Making trade-offs: A probabilistic and context-sensitive model of choice behavior.

The stochastic difference model assumes that decision makers trade normalized attribute value differences when making choices. The model is stochastic, with choice probabilities depending on the normalized difference variable, d, and a decision threshold, delta. The decision threshold indexes a person's sensitivity to attribute value differences and is a free estimated parameter of the model. Depending on the choice context, a person may be more or less sensitive to attribute value differences, and hence delta may be used to measure context effects. With proportional difference used as the normalization, the proportional difference model (PD) was tested with 9 data sets, including published data (e.g., J. L. Myers, M. M. Suydam, & B. Gambino, 1965; A. Tversky, 1969). The model accounted for individual and group data well and described violations of stochastic dominance, independence, and weak and strong stochastic transitivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Similarity and choice.

Examined choices between alternatives when the options confronting the decision maker have similar levels on an attribute. In these situations, 2 empirical phenomena often occur. First, differences on other attributes are enhanced. Similarity along 1 attribute magnifies differences on others. Second, violations of strong stochastic transitivity often occur. A contrast-weighting theory of choice is presented that can account for these puzzling phenomena. Binary choices are represented as a monotonic function of the difference between the utilities of the options. Furthermore, the utilities of any given attribute are weighted according to the similarity of the levels along the other attribute. Small contrasts along one dimension result in greater weight for the other dimension. This contrast-weighting theory is consistent with empirical results in several domains, including psychophysics, social judgment, and risky decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Framing of task performance strategies: effects on performance in a multiattribute dynamic decision making environment

It is well documented that the way a static choice task is "framed" can dramatically alter choice behavior, often leading to observable preference reversals. This framing effect appears to result from perceived changes in the nature or location of a person's initial reference point, but it is not clear how framing effects might generalize to performance on dynamic decision making tasks that are characterized by high workload, time constraints, risk, or stress. A study was conducted to examine the hypothesis that framing can introduce affective components to the decision making process and can influence, either favorably (positive frame) or adversely (negative frame), the implementation and use of decision making strategies in dynamic high-workload environments. Results indicated that negative frame participants were significantly impaired in developing and employing a simple optimal decision strategy relative to a positive frame group. Discussion focuses on implications of these results for models of dynamic decision making.     

Prospect relativity: How choice options influence decision under risk.

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Two-stage dynamic signal detection: A theory of choice, decision time, and confidence" by Timothy J. Pleskac and Jerome R. Busemeyer (Psychological Review, 2010[Jul], Vol 117[3], 864-901). The name of the philosopher Charles Peirce was misspelled throughout as Charles Pierce. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-14834-006.) The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory—2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory—that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential effects on effort discounting induced by inactivations of the nucleus accumbens core or shell.

The authors investigated the contribution of the nucleus accumbens (NAc) core and shell to effort-based decision making using a discounting procedure. Selection of 1 lever delivered a smaller, 2-pellet reward immediately, whereas the other lever delivered a 4-pellet reward after a fixed ratio of presses (2, 5, 10, or 20) that increased over 4 blocks of 10 discrete choice trials. Subsequent testing employed an equivalent delays procedure, whereby the relative delay to reward delivery after selection of either option was equalized. In well-trained rats, inactivation of the core, but not the shell, via infusion of GABA A/B agonists muscimol/baclofen reduced preference for the high-effort option under standard conditions and also when rats were tested using an equivalent delays procedure. However, inactivation of the core did not alter preference for 4-pellet versus 2-pellet rewards when the relative costs of each option were the same (1 press). Thus, the NAc core, but not the shell, appears to be part of a neural circuit that biases choice toward larger rewards associated with a greater effort cost. Furthermore, the contributions by the NAc core to this form of decision making can be dissociated from its role in delay discounting. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The probabilistic nature of preferential choice.

Previous research has developed a variety of theories explaining when and why people's decisions under risk deviate from the standard economic view of expected utility maximization. These theories are limited in their predictive accuracy in that they do not explain the probabilistic nature of preferential choice, that is, why an individual makes different choices in nearly identical situations, or why the magnitude of these inconsistencies varies in different situations. To illustrate the advantage of probabilistic theories, three probabilistic theories of decision making under risk are compared with their deterministic counterparts. The probabilistic theories are (a) a probabilistic version of a simple choice heuristic, (b) a probabilistic version of cumulative prospect theory, and (c) decision field theory. By testing the theories with the data from three experimental studies, the superiority of the probabilistic models over their deterministic counterparts in predicting people's decisions under risk become evident. When testing the probabilistic theories against each other, decision field theory provides the best account of the observed behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

People's intuitions about intuitive insight and intuitive choice.

How do people balance intuition and reason when making decisions? We report 6 studies that indicate that people are cued by the features of the decision problem to follow intuition or reason when making their choice. That is, when features of the choice resemble features commonly associated with rational processing, people tend to decide on the basis of reason; when features of the choice match those associated with intuitive processing, people tend to decide on the basis of intuition. Choices that are seen as objectively evaluable (Study 1A), sequential (Studies 1B and 3), complex (Study 2), or precise (Study 4) elicit a preference for choosing rationally. This framework accurately predicts people's choices in variants of both the ratio-bias (Study 3) and ambiguity-aversion paradigms (Study 4). Discussion focuses on the relationship between the task cuing account, other decision-making models, and dual-process accounts of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Expression theory and the preference reversal phenomena.

Previous research has confounded judgment versus choice with the response scale used to express preference. When these factors are crossed in a 2?×?2 design, 6 pairs of preference reversals are possible. Experiment 1 demonstrates that all of these reversals exist in one-outcome gambles. We then develop expression theory, which assumes that the basic evaluation of a gamble is expressed on various scales via a subjective interpolation process. A quantitative model is developed that accounts for both the magnitude and direction of the various reversals. In Experiment 2, the model correctly predicts that the strength of reversals is weakened using two-outcome gambles. Nevertheless, 5 of the 6 reversals are still significant. In Experiment 3, empirical violations of dominance are demonstrated and the results are shown to be consistent with expression theory. In Experiment 4, the model is used to predict ratings from prices and vice versa. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Configural weighting in judgments of two- and four-outcome gambles.

This study tested branch independence, a key property distinguishing nonconfigural from configural theories of decision making. Sixty undergraduates judged buying and selling prices of 168 lotteries composed of 2 or 4 equally likely outcomes, (x, y, z, v). Branch independence requires that (x, y, z, v) is judged higher than (x′, y′, z, v) whenever (x, y, z′, v′) is judged higher than (x′, y′, z′, v′). Different violations observed in different viewpoints are consistent with the theory that the utility function is independent of viewpoint and that only configural weights differ between viewpoints. Lower ranked outcomes have greater weights in the buyer's than in the seller's viewpoint. Sellers place more weight than buyers on higher ranked outcomes. In both viewpoints, violations of branch independence are contrary to the inverse-S weighting function of cumulative prospect theory: Moderate outcomes receive more weight than adjacent extreme outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Visual versus tactual receptor preference in normal and schizophrenic children.

Receptor preferences between visual or tactual stimuli were measured in schizophrenic and normal children. 4 pairs of standardized choice situations between visual or tactual stimuli were used, with the time of engagement with either stimulus constituting the preference measure. Schizophrenic children, ages 7-9, were compared with same aged normal children. A group of retardates were used for MA control. Schizophrenics were significantly lower in visual preference than the same aged normals, and an age trend for increased visual preference was found in the normal sample. Retardates showed greater visual preference than schizophrenics of comparable MA. Some implications for theory of schizophrenia are discussed. (20 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multialternative decision field theory: A dynamic connectionst model of decision making.

The authors interpret decision field theory (J. R. Busemeyer & J. T. Townsend, 1993) as a connectionist network and extend it to accommodate multialternative preferential choice situations. This article shows that the classic weighted additive utility model (see R. L. Keeney & H. Raiffa, 1976) and the classic Thurstone preferential choice model (see L. L. Thurstone, 1959) are special cases of this new multialternative decision field theory (MDFT), which also can emulate the search process of the popular elimination by aspects (EBA) model (see A. Tversky. 1969). The new theory is unique in its ability to explain several central empirical results found in the multialternative preference literature with a common set of principles. These empirical results include the similarity effect, the attraction effect, and the compromise effect, and the complex interactions among these three effects. The dynamic nature of the model also implies strong testable predictions concerning the moderating effect of time pressure on these three effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moderation of preference reversals in the long run.

This study explored how preference reversals, induced by changes in response mode (choice vs pricing), are moderated by how lotteries are represented, as being played 1, 10, or 100 times. Ss chose which of a pair of gambles they preferred to play and determined the minimum selling price of each gamble. Replicating previous research (e.g., A. Tversky and M. Bar-Hillel; see record 1984-11292-001), the preference reversal was obtained for single-play representations: Ss tended to choose the gambles with the higher probabilities of winning, but priced them lower. However, for multiple-play representations, preference reversals were reduced, and consistency between pricing and choice behaviors was increased. Both response modes were sensitive to differences in the expected values of gambles, but sensitivity did not vary significantly with the number of plays. These results support the hypothesis that violations of expected utility theory are reduced for multiple-play gambles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Utility measurement: Configural-weight theory and the judge's point of view.

Ss judged the values of lotteries from 3 points of view: the highest price that a buyer should pay, the lowest price that a seller should accept, and the "fair" price. The rank order of judgments changed as a function of point of view. Data also showed violations of branch independence and monotonicity (dominance). These findings pose difficulties for nonconfigural theories of decision making, such as subjective expected utility theory, but can be described by configural-weight theory. Configural weighting is similar to rank-dependent utility theory, except that the weight of the lowest outcome in a gamble depends on the viewpoint, and 0-valued outcomes receive differential weighting. Configural-weight theory predicted the effect of viewpoint, the violations of branch independence, and the violations of monotonicity, using a single scale of utility that is independent of the lottery and the point of view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Group decision making and social influence: A social interaction sequence model.

Discusses the social interaction sequence (SIS) model, which represents the group decision-making process in terms of the sequential choice behavior—changes in preference and certainty—of group members. This model states that the probabilities of preference and certainty changes are related to the current distribution of opinion in the group. An application of the SIS model to a study of jury decision making (G. Strasser, 1977) is presented, and results of earlier empirical studies are predicted by a computer simulation version of the model. Shift and opinion change versions of the model are proposed, with both extensions incorporating the concept of a characteristic certainty distribution. Characteristic certainty distributions are used to examine the expected effects of group size and assigned-decision rule on members' confidence in a group's decision. (57 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contingent weighting in judgment and choice.

Preference can be inferred from direct choice between options or from a matching procedure in which the decision maker adjusts one option to match another. Studies of preferences between two-dimensional options (e.g., public policies, job applicants, benefit plans) show that the more prominent dimension looms larger in choice than in matching. Thus, choice is more lexicographic than matching. This finding is viewed as an instance of a general principle of compatibility: The weighting of inputs is enhanced by their compatibility with the output. To account for such effects, we develop a hierarchy of models in which the trade-off between attributes is contingent on the nature of the response. The simplest theory of this type, called the contingent weighting model, is applied to the analysis of various compatibility effects, including the choice-matching discrepancy and the preference-reversal phenomenon. These results raise both conceptual and practical questions concerning the nature, the meaning and the assessment of preference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing mixture models of transitive preference: Comment on Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (2011).

This article contrasts 2 approaches to analyzing transitivity of preference and other behavioral properties in choice data. The approach of Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober (see record 2011-00732-003) assumes that on each choice, a decision maker samples randomly from a mixture of preference orders to determine whether A is preferred to B. In contrast, Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007) assumed that within each block of trials, the decision maker has a true set of preferences and that random errors generate variability of response. In this latter approach, preferences are allowed to differ between people; within-person, they might differ between repetition blocks. Both approaches allow mixtures of preferences, both assume a type of independence, and both yield statistical tests. They differ with respect to the locus of independence in the data. The approaches also differ in the criterion for assessing the success of the models. Regenwetter et al. fitted only marginal choice proportions and assumed that choices are independent, which means that a mixture cannot be identified from the data. Birnbaum and Gutierrez fitted choice combinations with replications; their approach allows estimation of the probabilities in the mixture. It is suggested that researchers should separate tests of the stochastic model from the test of transitivity. Evidence testing independence and stationarity assumptions is presented. Available data appear to fit the assumption that errors are independent better than they fit the assumption that choices are independent. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Consumer behavior and perceived decision freedom: A reexamination.

D. J. Reibstein et al (see record 1975-28533-001) found that for 2- and 4-alternative choice sets, perceived decision freedom was positively related to amount of soft drink consumed but was not related to postchoice attitude change. The present study with 72 undergraduates attempted to replicate these findings while controlling for a quantity effect and similarity of preference toward alternatives in the respective choice sets. Results indicate that perceived decision freedom is not linearly related to soft drink consumption. Furthermore, some support for a positive relationship between perceived decision freedom and postchoice attitude change was found. A possible explanation of the conflict between these studies is discussed. (12 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)