Treisman's search model does not require feature integration: Rejoinder to Treisman (1990).

A. Treisman's (1985) model does not entail integration in a sense that can be tested by her search paradigm. Models that do are incompatible with her data. Accordingly, the data do not support the notion of attentional feature integration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parts of activities: Reply to Fellbaum and Miller (1990).

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. C. Fellbaum and G. A. Miller's (see record 1991-03356-001) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) originally proposed for the kind–part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical constraints on theories of scientific reasoning: Reply to Baron (1990).

J. Baron (see record 1990-27432-001) makes two assertions concerning our research on reflectiveness in scientific reasoning (D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer; see record 1989-14366-001): (a) His theory, particularly as stated in Baron (1988), predicts our findings, and (b) we have misnamed the independent variable in our study as reflectiveness. In this essay, we briefly respond to each assertion and call for three improvements in theories of scientific reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More words but still no lexicon: Reply to Besner et al. (1990).

The major points in the D. Besner et al (see record 1990-27434-001) critique of the M. S. Seidenberg and J. L. McClelland (see record 1990-03520-001) model are addressed. The model's performance differs from that of people in ways that are predictable from an understanding of the limitations of implementation. The principal limitations are the size of the training corpus and the phonological representation. The issue of pseudohomophone effects is discussed, and Besner et al's new data are shown to be consistent with the Seidenberg and McClelland account of lexical decision. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Alpert (1995).

Replies to J. L. Alpert's (see record 1995-44717-001) comment on Brenneis' (see record 1995-18442-001) article concerning the relation of dreams to early childhood trauma. Brenneis addresses Alpert's (1) dispute of the findings on the relation of dream content to traumatic experience; (2) argument that clinicians, in reconstructing trauma, work from a broader context than dreams; and (3) insistence that clinical findings discrepant from research findings not be summarily dismissed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Shill (2004).

Shill's (see record 2004-11107-008) claim that the intersubjective perspective does not address conflict and defense is glaringly mistaken. In his article on signal anxiety, Shill (2004) declared that "the intersubjectivist approach does not address issues of conflict and defense at all" (p. 119). Astoundingly, he seems to have made this absurd pronouncement without being aware of any of the numerous articles and chapters my collaborators and I have written on the subject of psychological conflict and defense over the past three decades, one of which was published in this very journal (Stolorow & Brandchaft, 1987). Our aim has never been to defocus emotional conflict but rather to contextualize it-that is, to locate it within constitutive intersubjective systems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Pariser (2005).

The author responds to Michael Pariser's critique (see record 2005-01622-013) of her original article (see record 2003-99989-005) by distinguishing between reduction and reductionism, by refusing to see philosophy and neuroscience as competitors, by rejecting the call to adapt psychoanalysis to the demands of managed care, and by using the ideas of Wittgenstein to point out the problems of too-facile translation between the languages of neuroscience and of emotional-relational experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning-forgetting independence, unidimensional memory models, and feature models: Comment on Bogartz (1990).

In his recent articles, R. S. Bogartz (see record 1990-09037-001) offered a definition of what it means for forgetting rate to be independent of degree of original learning. He showed that, given this definition, independence is confirmed by extant data. Bogartz criticized G. R. Loftus's (see record 1986-05498-001) proposed method for testing independence. In this commentary, we counter Bogartz's criticisms and then offer 2 observations. First, we show that Loftus's horizontal-parallelism test distinguishes between 2 interesting classes of memory models: unidimensional models wherein the memory system's state can be specified by a single number and multidimensional models wherein at least 2 numbers are required to specify the memory system's state. Independence by Loftus's definition is implied by a unidimensional model. Bogartz's definition, in contrast, is consistent with either model. Second, to better understand the constraints on memory mechanisms dictated by the mathematics of the models under consideration, we develop a simple but general feature model of learning and forgetting. We demonstrate what constraints must be placed on this model to make learning and forgetting rate independent by Loftus's and by Bogartz's definitions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spreading suppression or feature integration? A reply to Duncan and Humphreys (1992).

J. Duncan and G. Humphreys (see record 1992-33782-001) propose an account of conjunction search in terms of interference from similar distractors, both through spreading suppression and through competition for input-template matching. Their reinterpretation of the calibration studies used to equate similarity by A. Treisman (1991) is questioned here. Furthermore, it is suggested that Duncan and Humphrey's new test, designed to equate similarity by matching the number of shared features, may actually require counting or conjoining of features in feature as well as in conjunction search. Another experiment is reported, which casts doubt on the idea that spreading suppression plays a major role in conjunction search. Finally, it is agreed that there is substantial convergence between the respective theories, but it still appears that conjoining features pose a special problem that cannot be explained solely by the grouping and matching mechanisms of Duncan and Humphreys. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The conditioned stimulus-unconditioned stimulus-feedback feeding sequence: Reply to Ellins, von Kluge, and Cramer (1990).

Taste-potentiated noise aversions have been demonstrated in rats (S. R. Ellins et al, Ellins and S. von Kluge, and M. D. Holder et al; see PA, Vols 73:3082, 74:24095, and 75:28622, respectively). However, these aversions are apparently less readily established than taste-potentiated odor aversions suggesting that all exteroceptive stimuli are not equally well potentiated by taste (Holder et al). Despite the claims of Ellins, von Kluge, and R. E. Cramer (see record 1990-19032-001), we replicated their findings and see no inconsistency between our findings and theirs. Both sets of results are explained by a common theory of conditioning (J. Garcia, 1989; Garcia & Holder, 1985). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Barbara Fajardo (2003).

Barbara Fajardo's negative response (see record 2003-02056-012) to the author's review (see record 2002-08457-006) of Arnold Goldberg's book Being of Two Minds (see record 1999-02973-000) includes the accusation that he has misread the book. Her proof for this apparently is based on her view of Goldberg's ideas derived from a participation in the group that produced this volume. In his response, the author maintains that his independent and critical reading cannot be dismissed as a misreading; rather, it is a reading that reveals fundamental differences in his approach to clinical work with the types of patients described in this text. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Charles Strozier (2003).

Attention to complexity of motivation and meaning would improve both Strozier's biography of Heinz Kohut and his treatment of reviewer Karen Maroda (Strozier, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More on Trieb: Reply to Mills (2004).

The author replies to J. Mills's (2004) (see record 2004-21113-019) comment on his article "Triebe and Their Vicissitudes: Freud's Theory of Motivation Reconsidered" (G. Frank, 2003) (see record 2003-09630-008). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stress and specificity: Reply to Miller (2009).

T. F. Denson, M. Spanovic, and N. Miller (see record 2009-19763-001) meta-analytically tested the hypotheses that specific appraisals and emotions would predict cortisol and immune responses to laboratory stressors and emotion inductions. Although the cortisol data supported the integrated specificity hypothesis, G. E. Miller (see record 2009-19763-002) raised questions concerning the extent to which the immunity data supported specificity. The authors respond to these concerns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attention/likelihood: Reply to Hintzman (1994).

D. L. Hintzman's (see record 1994-24278-001) criticism of K. Kim and M. Glanzer's (see record 1993-32210-001) theory on recognition memory consists of 2 points: An equation of attention/likelihood theory has been incorrectly written and the likelihood ratios of the theory can be replaced by another, preferable transformation. Both of these points are discussed and rebutted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Troubled meditations on psychosexual differentiation: Reply to Hegarty (2009).

P. Hegarty (see record 2009-09998-015) offered several critiques of the articles by G. Rieger, J. A. W. Linsenmeier, L. Gygax, and J. M. Bailey (see record 2007-19851-006) and K. D. Drummond, S. J. Bradley, M. Peterson-Badali, and K. J. Zucker (see record 2007-19851-005) that were published in a Developmental Psychology special section entitled “Sexual Orientation Across the Lifespan,” guest-edited by C. J. Patterson and R. C. Savin-Williams (2008): (a) reliance on a “disease paradigm” (i.e., the use of “medicalizing” language) of lesbian–gay–bisexual–transgender issues at the expense of a “stigma paradigm,” (b) endorsement of a developmental linkage between childhood sex-typed behavior and later gender identity–sexual orientation, and (c) various sociophilosophical and applied matters pertaining to the diagnosis of gender identity disorder in children. In this reply, we address these 3 criticisms and argue that an interdisciplinary approach, informed by multiple paradigms, will most certainly facilitate, not impede, the discovery of answers to many questions about psychosexual development for which data are currently lacking. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Vicissitudes of a misnomer: Reply to Dalgleish (2005).

The Stroop effect is psychology's classic measure gauging the selectivity of attention to individual attributes of complex stimuli. The emotional Stroop effect gauges the influence on behavior of threat and emotional stimuli. The former taps central/executive processes abstracted from particular stimulus contexts, whereas the latter taps automatic processes inextricably linked to particular stimuli in the environment. T. Dalgleish (see record 2005-14939-009) raised concerns about the data and theory that support the separateness of the 2 effects (D. Algom, E. Chajut, & S. Lev, see record 2004-17825-001). The present reply shows that Dalgleish's objections are unwarranted and that the term emotional Stroop effect blurs the deep conceptual divide separating the 2 phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to comments on Lipsey and Wilson (1993).

Replies to comments by H. J. Eysenck, D. Sohn, and H. Cooper et al (see PA, Vol 82:22192, 22208, and 22189, respectively) regarding Lipsey and Wilson's (see record 1994-18340-001) meta-analysis of meta-analyses. Both Sohn and Eysenck seem to be concerned with how theory is developed, but they may be confused about the role of meta-analysis in that process. It is argued that the purpose of meta-analysis is to develop generalizations about research findings across different studies. The extension of the analysis by Cooper et al reminds researchers that meta-analysis can be subject to error and bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)