酷思想

政府造城卖地拿走农民30万亿 @郑永年：推进城镇化的关键是土地制度。土地表面上看是农民的“唐僧肉”，谁都想吃——地产商、地方政府想吃，上级政府也想吃，但是主人农民却吃不到。土地产生的利益分配会产生很多冲突。     

基于政府间博弈的农村饮水安全工程补偿分摊模型

针对农村饮水安全工程补偿中产生的基层政府与省级政府虚报及确定各级政府间的补偿分摊比例等问题,就资金申报问题建立了中央与地方政府的监管博弈模型来监督地方政府的虚报,并构建了分摊比例模型来确定各级政府的分摊比例。将该模型应用于江苏某农村饮用水工程中,模型计算结果符合各博弈主体的利益。研究成果为中央及省级政府参与项目分摊提供了理论依据。     

论政府投资项目的环境影响评价

叙述了对政府投资的建设项目进行环境影响评价制度的执行情况和问题产生的原因,提出了相应的建议。     

风险感知驱动的垃圾焚烧发电项目利益主体博弈分析北大核心CSCD

垃圾焚烧发电项目易使公众产生不同程度的风险感知,进而诱发邻避事件。文章通过质性分析方法识别公众风险感知影响因子,构建了风险感知驱动的多利益主体动态博弈模型,基于系统动力学仿真探究了政府-企业-公众的行为策略变化。结果表明:臭气和烟气是风险感知的关键影响因子,升级环保管控措施、增加行政处罚力度以及提升公众接受度可产生三方博弈均衡,有助于促进企业-政府-公众三方共建、共治和共享有益态势的形成,推动邻避问题的化解。     

试论矿产开发的特许功能

由政府配置采矿权阻碍了政府职能的转变,也是经济增长方式转变的障碍和官矿勾结的前提。在理论和法律上认定行政特许功能是分配稀缺资源并相应形成的法律制度,是政府配置采矿权的依据。综观各国矿业法的规定可以认为,采矿权的配置及其纠纷由民法调整,行政特许的功能是内化矿产开采中企业主侵犯他人的权利,以后又不付费而产生的经济负外部性。     

财补:正向推动的巨大力量

太阳能热利用与建筑一体化的强制执行在地方政府之中产生了巨大的冲击波式的推动力。而在全国范围内推行强制执行之前、之中乃至今后为强制执行奠定基础的措施是政府对太阳能热利用与建筑一体化的财政补贴措施。这项措施对于化解负能量起到的是釜底抽薪的作用。而且不仅如此:它还是推动追求利润的企业行动的巨大推力。     

基于期权博弈理论的EPC项目投资决策研究

政府补贴金额对EMCo投资EPC项目产生的影响是一个值得研究的问题。本文以电力EPC项目的投资决策过程为研究对象,以政府的灵活补贴政策为依据,结合期权博弈模型,构建不确定情况下EPC项目的对称双头垄断投资模型,并在模型中设置价值匹配和平滑条件,研究了投资EPC项目过程中政府补贴对EMCo的影响,获得了EMCo签订节能服务合同的最优阈值和补贴数值及政府补贴的均衡策略,为电力EPC项目的投资决策提供了可靠依据。     

能源部的成立与撤销

1988年启动的政府机构改革是1982年后的又一次规模较大的机构变革：当年6月，能源部合并了煤炭、石油、水利电力、核工业等部门，宣告成立。但仅仅五年之后，争议声中的能源部便在人大会议中决议撤销。当下，人大即将选举产生新一届政府，新一轮的政府机构改革亦在动议之中，能源工业主管部门的变革亦势在难免。当年能源部究竟是怎样成立的？为什么五年之后又被撤销？了解这段历史，也许能给当前的大部制改革以一定的启示。     

规范化开展监理工作的必要性

分析了现阶段我国监理工作中存在的一些深层次的问题以及产生这些问题的原因,提出了政府要加大监管力度、完善监理法规、提高监理人员素质的建议和措施。     

对新能源产业影响几何?

修改条例公布实施后,有人说这有利于新能源产业的发展,甚至说新能源产业迎来了新的契机。诚如是,则改革成取得了预期效果:这是政府所期待的。问题是,在油气价格由国家控制、物价高企民众担忧涨价的背景下;在煤炭等改革处于预备期的背景下,现行的改革能够对新能源产业产生多少实质性的积极影响。     

中国需要适当数量的小煤矿

中国煤炭生产秩序有所好转,这得益于国家的正确决策。当前中国煤炭产业发展的一个基本问题是中国小煤矿的去留问题。从小煤矿的定义上着手,结合我国实际,通过深入分析我国煤炭产业现状及综合经济因素考虑,认为在坚决取缔非法小煤矿的同时,应支持引导合法小煤矿的生产,制定并实施一套优生优育小煤矿的新政策。只有这样,才能构筑既符合煤炭经济规律又适合于中国国情的可靠的煤炭生产与供应体系,并加快缩小煤炭资源所在地城乡差别的步伐。     

The safety regulation of small-scale coal mines in China: Analysing the interests and influences of stakeholders

Small scale coal mines (SCMs) have played an important role in China’s energy supply. At the same time, they also suffer from many social, economic, environmental, and safety problems. The Chinese government has made considerable efforts to strengthen the safety regulation of the coal mining industry. Yet, few of these efforts have proven to be very effective. This paper analyzes the interests and influences of key stakeholders in the safety regulation of SCMs, which includes the safety regulator, the local government, the mine owner, and mineworkers. We argue that the effective regulation of coal mine safety must both engage and empower mineworkers.     

Coal liquefaction policy in China: Explaining the policy reversal since 2006

China has emerged as a leader in coal liquefaction. While the country's abundant coal resources and acute concerns about oil security help explain China's interest in liquefaction, the driving forces for this industry are complicated and policy has been inconsistent. Since 2006 Beijing has tried to slow down the development of liquefaction; even as China has become more dependent on imported oil, the central government has been wary about the large impact of liquefaction technologies on scarce resources such as water. However, local government officials in coal rich areas have strong incentives to pour investment into the technology, which helps explain the uneven development and policy. The future of coal liquefaction will depend on how these forces unfold along with major Beijing-led reforms in the Chinese coal industry, which is closing smaller mines and favoring the emergence of larger coal producing firms. Those reforms will have mixed effects on liquefaction. They temporarily contribute to higher prices for coal while over the longer term creating coal companies that have much greater financial and technical skills needed to deploy technologies such as coal liquefaction at a scale needed if this energy pathway is to be competitive with conventional sources of liquid fuel.     

Allocation of coal de-capacity quota among provinces in China: A bi-level multi-objective combinatorial optimization approach

Coal de-capacity, or capacity cut, is an important part of China's energy transition. Formulating a quota allocation scheme for coal de-capacity is the key to realizing smooth exit of coal overcapacity. This study proposes a novel method of allocation of coal de-capacity quota among provinces, based on bi-level multi-objective combinatorial optimization. In this bi-level optimal allocation scheme (BOAS), the upper level is the central government and the lower level is the provincial governments. The results indicate that, because of the different costs of coal de-capacity in each province, the execution rate of each province for tasks assigned by the central government is quite different. Compared with the government allocation scheme (GAS) and the single-level optimal allocation scheme (SOAS), the growth rate of total factor productivity of the BOAS increases by 2.14% and 0.60%, respectively; the total de-capacity cost of BOAS has reduced 64 billion yuan and 19 billion yuan, respectively; and the environmental benefits of BOAS has increased 73 billion yuan and 71 billion yuan, respectively; the Gini coefficient of BOAS calculated by various indexes is less than 0.3, placing the scheme within the category of considerable or absolute fairness. In addition, the proposed allocation model truly reflects the complex dynamics of the game process of China's coal overcapacity governance system, and can provide a more effective decision-making reference for the Chinese government in formulating the allocation scheme of coal de-capacity.     

基于博弈论的煤矿安全管理问题

借助博弈论这个媒介,为中国政府与煤矿企业之间建立了一个博弈模型,以改进、完善煤矿生产安全管理制度,并提出一系列有效管理措施及方法,帮助加强对煤矿生产的管理水平,促进煤矿事业蓬勃发展。     

煤炭产业市场进入管制初探

自2005年以来,在全国开展了大规模的煤炭资源整合。与此同时,《煤炭法》进入修改程序,修改的基本目的是将煤炭资源整合的成果用法律形式固定下来。2009年底,正在修改中的《煤炭法》首次提到建立行业准入制度。煤炭资源整合仅是一种事后处置,应当由事前管制的市场准入制度取代常态化的资源整合。市场进入管制研究的主要对象是实质性进入管制理论,一般分为经济性管制和社会性管制。《煤炭法》在设立市场进入门槛时,必须在明晰政府与市场分工的基础上,准确界定市场进入管制的目标和对象。煤炭行业表现为经济的负外部性,属于市场失灵时的表现。煤炭行业进入管制的重心应是安全和环境的社会管制,是预防风险和威胁发生的事前管制,事中监督与事后处置只能作为事前管制的辅助和连续状态,《煤炭法》的修改中应设专章规定体现社会管制的特许权制度。煤炭行业不需要基于过度进入的经济管制,其理由一是因信息缺乏而导致政府失灵;二是因资本优势而出现资源垄断;三是因管制而滋生权力腐败。对于符合规划和计划的煤炭资源资产,应当允许其在流转市场自由进入。     

建立我国煤炭价格指数的理论设计与探讨

煤炭在我国国民经济发展和国家能源安全保障方面都有着十分重要的战略作用和地位。无论从国际定价权,还是从国内宏观调控的角度出发,目前急需要建立一套能够真实反映煤炭市场状况和未来走势的“煤炭价格指数”。本文以电煤为例,初步设计和建立一套煤炭价格指数的计算原则和方法,并指出了建立煤炭价格指数的关键所在。     

Economics of herbaceous bioenergy crops for electricity generation: Implications for greenhouse gas mitigation

This paper examines the optimal land allocation for two perennial crops, switchgrass and miscanthus that can be co-fired with coal for electricity generation. Detailed spatial data at county level is used to determine the costs of producing and transporting biomass to power plants in Illinois over a 15-year period. A supply curve for bioenergy is generated at various levels of bioenergy subsidies and the implications of production for farm income and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are analyzed. GHG emissions are estimated using lifecycle analysis and include the soil carbon sequestered by perennial grasses and the carbon emissions displaced by these grasses due to both conversion of land from row crops and co-firing the grasses with coal. We find that the conversion of less than 2% of the cropland to bioenergy crops could produce 5.5% of the electricity generated by coal-fired power plants in Illinois and reduce carbon emissions by 11% over the 15-year period. However, the cost of energy from biomass in Illinois is more than twice as high as that of coal. Costly government subsidies for bioenergy or mandates in the form of Renewable Portfolio Standards would be needed to induce the production and use of bioenergy for electricity generation. Alternatively, a modest price for GHG emissions under a cap-and-trade policy could make bioenergy competitive with coal without imposing a fiscal burden on the government.     

提高江苏省煤炭利用效率

江苏是能源消费大省,煤炭是主要能源,提高煤炭利用效率对于提高江苏省经济效益、节约能源、保护环境和促进社会协调发展都具有十分重要的意义。文中分析了江苏省煤炭利用现状及存在的问题,指出了提高江苏省煤炭利用效率的途径并提出了相关建议。     

尿素热解制氨系统简介

随着国内的经济发展,燃煤电厂锅炉烟气排放的指标控制越加严格,燃煤电厂烟气污染物的排放越来越受到国家和社会的广泛关注。锅炉烟气脱硫技术已在国内燃煤电厂全面实施,作为脱硝还原剂液氨的运用由于受到安全、地域等因素的限制,尿素热解和水解制氨技术逐渐受到青睐,将为许多用户提供选择。本文介绍尿素热解制氨系统工艺。