mothers and completed a set of theory of mind tasks indexing their ability to reason about conflicting mental representations and their understanding of knowledge. Semipartial correlations and analyses of covariance showed that children's theory of mind scores were related to their participation in memory conversations, independent of age and linguistic skill. The frequency with which mothers provided new information was related to children's theory of mind scores, although mothers' direct replies to children were generally unrelated to children's understanding of mind. This research takes an important step toward examining the relevance of theory of mind skills to real-world, social interaction. The results have implications for explaining the emergence of autobiographical memory.     

Mother–child participation in conversation about the past: Relationships to preschoolers' theory of mind.

Forty 3.5- to 4.5-year-olds discussed 3 past events with their mothers and completed a set of theory of mind tasks indexing their ability to reason about conflicting mental representations and their understanding of knowledge. Semipartial correlations and analyses of covariance showed that children's theory of mind scores were related to their participation in memory conversations, independent of age and linguistic skill. The frequency with which mothers provided new information was related to children's theory of mind scores, although mothers' direct replies to children were generally unrelated to children's understanding of mind. This research takes an important step toward examining the relevance of theory of mind skills to real-world, social interaction. The results have implications for explaining the emergence of autobiographical memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relation between individual differences in fantasy and theory of mind

The relation between early fantasy/pretense and children's knowledge about mental life was examined in a study of 152 3- and 4-year-old boys and girls. Children were interviewed about their fantasy lives (e.g., imaginary companions, impersonation of imagined characters) and were given tasks assessing their level of pretend play and verbal intelligence. In a second session 1 week later, children were given a series of theory of mind tasks, including measures of appearance-reality, false belief, representational change, and perspective taking. The theory of mind tasks were significantly intercorrelated with the effects of verbal intelligence and age statistically controlled. Individual differences in fantasy/pretense were assessed by (1) identifying children who created imaginary characters, and (2) extracting factor scores from a combination of interview and behavioral measures. Each of these fantasy assessments was significantly related to the theory of mind performance of the 4-year-old children, independent of verbal intelligence.     

The Genevan and Cattell-Horn conceptions of intelligence compared: Early implementation of numerical solution aids.

Highlights the similarities and differences of the Genevan and Cattell-Horn theories of intelligence and reports an investigation of the relation of operative level and set of performance on tasks indexing children's knowledge of correspondence relations. 105 children (aged 4 yrs to 7 yrs 11 mo) completed counting, instructional set, conservation of number, and static numerical comparison tasks. Findings indicate that performance on quantitative comparision task reflecting Ss' understanding of correspondence relations was highly related to operative level and that Ss' capacity to implement solution aids in making quantitative comparison was moderated by their level of operative development. While findings lend support to the Genevan theory, this theory tends to neglect issues pertaining to localized functioning such as the question of relative efficacy of rival solution approaches. In contrast, the Cattell-Horn theory emphasizes that well-learned knowledge-producing skills constitute potential solution aids and that children differ in what solution aids they learn to implement. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Young children's understanding of conflicting mental representation predicts suggestibility.

This study examined the relation between developmental suggestibility effects and preschoolers' emerging ability to reason about conflicting mental representations (CMRs). Three- to 5-yr-olds listened to a story accompanied by pictures. Following a 4-min delay, children answered straightforward and misleading questions about the story. One wk later, their memory for the story was assessed. Children also completed tasks indexing their ability to reason about CMRs. Stepwise regression analyses revealed that suggestibility was negatively related to performance on CMR tasks. This finding remained significant after controlling for age, children's level of initial encoding of the event, and their ability to retrieve event details when not misled. An integration is proposed between children's theory of mind and source monitoring that may help to explain early developmental changes in suggestibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preschoolers' use of desires to solve theory of mind problems in a pretense context

K. Bartsch and H. M. Wellman (1995) have suggested that 3-year-old children's preference to construe behavior in terms of desire may interfere with their ability to reason according to belief in standard false belief tasks. Other researchers have suggested that young children fail typical measures of theory of mind because they have a reality bias (e.g., P. Mitchell, 1994). Study 1 demonstrates that even young children are able to correctly attribute a false belief to an agent when that belief is about the status of a pretense. Study 2 shows that children find it easier to attribute a false belief when the desires of the agent are eliminated. However, Study 3 suggests that a reality bias also influences children's ability to consider beliefs. Implications for recent accounts of theory of mind development are discussed.     

Finding your marbles: does preschoolers' strategic behavior predict later understanding of mind?

The aim of this longitudinal study was to assess (a) stability of individual differences in preschoolers' executive function performance, (b) the external validity of 4 new simple executive function tasks, and (c) whether individual differences in early executive function performance could be used to predict later differences in theory of mind, or vice versa. Fifty children involved in an earlier study of relations between preschoolers' theory of mind, verbal ability, and executive function (C. Hughes, 1998) were followed up and tested 1 year later, using 1st- and 2nd-order false-belief tasks, a set of 4 simple executive function tasks, and a well-established executive test of planning: the Tower of London (T. Shallice, 1982). The results of the study support recent proposals (C. Hughes, 1996; J. Russell, 1996) that young children's understanding of mind is grounded in their growing competence in strategic planning and mental flexibility.     

Integrating relationship constructs and emotional experience into false belief tasks in preschool children

Themes of separation from attachment figures are involved when caregivers are integrated into standard theory of mind tasks in which objects or toys are located. Two experiments test the hypothesis that searching for a caregiver would interfere with false belief performance and be related to a child's emotional awareness. Experiment 1 consisted of a cross-sectional study of three- to five-year-old children administered false belief tasks related to object identity, object location, and caregiver location, i.e., false belief tasks where story characters became separated from a parent and had to locate them. As expected, there were age-related improvements in false belief performance to above-chance levels during object identity and object location tasks, but performance on the caregiver location tasks showed no age-related improvement and at age five was poorer than other tasks. Emotional integration also varied with task. Children who were relatively more aware of emotions were more likely to pass tasks involving objects, and queries of emotions during tasks were related to false beliefs about objects but not caregivers. A second study of children five years of age indicated that it was not caregivers per se that disrupted their performance on false belief tasks. Additional tasks showed that this finding was due to caregivers being animate "behaving" objects whose relocation had been self- as opposed to other-directed, which suggests that false belief performance was related to the intent of the sought item. The developing awareness of the minds of others in five-year-olds and emotional content of the task may interfere with performance in false belief tasks that are social.     

Children as common sense psychologists.

Reviews the book, Developing theories of mind edited by Janet W. Astington, Paul L. Harris, and David R. Olson (see record 1988-98675-000). This book is a collection of the 20 papers delivered at the International Conference on Developing Theories of Mind organized in the University of Toronto in 1986. The book explores the area of cognitive sciences dealing with children's awareness of themselves and other people as intentional creatures who know, believe, doubt, imagine, pretend, etc. The reviewer thinks that the work as a whole suffers from a lack of depth. The problem is that researchers have set out to explore a development without taking stock of that in which development is supposed to occur, namely intentionality and children's grasp of its nature in its diverse forms. On the other hand, if you want to know what psychologists are doing to understand the child's growing appreciation of mind and what psychologists claim they have found, this is the place to start. The contributions are attractively modest and free of bewildering jargon. The editors have worked hard and, together with the contributors, raise fundamental questions that have long been ignored. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Trick or treat?: uneven understanding of mind and emotion and executive dysfunction in "hard-to-manage" preschoolers

It is widely recognised that impaired social relations are characteristic of school-aged children with behavioural disorders, and predict a poor long-term outcome (Parker & Asher, 1987). However, little is known about the early antecedents of social impairment in behaviourally disturbed children. The aim of the present study was to explore three areas of potential dysfunction in younger children: theory of mind, emotion understanding, and executive function. Forty preschoolers, rated by their parents on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (Goodman, 1994) as "hard to manage" (H2M) were compared with a control group on a set of: (1) theory of mind tasks (including an emotion prediction task involving either a nice or a nasty surprise); (2) emotion understanding stories (that required affective perspective-taking skills as well as situational understanding); and (3) simple executive function tasks (adapted for preschoolers, and tapping inhibitory control, attentional set-shifting, and working memory). Small but significant group differences were found in all three cognitive domains. In particular, hard-to-manage preschoolers showed poor understanding of emotion and executive control, poor prediction or recall of a false belief, and better understanding of the belief-dependency of emotion in the context of a trick than a treat. Moreover, executive function was associated with performance on the theory of mind tasks for the hard-to-manage group alone, suggesting both direct and indirect links between executive dysfunction and disruptive behaviour.     

Executive Function and Theory of Mind: Stability and Prediction From Ages 2 to 3.

Several studies have demonstrated a relation between executive functioning (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) in preschoolers, yet the developmental course of this relation remains unknown. Longitudinal stability and EF-ToM relations were examined in 81 children at 24 and 39 months. At Time 1, EF was unrelated to behavioral measures of ToM but was significantly related to parent report of children's internal-state language, independent of vocabulary size. At Time 2, behavioral batteries of EF and ToM were significantly related (r=.50, p     

Mental evolution and development: Evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes, and other animals.

Recent interest in the development and evolution of theory of mind has provided a wealth of information about representational skills in both children and animals. According to J. Perner (1991), children begin to entertain secondary representations in the 2nd year of life. This advance manifests in their passing hidden displacement tasks, engaging in pretense and means-ends reasoning, interpreting external representations, displaying mirror self-recognition and empathic behavior, and showing an early understanding of "mind" and imitation. New data show a cluster of mental accomplishments in great apes that is very similar to that observed in 2-year-old humans. It is suggested that it is most parsimonious to assume that this cognitive profile is of homologous origin and that great apes possess secondary representational capacity. Evidence from animals other than apes is scant. This analysis leads to a number of predictions for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Referential Understanding of Videos in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), and Children (Homo sapiens).

Performance on identical search tasks based on cues directly perceived or indirectly perceived through video were compared among a group of 4 adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), a group of 2 adult orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), and a group of 36 children (between 2 and 3 years of age). Children comprehended directly perceived cues but had difficulty with video cues. In contrast, chimpanzees and 1 orangutan were successful in using video to guide their search for a hidden object. Two follow-up studies with 3-year-old children demonstrated the importance of more distinct perceptual and verbal cues in aiding children's understanding of video as referring to real-world events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's ability to infer utterance veracity from speaker informedness.

Children between the ages of 3 years 7 months and 6 years 5 months experienced a contradiction between what they knew or guessed to be inside a box and what they were told by an adult. The authors investigated whether children believed what they were told by asking them to make a final judgment about the box's content. Children tended to believe utterances from speakers who were better informed than they themselves were and to disbelieve those from less well-informed speakers, with no age-related differences. This behavior implies an understanding of the speaker's knowledge and suggests that children can learn from oral input while being appropriately skeptical of its truth. Children also gave explicit knowledge judgments on trials on which no utterances were given. Performance on knowledge trials was less accurate than, and unrelated to, performance on utterance trials. Research on children's developing explicit theory of mind needs to be broadened to include behavioral indexes of understanding the mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theory of mind and self-concept in preadolescents: Links with gender and language.

The investigation of the ability to attribute mental states to others and to see them as the basis for people's actions has been referred to as "theory of mind" (ToM) research. This study assessed ToM, or social understanding, in preadolescents and examined individual differences in the relations among social understanding, self-concept, and language competence. One hundred twenty-eight preadolescents (64 girls, 64 boys; mean age = 11 years, 9 months) completed tasks concerning self-concept and vocabulary and participated in a story-telling interview that assessed social and self-understanding. There were positive associations between children's social understanding and (a) self-understanding, (b) self-perceptions of behavioral conduct, and (c) general vocabulary ability. Independent of vocabulary ability, girls scored higher than boys on both social and self-understanding tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivating autistic children.

A major problem encountered in the field of autism is the children's characteristic lack of motivation. This problem is especially apparent when autistic children attempt to complete learning tasks. The purpose of this study was to investigate the influence of correct vs incorrect task completion on children's motivation to respond to such tasks. Ss were 3 autistic children aged 6 yrs 1 mo, 11 yrs 11 mo, and 12 yrs 3 mo. Results demonstrate that when Ss worked on tasks at which they were typically incorrect, their motivation for those tasks decreased to extremely low levels. However, designing treatment procedures to prompt Ss to keep responding until they completed the tasks correctly served to increase Ss' motivation to respond to those tasks. The implications of these findings are that (a) autistic children's learning handicaps (which typically lead to low levels of correct responding) may result in few or inconsistent rewards for attempting to respond at all, thus decreasing the children's motivation; and (b) treatment procedures designed to keep the children responding until they complete a task correctly may result in coincidental reinforcement for perseverance, increasing the children's motivation to respond to those tasks. Results are discussed in relation to the literature on learned helplessness. (22 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

SPECT scatter modelling in non-uniform attenuating objects

When young children appear to recognize that someone else is engaging in make-believe play, do they infer what the pretender is thinking? Are they aware that the pretender is thinking about a pretend scenario yet knows what the real situation is? Preschoolers ages 3-5 (N = 45) viewed scenes from the Barney & Friends television series depicting either make-believe or realistic actions. Children were questioned concerning the presence of pretense and the thoughts and beliefs of the TV characters. The children were also presented with false belief and appearance/reality theory of mind tasks. Children who identified when TV characters were engaging in pretend play did not necessarily infer the pretenders' thoughts and beliefs. Inferring pretenders' thoughts was related to performance on false belief and appearance/reality tasks, but simply recognizing pretense was not. These data support the view that children initially learn to recognize pretense from contextual cues and are able to infer pretenders' beliefs only with further development of metarepresentational ability.     

Piaget and Lévy-Bruhl.

Lévy-Bruhl exerted a powerful influence, seldom considered, on Piaget. The Lévy-Bruhlian thesis of a "pre-logical mentality" characterized by "mystical participation" is outlined, together with its initial reception. The first evidence of Piaget's interest in it dates from 1920, and when he began his studies of children's thinking he compared it with that of "primitives," also adopting Lévy-Bruhl's concept of "participation." By 1928 Piaget had elaborated a theory of the social foundations of different types of thought, which he regarded as also explaining the alleged similarity between the thinking of primitives and children: Both are subject to constraint, primitives by elders and children by parents and teachers. Logical as opposed to pre-logical thought was said to depend on cooperation in free social interaction. Piaget continued to maintain essentially the same views long after Lévy-Bruhl himself had renounced the notion of pre-logicality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)