Genetic algorithm-based spinning reserve dispatching in a competitive electricity market

Power systems rely greatly on ancillary services in maintaining operation security. As one of the most important ancillary services, spinning reserve must be provided effectively in the deregulated market environment. This paper focuses on the design of an integrated market for both electricity and spinning reserve service with particular emphasis on coordinated dispatch of bulk power and spinning reserve services. A new market dispatching mechanism has been developed to minimize the ISO's total payment while ensuring system security. Genetic algorithms are used in the finding of the global optimal solutions for this dispatching problem. Case studies and corresponding analyses have been carried out to demonstrate and discuss the efficiency and usefulness of the proposed market.     

On organization of markets of homogeneous goods

Different supply function auctions in a market of homogeneous good are considered. The problems of the unique existence and computation of a Nash equilibrium are studied for these models. Estimates of the Nash equilibrium deviation from the competitive equilibrium are obtained for each case. For a first-price auction different indexes of the “market power” are investigated as applied to the electricity market. It is shown that the ordinary criteria of competitive behavior are too gentle for this market. Stronger conditions are formulated that provide sufficiently small deviation of the market price from the competitive equilibrium price. The problem of optimal organization of an auction is discussed from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The obtained results are applied to the analysis of the electricity market in Russia.     

Classification, relationships and forecasting models for telecommunication services

In forecasting future market size for telecommunication services, it is customary to analyze individually the diffusion processes of the services that make up the whole market and aggregate them. Recently, however, many existing telecommunication services have diversified and new services have arisen in an effort to satisfy customer needs. Thus, an aggregated forecast should consider the various relationships among telecommunication services, such as competitiveness and complementariness in view of the customer's desires for telecommunication. In this paper, a framework for classifying telecommunication services is proposed and independent, competitive and complementary relationships are defined according to customer needs, customer premise equipment, cost and network. Forecasting models based on such relationships are applied to telecommunication services in Korea.     

Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions

This paper studies auctions in a setting where the different bidders arrive at different times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is received. Such settings occur in computerized auctions of computational resources as well as in other settings. We call such auctions, on-line auctions.

We first characterize exactly on-line auctions that are incentive compatible, i.e. where rational bidders are always motivated to bid their true valuation. We then embark on a competitive worst-case analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. We obtain several results, the cleanest of which is an incentive compatible on-line auction for a large number of identical items. This auction has an optimal competitive ratio, both in terms of seller's revenue and in terms of the total social efficiency obtained.     

Managing Electricity Reliability Risk Through the Forward Markets

In competitive electricity markets, the vertically integrated utilities that were responsible for ensuring system reliability in their own service territories, or groups of territories, often cease to exist. Typically, the burden falls to an independent system operator (ISO) to ensure that enough ancillary services (AS) are available for safe, stable, and reliable operation of the grid, defined, in part, as compliance with officially approved engineering specifications for minimum levels of AS. In order to characterize the behavior of market participants (generators, retailers, and an ISO) in a competitive electricity market with reliability requirements, we model a spot market for electricity and forward markets for both electricity and AS. By assuming that each participant seeks to maximize its expected utility of wealth and that all markets clear, we solve for the optimal quantities of electricity and AS traded in each market by all participants, as well as the corresponding market-clearing prices. We show that forward prices for both electricity and AS depend on expectations of the spot price, statistical aspects of system demand, and production cost parameters. More important, our model captures the fact that AS are essentially call options for electricity that can potentially be used just like any other derivative to manage risk within a competitive environment. We use data from the California electricity market to test our model's viability.     

Designing a successful trading agent:A fuzzy set approach

Software agents are increasingly being used to represent humans in online auctions. Such agents have the advantages of being able to systematically monitor a wide variety of auctions and then make rapid decisions about what bids to place in what auctions. They can do this continuously and repetitively without losing concentration. To provide a means of evaluating and comparing (benchmarking) research methods in this area the trading agent competition (TAC) was established. This competition involves a number of agents bidding against one another in a number of related auctions (operating different protocols) to purchase travel packages for customers. Against this background, this paper describes the design, implementation and evaluation of SouthamptonTAC, one of the most successful participants in both the Second and the Third International Competitions. Our agent uses fuzzy techniques at the heart of its decision making: to make bidding decisions in the face of uncertainty, to make predictions about the likely outcomes of auctions, and to alter the agent's bidding strategy in response to the prevailing market conditions.     

Probabilistic Automated Bidding in Multiple Auctions

This paper presents an approach to develop bidding agents that participate in multiple auctions with the goal of obtaining an item with a given probability. The approach consists of a prediction method and a planning algorithm. The prediction method exploits the history of past auctions to compute probability functions capturing the belief that a bid of a given price may win a given auction. The planning algorithm computes a price and a set of compatible auctions, such that by sequentially bidding this price in each of the auctions, the agent can obtain the item with the desired probability. Experiments show that the approach increases the payoff of their users and the welfare of the market.     

Time dynamics of overlapping e-auction mechanisms: Information transfer, strategic user behavior and auction revenue

This paper investigates the time dynamics of user strategic patterns and resulting welfares in a series of overlapping multiple online auctions. An auction mechanism is a dynamic game where the valuation and strategic space of bidders determine the outcomes. When those mechanisms exist concurrently or in a series in a market environment, multiple sources are visible and accessible, such that there is likely to be a form of interdependency across the auctions. While heterogeneous bidder behavior has been studied in some literature, the focus is mainly on an individual auction level and the underlying dynamics regarding the interdependency across the auctions in the market has not been explained. We use a two-phased approach to address this discrepancy. First, we classify user strategy using k-means clustering. Then, we characterize the transition pattern of heterogeneous clusters using a dynamic systems framework. Long-term behavior of the system is effectively and efficiently predicted using system parameters. The empirically calibrated simulation, which supports the analytical properties, provides managerial insights in designing multiple overlapping online auction market.     

Multi-item auctions for automatic negotiation

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem, which consists of using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource problem as a market in which there are vendor agents and buyer agents trading on items representing the resources. These agents use multi-item auctions, which are viewed here as a process of automatic negotiation, and implemented as a network of intelligent software agents. In this negotiation, agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities that let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. For example, the ‘richer’ an agent is, the more items it can buy, i.e. the more resources it can acquire. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, then we discuss experimental evidence of such a model.     

Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages

The search for enablers of continued growth of SMS traffic, as well as the take-off of the more diversified MMS message contents, open up for enterprises the potential of bulk use of mobile messaging, instead of essentially one-by-one use. In parallel, such enterprises or value added services needing mobile messaging in bulk – for spot use or for use over a prescribed period of time – want to minimize total acquisition costs, from a set of technically approved providers of messaging capacity. This leads naturally to the evaluation of auctioning for bulk SMS or MMS messaging capacity, with the intrinsic advantages therein such as reduction in acquisition costs, allocation efficiency, and optimality. The paper shows, with extensive results as evidence from simulations carried out in the Rotterdam School of Management e-Auction room, how multi-attribute reverse auctions perform for the enterprise-buyer, as well as for the messaging capacity-sellers. We compare 1- and 5-round auctions, to show the learning effect and the benefits thereof to the various parties. The sensitivity will be reported to changes in the enterprise's and the capacity providers utilities and priorities between message attributes (such as price, size, security, and delivery delay). At the organizational level, the paper also considers alternate organizational deployment schemes and properties for an off-line or spot bulk messaging capacity market, subject to technical and regulatory constraints.     

Multi area AGC scheme using imperialist competition algorithm in restructured power system

This paper is focused on optimization based design methodology and application of PID controller in restructured, competitive electricity market environment, for AGC problem. The paper compares two search algorithms for designing of PID controller used for AGC in multiarea power system. The optimal parameters of PID controller have been determined with the use of Imperialist Competitive Algorithm (ICA). A deregulated scenario has been considered to develop the model of the multiarea AGC scheme. This paper presents that the ICA tuned PID (ICA-PID) controller can optimally regulate the generators output and can provide the best dynamic response of frequency and tie-line power on a load perturbation. The performance of proposed controller has been checked on 2-area thermal power system and 3-area thermal-hydro power system with the consideration of generation rate constraint (GRC). The results obtained by ICA-PID controller and genetic algorithm tuned (GA-PID) controller have been compared on the basis of performance parameters (settling time and oscillations). It is seen that ICA-PID controller shows the better performance as compared to GA-PID controller.     

Kombinatorische Auktionen in der betrieblichen Beschaffung

Combinatorial auctions are promising auction formats for industrial and public procurement. Potential advantages of using combinatorial auctions include decreased overall spend, low transaction costs for multi-item negotiations, fairness and market transparency for suppliers, as well as high allocative efficiency. A number of fundamental design considerations are relevant to the application of combinatorial auctions in procurement. In addition, procurement specialists need to consider several domain-specific requirements, such as additional side constraints as well as alternative multidimensional bid types.     

On the Natural Selection of Market Choice

An evolutionary approach to the problem of economic mechanism choice is presented. It demonstrates the power that a single participant has on the choice of a preferred market mechanism. A population of sellers, each with one of two possible economic mechanisms, facing potential buyers, is presented as a test model. It is shown that if two auctions, such as first- and second-price auctions, are to attract an identical number of buyers, although under the model assumptions their expected revenues are identical, sellers using a first-price auction mechanism will be selected for. However, if a second-price auction attracts one additional buyer, then it will be selected for by the evolutionary process. These results are extended to the choice between an arbitrary k- and l-price auctions.     

An interactive approach for multi-attribute auctions

Auction processes are commonly employed in many environments. With rapid advances in Internet and computing technologies, electronic auctions have become very popular. People sell and buy a wide range of goods and services online. There is a growing need for the proper management of online auctions and for providing support to parties involved. In this paper, we develop an interactive approach supporting both the buyer and the bidders in a multi-attribute, single-item, multi-round, reverse auction environment. We demonstrate the algorithm on a number of problems.     

Trouble Management for Multimedia Services in Multi-Provider Environments

As telecommunications and computers evolve, multimedia services are being increasingly deployed over a variety of organizational and technology domains. Customer requirements and the competitive market mean that the delivery of multimedia services at a guaranteed level of quality can play a significant role in differentiating between service providers. In order to meet such quality of service requirements, service providers need to be supported by trouble management capabilities suitable for today's heterogeneous environment. This paper presents an integrated network and service trouble management system that has been designed for such an environment within the framework of the European ACTS project FlowThru. The FlowThru Service Quality Assurance System has been developed using TINA and TMN concepts and TeleManagement Forum business processes in order to support service providers with the necessary infrastructure, models and mechanisms for automated end-to-end trouble management in a multi-domain environment.     

Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions

Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behavior by bidders and promote simple, continual, meaningful bidding and thus, price discovery. These rules find application in the design of iterative combinatorial auctions for real world scenarios, for example in spectrum auctions, in airline landing slot auctions, and in procurement auctions. We introduce the notion of strong activity rules, which allow simple, consistent bidding strategies while precluding all behaviors that cannot be rationalized in this way. We design such a rule for auctions with budget-constrained bidders, i.e., bidders with valuations for resources that are greater than their ability to pay. Such bidders are of practical importance in many market environments, and hindered from bidding in a simple and consistent way by the commonly used revealed-preference activity rule, which is too strong in such an environment. We consider issues of complexity, and provide two useful forms of information feedback to guide bidders in meeting strong activity rules. As a special case, we derive a strong activity rule for non-budget-constrained bidders. The ultimate choice of activity rule must depend, in part, on beliefs about the types of bidders likely to participate in an auction event because one cannot have a rule that is simultaneously strong for both budget-constrained bidders and quasi-linear bidders.     

Integrate software agents and CORBA in computational grid

This paper presents an Agent-based Computational Grid (ACG), which applies the concept of CORBA and agent to computational grid. The ACG system is used to implement a uniform higher level management of the computing resources and services on the Grid, and provide users with a consistent and transparent interface for accessing such services. In ACG grid, grid services are implemented by CORBA or by grid agent. Grid agents and CORBA objects will interact with each other to achieve user's service request. Our solution is the creation of a bridge between the CORBA and grid agents. The solution provides with the opportunity of considering an agent as a CORBA service and accessing CORBA services even from a grid agent. Thus, in AGC grid, existing legacy systems can be easily exploited as grid services. In this paper, firstly, the features of ACG grid are described, and then the design and implementation are given. Finally, some conclusions are given.     

Supporting Group-Oriented Mobile Services Transactions

A middleware framework for wireless networks--including 3G/4G--provides solutions for managing transactions in group-oriented mobile services such as auctions, financial services, and multiparty interactive games.     

Identification of load pockets and market power in electric power systems

In this paper, we present a spectral method for the identification of load pockets and the application of practical techniques for the measurement of market power. Market power is a serious concern in electric energy markets, especially in the area of a load pocket. Common definitions for market power, which rely on a comparison between market prices and a so-called competitive price, are difficult to use in practice because the competitive price is not known when the market is not competitive. The competitive price cannot be computed from data naturally available to the market. Our technique focuses on the identification of participants with the ability to increase revenues by increasing prices, an ability not present in a competitive market. We then propose measures for quantifying the extent to which market power is being exercised. These measures can be computed from data available to the market; they are practical. We present results from a 30 bus, 6 generator system, which illustrates that generators in a load pocket have and can exploit joint market power.