Default reasoning by deductive planning

This paper deals with the automation of reasoning from incomplete information by means of default logics. We provide proof procedures for default logics' major reasoning modes, namely, credulous and skeptical reasoning. We start by reformulating the task of credulous reasoning in default logics as deductive planning problems. This interpretation supplies us with several interesting and valuable insights into the proof theory of default logics. Foremost, it allows us to take advantage of the large number of available methods, algorithms, and implementations for solving deductive planning problems. As an example, we demonstrate how credulous reasoning in certain variants of default logic is implementable by means of a planning method based on equational logic programming. In addition, our interpretation allows us to transfer theoretical results, such as complexity results, from the field of planning to that of default logics. In this way, we have isolated two yet unknown classes of default theories for which deciding credulous entailment is polynomial.Our approach to skeptical reasoning relies on an arbitrary method for credulous reasoning. It does not strictly require rather the inspection of all extensions, nor does it strictly require the computation of entire extensions to decide whether a formula is skeptically entailed. Notably, our approach abstracts from an underlying credulous reasoner. In this way, it can be used to extend existing formalisms for credulous reasoning to skeptical reasoning.This author was a visiting professor at the University of Darmstadt while parts of this work were being carried out. This author also acknowledges support from the Commission of the European Communities under grant no. ERB4001GT922433.     

若干限制形式的缺省推理的复杂性

该文研究判定一文字是否出现在缺省理论〈D,W〉的某一扩张中的复杂性.其中,D是一集Horn缺省规则,而W是definite Horn公式或者Bi-Horn公式.     

Inheritance systems with exceptions

In this paper, we are interested in the representation and management of multiple inheritance systems with exceptions in both semantic networks and object-oriented languages. Exception management raises different problems, particularly in the presence of contradictions. Three types of contradictions, which constitute the problematics of exception management, may be identified. The different methods used to solve these contradictions are presented; two approaches in particular are underscored: a logic approach and an algebraic approach.     

A new methodology for query answering in default logics via structure-oriented theorem proving

We present a new approach to query answering in default logics. The basic idea is to treat default rules as classical implications along with some qualifying conditions restricting the use of such rules while query answering. We accomplish this by taking advantage of the conception of structure-oriented theorem proving provided by Bibel's connection method. We show that the structure-sensitive nature of the connection method allows for an elegant characterization of proofs in default logic. After introducing our basic method for query answering in default logics, we present a corresponding algorithm and describe its implementation. Both the algorithm and its implementation are obtained by slightly modifying an existing algorithm and an existing implementation of the standard connection method. In turn, we give a couple of refinements of the basic method that lead to conceptually different algorithms. The approach turns out to be extraordinarily qualified for implementations by means of existing automated theorem proving techniques. We substantiate this claim by presenting implementations of the various algorithms along with some experimental analysis.Even though our method has a general nature, we introduce it in the first part of this paper with the example of constrained default logic. This default logic is tantamount to a variant due to Brewka, and it coincides with Reiter's default logic and a variant due to ukaszewicz on a large fragment of default logic. Accordingly, our exposition applies to these instances of default logic without any modifications.     

Reasoning situated in time I: basic concepts*

Abstract

The needs of a real-time reasoner situated in an environment may make it appropriate to view error-correction and non-monotonicity as much the same thing. This has led us to formulate situated (or step) logic, an approach to reasoning in which the formalism has a kind of real-time self-reference that affects the course of deduction itself. Here we seek to motivate this as a useful vehicle for exploring certain issues in commonsense reasoning. In particular, a chief drawback of more traditional logics is avoided: from a contradiction we do not have all wffs swamping the (growing) conclusion set. Rather, we seek potentially inconsistent, but nevertheless useful, logics where the real-time self-referential feature allows a direct contradiction to be spotted and corrective action taken, as part of the same system of reasoning. Some specific inference mechanisms for real-time default reasoning are suggested, notably a form of introspection relevant to default reasoning. Special treatment of ‘now’ and of contradictions are the main technical devices here. We illustrate this with a computer-implemented real time solution to R. Moore's Brother Problem.     

Extending the Maximum Entropy Approach to Variable Strength Defaults

A generalisation of the maximum entropy (ME) approach to default reasoning [7,8] to cater for variable strength defaults is presented. The assumptions on which the original work was based are reviewed and revised. A new algorithm is presented that is shown to compute the ME-ranking under these more general conditions. The limitations of the revised approach are discussed and a test for the uniqueness of the ME-solution is given. The ME-solutions to several illustrative examples of default reasoning are given, and the approach is shown to handle them appropriately. The conclusion is that the ME-approach can be regarded as providing a benchmark theory of default reasoning against which default intuitions and other default systems may be assessed.     

Spatial Reasoning About Points in a Multidimensional Setting

For n 1, we consider the possible relations between two points of the Euclidean space of dimension n. We define the n-point algebra on the pattern of the point algebra and the cardinal algebra. Generalizing the concept of convexity just as the one of preconvexity, we prove that the consistency problem of convex n-point networks is polynomial for n 1, whereas the consistency problem of preconvex n-point networks is NP-complete for n 3. We characterize a subset of the set of all preconvex relations: the set of all strongly preconvex relations, which contains the set of all convex relations. We demonstrate that the consistency problem of strongly preconvex n-point networks can be decided in polynomial time by means of the weak path-consistency method for all n 1. For n = 3 the set of all strongly preconvex relations is a maximal tractable subclass of the set of all n-point relations. Finally, we prove that the concept of strong preconvexity corresponds to the one of ORD-Horn representability.     

Abstract argumentation

In this paper we explore the thesis that the role of argumentation in practical reasoning in general and legal reasoning in particular is to justify the use of defeasible rules to derive a conclusion in preference to the use of other defeasible rules to derive a conflicting conclusion. The defeasibility of rules is expressed by means of non-provability claims as additional conditions of the rules.We outline an abstract approach to defeasible reasoning and argumentation which includes many existing formalisms, including default logic, extended logic programming, non-monotonic modal logic and auto-epistemic logic, as special cases. We show, in particular, that the admissibility semantics for all these formalisms has a natural argumentation-theoretic interpretation and proof procedure, which seem to correspond well with informal argumentation.In the admissibility semantics there is only one way for one argument to attack another, namely by undermining one of its non-provability claims. In this paper, we show how other kinds of attack between arguments, specifically how rebuttal and priority attacks, can be reduced to the undermining of non-provability claims.     

Modeling default reasoning using defaults

User modeling research can benefit from formal automated reasoning tools. However existing formal tools may need to be modified to suit the needs of user modeling. Theorist is a simple framework for default reasoning. It can be used as a tool for building and maintaining a user model, and as a model of a user's default reasoning. To apply Theorist to both tasks, we develop Nested Theorist (NT), a simple tool based on Theorist that allows default reasoning on arbitrarily-many levels. We extend NT in two ways: we allow prioritized defaults, and we allow reasoning about agents with limited reasoning capabilities. This paper focusses on applications, and uses wide-ranging examples from user-modeling literature to illustrate the usefulness of the tools presented.     

On nonmonotonic reasoning with the method of sweeping presumptions

Reasoning almost always occurs in the face of incomplete information. Such reasoning is nonmonotonic in the sense that conclusions drawn may later be withdrawn when additional information is obtained. There is an active literature on the problem of modeling such nonmonotonic reasoning, yet no category of method-let alone a single method-has been broadly accepted as the right approach. This paper introduces a new method, called sweeping presumptions, for modeling nonmonotonic reasoning. The main goal of the paper is to provide an example-driven, nontechnical introduction to the method of sweeping presumptions, and thereby to make it plausible that sweeping presumptions can usefully be applied to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning. The paper discusses a representative sample of examples that have appeared in the literature on nonmonotonic reasoning, and discusses them from the point of view of sweeping presumptions.     

缺省理论的简化

缺省理论△=(D,W)中的缺省规则集D,是该理论的不确定因素.如果能去掉一些缺省规则而又不影响该理论的延伸,则就在一定程度上简化了该理论.本文证明了关于规范缺省理论的延伸的若干性质,利用这些性质,我们可以把某些规范缺省理论在一定条件下得以化简,有的甚至可以把它们化为一阶逻辑理论.     

Embedding defaults into terminological knowledge representation formalisms

We consider the problem of integrating Reiter's default logic into terminological representation systems. It turns out that such an integration is less straightforward than we expected, considering the fact that the terminological language is a decidable sublanguage of first-order logic. Semantically, one has the unpleasant effect that the consequences of a terminological default theory may be rather unintuitive, and may even vary with the syntactic structure of equivalent concept expressions. This is due to the unsatisfactory treatment of open defaults via Skolemization in Reiter's semantics. On the algorithmic side, we show that this treatment may lead to an undecidable default consequence relation, even though our base language is decidable, and we have only finitely many (open) defaults. Because of these problems, we then consider a restricted semantics for open defaults in our terminological default theories: default rules are applied only to individuals that are explicitly present in the knowledge base. In this semantics it is possible to compute all extensions of a finite terminological default theory, which means that this type of default reasoning is decidable. We describe an algorithm for computing extensions and show how the inference procedures of terminological systems can be modified to give optimal support to this algorithm.This is a revised and extended version of a paper presented at the3rd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, October 1992, Cambridge, MA.     

The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning

This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.     

缺省推理中的三个定理

本文证明了缺省推理中的三个定理.定理1表明了缺省推理的非单调性这一特点.定理2的实际意义在于,在一个封闭规范缺省理论(D,W)中,只要W能推出D中某些缺省的结论,则可以把这样的缺省规则从理论中删除,所得到的较小的缺省理论其延伸仍与原来缺省理论一样.尤其是若W能推出D中所有的缺省规则结论,则(D,W)的延伸就是W,这就是本文推论的结论.     

What Should Default Reasoning be,by Default?

This is a position paper concerning the role of empirical studies of human default reasoning in the formalization of AI theories of default reasoning. We note that AI motivates its theoretical enterprise by reference to human skill at default reasoning, but that the actual research does not make any use of this sort of information and instead relies on intuitions of individual investigators. We discuss two reasons theorists might not consider human performance relevant to formalizing default reasoning: (a) that intuitions are sufficient to describe a model, and (b) that human performance in this arena is irrelevant to a competence model of the phenomenon. We provide arguments against both these reasons. We then bring forward three further considerations against the use of intuitions in this arena: (a) it leads to an unawareness of predicate ambiguity, (b) it presumes an understanding of ordinary language statements of typicality, and (c) it is similar to discredited views in other fields. We advocate empirical investigation of the range of human phenomena that intuitively embody default reasoning. Gathering such information would provide data with which to generate formal default theories and against which to test the claims of proposed theories. Our position is that such data are the very phenomena that default theories are supposed to explain.