Beyond objectivity and subjectivity.

Comments on the J. Krueger (see record 2001-16601-002) discussion on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The current author comments on the general treatment of objectivity and subjectivity that underlies Krueger's review. Despite repeated appeals to a pragmatic basis for NHST, Krueger seems to have missed a key implication of a pragmatic view of scientific inference in this regard. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of social comparison in choice shifts.

Tested social comparison predictions regarding influence processes related to risk taking in groups. It was predicted that a more complete information exchange condition would produce a shift toward risk of greater magnitude than a traditional information exchange condition. Two replications using 137 college students confirmed the prediction. Shifts toward risk were as likely to occur in groups where Ss exchanged information about their positions on the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) and information about their self-ratings of ability as in ordinary group discussions of the CDQ items. Ss in groups where only information about CDQ positions was exchanged showed far fewer shifts to risk. Findings are discussed in terms of a social comparison analysis of the social influence processes involved in risky shifts, which assumes that comparison processes can be engaged fully only when comparability is established by knowledge of other group members' standing on traits thought to be related to risk taking. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social combination models, persuasive arguments theory, social comparison theory, and choice shift.

Individuals and 5-person groups responded 3 successive times to 4 standard choice-dilemma items in the order of either individual–group–individual or individual–individual–individual; 288 male undergraduates served as Ss. Decisions were made for oneself, for a friend, and for a stranger (the hypothetical protagonist of the standard choice-dilemma instructions). Decisions for the stranger were more risky than decisions for a friend, and decisions for a friend were more risky than decisions for oneself. As predicted from persuasive arguments theory, the best fitting social combination model on the most risky item was risk-supported wins; the best fitting model on the most conservative item was conservative-supported wins; and the best fitting model on 2 less extreme items was majority wins. It is emphasized that social combination models and theories of group-interaction processes, such as persuasive arguments theory or social comparison theory, are complementary rather than rival explanations of collective decision making. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fear and social comparison.

Schachter (1959) had found a positive relationship between fear and the desire to be with others (affiliation). Schachter concluded, following Festinger (1954), that a person will attempt to reduce cognitive dissonance with regard to his self-picture in terms of information obtainable from others. This investigation attempts to determine the validity of this hypothesis by focusing on the dimension of the intensity of the emotion. "If a person is uncertain as to the intensity of his emotional reaction, he should seek information from others that will help him measure it. To the extent that he has information from others regarding the intensity of their reactions, his desire to be with them prior to the impending experience should be reduced." The hypothesis was supported; however, factors such as sex and order of birth were seen to affect S's reaction to threat. From Psyc Abstracts 36:04:4GE86G. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Emotional uncertainty and social comparison.

An experiment was run to test an assumption, basic to social comparison theory, that evaluational uncertainty regarding some aspect of the self, such as an emotional experience, produces a desire to compare one's self with others. Under threat of a strong shock, 2 levels of uncertainty were induced. Cross-cutting this induction were treatments in which information about others due to undergo the same experience was manipulated. Following Schachter, the desire for comparison information was measured by the strength of S's affiliation tendency. The findings suggest that: (a) uncertainty does produce a desire to compare one's self with others, (b) the individual's uncertainty relative to available comparison persons will determine his comparison tendency, and (c) a discrepancy in position (in this case, emotionality) reduces the desire to compare. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributional and social comparison processes in depression.

In this study we examined the consequences for depressed and nondepressed individuals of receiving comparison feedback regarding their causal understanding of an event. Specifically, the effects of similar, dissimilar, or no-comparison feedback on depressed and nondepressed subjects' evaluations of the comparison other and on their feelings about themselves were investigated. Because the reduction of uncertainty about one's conception of social reality is a major motive underlying social-comparison processes, we expected that depressed individuals, who are assumed to have experienced heightened uncertainty associated with frequent exposure to uncontrollable life events, would be more motivated to engage in social comparison and would be more sensitive to social-comparison feedback. Results generally were consistant with this reasoning. The implications of the results in terms of the development and maintenance of depression were discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-activation increases social comparison.

In a series of studies it is demonstrated that activating the self is sufficient to increase social comparison tendencies. Treating the relevant constructs as individual differences that can be measured as well as contextual variables that can be manipulated, the authors show that individual differences in self-activation are correlated with interest in social comparison information and that manipulations of self-activation cause changes in interest in social comparison. Self-certainty often has been portrayed as the primary determinant of social comparison interest. The present results suggest that self-activation affects interest in social comparison even when self-certainty is controlled. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Making objectivity credible and acceptable.

Discusses the increasing influence of and methods used by scientists in providing a factual basis for decisions on immediate social and technological issues. 3 types of advisory boards are discussed. In the evaluation mode, the past and present state of a particular situation are described. The advocacy report supplements research with recommendations. The disadvantages of this method include selection of panel members whose recommendations may be strongly biased, and the obligation felt by the recipient to implement the proposals. In the options report, recommendations are replaced by a list of possible solutions, each with its own stated advantages and disadvantages. It is concluded that the options report is the most effective means of maintaining scientific objectivity and allowing informed, balanced decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The myth of objectivity.

Scientists and journalists may be more alike than they are different. Most scientists concentrate their research efforts in the safer areas, where money is available and where their findings will be welcomed by their peers and readily published. The same factors that influence the selection of subject matter can also mold and shape the way the material is handled. (0 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Downward comparison principles in social psychology.

The theory of downward comparison posits that persons experiencing negative affect can enhance their subjective well-being through comparison with a less fortunate other, the process occurring on either a passive or active basis. The present author discusses the basic principle of downward comparison and its corollaries and suggests that these represent the motivational process for phenomena observed in several areas of social psychology. Evidence is considered from studies of the fear-affiliation effect, choice of others for social comparison, scapegoating, projection, aversive environmental events and attraction toward others, social prejudice, hostile aggression, and humor. It is shown that downward comparison principles encompass empirical evidence from these areas, account for nonreplications as well as confirmatory findings, and provide a theoretical basis for the relation among the various phenomena. (111 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgmental perspective and value connotations of response scale labels.

Compared attitudinal judgments as a function of response language among 60 school children (13–14 yrs old) presented with 10 statements on the issue of adult authority to be rated on 8 bipolar scales. Half the scales were marked at both ends by evaluatively positive labels (bold–polite, fearless–uncomplaining) and half by evaluatively negative labels (resentful–timid, disobedient–uncreative). Orthogonally, half the scales were marked at both ends by grammatically affirmative labels (bold–polite, resentful–timid) and half by grammatically negative labels (fearless–uncomplaining, disobedient–uncreative). Irrespective of judges' attitudes, judgments were significantly more polarized (extreme) on evaluatively positive than evaluatively negative scales. Judgments were also marginally more polarized on grammatically affirmative than grammatically negative scales. Accentuation theory and H. S. Upshaw's (see record 1965-12157-001) variable perspective model, which both offer semantic explanations for judgmental effects, are seen as jointly compatible with these results. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social projection and social comparison of opinions.

Using the notion of "social projection," in which a person self-generates a consensus for his or her own opinion, Festinger's (1954) theory of social comparison processes was reformulated, and predictions derived from the new model were tested. A 2?×?3 factorial design that cross-cut two levels of background similarity of a comparison other (similar, dissimilar) and three levels of comparison information (agree, disagree, no information control) on a legal case was used. The subject, believing that he or she was paired with another subject who either shared (similar) or did not share (dissimilar) a common background, subsequently compared his or her opinion on the case with the other's opinion. Emotional and cognitive reactions were measured using questionnaire and skin resistance. Results supported the predictions: Only disagreement with a similar other produced a negatively toned emotional response as well as decreases in opinion confidence, opinion importance, and readiness to act on the opinion. Positively toned reactions generated by agreement with a dissimilar other are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Judgmental biases resulting from differing availabilities of arguments.

Hypothesized that information which is disproportionately available in memory will have a correspondingly disproportionate impact on evaluative judgments. In a mock jury decision, the availability of selected information in memory was varied according to the relative vividness of the evidence (prosecution evidence more vivid or defense evidence more vivid) and the favorableness of the defendant ("good guy" or "bad guy"). 54 university students judged the defendant's guilt immediately and after 48 hrs; in addition, they recalled the evidence after the 48-hr interval. Ss recalled more vivid evidence and more evidence that disagreed with the defendant's favorableness. Their judgments of apparent guilt paralleled their differential recall of the prosecution and defense evidence. These availability differences occurred only after the retention interval and did not affect judgments given immediately after reading the arguments. Results support a model in which judgments are based on the availability and the diagnosticity of the information. (26 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Alcohol choice and outcome expectancies in social drinkers

Eighteen male social drinkers underwent four training sessions during which they ingested two colour-coded drinks (red or blue, balanced for drink type); one containing alcohol (aliquots of 0.1 g/kg) and the other placebo (aliquots of orangeade). Following the training sessions, subjects were presented with both drinks, and instructed to choose the drink they felt like consuming and to indicate their preference for their chosen drink over the other drink. In addition, they were instructed to consume the first drink but that all subsequent drinks (total of six drinks), offered at 10-min intervals, were optional. A number of trait characteristics were assessed including alcohol outcome expectancies, drinking habits and personality traits. The acute effects of alcohol on mood was also evaluated by comparing subjective ratings following alcohol and placebo during the training sessions. Of the 18 subjects, 12 chose alcohol at least once ('samplers'), whereas six never chose alcohol ('non-samplers'). Over the three sessions, however, alcohol and placebo were chosen equally. When alcohol was chosen, subjects drank significantly more than when placebo was chosen, which may be consistent with a priming effect of drinking alcohol. The amount of alcohol drunk was seen to correlate with the alcohol expectancy factor 'sociability'. Subjective reports of feeling 'alert', 'clear-headed', 'quick-witted', and 'attentive' all showed a main effect of choosing behaviour (i.e. 'samplers'/'non-samplers'). Further analysis indicated that this effect was due to 'samplers' reporting increased subjective ratings of these mood states following the ingestion of alcohol compared to 'non-samplers'. These increased subjective ratings were also positively correlated with the amount of alcohol consumed by the subjects during the choice procedure. No other relationships were found between the amount of alcohol consumed and any of the other state or trait measures. These data suggest that social drinkers who sample alcohol in a laboratory setting can be primed by alcohol to consume more. The results also indicated that the amount drunk was related to the degree to which subjects expected alcohol to increase sociability and to reports of subjective stimulant effects of alcohol (e.g., 'alert', 'clear-headed', 'quick-witted', and 'attentive').     

Why and how people engage in social comparison while learning social skills in groups.

This study was conducted among 269 medical students who participated in educational training groups. Self-evaluation was the most important motive to engage in social comparison with other group members, followed by, respectively, self-enhancement and self-improvement. Upward comparisons (i.e., with better-performing group members), were motivated by self-improvement, particularly when they involved identification. Upward comparisons were also motivated by self-evaluation, particularly when they involved contrast. Downward comparisons (i.e., with worse-performing group members) were mainly motivated by self-enhancement, particularly when they involved contrast. Performance stress was higher the more participants identified downward, the less they identified upward, and the more they contrasted themselves upward. It is concluded that educators should pay attention to the potentially maladaptive role that social comparisons might play in training groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Particularistic and universalistic evaluation in the social comparison process.

In this article we argue that people are motivated to evaluate both the universalistic and particularistic standing of their abilities. One's universalistic standing is assessed by comparing with others who are similar to oneself on attributes related to the ability being assessed. One's particularistic standing is assessed by comparing with reference others, those with whom one shares an identity or bond. In five studies we attempted to distinguish between these two types of evaluation. We manipulated reference closeness by varying the distinctiveness of a shared attribute. In Studies 1 and 2 we gave subjects the choice of comparing a test score with that of either a distinctively similar (reference) other or a nondistinctively similar (nonreference) other. Although the two choices provided equivalent universalistic information, subjects overwhelmingly preferred to compare with the distinctively similar other. Studies 3–5 provided evidence that subjects actually did identify more closely with distinctively similar others than with nondistinctively similar others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Motivational effects in the social comparison of opinions.

Four experiments were executed to test the effects of different epistemic motivations on subjects' tendency to compare with agreeing or disagreeing others. We found that under high (vs. low) fear of invalidity, subjects tend more to compare with disagreeing (vs. agreeing) others. By contrast, under high (vs. low) need for self-confirmation or a high (vs. low) need for cognitive structure, subjects tended more to compare with agreeing others. These results are discussed in reference to social comparison formulations (Festinger, 1954; Goethals & Darley, 1977) and the theory of lay epistemology (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The waxing and waning of the social self: Assimilation and contrast in social comparison.

Past research has revealed that social comparisons often lead to contrast effects in self-evaluation (such that people who encounter a highly talented person come to feel less talented by comparison). In this report, however, it is argued that when people possess confidently held self-views in a particular area, they are unlikely to engage in explicit social comparisons with close others. Instead, they assume that because "birds of a feather flock together," the strengths and weaknesses of their close relationship partners reflect directly (rather than comparatively) on themselves. A cross-sectional survey, a prospective survey, and a quasi-experiment all supported this idea. The implications of these findings for social comparison and for self-regulation are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)