Regular disjunction-free default theories

In this paper, the class of regular disjunction-free default theories is introduced and investigated.A transformation from regular default theories to normal default theories is established. The initial theory andthe transformed theory have the same extensions when restricted to old variables. Hence, regular default theoriesenjoy some similar properties (e.g., existence of extensions, semi-monotonicity) as normal default theories. Then,a new algorithm for credulous reasoning of regular theories is developed. This algorithm runs in a time not morethan 0(1.45~n), where n is the number of defaults. In case of regular prerequisite-free or semi-2CNF defaulttheories, the credulous reasoning can be solved in polynomial time. However, credulous reasoning for semi-Horndefault theories is shown to be NP-complete although it is tractable for Horn default theories. Moreover, skepticalreasoning for regular unary default theories is co-NP-complete.     

What Should Default Reasoning be,by Default?

This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing default reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain.     

Modeling default reasoning using defaults

User modeling research can benefit from formal automated reasoning tools. However existing formal tools may need to be modified to suit the needs of user modeling. Theorist is a simple framework for default reasoning. It can be used as a tool for building and maintaining a user model, and as a model of a user's default reasoning. To apply Theorist to both tasks, we develop Nested Theorist (NT), a simple tool based on Theorist that allows default reasoning on arbitrarily-many levels. We extend NT in two ways: we allow prioritized defaults, and we allow reasoning about agents with limited reasoning capabilities. This paper focusses on applications, and uses wide-ranging examples from user-modeling literature to illustrate the usefulness of the tools presented.     

Extending the Maximum Entropy Approach to Variable Strength Defaults

A generalisation of the maximum entropy (ME) approach to default reasoning [7,8] to cater for variable strength defaults is presented. The assumptions on which the original work was based are reviewed and revised. A new algorithm is presented that is shown to compute the ME-ranking under these more general conditions. The limitations of the revised approach are discussed and a test for the uniqueness of the ME-solution is given. The ME-solutions to several illustrative examples of default reasoning are given, and the approach is shown to handle them appropriately. The conclusion is that the ME-approach can be regarded as providing a benchmark theory of default reasoning against which default intuitions and other default systems may be assessed.     

Reasoning with Sets of Defaults in Default Logic

We present a general approach for representing and reasoning with sets of defaults in default logic, focusing on reasoning about preferences among sets of defaults. First, we consider how to control the application of a set of defaults so that either all apply (if possible) or none do (if not). From this, an approach to dealing with preferences among sets of default rules is developed. We begin with an ordered default theory , consisting of a standard default theory, but with possible preferences on sets of rules. This theory is transformed into a second, standard default theory wherein the preferences are respected. The approach differs from other work, in that we obtain standard default theories and do not rely on prioritized versions of default logic. In practical terms this means we can immediately use existing default logic theorem provers for an implementation. Also, we directly generate just those extensions containing the most preferred applied rules; in contrast, most previous approaches generate all extensions, then select the most preferred. In a major application of the approach, we show how semimonotonic default theories can be encoded so that reasoning can be carried out at the object level. With this, we can reason about default extensions from within the framework of a standard default logic. Hence one can encode notions such as skeptical and credulous conclusions, and can reason about such conclusions within a single extension.     

Reasoning situated in time I: basic concepts*

Abstract

The needs of a real-time reasoner situated in an environment may make it appropriate to view error-correction and non-monotonicity as much the same thing. This has led us to formulate situated (or step) logic, an approach to reasoning in which the formalism has a kind of real-time self-reference that affects the course of deduction itself. Here we seek to motivate this as a useful vehicle for exploring certain issues in commonsense reasoning. In particular, a chief drawback of more traditional logics is avoided: from a contradiction we do not have all wffs swamping the (growing) conclusion set. Rather, we seek potentially inconsistent, but nevertheless useful, logics where the real-time self-referential feature allows a direct contradiction to be spotted and corrective action taken, as part of the same system of reasoning. Some specific inference mechanisms for real-time default reasoning are suggested, notably a form of introspection relevant to default reasoning. Special treatment of ‘now’ and of contradictions are the main technical devices here. We illustrate this with a computer-implemented real time solution to R. Moore's Brother Problem.     

Default reasoning and belief revision: A syntax-independent approach

As an important variant of Reiter‘s default logic.Poole(1988) developed a nonmonotonic reasoning framework in the classical first-order language,Brewka and Nebel extended Poole‘s approach in order to enable a representation of priorities between defaults.In this paper a general framework for default reasoning is presented,which can be viewed as a generalization of the three approaches above.It is proved that the syntax-independent default reasoning in this framework is identical to the general belief revision operation introduced by Zhang et al.(1997).This esult provides a solution to the problem whether there is a correspondence between belief revision and default logic for the infinite case .As a by-product,an answer to the the question,raised by Mankinson and Gaerdenfors(1991),is also given about whether there is a counterpart contraciton in nonmonotonic logic.     

Default reasoning by deductive planning

This paper deals with the automation of reasoning from incomplete information by means of default logics. We provide proof procedures for default logics' major reasoning modes, namely, credulous and skeptical reasoning. We start by reformulating the task of credulous reasoning in default logics as deductive planning problems. This interpretation supplies us with several interesting and valuable insights into the proof theory of default logics. Foremost, it allows us to take advantage of the large number of available methods, algorithms, and implementations for solving deductive planning problems. As an example, we demonstrate how credulous reasoning in certain variants of default logic is implementable by means of a planning method based on equational logic programming. In addition, our interpretation allows us to transfer theoretical results, such as complexity results, from the field of planning to that of default logics. In this way, we have isolated two yet unknown classes of default theories for which deciding credulous entailment is polynomial.Our approach to skeptical reasoning relies on an arbitrary method for credulous reasoning. It does not strictly require rather the inspection of all extensions, nor does it strictly require the computation of entire extensions to decide whether a formula is skeptically entailed. Notably, our approach abstracts from an underlying credulous reasoner. In this way, it can be used to extend existing formalisms for credulous reasoning to skeptical reasoning.This author was a visiting professor at the University of Darmstadt while parts of this work were being carried out. This author also acknowledges support from the Commission of the European Communities under grant no. ERB4001GT922433.     

基于DFL的缺省假设推理研究

日常生活中人们可以在信息不完全的情况下进行推理并得出较好的推理结论,而且在推理过程中,很多对象都是具有动态模糊性(DF Character)。因此文中针对研究对象以及它们之间的动态模糊性,提出了基于动态模糊逻辑(DFL)的缺省假设推理,并给出了缺省假设推理的框架描述、动态模糊(DF)知识的表示以及推理算法等。     

An Interpretation of Default Logic in Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic

When reasoning about complex domains, where information available is usually only partial, nonmonotonic reasoning can be an important tool. One of the formalisms introduced in this area is Reiter's Default Logic (1980). A characteristic of this formalism is that the applicability of default (inference) rules can only be verified in the future of the reasoning process. We describe an interpretation of default logic in temporal epistemic logic which makes this characteristic explicit. It is shown that this interpretation yields a semantics for default logic based on temporal epistemic models. A comparison between the various semantics for default logic will show the differences and similarities of these approaches and ours.     

子句型缺省逻辑中的分情形推理

引进一种树型方法以研究缺省逻辑中分情形推理下的Roos扩张,深入讨论了Roos扩张的计算,并分析了Roos扩张与Reiter扩张的关系.为计算Roos扩张,引入了从子句集分解最小文字集的算法.方法对于在缺省逻辑中计算Roos扩张以及分析分情形推理的计算复杂性是有用的.     

在一类缺省理论中关于证明理论的完备性问题

缺省推理是各种非单调推理系统中最在影响的系统之一。Ｒ。Ｒｅｉｔｅｒ对规范缺省理论作了一系列的研究。他还提出了证明理论，并证明了这一证明理论对于规范缺省理论来说是完备的。Ｗ。Ｅｔｈｅｒｉｎｇｔｏｎ则提出了应用范围更为广泛的有序半规范缺省理论。本文先证明了这类缺省理论具有半单调性等各种性质，然后证明了Ｒ。Ｒｅｉｔｅｒ的证明理论对于有序半规范缺省理论也是完备的。     

On a rule-based interpretation of default conditionals

In nonmonotonic reasoning, a default conditional α→β has most often been informally interpreted as a defeasible version of a classical conditional, usually the material conditional. There is however an alternative interpretation, in which a default is regarded essentially as a rule, leading from premises to conclusion. In this paper, we present a family of logics, based on this alternative interpretation. A general semantic framework under this rule-based interpretation is developed, and associated proof theories for a family of weak conditional logics is specified. Nonmonotonic inference is easily defined in these logics. Interestingly, the logics presented here are weaker than the commonly-accepted base conditional approach for defeasible reasoning. However, this approach resolves problems that have been associated with previous approaches.      

缺省推理中的三个定理

本文证明了缺省推理中的三个定理.定理1表明了缺省推理的非单调性这一特点.定理2的实际意义在于,在一个封闭规范缺省理论(D,W)中,只要W能推出D中某些缺省的结论,则可以把这样的缺省规则从理论中删除,所得到的较小的缺省理论其延伸仍与原来缺省理论一样.尤其是若W能推出D中所有的缺省规则结论,则(D,W)的延伸就是W,这就是本文推论的结论.     

Embedding defaults into terminological knowledge representation formalisms

We consider the problem of integrating Reiter's default logic into terminological representation systems. It turns out that such an integration is less straightforward than we expected, considering the fact that the terminological language is a decidable sublanguage of first-order logic. Semantically, one has the unpleasant effect that the consequences of a terminological default theory may be rather unintuitive, and may even vary with the syntactic structure of equivalent concept expressions. This is due to the unsatisfactory treatment of open defaults via Skolemization in Reiter's semantics. On the algorithmic side, we show that this treatment may lead to an undecidable default consequence relation, even though our base language is decidable, and we have only finitely many (open) defaults. Because of these problems, we then consider a restricted semantics for open defaults in our terminological default theories: default rules are applied only to individuals that are explicitly present in the knowledge base. In this semantics it is possible to compute all extensions of a finite terminological default theory, which means that this type of default reasoning is decidable. We describe an algorithm for computing extensions and show how the inference procedures of terminological systems can be modified to give optimal support to this algorithm.This is a revised and extended version of a paper presented at the3rd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, October 1992, Cambridge, MA.     

An approach to fuzzy default reasoning for function approximation

This paper discusses fuzzy reasoning for approximately realizing nonlinear functions by a small number of fuzzy if-then rules with different specificity levels. Our fuzzy rule base is a mixture of general and specific rules, which overlap with each other in the input space. General rules work as default rules in our fuzzy rule base. First, we briefly describe existing approaches to the handling of default rules in the framework of possibility theory. Next, we show that standard interpolation-based fuzzy reasoning leads to counterintuitive results when general rules include specific rules with different consequents. Then, we demonstrate that intuitively acceptable results are obtained from a non-standard inclusion-based fuzzy reasoning method. Our approach is based on the preference for more specific rules, which is a commonly used idea in the field of default reasoning. When a general rule includes a specific rule and they are both compatible with an input vector, the weight of the general rule is discounted in fuzzy reasoning. We also discuss the case where general rules do not perfectly but partially include specific rules. Then we propose a genetics-based machine learning (GBML) algorithm for extracting a small number of fuzzy if-then rules with different specificity levels from numerical data using our inclusion-based fuzzy reasoning method. Finally, we describe how our approach can be applied to the approximate realization of fuzzy number-valued nonlinear functions     

The dynamics of default reasoning

In this paper we study default reasoning from a dynamic, agent-oriented, semantics-based point of view. In a formal framework used to specify and to reason about rational agents, we introduce actions that model the (attempted) jumping to conclusions that is a fundamental part of reasoning by default. Application of such an action consists of three parts. First it is checked whether the formula that the agent tries to jump to is a default, thereafter it is checked whether the default formula can consistently be incorporated by the agent, and if this is the case the formula is included in the agent's beliefs. As for all actions in our framework, we define the ability and opportunity of agents to apply these actions, and the states of affairs following application. To formalise formulae being defaults, we introduce the modality of common possibility. This modality is related to, but not reducible to, the notions of common knowledge and ‘everybody knows’-knowledge. To model the qualitative difference that exists between hard, factual knowledge and beliefs derived by default, we employ different modalities to represent these concepts, thus combining knowledge, beliefs, and defaults in one framework. Based on the concepts used to model the default reasoning of agents, we look into the dynamics of the supernormal fragment of default logic. We show in particular that by sequences of jumps to conclusions agents can end up with extensions in the sense of default logic of their belief.     

DEFAULT LOGICS: A UNIFIED VIEW

Default logic has been introduced for handling reasoning with incomplete knowledge. It has been widely studied, and various definitions have been proposed for it. Most of the variants have been defined by means of fixed points of some operator. We propose here another approach, which is based on a study of the way in which general rules with exceptions, used in a default reasoning process, can contradict one another. We then isolate sets of noncontradicting rules, as large as possible in order to exploit as much information as possible, and construct, for each of these sets of rules, the set of conclusions that can be deduced from it. We show that our framework encompasses most of the existing variants of default logic, allowing those variants to be compared from a knowledge representation point of view. Our approach also enables us to provide an operational definition of extensions in some interesting cases. Proof-theoretical and semantical aspects are investigated.     

Yet some more complexity results for default logic

We identify several new tractable subsets and several new intractable simple cases for reasoning in the propositional version of Reiter's default logic. The majority of our findings are related to brave reasoning. By making some intuitive observations, most classes that we identify can be derived quite easily from some subsets of default logic already known in the literature. Some of the subsets we discuss are subclasses of the so-called “extended logic programs”. All the tractable subsets presented in this paper can be recognized in linear time.